


2014 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT



Safeguarding Health Information:
Building Assurance through HIPAA Security – 2014
September 23, 2014

CYBER-ESPIONAGE



Incidents that 50 global contributors investigated form the basis of the research








































































































The DBIR uses the VERIS framework for data collection and analysis



Actor – Who did it?

Action – How'd they do it?

Asset – What was affected?

Attribute – How was it affected?

Documentation, classification examples, enumerations: http://veriscommunity.net/



2014: specific patterns for specific recommendations





Last year, we noticed most breaches fit into patterns

111	POS smash-and-grab
190	Physical ATM
+ 120	Assured Penetration Technique
421	
÷ 621	Total Breaches
68%	



We can use the structured VERIS coding of an incident for statistical clustering







The frequency of patterns in an industry supports specific recommendations

Figure 19.

Frequency of incident classification patterns per victim industry

INDUSTRY	POS INTRUS- ION	WEB APP ATTACK	INSIDER MISUSE	THEFT/ LOSS	MISC. ERROR	CRIME- WARE	PAYMENT CARD SKIMMER	OF	CYBER ESPION- AGE	EVERY- THING ELSE
Accommodation [72]	75%	1%	8%	1%	1%	1%	<1%	10%		4%
Administrative [56]		8%	27%	12%	43%	1%		1%	1%	7%
Construction [23]	7%		13%	13%	7%	33%			13%	13%
Education [61]	<1%	19%	8%	15%	20%	6%	<1%	6%	2%	22%
Entertainment [71]	7%	22%	10%	7%	12%	2%	2%	32%		5%
Finance [52]	<1%	27%	7%	3%	5%	4%	22%	26%	<1%	6%
Healthcare [62]	9%	3%	15%	46%	12%	3%	<1%	2%	<1%	10%
Information [51]	<1%	41%	1%	1%	1%	31%	<1%	9%	1%	16%
Management [55]		11%	6%	6%	6%		11%	44%	11%	6%
Manufacturing [31,32,33]		14%	8%	4%	2%	9%		24%	30%	9%
Mining [21]			25%	10%	5%	5%	5%	5%	40%	5%
Professional [54]	<1%	9%	6%	4%	3%	3%		37%	29%	8%
Public [92]		<1%	24%	19%	34%	21%		<1%	<1%	2%
Real Estate [53]		10%	37%	13%	20%	7%			3%	10%
Retail [44,45]	31%	10%	4%	2%	2%	2%	6%	33%	<1%	10%
Trade [42]	6%	30%	6%	6%	9%	9%	3%	3%		27%
Transportation [48,49]		15%	16%	7%	6%	15%	5%	3%	24%	8%
Utilities [22]		38%	3%	1%	2%	31%		14%	7%	3%
Other [81]	1%	29%	13%	13%	10%	3%		9%	6%	17%



Point of Sale (POS) Intrusions


Remote attacks against the environments where retail transactions are conducted, specifically where card-present purchases are made.



Point of Sale Intrusion Key Findings

- Overall frequency is actually declining
- Brute forcing remote access to POS still primary intrusion vector
- Increased frequency of RAM scraping malware (versus key logging)
- Recommended controls:
 - Restrict remote access, mixed use
 - Enforce password policies
 - Deploy AV
 - Network segmentation
 - Network monitoring
 - 2-factor authentication

Figure 20. Comparison of POS Intrusions and Web App Attacks incident classification patterns, 2011-2013






Insider and privilege misuse

Any unapproved or malicious use organizational resources.



Insider and Privilege Misuse Key Findings

- Most activity abuses trust necessary to perform normal duties
- Most incidents happen at the victim organization
- Motivation is primarily financial, with some espionage (to benefit a competitor)
- Internal detection is unusually common and fast
- Recommended controls:
 - Know your data and who has access to it
 - Review user accounts
 - Watch for data exfiltration
 - Publish audit results






Physical Theft and Loss

Incidents where an information asset went missing, whether through misplacement or malice.



Physical Theft and Loss Key Findings

- Assets are stolen more often from offices than vehicles or residences
- Loss is reported more frequently than theft (15:1)
- More losses and thefts are reported because of disclosure regulations than fraud
- Data varieties at risk are mostly personal and medical
- Recommended controls:
 - Encrypt devices
 - Keep them with you
 - Back them up
 - Lock them down
 - Use unappealing tech





Miscellaneous errors

Incidents where unintentional actions directly compromised a security attribute of an information asset.



Miscellaneous Errors Key Findings

- Highly repetitive processes involving sensitive data are particularly error prone
- Discovery typically takes a long time, and it's external about twothirds of the time
- Recommended controls:
 - Consider Data Loss Prevention (DLP) software
 - Tighten processes around posting documents
 - Spot-check large mailings
 - IT disposes of all information assets (and test them)

Figure 43. Top 10 threat action varieties within Miscellaneous Errors (n=558)





Cyber espionage

Incidents in this pattern include unauthorized network or system access linked to state-affiliated actors and/or exhibiting the motive of espionage.



Cyber espionage key findings

- Most actors are state affiliated, but 11% are organized crime
- Cyber espionage involves many actions, but few initial vectors
- Discovery methods and times leave a lot of room for improvement
- Recommended controls:
 - Patching
 - Anti-virus
 - User training
 - Network segmentation
 - Good logging
 - Break the delivery-exploitation-installation chain
 - Spot C2 and data exfiltration
 - Stop lateral movement inside the network



Figure 61. Vector for malware actions within Cyber-espionage (n=329)






					Figure 70. Prioritization of critical security controls by industry. Based on frequency of incident patterns within each industry and recommendations for each pattern given in this report. The shading is relative to each industry.													ind									
So what?						Critical Security Controls (SANS Institute)		Accommodation [7]	Administrative 56	Construction [23]	Education [61]	Entertainment [71]	Finance [52]	Healthcare [62]	Information [51]	Management [55]	Manufacturing [31,	Mining [21]	Other [81]	Professional [54]	Public [92]	Real Estate [53]	Retail [44,45]	Trade [42]	Transportation [48.	Utilities [22]	
Figure 69.			5.6	-	⋖	×	U	ш	ш	UL.	I	느	2	2	2	0	0	α.	œ	2	F	F	ם				
Critical security controls mapped to incident patterns. Based on recommendations given in this				Software Inventory	2.4																						
-								3.1																			
		SL	0.10		_ 88		Standard Configs	3.2													-						
Critical Security Controls		OS	3 Ap	Insider	sica t/Lo	Misc errors		3.8																			
(SANS Institute)		POS Intrusions	Web App Attacks	E ≥	Physical Theft/Loss	ΣÆ	Malware Defenses	5.1																			
		820			-			5.2																			
Software Inventory	2.4							5.6			100																
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Standard Configs	3.2			111				6.4																			
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Malware Defenses	5.2	•						6.11																			
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Incident Response	18.1						Data Loss Prevention	17.6																			
	18.2							17.9														1					
	18.3							18.1																			
Network Segmentation 19.4			Incident Response	18.2																							
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18.3

19.4

Confidential and proprietary materials for authorized Verizon personnel and outside Network Segmentation



Additional information is available

- Download: www.verizonenterprise.com/dbir
- VERIS: www.veriscommunity.net
- Email: DBIR@verizon.com
- Twitter: @vzdbir and hashtag #dbir
- Blog: http://www.verizonenterprise.com/security/blog/
- VERIS Community Database: http://vcdb.org