

System Firmware: *The Emerging Malware Battlefield*

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Office of the Chief Engineer
Sept 9, 2015**



Top 5 ways to know if you're in the right presentation

5

You think

Secure Boot

is a really safe piece of
cowboy footwear



Top 5 ways to know if you're in the right presentation

4

You think

Root of Trust

is something that will help a
spelling bee contestant spell
'trust'



Top 5 ways to know if you're in the right presentation

3

You think

Permanent Denial of Service

means never getting in to
that greasy-spoon diner
down the street



Top 5 ways to know if you're in the right presentation

2

You think

Boot Block

is that thing that helps a cowboy remove his boots



Top 5 ways to know if you're in the right presentation

1

You think
Firmware
is really
tight-fitting jeans



A Degrading Threat Landscape

The many forms of cybercrime

Professional
Hacktivism
State-sponsored
Terrorism
Cyber-physical

Today's IT platforms were designed for a friendlier Internet of the 90s



Situation & Motivations

Going Higher & Burrowing Deeper

Bulk Data Collection




Cloud



Apps



Operating System



System Firmware

**Stealth
Persistence
Disruption**



Supply Chain

What is System Firmware?

Most modern computer devices contain firmware and critical data

- Embedded software
- Executed on either a microcontroller on the device or the host processor (e.g. Expansion ROMs)
- Executes before the operating system
- Provides initialization of the device
- Typically mutable (on flash memory => “semi-permanent”)
- Typically contains “critical data” (e.g. configuration information)

PC or Server BIOS/UEFI is “special” firmware (aka host processor boot firmware)

- BIOS = Basic Input/Output System (legacy)
- UEFI = Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (modern)
- Not associated with just one device or component
- First instruction executed by host processor...*but rarely the first instruction executed on the system!*



Why is System Firmware a target for attack?



Ideal place to put malicious code

<i>Control</i>	Executes prior to the Operating System
<i>Permanence</i>	Code is in a chip on the system board or other embedded device
<i>Detection</i>	Very difficult; can't be done from the operating system
<i>Recovery</i>	Likely requires a service event that involves hardware rework/replacement

Impacts of Firmware Attacks

COVERT

Control of Device

Data Collection

Data Modification

Remote Monitoring

(Permanent) Denial of Service

Service Events

Brand Damage

Business Disruption

OVERT

Are these attacks just theoretical?



A Little History

Implementing and Detecting an ACPI BIOS Rootkit

John Heasman

Researchers de
Hat

Trusted Execution Techn
motherboards and BIOS

By Jaikumar Vijayan

February 18, 2009




Editorial Reviews

Product Description

Explaining security vulnerabilities, possible exploitation used to gather information from BIOS and expansion ROM BIOS are also covered.

About the Author

Darmawan Salihun has published papers on BIOS reverse engineering in *CodeBreakers Journal*.



Researchers unveil persistent BIOS methods

NET SECURITY EXPERTS

RSS Feed

CloudOnomics »

rootkit in

a Chinese security company called **Qihoo 360** blogged about a rootkit hitting Chinese computers. This turned to be a very interesting case as it appears to be the first real malware targeting BIOS. It is a well-known proof of concept called **IceLord** in 2007. The rootkit is named **romi** and contains a bit of everything: a BIOS rootkit, a kernel mode rootkit, a PE file infector and a Trojan horse. It is able to infect 64-bit operating system and it is not able to

application and OS patches you want, your machine still can be compromised at the lowest level—without the use of any vulnerability.

RAM:

d

security researchers from Core Security Group have shown new methods for infecting BIOS. In their latest attempt, Anibal Sacco and his team infected the BIOS with a small bit of code that is, the method worked on a virtual machine VMware Player.

Did Ortega: "We're not using a vulnerability, we're just reusing the act of this. We can reinfect the BIOS."

lain,
rumelard

So, you need either root privileges or a kernel mode rootkit. The scope. But the methods are not new. It's just a rootkit to implement the attack.

security
bourg 75007 Paris


I have a little code that can

oper that contains five crypted resource files: *hook.rom*, *kernel.rom*, *pe.infector.rom*, *trojan.rom*, and *update.rom*. All of these files will be presented later in this analysis.



Timeline of PC Firmware Attacks

Credit: Xeno Kovah (<http://timeglider.com/timeline/5ca2daa6078caaf4>)



Recent Real World Impacts

Targeted Attacks at Scale

Saudi Aramco (2012)

30,000 PCs and 1,000 servers

Master Boot Record (MBR), the partition tables, files corrupted

Weeks to get systems back up and running

South Korea ATM network attack... (2013)

Remote access and MBRs wiped

Sony Pictures (2014)

Data stolen, then hard drives wiped


Sands Casino (2014)

Hard drives wiped on PCs and servers



The Industry Path for PC BIOS/UEFI Security


A relative timeline



NIST SP 800-147 (& 800-147B)

BIOS Protection Guidelines

Authenticity



Only **cryptographically signed** code can be used to update system firmware
(BIOS code from factory must be inherently trusted)

Integrity



The system must **prevent unintended or malicious modification** of BIOS code, preferably with hardware-based mechanisms

Non-bypassability



The **authenticated BIOS update process** shall be the only way to modify BIOS

April, 2011

NIST
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce

Special Publication 800-147

BIOS Protection Guidelines

Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology

David Cooper
William Polk
Andrew Regenscheid
Murugiah Souppaya


Now also
ISO/IEC 19678:2015



HP BIOS Protection History

Pre-2013

Started in 2002 with HP Labs partnership



- Separation of Boot Block, *protected by chipset*, enforcing integrity of system BIOS/UEFI
- Boot Block checks rest of system BIOS/UEFI
- Secure BIOS/UEFI Update Process
- First to implement TPM in clients
- First to use TPM to secure: BIOS/UEFI Pre-boot user authentication, DriveLock, Full Disk Encryption
- One of the first to implement NIST SP 800-147 (*BIOS Protection Guidelines*)
- One of the first to provide early support for NIST SP 800-155 (*Golden Measurements*)
- Boot Block => Root of Trust for Update (RTU) – *assumed to be good!*

Roots of Trust

Root of Trust

A component that forms the basis of providing one or more security-specific functions, such as measurement, storage, reporting, recovery, verification, update, etc. **A Root of Trust is trusted to always behave in the expected manner because its misbehavior cannot be detected** and because it's proper functioning is essential to providing its security-specific functions.

