

Subspace Distinguisher for 5/8 Rounds of the ECHO-256 Hash Function*

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Abstract. In this work we present first results for the hash function of ECHO. We provide a subspace distinguisher for 5 rounds, near-collisions on 4.5 rounds and collisions for 4 out of 8 rounds of the ECHO-256 hash function. The complexities are 2^{96} compression function calls for the distinguisher and near-collision attack, and 2^{64} for the collision attack. The memory requirements are 2^{64} for all attacks. Furthermore, we provide improved compression function attacks on ECHO-256 to get distinguishers on 7 rounds and near-collisions for 6 and 6.5 rounds. The compression function attacks also apply to ECHO-512. To get these results, we consider new and sparse truncated differential paths through ECHO. We are able to construct these paths by analyzing the combined MixColumns and BigMixColumns transformation. Since in these sparse truncated differential paths at most one fourth of all bytes of each ECHO state are active, missing degrees of freedom are not a problem. Therefore, we are able to mount a rebound attack with multiple inbound phases to efficiently find according message pairs for ECHO.

Keywords: hash functions, SHA-3 competition, ECHO, cryptanalysis, truncated differential path, rebound attack, subspace distinguisher, near-collisions, collision attack

1 Introduction

Many new and interesting hash function designs have been proposed in the NIST SHA-3 competition [16]. In this paper, we analyze the hash function ECHO [1], which is one of 14 Round 2 candidates of the competition. ECHO is a wide-pipe, AES based design which transforms 128-bit words similar as AES transforms bytes. Inside these 128-bit words, two standard AES rounds are used. So far, most cryptanalytic results of ECHO were limited to the internal permutation [7, 12]. Recently, reduced round attacks on the wide-pipe compression function of ECHO have been published in [17], which cover up to 4/8 rounds for ECHO-256 and 6/10 rounds of ECHO-512. However, a drawback of attacks on building blocks (such as compression functions or permutations) is that they cannot be used to compare SHA-3 candidates due to their great design variety and different requirements for building blocks.

Therefore, in this work we analyze the hash function of ECHO and present results for up to 5/8 rounds of ECHO-256. We use the subspace distinguisher [9, 10] to compare our distinguishing attacks with the generic complexity on ideal hash functions. Our results greatly improve upon the previous results on the compression function, which are attacks on a similar number of rounds. Furthermore, we provide attacks on the compression function for up to 7/8 rounds of ECHO-256 and 7/10 rounds of ECHO-512. The main improvement is to consider a new type of sparse truncated differential paths by placing only a single active byte in the ECHO state with 16 active AES states. In all previous paths, the full active ECHO states also had full active AES states. The construction of such paths is possible by combining the last MixColumns transformation of the second AES round with the BigMixColumns transformation of an ECHO round to a SuperMixColumns transformation.

* This paper is an extended version of [18] and includes some new attacks which do not assume that the adversary controls the salt (see Table 1). Updated versions will be available at <http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/321>.

The attack itself is a rebound attack [13] with multiple inbound phases. Similar attacks have been applied to the SHA-3 candidate LANE [11] and the hash function Whirlpool [9]. Since the truncated differential paths are very sparse, we have plenty degrees of freedom to merge the solutions of these multiple inbound phases. Note that using multiple inbound phases, we can control more distant parts of much longer truncated differential paths than in a start-from-the-middle attack [12] or simple Super-Sbox analysis [7, 9, 14] where the controlled rounds are limited to only the middle rounds. To merge independent solutions of multiple inbound phases, we use a technique based on the generalized birthday attack [19]. A summary of our main results on the **ECHO**-256 hash function and both **ECHO** compression functions are given in Table 1. More details and the respective generic complexities, especially for near-collisions and distinguishers, are given in the sections describing the attacks.

Table 1. Summary of our results and related analysis for **ECHO**.

Hash Function	Target	Rounds	Time	Memory	Type	Reference
ECHO -256	hash function	5/8	2^{96}	2^{64}	distinguisher	Sect. 4.1
		4.5/8	2^{96}	2^{64}	near-collision	Sect. 4.2
		4/8	2^{64}	2^{64}	collision	Sect. 4.3
	compression function	7/8	2^{152}	2^{64}	distinguisher	Sect. 5.5
		7/8	2^{107}	2^{64}	distinguisher*	Sect. 5.5
		6.5/8	2^{152}	2^{64}	free-start near-collision	Sect. 5.6
		6.5/8	2^{96}	2^{64}	free-start near-collision*	Sect. 5.6
		4.5/8	2^{96}	2^{32}	distinguisher	[17]
		3/8	2^{64}	2^{32}	free-start collision	[17]
		3/8	2^{96}	2^{32}	semi-free-start collision*	[17]
ECHO -512	compression function	7/10	2^{162}	2^{64}	distinguisher	Sect. A.1
		7/10	2^{106}	2^{64}	distinguisher*	Sect. A.1
		6.5/10	2^{152}	2^{64}	free-start near-collision	Sect. A.2
		6.5/10	2^{96}	2^{64}	free-start near-collision*	Sect. A.2
		6.5/10	2^{96}	2^{32}	distinguisher	[17]
		3/10	2^{96}	2^{32}	(semi-)free-start collision*	[17]

* with chosen salt

2 Description of **ECHO**

In this section we briefly describe the AES based SHA-3 candidate **ECHO**. For a detailed description of **ECHO** we refer to the specification [1]. Since **ECHO** heavily uses AES round transformations, we describe the AES block cipher first.

2.1 The AES Block Cipher

The block cipher Rijndael was designed by Daemen and Rijmen and standardized by NIST in 2000 as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [15]. The AES follows the wide-trail design strategy [4, 5] and consists of a key schedule and state update transformation. Since **ECHO** does not use the AES key schedule, we just describe the state update here.

In the AES, a 4×4 state of 16 bytes is updated using the following 4 round transformations, with 10 rounds for AES-128, 12 rounds for AES-192 and 14 rounds for AES-256:

- The non-linear layer **SubBytes** (SB) applies the AES S-Box to each byte of the state independently.

- The cyclical permutation **ShiftRows** (SR) rotates the bytes of row j to the left by j positions.
- The linear diffusion layer **MixColumns** (MC) multiplies each column of the state by a constant MDS matrix M_{MC} .
- **AddRoundKey** (AK) adds the 128-bit round key K_i to the AES state.

Note that a round key is added prior to the first round and the **MixColumns** transformation is omitted in the last round of AES. For a detailed description of the AES we refer to [15].

2.2 The ECHO Hash Function

The ECHO hash function is a SHA-3 candidate submitted by Benadjila et al. [1]. It is a double-pipe, iterated hash function and uses the HAIFA [2] domain extension algorithm. More precisely, a padded t -block message M and a salt s are hashed using the compression function $f(H_{i-1}, M_i, c_i, s)$, where c_i is a bit counter, IV the initial value and $trunc(H_t)$ a truncation to the final output hash size of n bits:

$$\begin{aligned} H_0 &= IV \\ H_i &= f(H_{i-1}, M_i, c_i, s) \quad \text{for } 1 \leq i \leq t \\ h &= trunc_n(H_t). \end{aligned}$$

The message block size is 1536 bits for ECHO-256 and 1024 bits for ECHO-512, and the message is padded by adding a single 1 followed by zeros to fill up the block size. Note that the last 18 bytes of the last message block always contain the 2-byte hash output size, followed by the 16-byte message length.

