

Deep Dive:
NIST SP 800-171r1
and
DRAFT NIST SP 800-171B
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Jason McNew, CISSP

Stronghold Cyber Security

jason@strongholdcybersecurity.com

www.strongholdcybersecurity.com

1.800.378.1187

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Purpose

The purpose of this whitepaper is an in-depth comparison of:

- NIST SP 800-171 Revision 1, *Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations*

TO

- DRAFT NIST 800-171B *Enhanced Security Requirements for Critical Programs and High Value Assets*

This white paper was not written to be extremely technical and is intended for both security professionals who work with NIST 800-171, as well as managers and executives overseeing compliance efforts. It is important to note that 800-171B is in DRAFT form at the time this white paper was published.

Background

NIST 800-171B contains 33 enhanced requirements beyond the original 110 controls in revision 1. The basic rationale for 800-171B is summed up in the “Notes to Reviewers” section of that draft document:

“This publication provides a set of enhanced security requirements to protect the confidentiality of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) in nonfederal systems and organizations from the advanced persistent threat (APT).”

“The APT is extremely dangerous to the national and economic security interests of the United States since we are totally dependent on computing systems of all types—including traditional Information Technology (IT) systems, Operational Technology (OT) systems, Internet of Things (IoT) systems, and Industrial IoT (IIoT) systems.”

The large prime contractors such as Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics already have highly evolved cybersecurity programs, so it is the remainder of the supply chain that is starting to get some MAJOR attention from the DoD where their cybersecurity (or lack of it) is concerned.

800-171B goes on to say:

“The enhanced security requirements provide the foundation for a new multidimensional, defense-in-depth protection strategy that includes three, mutually supportive and reinforcing components: (1) penetration resistant architecture; (2) damage limiting operations; and (3) designing for cyber resiliency and survivability.”

In other words, they are moving the DoD supply chain toward a more Risk Management based approach, by not only adding additional requirements for protective technologies, but also strategies to contain and limit the impact of breaches when they inevitably do happen. To that end, 171B contains mappings to the NIST CSF (Cybersecurity Framework), which is very useful to both executives and security managers.

Analysis

For each control family, we will begin with a brief high-level discussion of 800-171’s original FIPS 200 derived basic requirements, followed by a description and explanation of 800-171B’s enhancements to those requirements. In some cases, we cite well-known vendors as solution examples – this is for demonstrative purposes only and should not be taken as an endorsement of those companies’ products and/or services.

That said, let’s get into the meat and potatoes of 800-171B here. Everything that really matters can be found in chapter three. As with the original 800-171, the new enhanced requirements are organized into 14 families – *Access Control, Awareness and Training, Audit and Accountability, Configuration Management, Identification and Authentication, Incident Response, Media Protection, Personnel Security, Physical Protection, Risk Assessment, Security Assessment, System and Communications Protection, and System and Information Integrity*. We’ll go through the enhanced controls family by family.

3.1 Access Control

This family contains 2 basic requirements and 20 derived. The basic requirements are to:

- *Limit system access to authorized users, processes acting on behalf of authorized users, and devices (including other systems).*
- *Limit system access to the types of transactions and functions that authorized users are permitted to execute.*

A properly designed and maintained standard business support system that is Windows based and following [The 20 CIS Controls & Resources](#) can meet most of this family without much additional effort or cost.

Revision B contains 3 enhanced security requirements beyond the first 22:

3.1.1e Employ dual authorization to execute critical or sensitive system and organizational operations.

Do not confuse this requirement with 2FA and MFA (dual and multi-factor authentication); they are not the same at all. What they are referring to here is TPI, or “Two Person Integrity”. This means that two people are required when executing certain “commands, operations, or functions” – meaning those operations deemed to be the most critical to your organization.

3.1.2e Restrict access to systems and system components to only those information resources that are owned, provisioned, or issued by the organization.

Any BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) goes out the window with this one for sure. As it currently reads, this also seems to imply that cloud services can’t be used, but when we dig into the guidance from 800-53, it qualifies that a little further and gives us the option to either *restrict* or *prohibit* the use of external information systems. There are many DoD contractors using cloud, but it has to be the right kind of cloud (such as Microsoft GCC or Google Government Cloud). This is also going to create some additional burdens where third party protective services such as SIEM and vulnerability scanning go.

3.1.3e Employ secure information transfer solutions to control information flows between security domains on connected systems.