Examples

Root of Trust for Update (RTU)

Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM)

Root of Trust for Storage (RTS)


Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR)



NIST SP 800-147 (& 800-147B)...and beyond

Protection, Detection, Recovery

Authenticity



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Integrity



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Non-bypassability



The **authenticated BIOS update process** shall be the only way to modify BIOS

Detection & Recovery




Secure automatic or manual firmware recovery from corruption or wrongful overwrite

HP Platform Security Philosophy


Protection

Build the highest walls across
all levels




Detection

Quickly identify threats when
they appear




Recovery

Increase user productivity
Lower total cost of ownership



HP Sure Start

First and only self-healing technology solution created to protect against Malware and Security attacks aimed at the BIOS/UEFI



Features

- Self-healing: Automatic recovery from BIOS malware and security attacks^{1,2}
- Firmware protection against Permanent Denial of Service (PDoS) attacks
- Detects, reports and allows auto recovery of Advance Persistent Threats (APTs) aimed at BIOS

Problems it solves

- No user downtime waiting for IT/Service ticket²
- Results in fewer help desk calls for crisis recovery or bricked units.
- Secure by default; safeguards machine unique data

Customer benefits

- Virtually uninterrupted Productivity
- Confidence in BIOS/UEFI Rollout
- Reduce TCO; no need to reinstall/replace hardware³
- Detection and recovery transparent to customer

1. 100% Automatic recovery of BIOS boot block.
 2. If all copies of BIOS are compromised or deleted, a manual step for recovering BIOS is available.
 3. Applicable to 2013 Elitebooks and Zbooks.

Roots of Trust

With HP Sure Start...

Root of Trust

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Examples

Root of Trust for Update (RTU)

Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM)

Root of Trust for Storage (RTS)

Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR)


Root of Trust for Detection (RTD)

Root of Trust for Recovery (RTRec)



HP BIOS Protection History

2013 and beyond



- **HP Sure Start** checks the Boot Block
- If Boot Block is corrupted, **HP Sure Start** recovers it from a known good image
- Boot Block checks rest of system BIOS/UEFI
- Goes beyond NIST SP 800-147 (*BIOS Protection Guidelines*)
- Boot Block => Root of Trust for Update (RTU) – *now known to be good!*

HP Sure Start and platform personality

HP Sure Start protects critical data that are intended to be immutable upon leaving HP factory / authorized service center

- Product Name
- Model
- SKU Number
- Serial Number
- System Board CT
- System Configuration ID (aka Feature Byte)
 - Estar, Touch Capable. TPM, TCM, SLP, Computrace, SoftSylus
- Warranty Start Date
- UUID
- Vt-x, Vt-d, etc default settings



HP Client Security

Protect

BIOS/UEFI Based

- HP Sure Start
- HP BIOSphere Protection
- Pre-boot Security
- Power-on Authentication

Software Based


- HP Drive Encryption
- HP Credential Manager

Hardware Based

- Physical device security
- TPM
- Self-encrypting drives
- Secure Erase

HP Touchpoint Manager

- Mobile device security policy
- Local password reset



Detect

BIOS/UEFI Based

- HP Sure Start
- Master Boot Record Security
- Secure Boot

Software Based

- Microsoft Security Essentials (Win 7)
- Microsoft Defender (Win8)

Hardware Based

- Smart Card Readers
- Fingerprint Reader

HP Touchpoint Manager

- Firewall policy violations
- Anti-virus policy violations

Recover

BIOS/UEFI Based


- HP Sure Start
- Always On Remote Management
- Master Boot Record Security

HP Touchpoint Manager

- Firewall enablement
- Anti-virus enablement
- Remote find, lock and wipe
- Boot error code reporting




(Over-)simplified PC/Server Functional Diagram



(Over-)simplified PC/Server Functional Diagram

Firmware everywhere

Most modern computer devices contain mutable firmware and critical data
Focus has been almost solely on host processor boot firmware
Focus has been almost solely on protection
All firmware needs protection mechanisms
Unfortunately, protection mechanisms are not always perfect
Detection and Recovery mechanisms are also required



What now?

Improving system firmware resiliency

Protection

- Ensure integrity of all firmware and critical data
- Ensure only authentic firmware and only valid critical data updates
- Ensure update mechanisms cannot be bypassed

Detection

- Must be able to reliably detect a failure of the protection mechanism
- Ideally done before firmware is executed
- Do not allow corruption of firmware or critical data to corrupt the detection mechanism

Recovery

- Secure mechanism
- State of integrity
- At scale

Founded in roots of trust

- Ideally immutable



Firmware resiliency considerations

Cost

- Likely additional compute & storage
- Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE)

Performance

- Digital signature verification takes non-zero time

Device Cooperation

- Some devices may need help from other devices

Supplier Cooperation

- Lots of suppliers involved in any reasonably complex system

System firmware resiliency is critical to system resiliency



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