The compression function of ECHO uses one internal 2048-bit permutation P which manipulates 128-bit words similar as AES manipulates bytes. The permutation consists of 8 rounds in the case of ECHO-256 and has 10 rounds for ECHO-512. The internal state of the permutation P can be modeled as a 4×4 matrix of 128-bit words. We denote one ECHO state by S_i and each 128-bit word or AES state is indexed by $[r, c]$, with rows $r \in \{0, \dots, 3\}$ and columns $c \in \{0, \dots, 3\}$ of the ECHO state.

The 2048-bit input of the permutation (which is also tweaked by the counter c_i and salt s) are the previous chaining variable H_{i-1} and the current message block M_i , concatenated to each other. After the last round of the permutation, a feed-forward (FF) is applied to get the preliminary output V :

$$V = P_{c_i, s}(H_{i-1} || M_i) \oplus (H_{i-1} || M_i). \quad (1)$$

To get the 512-bit chaining variable H_i for ECHO-256, all columns of the ECHO output state V are XORed. In the case of ECHO-512, the 1024-bit chaining variable H_i is the XOR of the two left and the two right columns of V . The feed-forward together with the compression of columns is called the **BigFinal** (BF) operation. To get the final output of the hash function, the lower half is truncated in the case of ECHO-256 and the right half is truncated for ECHO-512.

The round transformations of the ECHO permutation are very similar to AES rounds, except that 128-bit words are used instead of bytes. One round is the composition of the following three transformations in the given order:

- The non-linear layer **BigSubWords** (BSW) applies two AES rounds to each of the 16 128-bit words of the internal state. The first round key consists of a counter value initialized by c_i and increased for every AES state and round of ECHO. The second round key consists of the 128-bit salt s .
- The cyclical permutation **BigShiftRows** (BSR) rotates the 128-bit words of row j to the left by j words.

- The linear diffusion layer **BigMixColumns** (BMC) mixes the AES states of each **ECHO** column by the same MDS matrix M_{MC} but applied to those bytes with equal position inside the AES states.

3 Improved Truncated Differential Analysis of ECHO

In this section we describe the main concepts used to attack the **ECHO** hash function. We first describe the improved truncated differential paths which have a very low number of active S-boxes. These sparse truncated differential paths are the core of our attacks and for a better description of the attacks, we reorder the **ECHO** round transformations. This reordering gives two combined building blocks of **ECHO**, the **SuperMixColumns** and **SuperBox** transformations. We then show how to efficiently find both differences and values through these functions for a given truncated differential path.

3.1 Sparse Truncated Differential Paths for ECHO

In this section we construct truncated differential paths with a low number of active bytes. Since **ECHO** has the same properties for words as AES has for bytes, at least 25 AES states are active in each 4-round differential path of **ECHO**. However, we can reduce the number of active S-boxes in each AES state to get a sparse 4-round truncated differential path with only 245 active S-boxes. Note that the truncated differential path of the previously best known analysis of **ECHO** has already 320 active S-boxes in a single round [17]. A trivial lower bound [1] of active S-boxes for 4 rounds is 125.

The AES structure of **ECHO** ensures that the minimum number of active AES states (or words) for 4 rounds has the following sequence of active AES states:

$$1 \xrightarrow{r_1} 4 \xrightarrow{r_2} 16 \xrightarrow{r_3} 4 \xrightarrow{r_4} 1$$

Also, the same sequence of active bytes holds for 4 rounds of AES. In previous analysis of **ECHO**, truncated differential paths have been used with 16 active bytes in the AES states where the **ECHO** state has also 16 active words. In these attacks always one full active state with 256 active S-boxes was used. In the following, we show how to construct sparse truncated differential paths with a maximum of 64 active bytes in each single **ECHO** state.

The main idea is to place AES states with only one active S-box into those **ECHO** rounds with 16 active words. This way, the number of total active bytes (or S-boxes) can be greatly reduced. The resulting 4-round truncated differential path of **ECHO** is given in Fig. 1 and consists of only 245 active S-boxes. Since one round of **ECHO** consists of two AES rounds, it follows that the full active AES states result in those rounds of **ECHO** with 4 active words. The **ECHO** state with only one active word contains only one active byte in this AES state. Note that in the attacks on **ECHO**, we use this truncated differential path with small modifications to improve the overall complexity of the attacks.

3.2 An Equivalent ECHO Round Description

For an easier description of our attack, we use an equivalent description of one **ECHO** round. First, we swap the **BigShiftRows** transformation with the **MixColumns** transformation of the second AES round. Second, we swap **SubBytes** with **ShiftRows** of the first AES round. Swapping these operations does not change the computational result of **ECHO** and similar alternative descriptions have already been used in the analysis of AES. This way, we get two new super-round transformations separated just by byte shuffling operations: **SuperMixColumns** and **SuperBox**.

These functions with adjacent byte shuffling operations are shown in Fig. 2. In the following subsections, we describe these transformations and show how to efficiently find differences and pairs according to a given truncated differential path for both transformations.

3.3 SuperMixColumns

The **SuperMixColumns** transformation combines the four **MixColumns** transformations of the second AES round with the 4 **MixColumns** transformations of **BigMixColumns** in the same 1×16 column slice of the **ECHO** state (see Fig. 2). We denote by column slice the 16 bytes of the same 1-byte wide column of the 16×16 **ECHO** state. Note that the **BigMixColumns** transformation consists of 16×4 parallel **MixColumns** transformations. Each of these **MixColumns** transformations mixes those four bytes of an **ECHO** column, which have the same position in the four AES states. Using the alternative description of **ECHO** (see Fig. 2), it is easy to see that four **MixColumns** operations of the second AES round work on the same column slice as four **MixColumns** operations of **BigMixColumns**. We combine these eight **MixColumns** transformations to get a **SuperMixColumns** transformation on a 1-byte wide column slice of **ECHO**.

We have determined the 16×16 matrix M_{SMC} of the **SuperMixColumns** transformation which is applied to the **ECHO** state instead of **MixColumns** and **BigMixColumns**. This matrix can be computed by the Kronecker product of two **MixColumns** MDS matrices M_{MC} and is given as follows:

$$M_{\text{SMC}} = M_{\text{MC}} \otimes M_{\text{MC}} = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \end{bmatrix} \otimes \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 4 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 6 & 5 & 3 & 3 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 2 & 4 & 6 & 2 & 3 & 6 & 5 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 2 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 3 & 3 & 6 & 5 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 6 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 5 & 3 & 3 & 6 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 4 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 6 & 5 & 3 & 3 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 2 & 3 & 6 & 5 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 3 & 3 & 6 & 5 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 5 & 3 & 3 & 6 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 4 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 6 & 5 & 3 & 3 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 2 & 3 & 6 & 5 & 3 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 3 & 3 & 6 & 5 \\ 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 5 & 3 & 3 & 6 \\ 6 & 5 & 3 & 3 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 4 & 6 & 2 & 2 \\ 3 & 6 & 5 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 2 \\ 3 & 3 & 6 & 5 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 6 \\ 5 & 3 & 3 & 6 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 4 \end{bmatrix}$$

Note that the optimal branch number of a 16×16 matrix is 17, which could be achieved by an MDS matrix. Using Magma we have computed the branch number of **SuperMixColumns** which is 8. Hence, it is possible to find differential paths in **SuperMixColumns** such that the sum of active bytes at input and output is only 8. An according truncated differential path through **MixColumns** and **BigMixColumns** has the following sequence of active bytes:

$$4 \xrightarrow{\text{MC}} 16 \xrightarrow{\text{BMC}} 4$$

An example for a valid **SuperMixColumns** differential according to this truncated differential path is given as follows:

$$\text{SMC}([E000 \ 9000 \ D000 \ B000]^T) = [2113 \ 0000 \ 0000 \ 0000]^T$$

However, the probability for a truncated differential path from $4 \rightarrow 16 \rightarrow 4$ active bytes (with fixed position) through **SuperMixColumns** is 2^{-24} . Hence, only 2^8 (out of 2^{32}) such differentials for the given position of active bytes exist. In the sparse truncated differential path of Fig. 1, this $4 \rightarrow 16 \rightarrow 4$ transition through **SuperMixColumns** occurs in the second and forth round.




