



Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Virtual

**FIPS 140-2 Non Proprietary Security Policy
Level 1 Validation**

Version 0.1

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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose

This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Virtual running software version 9.6; referred to in this document as ASA_v. This security policy describes how the module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and how to run the module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation and may be freely distributed.

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/index.html>.

1.2 Module Validation Level

The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.

No.	Area Title	Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	1
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
4	Finite State Model	1
5	Physical Security	N/A
6	Operational Environment	1
7	Cryptographic Key management	1
8	Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility	1
9	Self-Tests	1
10	Design Assurance	1
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A
	Overall module validation level	1

Table 1 ASA_v Module Validation Level

1.3 References

This document deals with the specification of the security rules listed in Table 1 above, under which the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Virtual will operate, including the rules derived from the requirements of FIPS 140-2, FIPS 140-2IG and additional rules imposed by Cisco Systems, Inc. More information is available from the following Cisco Systems websites:

<http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/index.html>

<http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6120/index.html>

For answers to technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts listed on the Cisco Systems website at www.cisco.com.

The NIST Validated Modules website (<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/validation.html>) contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the module.

1.4 Terminology

In this document, the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Virtual model identified is referred to as ASA virtual, ASAv, virtual, module or the system.

1.5 Document Organization

The Security Policy document is part of the FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:

- Vendor Evidence document
- Finite State Machine
- Other supporting documentation as additional references

This document provides an overview of the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Virtual identified in section 1.2 above and explains the secure configuration and operation of the module. This introduction section is followed by Section 2, which details the general features and functionality of the module. Section 3 specifically addresses the required configuration for the FIPS-mode of operation.

With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission Documentation is Cisco-proprietary and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Cisco Systems.

2 Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Virtual

Cisco® Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Virtual Series Next-Generation Firewalls provides balanced security effectiveness with productivity. This solution offers the combination of the industry's most deployed stateful firewall with a comprehensive range of next-generation network security services, intrusion prevention system (IPS), content security, secure unified communications, TLSv1, SSHv2, IKEv2, Remote Access VPN [With TLSv1/ DTLsv1 and IKEv2/ ESPv3] and Suite B, all running in a virtual environment.

The Cisco ASA virtual delivers enterprise-class security for business-to-enterprise networks in a virtual environment.

2.1 Cisco Servers

Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Virtual runs on many different UCS servers with the VMware vSphere ESXi hypervisor version 5.5 and version 6.0 (vendor affirmed), providing pass through data between the host platform and the module.

For the purposes of this validation, the module was tested in the lab on the following servers:

Platform	Hypervisor	Processor
Cisco C220 M3	VMware ESXi 5.5	Intel Xeon

Table 2 Testing Configuration

The following Cisco UCS servers are Vendor affirmed:

B22 M3	C22 M3	E140S M1
B200 M3	C24 M3	E140S M2
B200 M4	C220 M4	E140D M1
B230 M2	C240 M3	E160D M2
B420 M3	C240 M4	E160D M1
B440 M2	C260 M2	E140DP M1
B260 M4	C420 M3	E160DP M1
B460 M4	C460 M2	EN120E
	C460 M4	EN120SM2

Additionally, the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment which is not listed on the validation certificate.

2.2 Cryptographic Boundary

The cryptographic module is defined as a multi-chip standalone software module, ASA virtual module (yellow box), while the physical boundary is defined as the hard case enclosure around the Server on which everything runs (blue box). Then the logical boundary is the ASA virtual module, hypervisor, API and processor (red dash box).




Figure 1 – Block diagram

The module makes use of the physical interfaces of the tested platform(s) hosting the virtual environment upon which the module is installed. The hypervisor, controls and directs all interactions between the ASA v and the operator, and is responsible for mapping the module's virtual interfaces to the GPC's physical interfaces.