Controlling the flow of CUI, especially in large organizations, can be very challenging. The first step in the process is usually a room full of people and a whiteboard, so that we can figure out where all of the CUI actually *is* -- and that is just the beginning. We recently did exactly this with a large cloud company, and determined that CUI existed in AWS, Google, Azure, Jira, Salesforce, and numerous proprietary systems that existed outside of the facility that is supposed to be servicing the government. Controlling the flow of CUI (or any other important data) entails a complex mix of both technical and administrative controls.

The main takeaway from this one is that the original control is only mapped to the base portion of AC-4 in NIST 800-53, whereas the newly enhanced control is mapped to 7 additional sections of AC-4, plus SC-46 (Cross Domain Policy Enforcement). Meaning, that controlling the flow of your CUI properly is going to be MUCH more difficult under 800-171B. This control enhancement alone could warrant an entire separate white paper.

3.2 Awareness and Training

This family contains 2 basic controls and 1 derived. The basic requirements are to:

- *Ensure that managers, systems administrators, and users of organizational systems are made aware of the security risks associated with their activities and of the applicable policies, standards, and procedures related to the security of those systems.*
- *Ensure that organizational personnel are adequately trained to carry out their assigned information security-related duties and responsibilities.*

Under the original framework, contractors basically have to have a regular formal cyber security training program in place that includes insider threat training and incident response training. In larger organizations, this control is interpreted to mean that IT and security people should have training commensurate with their job roles. DoD [Directive 8140](#) is a great reference for governing the last part.

Revision B contains 2 enhanced security requirements beyond the first 3:

3.2.1e Provide awareness training focused on recognizing and responding to threats from social engineering, advanced persistent threat actors, breaches, and suspicious behaviors; update the training at least annually or when there are significant changes to the threat

This one is pretty self-explanatory. There are a bunch of vendors such as KnowBe4, Breach Secure Now, Wombat, etc. that contractors are using to train their people – while those are adequate under the original framework, 800-171B is demanding expanded training that is greater in depth.

3.2.2e Include practical exercises in awareness training that are aligned with current threat scenarios and provide feedback to individuals involved in the training and their supervisors.

Again, pretty self-explanatory. Here is what NIST 800-53 AT-2 has to say about this: “Practical exercises may include, for example, no-notice social engineering attempts to collect information, gain unauthorized access, or simulate the adverse impact of opening malicious email attachments or invoking, via spear phishing attacks, malicious web links.”

3.3 Audit and Accountability

This family contains 2 basic requirements and 7 derived. The basic requirements are to:

- *Create and retain system audit logs and records to the extent needed to enable the monitoring, analysis, investigation, and reporting of unlawful or unauthorized system activity.*
- *Ensure that the actions of individual system users can be uniquely traced to those users so they can be held accountable for their actions.*

Interestingly, 800-171B has NO new requirements here – a few words on that are in order here, however. Section 3.3 of the original framework basically mandates a system wide SIEM (Security Information and Event Monitoring) and in fact contains 9 of the 110 total controls -- about 8% of the total framework. If 8% of the framework is SIEM, we know this is something that the DoD takes very seriously. In spite of this fact, around 80% of the clients we have worked with do not have a SIEM at the outset of our assessments and have a tendency to drag their feet on SIEM post assessment. When a client is generally lacking protective technologies such as SIEM, IDPS, and vulnerability scanning, the best answer to that is usually a UTM (Unified Threat Management) solution.

3.4. Configuration Management

This family contains 2 basic requirements, and 7 derived. The basic requirements are to:

- *Establish and maintain baseline configurations and inventories of organizational systems (including hardware, software, firmware, and documentation) throughout the respective system development life cycles.*
- *Establish and enforce security configuration settings for information technology products employed in organizational systems.*

Many DoD contractors fall short on this and have limited written policies and procedures or configure their IT on an ad-hoc basis. ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) is a good resource for standing up a formal configuration management program.

Revision B contains 3 enhanced requirements beyond the first 9:

3.4.1e Establish and maintain an authoritative source and repository to provide a trusted source and accountability for approved and implemented system components.

Well, this sounds kind of like the [NSA's CSfC](#) (Commercial Solutions for Classified Program) which is a lengthy list of COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf) hardware and software that has been vetted and approved for use on classified networks. Any easy way to meet this requirement would be to simply defer to the CSfC for all of your IT shopping needs and make it your company policy to do so. There are more than enough pre-approved products on the CSfC to build and maintain a full scope IT enterprise – I would not describe it as overly limiting.

