



MPC-Based Key Management

Using threshold trust to address different threat models

Jakob Pagter

CTO, Co-founder Sepior

Introduction to Sepior

- Founded 2014 in Denmark
 - Spinout from University of Aarhus, world-renowned cryptographers
 - Groundbreaking research in Multiparty Computation (MPC), essential patents & applications
 - Proven leadership team based in CA and Denmark
 - Well funded, grants from EU & Denmark, Series A



- Distributed cryptographic key management using MPC
- License cryptographic libraries, SDKs, and platforms to solution integrators and service providers
- Co-founders of the MPC Alliance







I/O models (NISTIR 8214A)

- "Threshold modes" focus on how input and output sent to/from client
- No explicit focus on
 - Who control the components
 - How is the client structured
- These perspectives are often an important focus of the practitioner using a Threshold Security Module and map to the threat model and security policies underlying the practical application




Figure 2. Several threshold interfaces (and one non-threshold case)


From NISTIR 8214A



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
Two examples

Threshold Security Module (TSM)



(Simplified) threat model: intrusion across enterprise perimeter

Policy-ruled end-user wallet




(Simplified) threat model: mutual distrust between end-user and wallet service



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Taxonomy building blocks









THANK YOU!