Fig. 1. The sparse truncated differential path for 4 rounds of ECHO. By 1, D, C, F we denote the pattern and number of active bytes in each AES state (also see [7]). A 1 denotes an AES state with only one active byte, a D an active diagonal (4 active bytes), a C an active column (4 active bytes) and an F denotes a full active state (16 active bytes). Note that a maximum of 64 bytes are active in each single ECHO state.

3.4 SuperBox

The SuperBox has first been used by the designers of AES in the differential analysis of two AES rounds [6]. Since one round of ECHO also consists of two consecutive AES rounds we use this concept in our analysis as well. Using SuperBoxes, we can represent two rounds of AES using a single non-linear layer and two adjacent linear layers. Since we can swap the SubBytes and ShiftRows operation of the first AES round, we get a sequence of SB-MC-SB transformations with independent columns in the middle. One such column is called a SuperBox and consists of 4 parallel S-boxes, one MixColumns operation and another 4 parallel S-boxes (see Fig. 2). Hence, a SuperBox is in fact a 32-bit non-linear S-box.

This separation of two AES rounds into parallel 32-bit SuperBoxes allows to efficiently find pairs for a given (truncated) differential. In a theoretical attack on ECHO or if we do not care about memory, we can simply pre-compute and store the whole differential distribution table (DDT) of the AES SuperBox with a time and memory complexity of 2^{64} . The DDT stores which input/output differentials of the SuperBox are possible and also stores all input values such that these differentials are fulfilled. Note that in ECHO, each SuperBox is keyed in the middle by the counter value. Hence, we need different DDTs for all SuperBoxes with different keys. To reduce the memory requirements and the maximum time to find values for given SuperBox differentials, a time-memory trade-off with average complexity one and memory requirements of 2^{32} can be used. This method has first been proposed in the analysis of the hash function Whirlpool [9, Appendix A] and applied to Grøstl in [14]. The same technique has been discovered independently in [7].




Fig. 2. The two super-round transformations of ECHO: SuperBox (top, red) and SuperMixColumns (bottom, green) with adjacent byte shuffling operations (ShiftRows and BigShiftRows).

3.5 Expected Number of Pairs

At this point, we can already compute the expected number of pairs conforming to the 4-round truncated differential path given in Fig. 1. The resulting number of solutions determines the degrees of freedom we have in the attack. At the input of the path, we have a 2048-bit value and differences in 4 bytes. Therefore, the total number of possible inputs pairs (excluding the 128-bit salt) is about

$$2^{2048} \cdot 2^{8 \cdot 4} = 2^{8 \cdot 260} = 2^{2080}.$$

In general, the probability for a random pair to follow a truncated differential path from a to b active bytes (with $a + b \geq 5$) through MixColumns is $2^{-8 \cdot (4-b)}$. An exception is the propagation from $4 \rightarrow 16 \rightarrow 4$ bytes through SuperMixColumns, which has a probability of 2^{-24} (see Sect. 3.3). Multiplying all probabilities through MixColumns and SuperMixColumns gives the approximate probability for a random input pair to follow the whole truncate differential path. For the path given in Fig. 1, we get a probability significantly less than one for all MixColumns or SuperMixColumns transformation where a reduction in the number of active bytes occur. This happens in the 1st MC of round 1 ($D - 1$), the 2nd MC of round 2 ($4 \times F - D$), the 1st MC ($16 \times D - 1$) and SMC ($4 \times 1111 - \text{FFFF} - \text{F000}$) of round 3, and the 2nd MC ($4 \times F - D$) and BMC ($3 \times D - 0$) of round 4. We then get for the total probability of the truncated differential path (in base 2 logarithm):

$$-8 \cdot (3 + 4 \cdot 12 + 16 \cdot 3 + 4 \cdot 3 + 4 \cdot 12 + 3 \cdot 4) = -8 \cdot 171$$

So in total, the expected number of solutions for this path is

$$2^{8 \cdot 260} \cdot 2^{-8 \cdot 171} = 2^{8 \cdot 89} = 2^{712}$$

and we have about 712 degrees of freedom in this 4-round truncated differential path.

4 Attacks on the ECHO-256 Hash Function

In this section we use the sparse truncated differential path and properties of SuperMixColumns to get attacks for up to 5 rounds of the ECHO-256 hash function. We first describe our main result, the subspace distinguisher for 5 rounds of ECHO-256 in detail. Then, we briefly show how to get near-collisions for 4.5 rounds and collisions for 4 rounds of ECHO-256.

4.1 Subspace Distinguisher for 5 Rounds


In this section we show that ECHO-256 reduced to 5 rounds can be distinguished from an ideal hash function. We are able to construct a large set of output differences which fall into a vector space of fixed dimension. But when does this result in a distinguisher on the hash function? An attacker could have chosen the vector space specifically to fit a previously computed set of differences. Also, finding up to x differences in subspace of dimension x is trivial, even for ideal functions. But once a subspace has been chosen, finding additional differences in this subspace should again have the generic complexity. We have a similar situation for preimage attacks: finding a preimage is trivial if the attacker can choose the hash value. Note that in most distinguishing attacks, the generic complexity also depends on the number of found solutions. To compare distinguishers with generic attacks, differential q -multicollisions have been used in the distinguishing attacks on AES [3]. More general, to analyze the complexity of finding differences in a vector space of fixed dimension, the subspace distinguisher has been introduced in the analysis of Whirlpool [9, 10]. Before we describe the subspace distinguisher for 5 rounds of ECHO-256 in detail, we give an overview of the truncated differential path and provide a brief outline of the attack.

The Truncated Differential Path. For the attack we use two message blocks where the first block does not contain differences. For the second message block, we use the truncated differential path given in Fig. 3. We use colors (red, yellow, green, blue, cyan) to describe different phases of the attack and to denote their resulting solutions. Active bytes are denoted by black color and all AES states are active which contain at least one active byte. Hence, the sequence of active AES states for each round of ECHO is as follows:

$$5 \xrightarrow{r_1} 16 \xrightarrow{r_2} 4 \xrightarrow{r_3} 1 \xrightarrow{r_4} 4 \xrightarrow{r_5} 16$$

Note that in this path we keep the number of active bytes low as described in Sect. 3.1. Except for the beginning and end, at most one fourth of the ECHO state is active and therefore, we have enough freedom to find many solutions. Since the lower half of the state is truncated, we have most differences in the lower half of the message and there are no differences in the chaining input (blue). The padding of the second (and last) message block is denoted by cyan bytes. The last 16 bytes (one AES state) of the padding contain the message length, and the two bytes above contain the 2-byte value with the hash size. Note that the AES states containing the chaining values (blue) and padding (cyan) do not get mixed with other AES states until the first BigMixColumns transformation.

