# Combinatorial Testing 

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## What is NIST?

## - A US Government agency

- The nation's measurement and testing laboratory - 3,000 scientists, engineers, and support staff including 3 Nobel laureates

- Research in physics, chemistry, materials, manufacturing,
computer science
Among other topics, analysis of engineering failures, including buildings, materials, and ...


## Software Failure Analysis

- NIST studied software failures in a variety of fields including 15 years of FDA medical device recall data
-What causes software failures?
- logic errors?

- calculation errors?
- inadequate input checking? Etc.
-What testing and analysis would have prevented failures?
- Would all-values or all-pairs testing find all errors, and if not, then how many interactions would we need to test to find all errors?

```
e.g., failure occurs if
pressure < 10 (1-way interaction)
pressure < 10 & volume > 300 (2-way interaction)
```


## Pairwise testing is popular, but when is it enough?

- Pairwise testing commonly applied to software
- Intuition: some problems only occur as the result of an interaction between parameters/components Pairwise testing finds about $50 \%$ to $90 \%$ of flaws
- Cohen, Dalal, Parelius, Patton, 1995 - 90\% coverage with pairwise, all errors in small modules found
- Dalal, et al. 1999 - effectiveness of pairwise testing, no higher degree interactions
- Smith, Feather, Muscetolla, 2000-88\% and 50\% of flaws for 2 subsystems

What if finding 50\% to $90 \%$ of flaws is not good enough?

## When is pairwise testing not enough?


"Relax, our engineers found
90 percent of the flaws."

# How about hard-to-find flaws? 

- Interactions
e.g., failure occurs if
- pressure < 10 (1-way interaction)
- pressure < 10 \& volume > 300 (2-way interaction)
- pressure $<10$ \& volume $>300$ \& velocity $=5$ (3-way interaction)

- The most complex failure reported required 4-way interaction to trigger


Interesting, but that's only one kind of application!

## How about other applications?

Browser (green)


These faults more complex than medical device software!!

Why?

## And other applications?

Server (magenta)


## Still more?

## NASA distributed database

(light blue)


## Even more?

## TCAS module (seeded errors)

(purple)


## Finally

Network security (Bell, 2006)
(orange)


These are most complex faults of all.

Why?

## So, how many parameters are involved in really tricky faults?

- Maximum interactions for fault triggering for these applications was $\underline{6}$
- Much more empirical work needed
- Reasonable evidence that maximum interaction strength for fault triggering is relatively small

How is this
knowledge useful?


## How is this knowledge useful?

- Suppose we have a system with on-off switches:



## How do we test this?

34 switches $=2^{34}=1.7 \times 10^{10}$ possible inputs $=1.7 \times 10^{10}$ tests


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# What if we knew no failure involves more than 3 switch settings interacting? 

34 switches $=2^{34}=1.7 \times 10^{10}$ possible inputs $=1.7 \times 10^{10}$ tests

- If only 3-way interactions, need only 33 tests
- For 4-way interactions, need only 85 tests



# What is combinatorial testing? A simple example 



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## How Many Tests Would It Take?

- There are 10 effects, each can be on or off
- All combinations is $2^{10}=1,024$ tests
too many to visually check ...
- Let's look at all 3-way interactions ...


## Now How Many Would It Take?

- There are $\left[\begin{array}{c}10 \\ 3\end{array}\right]=1203$-way interactions.
- Naively $120 \times 2^{3}=960$ tests.
- Since we can pack 3 triples into each test, we need no more than 320 tests.
- Each test exercises many triples:


We oughtta be able to pack a lot in one test, so what's the smallest number we need?

## A Covering Array

Each row is a test:


Each column is a parameter:


## All triples in only 13 tests

| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | O | 0 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | O | 1 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

0 = effect off
1 = effect on


13 tests for all 3-way combinations
$2^{10}=1,024$ tests for all combinations

## New algorithms to make it practical

- Tradeoffs to minimize calendar/staff time:
- FireEye (extended IPO) - Lei - roughly optimal, can be used for most cases under 40 or 50 parameters
- Produces minimal number of tests at cost of run time
- Currently integrating algebraic methods
- Adaptive distance-based strategies - Bryce - dispensing one test at a time w/ metrics to increase probability of finding flaws
- Highly optimized covering array algorithm
- Variety of distance metrics for selecting next test
- PRMI - Kuhn -for more variables or larger domains
- Randomized algorithm, generates tests w/ a few tunable parameters; computation can be distributed
- Better results than other algorithms for larger problems