3.4.2e Employ automated mechanisms to detect the presence of misconfigured or unauthorized system components and remove the components or place the components in a quarantine or remediation network that allows for patching, re-configuration, or other mitigations.

When Stronghold Cyber Security does assessments, there are often significant differences between what the customer thinks they have, and what they actually do have. The first answer to this problem is a robust vulnerability scanner similar to Nessus or Qualys, that can be used to discover unauthorized or misconfigured assets on your network. This control also warrants technology such as 802.1x or Kerberos to automatically restrict the connection of unauthorized or misconfigured assets. This kind of technology is not easy or cheap to maintain.

3.4.3.e Employ automated discovery and management tools to maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available inventory of system components.

Pretty self-explanatory. There are a bunch of advanced tools from various vendors that can do this. You need to know about EVERYTHING that is connected to your information systems at all times, and also receive notifications when unauthorized devices are connected for any reason.

3.5. Identification and Authentication

This family contains 2 basic requirements and 9 derived. The basic requirements are to:

- *Identify system users, processes acting on behalf of users, and devices.*
- *Authenticate (or verify) the identities of users, processes, or devices, as a prerequisite to allowing access to organizational systems.*

Like 3.1 (Access Control), a properly designed and maintained standard business support system that is Windows based and following [The 20 CIS Controls & Resources](#) can meet most of this family without much difficulty – although if your infrastructure is cloud based vs. on premise, things are more complex.

Revision B contains 3 requirements beyond the first 11:

3.5.1e Identify and authenticate systems and system components before establishing a network connection using bidirectional authentication that is cryptographically-based and replay resistant.

The key word here is “BEFORE” establishing a network connection. Taken in conjunction with the enhancements in Configuration Management, this almost certainly means that 802.1x or similar is a must. In advanced environments, some contractors even use VPN *internally*. While impractical, using Wi-Fi along with RADIUS and WPA2 for everything in your environment would probably satisfy the intent of this control.

3.5.2e Employ password managers for the generation, rotation, and management of passwords for systems and system components that do not support multifactor authentication or complex account management.

At first blush this control sounds like it is simply talking about a password manager like KeePass or LastPass, but that isn’t the case. This means not using cheap network or security hardware that only supports a single administrator login and moving into enterprise level gear like HP and Cisco, along with TACACS+ (for example) to manage logins.

3.5.3e Employ automated mechanisms to prohibit system components from connecting to organizational systems unless the components are known, authenticated, in a properly configured state, or in a trust profile.

This control enhancement is working in conjunction with and reinforcing some of the others. The bottom line here is that being a Windows domain member and having MAC filtering in place are not good enough to be part of the information system – we also need advanced IAM (Identity and Access Management) along the lines of what RSA or Okta offer.

3.6. Incident Response

This family contains 2 basic requirements and 1 derived. The basic requirements are to:

- *Establish an operational incident-handling capability for organizational systems that includes preparation, detection, analysis, containment, recovery, and user response activities.*
- *Track, document, and report incidents to designated officials and/or authorities both internal and external to the organization.*

Under the original 800-171 framework, simply having a written Incident Response Plan, appointing some people to security roles and then testing that plan yearly was enough to satisfy the intent of the controls.

Revision B contains 2 requirements beyond the first 3.

3.6.1e Establish and maintain a full-time security operations center capability.

3.6.2e Establish and maintain a cyber incident response team that can be deployed to any location identified by the organization within 24 hours.

These do not require explanation by the likes of us cyber security experts. Get out your check book kids.

3.7 Maintenance

This family contains 2 basic requirements and 4 derived. The basic requirements are to:

- *Perform maintenance on organizational systems.*
- *Provide controls on the tools, techniques, mechanisms, and personnel used to conduct system maintenance.*

A written set of policies and procedures (provided they are actually followed) is generally enough to satisfy the intent of this family. Interestingly, revision B doesn't add anything to this – regular maintenance is critical to the availability of information and information systems. The takeaway here is that like PCI and HIPAA, the DoD is more concerned with protecting the confidentiality of the data than whether your business actually functions – something to keep in mind when implementing this framework. For that reason, it is a good idea to self-impose controls to address the availability of your information systems.