Attack Outline. To find input pairs according to this path we use the rebound attack [13] with multiple inbound phases [9, 11]. The main advantage of multiple inbound phases is that we can first find pairs for each inbound phase independently and then, connect (or merge) the results. For the attack on 5 rounds of ECHO-256 we use an inbound phase in round 2 (red) and another inbound phase in round 3 (yellow). The 1st inbound phase finds values and differences for the red bytes which we connect with the chaining input (blue) and padding (cyan) by merging lists. Then, we compute the solutions of the 2nd inbound phase forwards in the outbound phase (green) to insure the propagation according to the truncated differential path until the end. Finally, we merge the solutions of the two inbound phases by determining the remaining (white) values using a generalized birthday attack on 4 independent columns of the state. Note that in some cases, the probability to find one solution is only close to one. However, for simplicity reasons of describing the attack we assume it is one, since we have enough freedom in the attack to repeat all phases with different starting points to get one solution on average.



1st Inbound. We start the 1st inbound phase with a random difference according to the truncated differential path through **SuperMixColumns** between state S_{14} and state S_{16} (see Sect. 3.3). We compute these differences backward to get the output differences of the **SuperBoxes** in state S_{12} . For each column in state S_7 we choose 2^{32} random differences for the given active bytes. We compute these differences forward through **BigMixColumns** to the input of the **SuperBoxes**. Note that for the last column we could choose up to 2^{64} differences (8 active bytes), whereas in all other columns we have only 2^{32} possible differences (4 active bytes).

As described in Sect. 3.4, we find values according to the **SuperBox** differentials with an average complexity of 1 by using DDT lookups. Note that for some differentials no solutions exist, but for each possible differential we get more pairs which out-weight the non-existing ones (for more details we refer to [13]). In general, for each active AES S-box a differential is possible with a probability of about 2^{-1} and we get at least 2 pairs. Hence, for a full active AES state, one out of approximately 2^{16} differences gives a differential match and then, provides at least 2^{16} solutions. In the following attacks, it is reasonable to assume that for each differential we get one solution with average complexity one.

Since in the 1st inbound phase the columns of **ECHO** are independent, we get 2^{32} independent solutions for each of the four columns in state S_7 (red and black bytes) with complexity 2^{32} in time and memory. These solutions (or pairs) consist of differences and values for the black bytes, and values for the red bytes in S_7 . Note that for each solution (and arbitrary choice of white bytes in S_7) the truncated differential path from state S_3 to state S_{23} is already fulfilled.

Merge Chaining Input. Next, we need to merge the solutions of the 1st inbound phase with the chaining input and bytes fixed by the padding. Therefore, we choose 2^{32} random first message blocks and compute the resulting chaining value after one compression function call of **ECHO**. Note that each AES state can be independently computed forward to state S_7 until the first **BigMixColumns** transformation. We do this for the chaining values (blue) and the AES state containing the message length (cyan). Note that we match the two remaining bytes and one bit of the padding at a later step.

We merge the 2^{32} chaining values with the solutions of the 1st inbound phase column by column. We start with column 0 where we need to match the padding state as well. Since we match 64 bits of overlapping red and blue/cyan bytes, the expected number of solutions is $2^{32} \times 2^{32} \times 2^{-64} = 1$. We compute this solution by merging the two lists of size 2^{32} and exploiting the birthday effect. For all other columns, we need to match only 4 red bytes in each blue AES state and we get $2^{32} \times 2^{-32} = 1$ solution as well. Since we only merge lists of size 2^{32} the complexity of this step is 2^{32} in time and memory.

After this step, we have found solutions where the values of all blue, cyan and red bytes, as well as the values of the black bytes between state S_7 and state S_{14} are determined. Furthermore, all differences (black bytes) from state S_4 up to state S_{17} can be computed.

2nd Inbound. In the 2nd inbound phase, we search for values and differences such that the truncated differential path in round 3 is fulfilled (yellow). Remember that the differences in state S_{17} have already been fixed due to the 1st inbound phase. We start with 2^{64} differences of state S_{24} and compute backwards to state S_{20} , the output of the **SuperBoxes**. Note that we have 16 independent **SuperBoxes** for the yellow AES states between state S_{17} and S_{20} . Again, we use the DDT of the **SuperBoxes** to find the according values for the given differentials. For 4 full active AES states, the probability of a differential is about $2^{-4 \cdot 16}$. Among the 2^{64} differentials, we expect to find one possible differential. Note that for a valid differential, the expected number of solutions for the 2nd inbound phase is 2^{64} . For each of these pairs, differences and values of all yellow and black bytes in round 3 are determined.

Outbound Phase. Next, we compute the 2^{64} differences and values of state S_{24} forward to S_{31} . With a probability of 2^{-96} we get 4 active bytes after MixColumns in state S_{31} . Hence, we have to repeat the 2nd inbound phase 2^{32} times to find one solution for the outbound phase as well and we get a total complexity of 2^{96} . After this step, the complete truncated differential path is fulfilled (except for two cyan bytes in the first states). Furthermore, all differences (black bytes) from state S_4 until state S_{33} are already determined. Also, the values of the yellow, red, blue, green and cyan bytes, and the values of the black bytes from state S_7 to S_{31} except for state S_{15} are determined. What remains is to find values for the white bytes such that the results of the two inbound phases (blue/cyan/red and yellow bytes) can be connected.

Merge Inbound. To merge the two inbound phases, we need to find according values for the white bytes. We first choose random values for all remaining bytes of the first two columns in state S_7 (gray and lightgray) and compute them forward to state S_{14} . Note that we need to try $2^{2 \cdot 8 + 1}$ values for AES state $S_7[2, 1]$ to also match the 2-byte (cyan) and 1-bit padding at the input in AES state $S_0[2, 3]$. To illustrate all further steps, we use only states and colors shown in Fig. 4. Note that all gray, lightgray and brown bytes have already been determined either by an inbound phase, chaining value, padding or just by choosing random values for the remaining free bytes of the first two columns of S_7 . Also the cyan bytes are fixed already. However, all white, red, green, yellow and blue bytes are still free to choose.




Fig. 4. States used to merge the two inbound phases with the chaining values. Gray, lightgray and brown bytes show values already determined. Green, blue, yellow and red bytes show independent values used in the generalized birthday attack and cyan bytes represent values with the target conditions.