## New algorithms

- Smaller test sets faster, with a more advanced user interface
- First parallelized covering array algorithm
- More information per test

IPOG
(Lei, 06)

| T-Way | IPOG |  | ITCH (IBM) |  | Jenny (Open Source) |  | TConfig (U. of Ottawa) |  | TVG (Open Source) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Size | Time | Size | Time | Size | Time | Size | Time | Size | Time |
| 2 | 100 | 0.8 | 120 | 0.73 | 108 | 0.001 | 108 | >1 hour | 101 | 2.75 |
| 3 | 400 | 0.36 | 2388 | 1020 | 413 | 0.71 | 472 | >12 hour | 9158 | 3.07 |
| 4 | $1363$ | 3.05 | 1484 | 540 | $1536$ | 3.54 | 1476 | >21 hour | 64696 | 127 |
| 5 | 226 | 18.41 | NA | $>1$ day | $4580$ | 43.54 | NA | >1 day | 313056 | 1549 |
| 6 | 10941 | 65.03 | NA | >1 day | 11625 | 470 | NA | >1 day | 1070048 | 12600 |

Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS): $2^{7} 3^{2} 4^{1} 10^{2}$
PRMI
(Kuhn, 06)

|  | $\mathbf{1 0}$ |  | 15 |  | 20 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | tests | sec | tests | sec | tests | sec |
| $\mathbf{1}$ proc. | 46086 | 390 | 84325 | 16216 | 114050 | 155964 |
| $\mathbf{1 0}$ proc. | 46109 | 57 | 84333 | 11224 | 114102 | 85423 |
| $\mathbf{2 0}$ proc. | 46248 | 54 | 84350 | 2986 | 114616 | 20317 |
| FireEye | 51490 | 168 | 86010 | 9419 | $* *$ | $* *$ |
| Jenny | 48077 | 18953 | $* *$ | $* *$ | $* *$ | $* *$ |

Table 6. 6 way, $5^{\mathrm{k}}$ configuration results comparison
** insufficient memory

## A Real-World Example

N* travelocity"
Home Vacation Packages Flights Hotels

Travel Info Center Flight Status Destination Guides Tra:


No silver bullet because:
Many values per variable
Need to abstract values
But we can still increase information per test

Plan: flt, flt+hotel, flt+hotel+car
From: CONUS, HI, Europe, Asia ...
To: CONUS, HI, Europe, Asia ...
Compare: yes, no
Date-type: exact, 1to3, flex
Depart: today, tomorrow, 1yr, Sun, Mon ...
Return: today, tomorrow, 1yr, Sun, Mon ...
Adults: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Minors: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Seniors: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

## Example

- Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) module
- Used in previous testing research
- 41 versions seeded with errors
- 12 variables: 7 boolean, two 3-value, one 4value, two 10 -value
- All flaws found with 5-way coverage
- Thousands of tests - generated by model checker in a few minutes


## Tests generated

| $t$ | Test cases |
| :---: | ---: |
| 2-way: | 156 |
| 3-way: | 461 |
| 4-way: | 1,450 |
| 5-way: | 4,309 |
| 6-way: | 11,094 |



## Results

- Roughly consistent with data on large systems
- But errors harder to detect than real-world examples



Bottom line for model checking based combinatorial testing: Expensive but can be highly effective

## Where does this stuff make sense?

- More than (roughly) 7 or 8 parameters and less than 300, depending on interaction strength desired
- Processing involves interaction between parameters (numeric or logical)


## Where does it not make sense?

- Small number of parameters, where exhaustive testing is possible
- No interaction between parameters, so interaction testing is pointless (but we don't usually know this up front)


## Modeling \& Simulation Application

- "Simured" network simulator
- Kernel of $\sim 5,000$ lines of C++ (not including GUI)
- Objective: detect configurations that can produce deadlock:
. Prevent connectivity loss when changing network
- Attacks that could lock up network
- Compare effectiveness of random vs. combinatorial inputs
- Deadlock combinations discovered
- Crashes in >6\% of tests w/ valid values (Win32 version only)