3.8 Media Protection

This family contains 3 basic requirements and 6 derived. *The basic requirements are to:*

- *Protect (i.e., physically control and securely store) system media containing CUI, both paper and digital, and to: Limit access to CUI on system media to authorized users.*
- *Sanitize or destroy system media containing CUI before disposal or release for reuse.*

Removable media is a big risk in terms of data theft, especially where the insider threat is concerned. About half of the companies we have assessed under NIST 800-171r1 have no meaningful media protection (whether technical or administrative) in place at all.

We find it odd that revision B contains no enhancements, and we suspect that might change once its finalized. There should probably be some talk of DLP (Data Loss Prevention) technology in here.

3.9 Personnel Security

This family contains 2 basic requirements and no derived. The basic requirements are to:

- *Screen individuals prior to authorizing access to organizational systems containing CUI.*
- *Ensure that organizational systems containing CUI are protected during and after personnel actions such as terminations and transfers.*

Most contractors screen their people at some level, whether it is using a third-party service such as ADP or doing criminal background checks, and that is all that the first version of 800-171 really required. It's also necessary to terminate system access and collect badges when someone is fired.

Revision B imposes 2 new requirements:

3.9.1e Conduct enhanced personnel screening (vetting) for individual trustworthiness and reassess individual trustworthiness on an ongoing basis.

3.9.2e Ensure that organizational systems are protected whenever adverse information develops regarding the trustworthiness of individuals with access to CUI.

It's not exactly clear on what the difference between a "personnel screen" and "enhanced personnel screening" means – although something along the lines of a [NACI](#) (National Agency Check with Inquiries) could eventually be imposed on everyone working in the Defense Industrial Base. In addition to the initial screening of new hires required under the original framework, revision B now requires keeping an eye on employees with access to CUI after hiring. This is another new requirement that won't be cheap.

3.10 Physical Protection

This family contains 2 basic requirements and 4 derived. The basic requirements are to:

- *Limit physical access to organizational systems, equipment, and the respective operating environments to authorized individuals.*
- *Protect and monitor the physical facility and support infrastructure for organizational systems.*

Most contractors we have assessed have reasonable physical security controls in place, including a badge access system and building alarms. Revision B has nothing to add here. The threat to CUI is mainly virtual, although there have been cases of insider persons working for our nations adversaries and stealing CUI.

3.11 Risk Assessment

This family has only one basic requirement and 2 derived. The basic requirement is to:

- *Periodically assess the risk to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, and individuals, resulting from the operation of organizational systems and the associated processing, storage, or transmission of CUI.*

For smaller contractors, we simply include a Risk Assessment template as part of the SSP, and have the contractor complete it annually. For larger companies a separate exercise driven by NIST 800-30, *Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments*, is more appropriate. This family also requires some form of vulnerability scanning and vulnerability management.

Revision B adds a whole lot to this – 7 enhancements.

3.11.1e Employ threat intelligence to inform the development of the system and security architectures, selection of security solutions, monitoring, threat hunting, and response and recovery activities.

Before developing an SSP and designing security architectures and solutions, DoD contractors need to discuss what information they have, who would want that information, and what capabilities those threat actors may have.

3.11.2e Establish and maintain a cyber threat hunting capability to search for indicators of compromise in organizational systems and detect, track, and disrupt threats that evade existing controls.

The protective technologies prescribed in the original 110 controls – SIEM, IDPS, vulnerability scanning, etc. – are no longer enough. Contractors will need to actively search for toe holds and highly sophisticated streams of data exfiltration in their networks. Expect to implement SSL DPI and application layer gateways. Expect much tighter firewall requirements, especially on outbound traffic.

3.11.3e Employ advanced automation and analytics capabilities to predict and identify risks to organizations, systems, or system components.

This enhancement is intended to augment and/or supplement the required SOC and Incident Response capabilities that contractors will be required to have under 800-171B. Vendors offering this kind of advanced Cyber Threat Intelligence services include FireEye and AlienVault.

3.11.4e Document or reference in the system security plan the risk basis for security solution selection and identify the system and security architecture, system components, boundary isolation or protection mechanisms, and dependencies on external service providers.

This appears to mostly supplement and/or augment the other enhancements in 3.11, but there is some big emphasis on external providers, which these days nearly every IT enterprise has. Contractors will need to not only list all of their providers by type (e.g., software as a service, platform as a service), but also document what security controls their external providers have in place.

