

### Building Cyber Resilient Systems A National and Economic Security Imperative

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
The Current Landscape. It's a dangerous world in cyberspace...





## Cyber Risk.

Function (threat, vulnerability, impact, likelihood)









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#### **Defense Science Board Reports**





# Our appetite for *advanced technology* is rapidly exceeding our ability to protect it.



## Data. Data. Everywhere.

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### Houston, we have a problem.



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
Protecting critical systems and assets and making them cyber resilient— The highest priority for the national and economic security interests of the United States.

## Defending cyberspace in 2018 and beyond.

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# Reducing susceptibility to *cyber threats* requires a multidimensional strategy.






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### NIST SP 800-160, Volume 2

#### Systems Security Engineering

Cyber Resiliency Considerations for the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems







The ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or compromises on systems that use or are enabled by cyber resources.



#### CYBER RESILIENCY ENGINEERING

PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY.

### FOCUS ON MISSION OR BUSINESS

Cyber resiliency focuses on capabilities supporting organizational missions or business functions. It maximizes the ability of organizations to complete critical or essential missions or business functions despite an adversary presence in their systems and infrastructure, threatening mission-critical systems and system components.



#### CYBER RESILIENCY ENGINEERING

PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY.

### FOCUS ON ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREAT

Cyber resiliency addresses threats to systems containing cyber resources, whether such threats are cyber or non-cyber (e.g., kinetic). But the focus of cyber resiliency is on the APT. The resources associated with the APT, its stealthy nature, its persistent focus on the target of interest, and its ability to adapt in the face of defender actions make it a highly dangerous threat.



#### CYBER RESILIENCY ENGINEERING

PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY.

### ASSUME ADVERSARY WILL COMPROMISE SYSTEM

A fundamental assumption of cyber resiliency is that a sophisticated adversary cannot always be kept out of a system or be quickly detected and removed from that system, despite the quality of the system design, functional effectiveness of the security components, and trustworthiness of the selected components.



#### CYBER RESILIENCY ENGINEERING

PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY.

### ASSUME ADVERSARY WILL MAINTAIN A PRESENCE

Cyber resiliency assumes that the adversary presence in the system may be a persistent and long-term issue—and recognizes that the stealthy nature of the APT makes it difficult for an organization to be certain that the threat has been eradicated. It also recognizes that the ability of the APT to adapt implies that mitigations that previously were successful may no longer be effective.










# Cyber resiliency relationships with other specialty engineering disciplines.





# Cyber Resiliency Applicability.




# CREF

### CYBER RESILIENCY ENGINEERING FRAMEWORK

PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY.



### Relationship among cyber resiliency constructs.





# CREF

### CYBER RESILIENCY ENGINEERING FRAMEWORK

PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY.



- Prevent or Avoid
  - Prepare
    - Continue
      - Constrain
        - Reconstitute
          - Understand
            - Transform
              - **Re-Architect**

# CREF

### CYBER RESILIENCY ENGINEERING FRAMEWORK

PROTECTION. DAMAGE LIMITATION. RESILIENCY.

·	Adaptive Response	<ul> <li>Non-Persistence</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Analytic Monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Diversity</li> </ul>
Tachuisusa	Coordinated Protection	Realignment
Techniques	Substantiated Integrity	<ul> <li>Redundancy</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Privilege Restriction</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Segmentation</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Dynamic Positionii</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Dynamic Representation</li> </ul>	sentation - Unpredictability

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### Cyber Resiliency Constructs in System Life Cycle.



### *ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288:2015*

Systems and software engineering — System life cycle processes




- Business or mission analysis
  - Stakeholder needs and requirements definition
    - System requirements definition
      - Architecture definition
        - Design definition
          - System analysis
            - Implementation
            - Integration
          - Verification
        - Transition
      - Validation
    - Operation
  - Maintenance
- Disposal





### Cyber Resiliency and the Risk Management Framework.





### Some final thoughts.





# Transparency. Traceability.







Institutionalize.

### Cyber Resiliency.



Operationalize.



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Cyber resilient systems can not be achieved without planning and resources...



Leadership. Governance. Accountability.



## **On the Horizon...**

#### NIST Special Publication 800-160, Volume 2

Systems Security Engineering Cyber Resiliency Considerations for the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems Final Publication: October 2018

### NIST Special Publication 800-160, Volume 3

Systems Security Engineering Software Assurance Considerations for the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems Final Publication: December 2019

### NIST Special Publication 800-160, Volume 4

Systems Security Engineering Hardware Assurance Considerations for the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems Final Publication: December 2020



### NIST Special Publication 800-160, Volume 2 Systems Security Engineering Cyber Resiliency Considerations for the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems

### Public Comment Period March 21 — May 18, 2018 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-160/vol-2/draft

### Please send comments to sec-cert@nist.gov

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#### CYBER RESILIENCY ENGINEERING FRAMEWORK

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