## Simulation Input Parameters

| Parameter |  | Values |
| :--- | :--- | ---: |
| 1 | DIMENSIONS | $1,2,4,6,8$ |
| 2 | NODOSDIM | $2,4,6$ |
| 3 | NUMVIRT | $1,2,3,8$ |
| 4 | NUMVIRTINJ | $1,2,3,8$ |
| 5 | NUMVIRTEJE | $1,2,3,8$ |
| 6 | LONBUFFER | $1,2,4,6$ |
| 7 | NUMDIR | 1,2 |
| 8 | FORWARDING | 0,1 |
| 9 | PHYSICAL | true, false |
| 10 | ROUTING | $0,1,2,3$ |
| 11 | DELFIFO | $1,2,4,6$ |
| 12 | DELCROSS | $1,2,4,6$ |
| 13 | DELCHANNEL | $1,2,4,6$ |
| 14 | DELSWITCH | $1,2,4,6$ |

$5 \times 3 \times 4 \times 4 \times 4 \times 4 \times 2 \times 2$
$\times 2 \times 4 \times 4 \times 4 \times 4 \times 4$
$=31,457,280$
configurations

Are any of them dangerous?

If so, how many?
Which ones?

## Combinatorial vs. Random

Deadlocks Detected -
combinatorial

|  |  |  | 1000 | 2000 | 4000 | 8000 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| t | Tests | 500 pkts | pkts | pkts | pkts | pkts |
| 2 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 3 | 161 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| 4 | 752 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 |

Average Deadlocks Detected random

|  |  |  | 1000 | 2000 | 4000 | 8000 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| t | Tests | 500 pkts | pkts | pkts | pkts | pkts |
| 2 | 28 | 0.63 | 0.25 | 0.75 | 0.50 | 0.75 |
| 3 | 161 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| 4 | 752 | 10.13 | 11.75 | 10.38 | 13 | 13.25 |

## Network Deadlock Detection

Detected 14 configurations that can cause deadlock: $14 / 31,457,280=4.4 \times 10^{-7}$

Combinatorial testing found one that very few random tests could find:

$$
1 / 31,457,280=3.2 \times 10^{-8}
$$

Combinatorial testing found more deadlocks than random, including some that might never have been found with random testing

Risks:

- accidental deadlock configuration: low
- deadlock configuration discovered by attacker: high


## ACTS Tool

## E3reEye 1.0 －FireEye Main Window

System Edit Operations Help
距田感图

\section*{|  |
| ---: |
|  |
| ［Root Node］ |}

$\square$［Root Node］ Cur＿vertical＿Sep
－㿞 299
－． 300
… 601
$\square$ High＿Confidence
－true
－falseTwo＿of＿Three＿Reports
－true
－false
Own＿Tracked＿Alt
－ 1

## － 2

Other＿Tracked＿Alt$\cdots 1$
曹 2
Own＿Tracked＿Alt＿Rate
－ 600
－ 601
Alt＿Layer＿Value
－ 0
－ 1
$\cdots 2$
－ 3
－Up＿Separation
－ 0
－ 399
－ 400
－ 499
－ 500
… 639