3.11.5e Assess the effectiveness of security solutions at least annually to address anticipated risk to the system and the organization based on current and accumulated threat intelligence.

The first version of 800-171 requires that the controls be reviewed on a regular basis, but how often was up to the contractor. Now they are saying flat out – at least annually.

3.11.6e Assess, respond to, and monitor supply chain risks associated with organizational systems.

3.11.7e Develop and update as required, a plan for managing supply chain risks associated with organizational systems.

Contractors need to understand where they fall in the DoD supply chain and use that understanding in the development of their SSP and the selection of their security architecture. You may be making or handling what seem like mundane parts, but if those parts are critical to the operation of a nuclear sub or a B2 bomber, you are a target for reasons of Asymmetric Warfare.

3.12 Security Assessment

This family contains 4 basic requirements and no derived. The basic requirements are to:

- *Periodically assess the security controls in organizational systems to determine if the controls are effective in their application.*
- *Develop and implement plans of action designed to correct deficiencies and reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities in organizational systems.*
- *Monitor security controls on an ongoing basis to ensure the continued effectiveness of the controls.*
- *Develop, document, and periodically update system security plans that describe system boundaries, system environments of operation, how security requirements are implemented, and the relationships with or connections to other systems.*

These 4 controls taken together form the basic mandate to have a System Security Plan (SSP) and a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M). The SSP essentially authorizes the existence of and governs your IT security plan. The POA&M is a document that openly identifies unmet controls, along with a plan to remediate those unmet controls. Contractors are also required to treat the SSP as a living document that must be maintained.

A comment on SSP's here – NIST 800-171r1 does not prescribe a particular format for the SSP itself, so we have seen a variety of arrangements from various assessors. In many cases, security auditors will use an automated tool to run through a lengthy Q&A, and then print out a very long and cumbersome SSP which is difficult for the client to maintain. Stronghold Cyber Security uses the Defense Security Service (DSS) templates for our clients' SSP's and POA&M's. The controls themselves are all addressed in an Excel spreadsheet. This results in a concise, brief, and easy to maintain SSP. If you are considering a third-party assessment, ask what format the SSP will be delivered in. If the entire SSP will all be delivered in a single Word document or similar, find another assessor.

Revision B adds a single enhancement here, but it is significant:

3.12.1e Conduct penetration testing at least annually, leveraging automated scanning tools and ad hoc tests using human experts.

While contractors are given some latitude on how these pen tests will be conducted – internal, external, white/gray/black box, Red Team, etc. – this is an entirely new requirement. Penetration Testing requires highly trained (and expensive) humans to execute properly. Penetration testing can vary wildly in scope, cost, and quality (this cannot be overstated), so the onus is completely on the buyer to find and engage with the right company. Cybersecurity professionals (including Penetration Testers) are not vetted and licensed by the government

like lawyers, doctors, accountants, or even hair dressers and food trucks are. Caveat Emptor (Buyer Beware!!)

3.13 System and Communications Protection

This family contains 2 basic requirements and 14 derived. The basic requirements are to:

- *Monitor, control, and protect communications (i.e., information transmitted or received by organizational systems) at the external boundaries and key internal boundaries of organizational systems.*
- *Employ architectural designs, software development techniques, and systems engineering principles that promote effective information security within organizational systems.*

All in, this family imposes a bunch of requirements – firewalls, network segmentation, DMZ's, FIPS encryption, session control, control of mobile code (Java, Flash) etc. Mostly standard stuff in a mature and well-designed IT environment. It does however require a “deny all, permit by exception” policy on **outbound** firewall traffic – something which in our experience most companies just don't do, or do it poorly.

Revision B adds 4 enhancements:

3.13.1e Employ diverse system components to reduce the extent of malicious code propagation.

At face value, this requirement seems scary – standardization of IT makes administration easier and more cost effective. The discussion of this control does say: *“Satisfying this requirement does not mean that organizations need to acquire and manage multiple versions of operating systems, applications, tools, and communication protocols..... For example, it is common for organizations to employ diverse anti-virus products at different parts of the infrastructure simply because each vendor may issue updates to new malicious code patterns at different times and frequency. Similarly, some organizations employ products from one vendor at the server level, and products from another vendor at the end-user level.”*

3.13.2e Disrupt the attack surface of organizational systems and system components through unpredictability, moving target defense, or non-persistence.

