BETA: Biometric Enabled Threshold Authentication

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
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Password-based Authentication

- Enrollment phase
 - Enroll password on the server store salted hash
- Online phase



- Offline dictionary attacks Large scale real world breaches
- Usability concerns: High entropy requirement

Biometric Authentication

• Enrollment phase

• store biometric template on a server






- Better usability than passwords
- Server side breaches are more damaging



FIDO protocol and how it works


• Enrollment phase



Verify signature to authenticate


``Distributed" FIDO

• Enrollment phase




``Distributed" FIDO

• Online phase



Server



Verify signature to authenticate

Requirements:

- 1. Need to talk to only a threshold number of devices
- 2. The other devices don't need to interact amongst themselves.

Our Results

- New Primitive: Fuzzy Threshold Tokenizer
- Formal security model with universally composable (UC) security
- Two feasibility results for any biometric matching metric and arbitrary corruption threshold.
- Efficient protocol for Cosine Similarity (Face/Fingerprint recognition) tolerating single corruption.