By taking a look at the linear SuperMixColumns transformation, we observe that in each column slice, 14 out of 32 input/output values are already fixed. Hence, we expect to get 2^{16} solutions for this linear system of equations. Unfortunately, for the given position of already determined 14 bytes, the linear system of equations does not have a full rank. One can determine the resulting system using the matrix M_{SMC} of SuperMixColumns. For the first column-slice the system is given as follows:

$$M_{\text{SMC}} \cdot [a_0 L_0 L_1 L_2 a_1 L'_0 L'_1 L'_2 a_2 x_0 x_1 x_2 a_3 x_3 x_4 x_5]' = [b_0 b_1 b_2 b_3 y_0 y_1 y_2 y_3 y_4 y_5 y_6 y_7 y_8 y_9 y_{10} y_{11}]$$

The free variables in this system are x_0, \dots, x_5 (green). The values $a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3$ (brown) have been determined by the first or second inbound phase, and the values L_0, L_1, L_2 (lightgray) and L'_0, L'_1, L'_2 (gray) are determined by the choice of arbitrary values in state S_7 . Since the values y_0, \dots, y_{11} (white) are free to choose we can remove their respective equations. We move terms which do not depend on x_i to the right side and get the following linear system

with 4 equations and 6 variables:

$$\begin{bmatrix} 3 & 1 & 1 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 1 & 1 & 2 \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \\ x_4 \\ x_5 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} c_0 \\ c_1 \\ c_2 \\ c_3 \end{bmatrix} \quad (2)$$

On the right side, we have the constant values c_0, c_1, c_2, c_3 which are determined by $a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3, L_0, L_1, L_2, L'_0, L'_1, L'_2$ and we get for example:

$$c_0 = b_0 + 4a_0 + 6L_0 + 2L_1 + 2L_2 + 6a_1 + 5L'_0 + 3L'_1 + 3L'_2 + 2a_0 + 2a_1$$

The matrix of this linear system has rank 3 instead of 4 and therefore, we only get a solution with probability 2^{-8} . We can solve this system of equations by transforming the system into echelon form and get:

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \\ x_4 \\ x_5 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} c'_0 \\ c'_1 \\ c'_2 \\ c'_3 \end{bmatrix} \quad (3)$$

where the values c'_0, c'_1, c'_2, c'_3 are a linear combination of c_0, c_1, c_2, c_3 . From the last equation, we get the 8-bit condition $c'_3 = 0$. Since also c'_3 depends linearly on L_i and L'_i , we can separate this linear equation into terms depending only on values of L_i and only on L'_i , and get $c'_3 = f_1(L_i) + f_2(L'_i) + f_3(a_i, b_i) = 0$. For all other 16 column-slices and fixed positions of gray bytes, we also get matrices of rank 3. In total, we get 16 8-bit conditions and the probability to find a solution for a given choice of gray and lightgray values in state S_{14} and S_{16} is 2^{-128} . However, we can also find a solution using the birthday effect with a complexity of 2^{64} in time and memory.

First, we start by choosing 2^{64} values for each of the first (gray) and second (lightgray) BigColumn in state S_7 . We compute these values independently forward to state S_{14} and store them in two lists L and L' . We also separate all equations of the 128-bit condition into parts depending only on values of L and L' . We apply the resulting functions f_1, f_2, f_3 to the elements of lists L_i and L'_i , and search for matches between the two lists using the birthday effect. Now, by solving (3) we get 2^{24} solutions for the first column-slice. By doing the same for all other slices, we get 2^{24} independent solutions for each column-slice. Hence, in total we can get up to $2^{16 \cdot 24} = 2^{384}$ solutions for the whole ECHO state.

We continue with a generalized birthday match to find values for all remaining bytes of the state. For each column in state S_{14} , we independently choose 2^{64} values for the green, blue, yellow and red columns, and compute them independently backward to S_8 . We need to match the values of the cyan bytes of state S_7 , which results in a condition on 24 bytes or 192 bits. Since we have 4 independent lists with 2^{64} values in state S_8 , we can use the generalized birthday attack [19] to find one solution with a complexity of $2^{192/3} = 2^{64}$ in time and memory. In detail, we need to match values after the BigMixColumns transformation in backward direction. Hence, we first multiply each byte of the 4 independent lists by the 4 multipliers of the InvMixColumns transformation. Then, we get 24 equations containing only XOR conditions on bytes between the target value and elements of the 4 independent lists. This can be solved using a generalized birthday attack.

After this step, all values and differences are determined. We can compute the input message pair, as well as the output differences for ECHO-256 reduced to 5 rounds. By simply repeating the merge inbound phase 2^{32} times, we can find at least 2^{32} solutions for the whole truncated differential path. The total complexity is still 2^{96} compression function evaluations and memory requirements of 2^{64} .

Subspace Distinguisher. Note that one message pair resulting in one output differences does not give a distinguisher. We need to find many output differences in a subspace with a complexity less than in the generic case. To determine the generic complexity of finding output differences in a vector space and the resulting advantage of our attack we use the subspace distinguisher. In general, the size of the output vector space is define by the number of active bytes prior to the linear transformations in the last round (16 active bytes after the last SubBytes), combined with the number of active bytes at the input due to the feed-forward (0 active bytes in our case). This would results in a vector space dimension of $(16 + 0) \cdot 8 = 128$. However, a weakness in the combined transformations SuperMixColumns, BigFinal and output truncation reduces the vector space to a dimension of 64 at the output of the hash function (for the given truncated differential path).

Note that we can move the BigFinal function prior to SuperMixColumns, since BigFinal is a linear transformation and the same linear transformation M_{SMC} is applied to all columns in SuperMixColumns. Hence, we get 4 active bytes in each column slice at the same position in each AES state. To each (active) column slice C_{16} , we first apply the SuperMixColumns multiplication with M_{SMC} and then, a matrix multiplication with M_{trunc} which truncates the lower 8 rows. Since only 4 bytes are active in C_{16} , these transformations can be combined into a transformation using a reduced 4×8 matrix M_{comb} applied to the reduce input C_4 , which contains only the 4 active bytes of C_{16} :

$$M_{trunc} \cdot M_{SMC} \cdot C_{16} = M_{comb} \cdot C_4$$

The multiplication with zero differences of C_{16} removes 12 columns of M_{SMC} while the truncation removes 8 rows of M_{SMC} . An example for the first active column slice is given as follows:

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} 4 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 6 & 5 & 3 & 3 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 2 & 4 & 6 & 2 & 3 & 6 & 5 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 2 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 3 & 3 & 6 & 5 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 6 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 5 & 3 & 3 & 6 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 4 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 6 & 5 & 3 & 3 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 2 & 3 & 6 & 5 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 3 & 3 & 6 & 5 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 5 & 3 & 3 & 6 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 4 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 6 & 5 & 3 & 3 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 2 & 3 & 6 & 5 & 3 \\ 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 3 & 3 & 6 & 5 \\ 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 5 & 3 & 3 & 6 \\ 6 & 5 & 3 & 3 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 4 & 6 & 2 & 2 \\ 3 & 6 & 5 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 2 \\ 3 & 3 & 6 & 5 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 2 & 2 & 4 & 6 \\ 5 & 3 & 3 & 6 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 & 6 & 2 & 2 & 4 \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} a \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ b \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ c \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 4 & 6 & 2 & 2 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 2 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 6 & 5 & 3 & 3 \\ 2 & 4 & 6 & 2 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 1 & 2 & 3 & 1 \\ 3 & 6 & 5 & 3 \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} a \\ b \\ c \\ d \end{bmatrix}$$

Analyzing the resulting matrix M_{comb} for all 4 active column slices shows that in each case, the rank of M_{comb} is 2 instead of 4. This reduces the dimension of the vector space in each active column slice from 32 to 16. Since we have 4 active columns, the total dimension of the vector space at the output of the hash function is 64.