Now we are getting into NSA type stuff. Meeting this control can be done (for example) by periodically changing IP schemes, DNS schemes, and network topologies. Extensive and

creative use of virtualization is another means to achieve this sort of unpredictability and non-persistence.

3.13.3e Employ technical and procedural means to confuse and mislead adversaries through a combination of misdirection, tainting, or disinformation.

Flat-out Information Warfare – use sandboxing, misdirection, and honeypots filled with deliberately tainted information.

3.13.4e Employ physical and logical isolation techniques in the system and security architecture.

Some options here in terms of logical isolation are data tagging, digital rights management (DRM), and data loss prevention (DLP) technology, or logical network segregation using VLAN's and ACL's.

Partial and/or total physical isolation is a good option as well – in large organizations with thousands of nodes, having a much smaller, separate network for handling CUI makes a lot of sense both in terms of cost and security.

3.14 System and Information Integrity

This family contains 3 basic requirements and 4 derived. The basic requirements are to:

- *Identify, report, and correct system flaws in a timely manner.*
- *Provide protection from malicious code at designated locations within organizational systems.*
- *Monitor system security alerts and advisories and take action in response.*

Contractors are expected to perform regular vulnerability scanning, have some kind of VMS (Vulnerability Management System) in place, anti-virus technology, and network and/or host-based intrusion detection – all standard protective technologies.

Revision B adds 6 enhancements:

3.14.1e Employ roots of trust, formal verification, or cryptographic signatures to verify the integrity and correctness of security critical or essential software.

Contractors will need to leverage UEFI, Secure Boot and TPM (Trusted Platform Modules). Cryptographic hashes and signatures will need to be verified as part of a formal configuration and change management process before new software and firmware is installed.

3.14.2e Monitor individuals and system components on an ongoing basis for anomalous or suspicious behavior.

This going to require some advanced integration between various protective technologies – having separate SIEM, IDPS, vulnerability scanning, etc. will not satisfy 800-171B. Contractors will need an advanced UTM that integrates with A/V endpoint protection and DLP, all monitored from a dedicated 24x7 SOC.

3.14.3e Ensure that Internet of Things (IoT), Operational Technology (OT), and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) systems, components, and devices are compliant with the security requirements imposed on organizational systems or are isolated in purpose-specific networks.

Contractors will need to ensure that PLC's (Programmable Logic Controllers), DCS (Distributed Control Systems), SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition), embedded controllers, and all other IoT (Internet of Things) devices are properly isolated and/or protected. We often see massive cybersecurity blind spots in these systems, because contractors tend to be more focused on protecting their (mostly Windows based) business support systems.

3.14.4e Refresh organizational systems and system components from a known, trusted state at least twice annually.

Using a verified trusted source, reload operating systems, applications and firmware twice a year (or more) to get rid of possible hidden APT toe holds.

3.14.5e Conduct periodic reviews of persistent organizational storage locations and purge CUI that is no longer needed consistent with federal records retention policies and disposition schedules.

Have formal policies and procedures in place to ensure that CUI is not retained longer than it is needed to support a specific program or project.

3.14.6e Use threat indicator information relevant to the information and systems being protected and effective mitigations obtained from external organizations to inform intrusion detection and threat hunting.

In addition to deploying highly integrated protective technologies and a full time SOC, contractors will need to participate in threat sharing consortia such as CERTCC, US-CERT, FIRST, ISAO, etc. Use this information in the security decision making process.

Conclusion

If NIST SP 800-171 revision 1 was a mid-sized family sedan, 800-171B would be an exotic sports car; much more complex and several times more expensive to both acquire and operate. For a very moderate sized, 25-50 endpoint system, The DoD is estimating some rather costly implementation figures:

- Process and IT configuration changes: \$50K
- Network Isolation:
 - \$100K to isolate existing network or existing network segment
 - \$500K-2.5M to create new isolated network (depending on network complexity)
- Security Operations Center/Threat related costs: \$75K-150K (if not already met).

These estimates assume that affected contractors are already meeting the 110 controls in NIST 800-171r1, so they are in addition to those efforts. Out of the approximately 69,000 contractors currently processing CUI, around one half of one percent (345) would be subjected to the 33 enhancements of 800-171B. While that may seem like a small number, based on our experience with the Defense Industrial Base, this figure is almost certain to rise.

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