2.3 Module Interfaces

The module provides a number of physical and logical interfaces to the device, and the physical interfaces provided by the module are mapped to the following FIPS 140-2 defined logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, status output, and power. The module provided no power to external devices and takes in its power through normal power input/cord. The logical interfaces and their mapping are described in the following table:

Physical Port/Interface	ASA Virtual	FIPS 140-2 Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000) Ports	Virtual Ethernet Ports, Virtual Serial Ports	Data Input Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000) Ports	Virtual Ethernet Ports, Virtual Serial Ports	Data Output Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000) Ports; Host System Serial Port	Virtual Ethernet Ports, Virtual Serial Ports	Control Input Interface
Host System Ethernet (10/100/1000) Ports; Host System Serial Port	Virtual Ethernet Ports, Virtual Serial Ports	Status Output Interface

Table 3 Module Interfaces

2.4 Roles and Services

The module can be accessed in one of the following ways:

- Console Port
- Telnet over IPsec
- SSH v2
- ASDM via HTTPS/TLS

Each user is authenticated by the module upon initial access to the module. Authentication is identity-based. As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles in the module that operators may assume: Crypto Officer role and User role. The administrator of the module assumes the Crypto Officer role in order to configure and maintain the module using Crypto Officer services, while the Users exercise only the basic User services. The module also supports RADIUS and TACACS+ as another means of authentication, allowing the storage of usernames and passwords on an external server as opposed to using the module's internal database for storage.

The User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets must each be at a minimum eight (8) characters long. There must be at least one special character and at least one number character (enforced procedurally) along with six additional characters taken from the 26 upper case, 26 lower case, 10 numbers and 32 special characters. See the Secure Operation section for more information. If six (6) special/alpha/number characters, one (1) special character and one (1) number are used without repetition for an eight (8) digit value, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 187,595,543,116,800. This is calculated by performing $94 \times 93 \times 92 \times 91 \times 90 \times 89 \times 32 \times 10$. In order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over 3,126,592,385,280 guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module.

Additionally, when using RSA based authentication, RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048 bits, thus providing 112 bits of strength. Assuming the low end of that range, an attacker would have a 1 in 2^{112} chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 8.65×10^{31} attempts per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module to support.

User Services

A User enters the system by accessing the console port with a terminal program or via IPsec protected telnet or SSH session to a virtual Ethernet port or ASDM via HTTPS/TLS. The module prompts the User for username and password. If the password is correct, the User is allowed entry to the module management functionality. The other means of accessing the console is via an IPsec session. This session is authenticated either using a shared secret or RSA digital signature authentication mechanism. The services available to the User role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:

Services	Description	Keys and CSPs Access
Status Functions	View state of interfaces and protocols, version of IOS currently running.	Operator password (r)
Terminal Functions	Adjust the terminal session (e.g., lock the terminal, adjust flow control).	Operator password (r)
Directory Services	Display directory of files kept in flash memory.	Operator password (r)
Self-Tests	Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand	N/A
IPsec VPN	Negotiation and encrypted data transport via IPsec VPN	Operator password, skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, ISAKMP preshared, IKE authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPsec encryption key, IPsec authentication key (r, w, d)
SSH Functions	Negotiation and encrypted data transport via SSH	Operator password, SSH Traffic Keys (r, w, d)
HTTPS Functions (TLS)	Negotiation and encrypted data transport via HTTPS	Operator password, TLS pre-master secret and TLS Traffic Keys (r, w, d)

Table 4 - User Services

Crypto Officer Services

The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration and maintenance of the module and authenticates from the **enable** command (for local authentication) or the **login** command (for AAA authentication) from the user services. The Crypto Officer services consist of the following:

The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration of the module. The services available to the User role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:

Services	Description	Keys and CSPs Access
Configure the Security Blade	Define network interfaces and settings, create command aliases, set the protocols the router will support, enable interfaces and network services, set system date and time, and load authentication information.	ISAKMP preshared, Operator password, Enable password, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, IKE authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPsec encryption key, IPsec authentication key (r, w, d)
Define Rules and Filters	Create packet Filters that are applied to User data streams on each interface. Each Filter consists of a set of Rules, which define a set of packets to permit or deny based on characteristics such as protocol ID, addresses, ports, TCP connection establishment, or packet direction.	Operator password, Enable password - (r, w, d)
View Status Functions	View the module configuration, routing tables, active sessions, health, temperature, memory status, voltage, packet statistics, review accounting logs, and view physical interface status.	Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
Manage the Security Blade	Log off users, shutdown or reload the module, erase the flash memory, manually back up module configurations, view complete configurations, manager user rights, and restore module configurations.	Operator password, Enable password (r, w, d)
Configure Encryption/Bypass	Set up the configuration tables for IP tunneling. Set preshared keys and algorithms to be used for each IP range or allow plaintext packets to be set from specified IP address.	[ISAKMP preshared, Operator password, Enable password, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, IKE authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPsec encryption key, IPsec authentication key (r, w, d)
TLS VPN (TLSv1.0)	Configure SSL VPN parameters, provide entry and output of CSPs.	TLS pre-master secret, TLS Traffic Keys (r, w, d)
SSH v2	Configure SSH v2 parameter, provide entry and output of CSPs.	SSHv2 Private Key, SSHv2 Public Key and SSHv2 session key (r, w, d)

IPsec VPN	Configure IPsec VPN parameters, provide entry and output of CSPs.	ISAKMP preshared, skeyid, skeyid_d, SKEYSEED, IKE session encrypt key, IKE session authentication key, IKE authentication private Key, IKE authentication public key, IPsec encryption key, IPsec authentication key (r, w, d)
Self-Tests	Execute the FIPS 140 start-up tests on demand	N/A
User services	The Crypto Officer has access to all User services.	Operator password (r, w, d)
Local Certificate Authority	Allows the ASA to be configured as a Root Certificate Authority and issue user certificates for SSL VPN use (AnyConnect and Clientless). The ASA can then be configured to require client certificates for authentication.	N/A
Zeroization	Zeroize cryptographic keys/CSPs by running the zeroization methods classified in table 7, Zeroization column.	All CSPs (d)

Table 5 - Crypto Officer Services

2.5 Non-FIPS mode Services

The cryptographic module in addition to the above listed FIPS mode of operation can operate in a non-FIPS mode of operation. This is not a recommended operational mode but because the associated RFC's for the following protocols allow for non-approved algorithms and non-approved key sizes, a non-approved mode of operation exist. So those services listed above with their FIPS approved algorithms in addition to the following services with their non-approved algorithms and non-approved keys sizes are available to the User and the Crypto Officer. Prior to using any of the non-approved services in Section 2.5, the Crypto Officer must zeroize all CSPs which places the module into the non-FIPS mode of operation.

Services ¹	Non-Approved Algorithms
IPsec	Hashing: MD5, MACing: HMAC-SHA-1, MD5 Symmetric: DES, RC4 Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
SSH	Hashing: MD5, MACing: HMAC MD5 Symmetric: DES Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman
TLS	Symmetric: DES, RC4 Asymmetric: 768-bit/1024-bit RSA (key transport), 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman

Table 6 – Non-approved algorithms in the Non-FIPS mode services

Neither the User nor the Crypto Officer are allowed to operate any of these services while in FIPS mode of operation.

All services available can be found at

<http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/roadmap/asaroadmap.html>. This site lists all configuration guides for the ASA systems.

¹ These approved services become non-approved when using any of non-approved algorithms or non-approved key or curve sizes. When using approved algorithms and key sizes these services are approved.

2.6 Unauthenticated Services

There are no unauthenticated services associated with a virtual module.

2.7 Cryptographic Key/CSP Management

The module administers both cryptographic keys and other critical security parameters such as passwords. All keys and CSPs are protected by the password-protection of the Crypto Officer role login, and can be zeroized by the Crypto Officer. Zeroization consists of overwriting the memory that stored the key or refreshing the volatile memory. Keys are both manually and electronically distributed but entered electronically. Persistent keys with manual distribution are used for pre-shared keys whereas protocols such as IKE, TLS and SSH are used for electronic distribution.

