From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: MEGE, Alexandre <alexandre.mege@airbus.com> Monday, July 15, 2019 11:02 AM lightweight-crypto lwc-forum@list.nist.gov OFFICIAL COMMENT: Triad

Dear All,

It seems TRIAD is vulnerable to forgery attack.

This vulnerability comes from the absence of domain separation between AD and PT processing.

This leads to a forgery attack where the padding pattern including the AD length separating AD and PT data is moved from the correct pattern limit to a decoy pattern embedded in the PT data.

This could be solved by using different tweaks for processing the AD and PT part of the input data.

Ex for triadaev1:

Key=0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f

Nonce=0x2a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435

Ad=0x00

Ct=0xab19f549a3f2723e5e17360726c51b

Key=0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f

Nonce=0x2a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435

Pt=0x

Ad=0x00<u>0100000000000</u>

Ct=0x3e5e17360726c51b

Best regards,

Alexandre Mège

Takanori Isobe <takanori.isobe@ai.u-hyogo.ac.jp></takanori.isobe@ai.u-hyogo.ac.jp>
Thursday, July 18, 2019 7:03 PM
MEGE, Alexandre
lightweight-crypto; triad-designers@googlegroups.com; lwc-forum@list.nist.gov
Re: [lwc-forum] OFFICIAL COMMENT: Triad

Dear Alexandre,

Thank you very much for your analysis. As you pointed out, our padding is not proper. We will add the length padding for PT after absorbing the message, which totally defends the forgery attack.

Best Regards, Triad Team

On 2019/07/16 0:02, MEGE, Alexandre wrote:

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Ex for triadaev1:

Key=0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f

Nonce=0x2a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435

Pt=0x<u>0800000000000</u>

Ad=0x00

Ct=0xab19f549a3f272<u>3e5e17360726c51b</u>

Key=0x000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f

Nonce=0x2a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435