E暃 Test Result IJF Statistics

|  | CUR＿V．．． | HIGH＿．．． | TWO＿．．． | OWN＿．．． | OTHER．．． | OWN＿．．． | ALT＿L．．． | UP＿SE．．． | DOWN．．． | OTHE．．． | OTHER．．． | CLIMB． |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 299 | true | true | 1 | 1 | 600 | 0 | 0 | 0 | NO＿INT．．． | TCAS＿TA | true |
| 2 | 300 | false | false | 2 | 2 | 601 | 1 | 0 | 399 | DO＿NO．．． | OTHER | false |
| 3 | 601 | true | false | 1 | 2 | 600 | 2 | 0 | 400 | DO＿NO．．． | OTHER | true |
| 4 | 299 | false | true | 2 | 1 | 601 | 3 | 0 | 499 | DO＿NO．．． | TCAS＿TA | false |
| 5 | 300 | false | true | 1 | 1 | 601 | 0 | 0 | 500 | DO＿NO．．． | OTHER | true |
| 6 | 601 | false | true | 2 | 2 | 600 | 1 | 0 | 639 | NO＿INT．．． | TCAS＿TA | false |
| 7 | 299 | false | false | 2 | 1 | 601 | 2 | 0 | 640 | NO＿INT．．． | TCAS＿TA | true |
| 8 | 300 | true | false | 1 | 2 | 600 | 3 | 0 | 739 | NO＿INT．．． | OTHER | false |
| 9 | 601 | true | false | 2 | 1 | 601 | 0 | 0 | 740 | DO＿NO．．． | TCAS＿TA | true |
| 10 | 299 | true | true | 1 | 2 | 600 | 1 | 0 | 840 | DO＿NO．．． | OTHER | false |
| 11 | 300 | false | true | 1 | 2 | 600 | 2 | 399 | 0 | DO＿NO．．． | TCAS＿TA | false |
| 12 | 601 | true | false | 2 | 1 | 601 | 3 | 399 | 399 | DO＿NO．．． | TCAS＿TA | true |
| 13 | 299 | false | true | 2 | 1 | 601 | 0 | 399 | 400 | NO＿INT．．． | OTHER | false |
| 14 | 300 | true | false | 1 | 2 | 600 | 1 | 399 | 499 | DO＿NO．．． | OTHER | true |
| 15 | 601 | true | false | 2 | 2 | 600 | 2 | 399 | 500 | DO＿NO．．． | TCAS＿TA | false |
| 16 | 299 | true | false | 1 | 1 | 601 | 3 | 399 | 639 | DO＿NO．．． | OTHER | true |
| 17 | 300 | true | true | 1 | 2 | 600 | 0 | 399 | 640 | DO＿NO．．． | OTHER | false |
| 18 | 601 | false | true | 2 | 1 | 601 | 1 | 399 | 739 | DO＿NO．．． | TCAS＿TA | true |
| 19 | 299 | false | true | 1 | 2 | 600 | 2 | 399 | 740 | NO＿INT．．． | OTHER | false |
| 20 | 300 | false | false | 2 | 1 | 601 | 3 | 399 | 840 | NO＿INT．．． | TCAS＿TA | true |
| 21 | 601 | true | false | 2 | 1 | 601 | 1 | 400 | 0 | DO＿NO．．． | OTHER | true |
| 22 | 299 | false | true | 1 | 2 | 600 | 0 | 400 | 399 | NO＿INT．．． | TCAS＿TA | false |
| 23 | 300 | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | 3 | 400 | 400 | DO＿NO．．． | TCAS＿TA | ＊ |
| 24 | 601 | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | 2 | 400 | 499 | NO＿INT．．． | ＊ | ＊ |
| 25 | 299 | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | 1 | 400 | 500 | NO＿INT．．． | ＊ | ＊ |
| 26 | 300 | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | 0 | 400 | 639 | DO＿NO．．． | ＊ | ＊ |
| 27 | 601 | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | 3 | 400 | 640 | DO＿NO．．． | ＊ | ＊ |
| 28 | 299 | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | 2 | 400 | 739 | DO＿NO．．． | ＊ | ＊ |
| 29 | 300 | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | 1 | 400 | 740 | DO＿NO．．． | ＊ | ＊ |
| 30 | 601 | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | ＊ | 0 | 400 | 840 | DO＿NO．．． | ＊ | ＊ |
| 31 | 299 | true | true | 1 | 1 | 600 | 3 | 499 | 0 | NO＿INT．．． | OTHER | true |
| 32 | 1300 | false | false | 2 | 2 | 601 | 2 | 499 | 399 | DO NO．．． | TCAS TA | false |
| ＜ |  |  |  |  |  | IIII |  |  |  |  |  | $>$ |



## Variable interaction strength



## Constraints




## Output

Output formats:

- XML
- Numeric
- CSV
- Excel

Post-process output using Perl scripts, etc.

## Output options

Degree of interaction coverage: 2 Number of parameters: 12
Number of tests: 100

000000000000
111111101111
201010202210
010101303101
110001004210
210110105001
011101206000
101010307011
201101008100
000010109211
110010210101 Etc.

Degree of interaction coverage: 2
Number of parameters: 12
Maximum number of values per parameter: 10
Number of configurations: 100
Configuration \#1:

```
1 = Cur_Vertical_Sep=299
2 = High_Confidence=true
3 = Two_of_Three_Reports=true
4 = Own_Tracked_Alt=1
5 = Other_Tracked_Alt=1
6 = Own_Tracked_Alt_Rate=600
7 = Alt_Layer_Value=0
8 = Up_Separation=0
9 = Down_Separation=0
10 = Other_RAC=NO_INTENT
11 = Other_Capability=TCAS_CA
12 = Climb_Inhibit=true
```


## ACTS Users



## Summary

- Empirical research suggests that all software failures caused by interaction of few parameters
- Combinatorial testing can exercise all t-way combinations of parameter values in a very tiny fraction of the time needed for exhaustive testing
- New algorithms and faster processors make large-scale combinatorial testing possible
- Project could produce better quality testing at lower cost
- Beta release of tools available, to be open source


## Please contact us if you are interested!

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