All pre-shared keys are associated with the CO role that created the keys, and the CO role is protected by a password. Therefore, the CO password is associated with all the pre-shared keys. The Crypto Officer needs to be authenticated to store keys. Only an authenticated Crypto Officer can view the keys. All Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys agreed upon for individual tunnels are directly associated with that specific tunnel only via the IKE protocol. RSA Public keys are entered into the module using digital certificates which contain relevant data such as the name of the public key's owner, which associates the key with the correct entity. All other keys are associated with the User role that entered them.

The ASA v harvests entropy through clock drifts and pulls entropy into an entropy pool. Additional information is available in Cisco's ASA Entropy Information document. The ASA v pulls at least 256 bits for entropy from the entropy pool per each GET function call.

Name	CSP Type	Size	Description/Generation	Storage	Zeroization
DRBG entropy input	SP800-90A HASH_DRBG (using SHA-512)	256-bits	This is the entropy for SP 800-90A HASH_DRBG. HW (onboard Cavium cryptographic processor) based entropy source used to construct seed.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
DRBG Seed	SP800-90A HASH_DRBG (using SHA-512)	384-bits	Input to the DRBG that determines the internal state of the DRBG. Generated using DRBG derivation function that includes the entropy input from hardware-based entropy source.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
DRBG V	SP800-90A HASH_DRBG (using SHA-512)	128-bits	The DRBG V is one of the critical values of the internal state upon which the security of this DRBG mechanism depends. Generated first during DRBG instantiation and then subsequently updated using the DRBG update function.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device

Name	CSP Type	Size	Description/Generation	Storage	Zeroization
DRBG C	SP800-90A HASH_DRBG (using SHA-512)	256-bits	Internal critical value used as part of SP 800-90A HASH_DRBG. Established per SP 800-90A HASH_DRBG.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret	DH	2048, 3072, or 4096 bits	The shared secret used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange. Established per the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
Diffie Hellman private key	DH	224, 256, or 379 bits	The private key used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange. This key is generated by calling SP800-90A DRBG.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
Diffie Hellman public key	DH	2048, 3072, or 4096 bits	The public key used in Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange. This key is derived per the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
skkeyid	Shared Secret	160 bits	A shared secret known only to IKE peers. It was established via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF and it will be used for deriving other keys in IKE protocol implementation.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
skkeyid_d	Shared Secret	160 bits	A shared secret known only to IKE peers. It was derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2) and it will be used for deriving IKE session authentication key.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
SKEYSEED	Shared Secret	160 bits	A shared secret known only to IKE peers. It was derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2) and it will be used for deriving IKE session authentication key.	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
IKE session encrypt key	Triple-DES/AES	168 bits Triple-DES or 128/192/256 bits AES	The IKE session (IKE Phase I) encrypt key. This key is derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2).	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
IKE session authentication key	HMAC SHA-1	160 bits	The IKE session (IKE Phase I) authentication key. This key is derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2).	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device