We use [9, Corollary 1] and [9, Equation (19)] to compute the complexity of a generic distinguishing attack on the ECHO-256 hash function. We get the parameters $N = 256$ (hash function output size), $n = 64$ (dimension of vector space) and $t = 2^{32}$ (number of outputs in vector space) for the subspace distinguisher. Then, the generic complexity to construct 2^{32} elements in a vector space of dimension 64 is about $2^{111.8}$ compression function evaluations. Remember that in our attack on ECHO we also get 2^{32} pairs in a vector space of the same dimension. Hence, the total complexity for our subspace distinguisher on 5 rounds of the ECHO-256 hash function is about 2^{96} compression function evaluations with memory requirements of 2^{64} .

4.2 Near-Collisions for 4.5 Rounds

We can also use the truncated differential path for the subspace distinguisher on 5 rounds to get a near-collision attack for 4.5 rounds. If we remove the last `MixColumns`, `BigShiftRows` and `BigMixColumns` transformations we get 2^{32} 64-bit near-collisions (8 active bytes at the output) with a total complexity of 2^{96} and 2^{64} memory. Note that the generic complexity to find one such near-collision is 2^{96} while the complexity to find 2^{32} near-collisions is 2^{128} compression function evaluations.

We can also change the truncate differential path slightly to find one 48-bit near-collision with only 6 active bytes at the output (generic complexity 2^{104}). Instead of computing 2^{32} solutions after the merge inbound phase, we search for one pair according the truncated differential path of Fig. 5 in the last round. The probability for the propagation through `MixColumns` in state S_{35} is 2^{-32} and we get one 48-bit near-collision with a complexity of 2^{96} compression function evaluations and 2^{64} memory.




Fig. 5. The truncated differential path for the last round to get a near-collision for 4.5 rounds of ECHO-256. Black bytes are active and purple bytes are determined in the 2nd outbound phase.

Additionally, we can improve the complexity of a near-collision attack by choosing the salt value. In this case, we extend the attack by a 3rd inbound phase in round 4 instead of the outbound phase. Since the salt has to be determined first, we need to compute the 2nd and 3rd inbound phase before the 1st inbound phase. Note that the 128-bit salt value is added after the second AES `MixColumns` transformation in each round of ECHO. Since the same salt value is added in every AES state and `BigMixColumns` is a linear operation, we can move the XOR-addition of the salt after `BigMixColumns`. Then, the whole 2nd and 3rd inbound phase is independent of the salt value and we use the freedom in the salt to connect the two inbound phases.

In detail, we first compute the resulting difference of the 2nd inbound phase forward to state S_{25} and one difference of state S_{31} backward to state S_{28} . Then, we use the DDT of the `SuperBoxes` to find values according to the given differential or repeat with another difference of state S_{31} . This step determines values and differences of the green and black bytes of round 4. Since the differences between the 2nd and 3rd inbound phase already match we just need to choose the salt such that the values in the active AES state match as well. Since we do not reduce the number of active bytes in the outbound phase, the total complexity to find a 64-bit near-collision with chosen salt (8 active bytes at the output) is 2^{64} in time and memory.

4.3 Collisions for 4 Rounds

Finally, we are able to construct collisions for 4 rounds of the ECHO-256 hash function. The attack and truncated differential path is similar as for the subspace distinguisher on 5 rounds. We use a two-block message and the truncated differential path for the second block is given in Fig. 6. Again, we start with the 1st inbound phase, merge the chaining input and continue with the 2nd inbound and outbound phase. To get a collision at the output we use differences in the feed-forward and do a 3rd inbound phase in two AES states in round 1. Finally, we merge the

solutions of the two inbound phases to determining the remaining values. In the following, we only describe parts of the attack which are new or have been changed.

1st Inbound. The 1st inbound phase is the same as for the subspace distinguisher, except that in state S_7 we choose 2^{64} random differences for the active bytes of column 0 and 1, and 2^{32} random differences for column 2 and 3. Hence, after the 1st inbound phase we get 2^{64} independent solutions for each of the first two columns, and 2^{32} solutions for each of the last two columns in state S_7 (red and black bytes).

Merge Chaining Input. Again, we choose 2^{32} random first message blocks and merge them with the solutions of the 1st inbound phase column by column. We start with column 0 where we need to match the padding state as well. Since we match 64 bits of overlapping red and blue/cyan bytes, the expected number of solutions is $2^{32} \times 2^{64} \times 2^{-64} = 2^{32}$. For all other columns, we need to match only the 4 red bytes in each blue AES state with a probability of 2^{-32} . For column 1 we get 2^{32} solutions since we have computed 2^{64} results in the 1st inbound phase. For column 2 and 3, we have 2^{32} solutions from the 1st inbound phase and get one match on the overlapping 4 bytes.

2nd Inbound. To get the first solution for the 2nd inbound phase we need to try 2^{64} differences of state S_{24} , since the probability of a differential match in 4 full active AES states is only about $2^{-4 \cdot 16}$. Then, the expected number of solutions for the 2nd inbound phase is 2^{64} but we only need 2^{48} solutions to continue.

Outbound Phase. In the outbound phase we compute these 2^{48} differences and values of state S_{24} forward to S_{27} . With a probability of 2^{-48} we get one active byte after MixColumns in each active state of S_{27} . After this step, the complete truncated differential path (except for the three first states) is fulfilled. What remains is to determine differences in the first state to get a collision at the output and to find values for the white bytes.

3rd Inbound. To get a collision at the output, we use two additional active AES states in round 1. In $S_0[0, 1]$ and $S_0[1, 1]$, only the first column should be active such that the active bytes overlap with the active bytes at the output. For these active bytes at the input, we choose the differences to be $S_0[0, 1] = S_{32}[0, 0] \oplus S_{32}[0, 3]$ and $S_0[1, 1] = S_{32}[1, 0] \oplus S_{32}[1, 3]$. Then, these differences cancel each other by the feed-forward and we get a collision. In a 3rd inbound phase, we determine the remaining values of the gray and black bytes such that the given truncated differential for these two AES states in round 1 is satisfied. Again, we can find such values and differences with a complexity of about 1 using the DDT of the SuperBoxes, and compute 2^{32} solutions for each AES state. Since we still have 2^{32} solutions for each of column 0 and column 1 due to the 1st inbound phase, we expect to find a match for both differences and values of the overlapping 4 diagonal bytes of AES state $S_7[0, 1]$ and $S_7[1, 0]$.

Merge Inbound. Finally, we merge the 1st and 2nd inbound phases as in the previous attacks. Then, all values and differences are determined and we can compute the input message pair which results in a collision for ECHO-256 reduced to 4 rounds. The total complexity is 2^{64} in time and memory.




Fig. 6. The truncated differential path to get a collision on 4 rounds of ECHO-256. Black bytes are active, blue and cyan bytes are determined by the chaining input and padding, red bytes are values computed in the 1st inbound phase and yellow bytes in the 2nd inbound phase, green bytes in the outbound phase and gray bytes in the input inbound phase.

5 Attacks on the ECHO-256 Compression Function

The attack on the hash functions of ECHO can be extended to the compression function almost in a straight-forward way. In this case, instead of the chaining value a 512-bit value of another inbound phase is merged with the 1st inbound phase. In fact we can continue with a similar 3-round path in backward direction as we have in the hash function case in forward direction. Then, the full active ECHO state is located in the middle round and we can construct attacks for up to 7 out of 8 rounds of the compression function of ECHO-256. By choosing the salt input, we get a subspace distinguisher for 7 rounds of the compression function with complexity 2^{107} and 2^{64} memory. If the attacker is not allowed to choose the salt, one still gets a distinguisher for 7 rounds with a complexity of 2^{152} and 2^{64} memory using the limited birthday distinguisher [7]. Note that in this setting, not only the outputs but also parts of the inputs are constraint.

5.1 The Truncated Differential Path

We use the 7-round truncated differential path given in Fig. 7. Black bytes are active and colored bytes are determined by the different inbound and outbound phases. Since this path is sparse, we do not have problems with missing degrees of freedom and are able to find many pairs according to this path. Again, we can already compute the expected number of pairs by considering the MixColumns and SuperMixColumns transformations. At the input, we start with values in 256 bytes, a 16 byte differences and a 128-bit salt. We get a reduction of pairs at the 1st MC and SMC of round 1, the 2nd MC of round 3, the 1st MC and SMC of round 4, the BMC of round 5 and the 2nd MC of round 6. The expected number of pairs (in base 2 logarithm) for the path is given as follows:

$$8 \cdot (256 + 16 + 16 - 12 - 3 - 48 - 48 - 12 - 48 - 12) = 8 \cdot 105 \quad (4)$$

To summarize, the expected number of pairs conforming to this 7-round truncated differential path is $2^{8 \cdot 105} = 2^{800}$ which corresponds to 800 degrees of freedom. Note that this is much more than for the paths given in [12] and [17].

5.2 Outline of the Attack

The attack on the compression function consists of 3 main parts and we start in the middle of the compression function. The forward part is similar to the hash function attack and the backward part consists of additional inbound and outbound phases in round 3 and round 2. Instead of merging with the chaining input, we merge the results of the forward and backward part. Again, we start with the 1st inbound phase which is now located in round 4. Then, we compute the inbound and outbound phases in round 3 and round 2. We continue with the 2nd inbound phase (round 5), the 1st outbound phase (round 6) and finally, merge the forward and backward part by finding solutions for the remaining white bytes, similar as in the hash function attack.

5.3 Compression Function Attack with Chosen Salt

Similarly to the hash function attack, we start with the 1st inbound phase which we change slightly. Again, we use all 2^{32} difference for each active AES state in S_{23} , but also all 2^{32} differences for the active bytes in state S_{30} . According to the SuperMixColumns transformation in round 4, 2^{32} such differences exist.




Fig. 7. The truncated differential path to get a subspace distinguisher for 7 rounds of the ECHO-256 and ECHO-512 compression function. Black (and brown) bytes are active, red bytes are values computed in the 1st inbound phase, yellow bytes in the 2nd, blue bytes in the 3rd and green bytes in the 4th inbound or 2nd outbound phase. Brown bytes in state S_{15} and S_{23} are active and show the position where the salt is chosen in the chosen-salt attack. Purple bytes are determined in the 1st outbound phase and gray bytes are chosen randomly. Note that by omitting the last (half) round, we get near-collisions for the compression function.

3rd Inbound. In the 3rd inbound phase, we search for values and differences such that the truncated differential path in round 3 is fulfilled. Furthermore, we need to ensure that the results can be connected with the solutions of the 1st inbound phase. We have 2^{32} solutions for the 1st inbound phase and choose 2^{32} values of the salt corresponding to the active diagonal bytes (red and black bytes) in state S_{23} . Hence, we get in total 2^{64} values with equal differences for the red and black bytes of state S_{23} . Next, we compute the difference of S_{23} backward to state S_{20} , choose a random difference in state S_{15} and compute forwards to state S_{17} . Again, we have 16 independent active **SuperBoxes** in round 3 and can use the DDT to find according values for the given differentials with an average complexity of 1. We need to match the overlapping values of the 16 black bytes in state S_{23} . We repeat the previous step with 2^{96} random differences of state S_{15} to get $2^{96} \times 2^{64} \times 2^{-128} = 2^{32}$ solutions.

4th Inbound. The 4th inbound phase is applied in round 2. We first choose a difference according to the truncated differential path through **SuperMixColumns** in round 1 and compute this difference forward to state S_9 . Furthermore, we compute the differences of the 2^{32} solutions of the 3rd inbound phase backwards to state S_{12} . We use the DDT of the **SuperBoxes** to get 2^{32} solutions for the 4th inbound phase. Next, we need to connect the values of the 3rd and 4th inbound in state S_{15} . Among the 2^{32} solutions of the 4th inbound phase, we expect to find one match for the 4 bytes of the diagonal of state $S_{15}[0, 0]$. For all other bytes, we simply choose the remaining 12 bytes of the salt accordingly.

1st Outbound. In the 2nd inbound phase, we have computed 2^{96} solutions which we now propagate outwards to state S_{47} . With a probability of 2^{-96} we get 4 active bytes after **MixColumns** in state S_{47} and expect to find one such pair. The remaining part of the truncated differential path holds with probability 1. For this resulting pair, the complete 7-round truncated differential path is fulfilled and we just need to find values for the white (and gray) bytes again.

Merge Inbound. We can choose random values for the gray bytes in round 3 and continue with merging the inbound phases as in Sect. 4.1 of the hash function attack. Hence, the overall complexity to find one pair according to the truncated differential path for the permutation is 2^{96} with 2^{64} memory.

5.4 Compression Function Attack without Chosen Salt

Again, we start with the 1st inbound phase. We use all 2^{32} difference for the active AES states in S_{23} , but only a single difference for the active bytes in state S_{30} . Similar as in the hash function attack, we can independently find 2^{32} solutions for each column of state S_{23} with a complexity of 2^{32} .

3rd Inbound. In this inbound phase, we search for values and differences such that the truncated differential path in round 3 is fulfilled. Furthermore, we ensure that the results can be connected with the 1st inbound phase. For each active AES state in S_{23} , we independently compute the 2^{32} difference backward to state S_{20} . Next, we choose a random difference in state S_{15} and compute forwards to state S_{17} . Since, we have 16 independent active **SuperBoxes** in round 3, we can use the DDT to find according values for the given differentials with an average complexity of 1. Then, we can independently match the overlapping values and differences of the 16 black bytes in state S_{23} . For each AES state, we expect to get $2^{32} \times 2^{32} \times 2^{-64} = 1$ solution on average with a complexity of 2^{32} . For this solution, the differences between state S_{12} and S_{33} , and the values of the red and black bytes between state S_{16} and S_{30} are determined.

2nd Outbound. In the 2nd outbound phase, we simply propagate the solution of the 3rd inbound phase backwards through round 2 and 1. Note that only 2^8 differences of state S_8 result in the given truncated differential path through **SuperMixColumns** in round 1. The probability to hit one of these differences from an active AES state is 2^{-120} . Hence, we need to repeat the 3rd inbound phase about 2^{120} times. Since the forward and merging part of the compression function attack does not change, we get a total complexity of 2^{152} with 2^{64} memory.

5.5 Distinguishers for 7 Rounds

To distinguish 7 rounds of the **ECHO-256** compression function from an ideal compression function, we use a subspace distinguisher again. Since the output is not truncated, the size of the vector space is defined by the number of active bytes prior to the **MixColumns** and **BigMixColumns** transformations in the last round (16 active bytes), and the number of active bytes at the input due to the feed-forward (16 active bytes). Since in total, 32 active bytes determine the vector space we get a dimension of $32 \cdot 8 = 256$. Again, we use [9, Equation (19)] to compute the complexity of a generic distinguishing attack on the **ECHO-256** compression function.