Name	CSP Type	Size	Description/Generation	Storage	Zeroization
ISAKMP preshared	Pre-shared secret	Variable 8 plus characters	The secret used to derive IKE keyid when using preshared secret authentication. This CSP is entered by the Crypto Officer.	NVRAM (plaintext)	By running '# no crypto isakmp key' command
IKE authentication private Key	RSA/ ECDSA	RSA (2048 bits) or ECDSA (Curves: P-256/P-384)	RSA/ECDSA private key used in IKE authentication. This key is generated by calling SP800-90A DRBG.	NVRAM (plaintext)	By running '#crypto key zeroize' command
IKE authentication public key	RSA/ ECDSA	RSA (2048 bits) or ECDSA (Curves: P-256/P-384)	RSA/ECDSA public key used in IKE authentication. Internally generated by the module.	NVRAM (plaintext)	By running '#crypto key zeroize' command
IPsec encryption key	Triple-DES, AES and AES-GCM	168 bits Triple-DES or 128/192/256 bits AES	The IPsec (IKE phase II) encryption key. This key is derived via a key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2).	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
IPsec authentication key	HMAC SHA-1	160-bits	The IPsec (IKE Phase II) authentication key. This key is derived via a key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (IKEv2).	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
Operator password	Password	8 plus characters	The password of the User role. This CSP is entered by the User.	NVRAM (plaintext)	Overwrite with new password
Enable password	Password	8 plus characters	The password of the CO role. This CSP is entered by the Crypto Officer.	NVRAM (plaintext)	Overwrite with new password
RADIUS secret	Shared Secret	16 characters	The RADIUS shared secret. Used for RADIUS Client/Server authentication. This CSP is entered by the Crypto Officer.	NVRAM (plaintext),	By running '# no radius-server key' command
TACACS+ secret	Shared Secret	16 characters	The TACACS+ shared secret. Used for TACACS+ Client/Server authentication. This CSP is entered by the Crypto Officer.	NVRAM (plaintext),	By running '# no tacacs-server key' command
SSHv2 Private Key	RSA	2048 bits modulus	The SSHv2 private key used in SSHv2 connection. This key is generated by calling SP 800-90A DRBG.	NVRAM (plaintext)	By running '# crypto key zeroize rsa' command
SSHv2 Public Key	RSA	2048bits modulus	The SSHv2 public key used in SSHv2 connection. This key is internally generated by the module.	NVRAM (plaintext)	By running '# crypto key zeroize rsa' command

Name	CSP Type	Size	Description/Generation	Storage	Zeroization
SSHv2 Session Key	Triple-DES/AES	168 bits Triple-DES or 128/192/256 bits AES	This is the SSHv2 session key. It is used to encrypt all SSHv2 data traffics traversing between the SSHv2 Client and SSHv2 Server. This key is derived via key derivation function defined in SP800-135 KDF (SSH).	DRAM (plaintext)	Power cycle the device
ECDSA private key	ECDSA	Curves: P-256,384,521	Key pair generation, signature generation/Verification. This key is generated by calling SP 800-90A DRBG.	DRAM (plaintext)	Zeroized upon API call “#crypto key zeroize ecdsa”
ECDSA public key	ECDSA	Curves: P-256,384,521	Key pair generation, signature generation/Verification. This key is generated by calling SP 800-90A DRBG.	DRAM (plaintext)	Zeroized upon API call “#crypto key zeroize ecdsa”
Enable secret	Shared Secret	At least eight characters	The obfuscated password of the CO role. However, the algorithm used to obfuscate this password is not FIPS approved. Therefore, this password is considered plaintext for FIPS purposes. This password is zeroized by overwriting it with a new password. The Crypto Officer optionally configures the module to obfuscate the Enable password. This CSP is entered by the Crypto Officer.	NVRAM (plaintext)	Overwrite with new password
RSA private keys	RSA	2048 bits	Identity certificates for the module itself and also used in IPsec, TLS, and SSH negotiations. This key was generated by calling FIPS approved DRBG.	NVRAM (plaintext)	Zeroized by “#crypto key zeroize rsa”, write to startup config, followed by a module reboot
RSA public keys	RSA	2048 bits	Identity certificates for the module itself and also used in IPsec, TLS, and SSH negotiations. This key was generated by calling FIPS approved DRBG.	NVRAM (plain text)	Zeroized by “#crypto key zeroize rsa”, write to startup config, followed by a module reboot
TLS pre-master secret	Shared Secret	At least eight characters	Shared secret created/derived using asymmetric cryptography from which new HTTPS session keys can be created. This key entered into the module in cipher text form, encrypted by RSA public key.	DRAM (plaintext)	Automatically when TLS session is terminated.

Name	CSP Type	Size	Description/Generation	Storage	Zeroization
TLS traffic keys	Triple-DES/AES 128/192/256 HMAC- SHA1/256/384/512	168 bits Triple- DES or 128/192/256 bits AES	Used in HTTPS connections. Generated using TLS protocol. This key was derived in the module.	DRAM (plain text)	Automatically when TLS session is terminated
Integrity test key	RSA-2048 Public key	2048 bits	A hard coded key used for software power-up/load integrity verification.	Hard coded for Software integrity testing	Zeroized by “#erase flash:” command (or replacing), write to startup config, followed by a module reboot

Table 7 Cryptographic Keys and CSPs

2.8 Cryptographic Algorithms

The module implements a variety of approved and non-approved algorithms.

Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

The module supports the following FIPS 140-2 approved algorithm certificates implemented by Adaptive Security Appliance Virtual (ASA_v):

Algorithm	Certificate
AES (128/192/256 bit CBC, GCM)	4344
Triple-DES (CBC, 3-key)	2348
SHS (SHA-1/256/384/512)	3579
HMAC (SHA-1/256/384/512)	2882
RSA (PKCS1_V1_5; KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; 2048 bits)	2346
ECDSA (KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer; P-256, P-384, P-521)	1027
DRBG (SHA-512)	1386
CVL Component (IKEv2, TLS, SSH)	1048

Table 8 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

Notes:

- There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in this table.
- The module's AES-GCM implementation conforms to IG A.5 scenario #1 following RFC 6071 for IPsec and RFC 5288 for TLS. The module uses basically a 96-bit IV, which is comprised of a 4 byte salt unique to the crypto session and 8 byte monotonically increasing counter. The module generates new AES-GCM keys if the module loses power.
- The SSH, TLS and IKEv2 protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode

The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are permitted for use in the FIPS approved mode:

- Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
- RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
- NDRNG
- HMAC MD5 is allowed in FIPS mode strictly for TLS
- MD5 is allowed in FIPS mode strictly for TLS

Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

The module supports the following non-approved cryptographic algorithms that shall not be used in FIPS mode of operation:

- DES
- HMAC MD5
- MD5
- RC4
- HMAC-SHA1 is not allowed with key size under 112-bits

Note: The non-approved algorithms HMAC MD5 and MD5 are not allowed in FIPS mode when not used with TLS.

2.9 Self-Tests

The module includes an array of self-tests that are run during startup and periodically during operations to prevent any secure data from being released and to insure all components are functioning correctly.

Self-tests performed

- ASA Self Tests
 - POSTs – Adaptive Security Appliance OS (Software)
 - AES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
 - DRBG KAT (Note: DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP800-90A Section 11.3 are performed)
 - ECDSA (sign/verify)
 - HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
 - RSA (sign/verify) KATs
 - SHA-1 KAT

- SHA-256 KAT
 - SHA-512 KAT
 - SHA-384 KAT
 - Software Integrity Test (using SHA-512 and RSA 2048)
 - Triple-DES Encrypt/Decrypt KATs
- Conditional tests - Adaptive Security Appliance OS (Software)
 - RSA pairwise consistency test (encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify)
 - ECDSA pairwise consistency test
 - Conditional IPSec Bypass test
 - Continuous Random Number Generator test for SP800-90A DRBG
 - Continuous Random Number Generator test for NDRNG

The module performs all power-on self-tests automatically at boot when the power is applied. All power-on self-tests must be passed before a User/Crypto Officer can perform services. The power-on self-tests are performed after the cryptographic systems are initialized but prior to the initialization of the LAN's interfaces; this prevents the module from passing any data during a power-on self-test failure. In the unlikely event that a power-on or conditional self-test fails, an error message is displayed on the console followed by a module reboot.

3 Secure Operation

Initial install of the ASAv can be obtained in

<http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/asa94/asav/quick-start/asav-quick.pdf>. The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The module is shipped only to authorized operators by the vendor, and the module is shipped in Cisco boxes with Cisco adhesive. Follow the installation instructions found in the link above and the instructions provided below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating this module without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.

3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Initialization

The Cisco ASAv module was validated with adaptive security appliance software version 9.6 (File name: asav962.zip). This is the only allowable image for FIPS-approved mode of operation.

The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the following initialization steps:

Step 1: Disable the console output of system crash information, using the following command:

```
(config) #crashinfo console disable
```

Step 2: Install Triple-DES/AES licenses to require the module to use Triple-DES and AES (for data traffic and SSH).