With chosen salt, we get the parameters $N = 512$ (compression function output size), $n = 256$ (dimension of vector space) and $t = 2^{11}$ (number of outputs in vector space) for the subspace distinguisher. Then, the generic complexity to construct 2^{11} elements in a vector space of dimension 256 is about $2^{117.3}$ compression function evaluations. Note that we also need to repeat our attack on the **ECHO-256** compression function about 2^{11} times to get enough differences in the vector space. Hence, the total complexity for the subspace distinguisher on the compression function is about 2^{107} with memory requirements of 2^{64} .

Without chosen salt, the complexity of the attack is too high to get a subspace distinguisher. However, in a weaker attack model, for example using a limited birthday distinguisher [7] where also the input space is restricted, a distinguisher for 7/8 rounds of the compression function of **ECHO-256** without chosen salt can be constructed. In this case, the output differences need to be in a 256-bit subspace again. The generic complexity to find one such pair for a 512-bit compression function is $2^{(512-256)/2} = 2^{128}$ using the birthday effect. However, to find more such pairs the whole attack needs to be repeated with different values, since the input is limited to a 128-bit difference. The generic complexity to find x solutions is therefore $x \cdot 2^{128}$.

Similar as in the near-collision attack of Sect. 4.2, we can find many solutions with a total complexity of 2^{152} . For example, we can repeat the merge inbound phase (complexity 2^{64}) at least 2^{32} times to get $x = 2^{32}$ solutions with a complexity of 2^{96} for the merge inbound phase. Since the differences for the truncated differential path are already fixed, each of these solutions results in output differences in the same subspace. To summarize, we can find up to $x = 2^{152-64} = 2^{88}$ input pairs which conform to the whole truncated differential path with a total complexity of 2^{152} and without choosing the salt. The generic complexity to find 2^{88} such solutions is 2^{216} compression function evaluations.

5.6 Near-Collisions for 6 and 6.5 Rounds

Due to the truncating output transformation of **ECHO**, near-collisions are also interesting for the compression function. To construct near-collisions for up to 6.5 rounds of the compression function, we use the same truncated differential path as before. With chosen salt, we get a 128-bit near-collision (4 diagonals with 4 bytes are active) for the 512-bit compression function of **ECHO-256** and 6 rounds, or a 192-bit near-collision (6 bytes in 4 AES states are active) and 6.5 rounds with a complexity of 2^{96} and 2^{64} memory. Without chosen salt, the complexity increases to 2^{152} and 2^{64} memory. For a 512-bit compression function, the generic complexity is 2^{192} to

get a 128-bit near-collision and 2^{160} to get a 192-bit near-collision. Because of the padding, this near-collision does not apply to the last compression function call of ECHO-256.

6 Conclusion

In this work we have presented the first analysis of the ECHO hash function. We give a subspace distinguisher for 5 rounds, near-collisions for 4.5 rounds and collisions for 4 out of 8 rounds of the ECHO-256 hash function. Note that also near-collision resistance is a NIST requirement for a future SHA-3 [16]. Our results improve upon the previous results which are only on the (double-pipe) compression function of ECHO and for less rounds. Since ECHO has a truncating output transformation, near-collisions are also an interesting property of the compression function. We have analyzed the compression functions of ECHO to get a distinguisher for 7 rounds and near-collisions for up to 6.5 rounds of ECHO-256. We get similar compression function results also for ECHO-512.

In our improved attacks we combine the MixColumns transformation of the second AES round with the subsequent BigMixColumns transformation to a combined SuperMixColumns transformation. This allows us to construct very sparse truncated differential paths. In these paths, at most one fourth of the bytes are active throughout the whole computation of ECHO. This behavior is not known from the AES or AES based hash functions which strictly follow the wide-trail design strategy. Additionally, we are able to apply a rebound attack with multiple inbound phases to ECHO by using a generalized birthday technique to merge the inbound phases. Future work includes the search for even sparser truncated differential paths and the improvement of the given attacks by using the large degrees of available freedom. Also the separate search for differences and values as proposed in [12] and [8] may be used to improve the complexity of additional inbound phases.

Acknowledgements

We thank the members of the IAIK Krypto group, the designers of ECHO and especially Jérémy Jean and Florian Mendel for their comments and useful discussions. This work was supported in part by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), project P21936, by the European Commission through the ICT programme under contract ICT-2007-216676 ECRYPT II, and by the IAP Programme P6/26 BCRYPT of the Belgian State (Belgian Science Policy).

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A Results on the ECHO-512 Compression Function

The truncated differential path to analyze the ECHO-256 compression function can also be used for the compression function of ECHO-512. However, the active bytes for the near-collisions and the complexities for the subspace distinguisher change slightly. The complexity to find one solution for the truncated differential path is 2^{96} and 2^{64} memory with chosen salt, and 2^{152} with 2^{64} memory without chosen salt.

If we rotate the truncated differential path by one column of ECHO to the right, we can also correct the 144-bit padding of the last compression function call. To fix the padding, we need to repeat the merge inbound phase (complexity 2^{64}) about 2^{144} times. Hence, we get a total complexity of 2^{208} compression function evaluations and 2^{64} memory with and without chosen salt.

A.1 Subspace Distinguisher for 7 Rounds

For the compression function of ECHO-512, the parameters of the subspace distinguisher are $N = 1024$ (compression function output size), $n = 256$ (dimension of vector space) and $t = 2^{10}$ (number of outputs in vector space). The generic complexity for a subspace distinguisher is $2^{292.9}$ compression function evaluations. In our attack, we get for a subspace distinguisher on the ECHO-512 compression function a complexity of about 2^{106} with chosen salt, 2^{162} without chosen salt, and 2^{218} without chosen salt and correct padding (with memory 2^{64} in all cases).

A.2 Near-Collisions for 6 and 6.5 Rounds

For the 1024-bit compression function of ECHO-512, we get a 192-bit near-collision after 6 rounds (6 diagonals with 4 bytes are active). Without the last MixColumns, BigShiftRows and BigMixColumns transformation, we get a 224-bit near-collision after 6.5 rounds (2 AES states with 6 bytes and 4 AES states with 4 bytes are active). With chosen salt, the complexity is 2^{96} , and without chosen salt we get a complexity of 2^{152} . In both cases, we can also correct the padding of the last block and get a complexity of 2^{208} (with memory requirements of 2^{64} in all cases). For a 1024-bit compression function, the generic complexity is 2^{416} to get a 192-bit near-collision and 2^{400} to get a 224-bit near-collision.

For the rotated truncated differential path, we can additionally get a 64-bit near-collision for 6 and 6.5 rounds of the last compression function call, including the ECHO output transformation and correct padding. The resulting truncated differences after the feed-forward, the BigFinal and the output transformation are given in Figure 8. Again, the total complexity is 2^{208} compression function evaluations and 2^{64} memory. The generic complexity of a 64-bit near-collision for an ideal 512-bit function is 2^{224} .




Fig. 8. Near-collisions for 6 and 6.5 rounds of the last compression function call of ECHO-512. The truncated differential path is rotated one column to the right. The second and forth columns are truncated by the output transformation.