Step 3: Enable “FIPS Mode” to allow the module to internally enforce FIPS-compliant behavior, such as run power-on self-tests and bypass test, using the following command:

```
(config) #fips enable
```

Step 4: Disable password recovery.

```
(config) #no service password-recovery
```

Step 5: Set the configuration register to bypass ROMMON prompt at boot.

```
(config) #config-register 0x10011
```

Step 6: If using a Radius/TACACS+ server for authentication, perform the following steps (see Operator manual for specific TACACS+ commands). Otherwise, skip to step 7.

```
(config) #aaa-server radius-server protocol radius
```

```
(config) #aaa-server radius-server host <IP-address>
```

Configure an IPsec tunnel to secure traffic between the ASA and the Radius server.

The pre-shared key must be at least 8 characters long.

Step 7: Enable AAA **authentication** for the console.

```
(config) #aaa authentication serial console LOCAL
```

```
(config) #username <name> password <password>
```

Step 8: Enable AAA **authentication** for SSH.

```
(config) #aaa authentication ssh console LOCAL
```

Step 9: Enable AAA **authentication** for Enable mode.

```
(config) #aaa authentication enable console LOCAL
```

Step 10: Specify Privilege Level 15 for Crypto Officer and Privilege Level 1 for User and set up username/password for each role.

```
(config) #username <name> password <password> privilege 15
```

```
(config) #username <name> password <password> privilege 1
```

Step 11: Ensure passwords are at least 8 characters long.

Step 12: All default passwords, such as enable and telnet, must be replaced with new passwords.

Step 13: Reboot the module.

3.2 Crypto Officer Guidance - System Configuration

To operate in FIPS mode, the Crypto Officer must perform the following steps:

Step 1: Assign users a Privilege Level of 1.

Step 2: Define RADIUS and TACACS+ shared secret keys that are at least 8 characters long and secure traffic between the module and the RADIUS/TACACS+ server via IPsec tunnel.

Note: Perform this step only if RADIUS/TACAS+ is configured, otherwise proceed to step 3.

Step 3: Configure the TLS protocol when using HTTPS to protect administrative functions. Due to known issues relating to the use of TLS with certain versions of the Java plugin, we require that you upgrade to JRE 1.5.0_05 or later. The following configuration settings are known to work when launching ASDM in a TLS-only environment with JRE 1.5.0_05:

a. Configure the device to allow only TLSv1 packets using the following command:

```
(config)#ssl server-version tlsv1-only
```

```
(config)#ssl client-version tlsv1-only
```

b. Uncheck SSL Version 2.0 in both the web browser and JRE security settings.

c. Check TLS V1.0 in both the web browser and JRE security settings.

Step 4: Configure the module to use SSHv2. Note that all operators must still authenticate after remote access is granted.

```
(config)#ssh version 2
```

Step 5: Configure the module such that any remote connections via Telnet are secured through IPsec.

Step 6: Configure the module such that only FIPS-approved algorithms are used for IPsec tunnels.

Step 7: Configure the module such that error messages can only be viewed by a Crypto Officer.

Step 8: Disable the TFTP server.

Step 9: Disable HTTP for performing system management in FIPS mode of operation. HTTPS with TLS should always be used for Web-based management.

Step 10: Ensure that installed digital certificates are signed using FIPS approved algorithms.

Step 11: Ensure that the 2048 bits RSA keys are used.

Step 12: Ensure that DH Group 1 (768-bits) and DH Group 2 (1024-bits) keys are not used.

3.3 Identifying Module Operation in an Approved Mode

The following activities are required to verify that the module is operating in an Approved mode of operation:

1. Verify that the length of User and Crypto Officer passwords and all shared secrets are at least eight (8) characters long, include at least one letter, and include at least one number character, as specified in the “Secure Operation” section of this document.
2. Issue the following commands: 'show crypto IPsec sa' and 'show crypto isakmp policy' to verify that only FIPS approved algorithms are used.