



FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

CryptoComply for Mobile

Software Version 2.1

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Abstract

This document provides a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for CryptoComply for Mobile.

SafeLogic's CryptoComply for Mobile is designed to provide FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic functionality and is available for licensing. For more information, visit

<https://www.safelogic.com/cryptocomply/>.

Table of Contents

1	Introduction	5
1.1	About FIPS 140	5
1.2	About this Document	5
1.3	External Resources	5
1.4	Notices	5
1.5	Acronyms	5
2	CryptoComply for Mobile	7
2.1	Cryptographic Module Specification	7
2.1.1	Validation Level Detail	7
2.1.2	Approved Cryptographic Algorithms	7
2.1.3	Non-Approved Mode of Operation	10
2.2	Module Interfaces	11
2.3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	13
2.3.1	Operator Services and Descriptions	13
2.3.2	Operator Authentication	14
2.4	Physical Security	14
2.5	Operational Environment	14
2.6	Cryptographic Key Management	15
2.6.1	Random Number Generation	16
2.6.2	Key/Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Authorized Access and Use by Role and Service/Function	17
2.6.3	Key/CSP Storage	17
2.6.4	Key/CSP Zeroization	17
2.7	Self-Tests	17
2.7.1	Power-On Self-Tests	18
2.7.2	Conditional Self-Tests	18
2.7.3	Cryptographic Function	19
2.8	Mitigation of Other Attacks	19
3	Guidance and Secure Operation	20
3.1	Crypto Officer Guidance	20
3.1.1	Software Installation	20
3.1.2	Additional Rules of Operation	20
3.2	User Guidance	20
3.2.1	General Guidance	20

List of Tables

Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms	6
Table 2 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section	7
Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Certificates.....	9
Table 4 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping	13
Table 5 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions	14
Table 4 – Tested Environments	14
Table 6 – Module Keys/CSPs	16
Table 7 – Power-On Self-Tests.....	18
Table 8 – Conditional Self-Tests	19

List of Figures

Figure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram.....	12
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1 Introduction

1.1 About FIPS 140

Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140 program. The NVLAP accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140 testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS 140 validation. *Validated* is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140 criteria.

More information is available on the CMVP website at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html>.

1.2 About this Document

This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for CryptoComply for Mobile from SafeLogic provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2. This document contains details on the module's cryptographic keys and critical security parameters. This Security Policy concludes with instructions and guidance on running the module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation.

CryptoComply for Mobile may also be referred to as the “module” in this document.

1.3 External Resources

The SafeLogic website (<http://www.safelogic.com>) contains information on SafeLogic services and products. The Cryptographic Module Validation Program website contains links to the FIPS 140-2 certificate and SafeLogic contact information.

1.4 Notices

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.

1.5 Acronyms

The following table defines acronyms found in this document:

Acronym	Term
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
API	Application Programming Interface
BT	BlueTooth
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO	Crypto Officer
CCCS	Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DRBG	Deterministic Random Number Generator
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
EC	Elliptic Curve
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
GPD	General Purpose Device
GUI	Graphical User Interface
HMAC	(Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
KAT	Known Answer Test
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MD	Message Digest
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NVLAP	National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
OS	Operating System
PKCS	Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PRNG	Pseudo Random Number Generator
PSS	Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RF	Radio Frequency
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
Triple-DES	Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TLS	Transport Layer Security
USB	Universal Serial Bus

Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms

2 CryptoComply for Mobile

2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification

CryptoComply for Mobile is a standards-based “Drop-in Compliance” cryptographic engine for mobile devices. The module delivers core cryptographic functions to mobile platforms and features robust algorithm support, including Suite B algorithms. CryptoComply offloads functions for secure key management, data integrity, data at rest encryption, and secure communications to a trusted implementation.

The module's logical cryptographic boundary is the shared library files and their integrity check HMAC files. The module is a multi-chip standalone embodiment installed on a General Purpose Device.

All operations of the module occur via calls from host applications and their respective internal daemons/processes. As such there are no untrusted services calling the services of the module.

2.1.1 Validation Level Detail

The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:

FIPS 140-2 Section Title	Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services, and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility	1
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

Table 2 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section

2.1.2 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

The module's cryptographic algorithm implementations have received the following certificate numbers from the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program:

Algorithm	CAVP Certificate for iOS	CAVP Certificate for Android
<p>AES</p> <p>ECB (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)</p> <p>CBC (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)</p> <p>CFB1 (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)</p> <p>CFB8 (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)</p> <p>OFB (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)</p> <p>CTR (ext only; 128 , 192 , 256)</p> <p>CCM (KS: 128 , 192 , 256)</p> <p>CMAC (Generation/Verification) (KS: 128, 192, 256)</p> <p>GCM (KS: AES_128(e/d), AES_192(e/d), AES_256(e/d))</p> <p>GMAC_Supported</p>	<p>2126</p>	<p>2125</p>
<p>HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC- SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512</p>	<p>1297</p>	<p>1296</p>
<p>DSA, DSA 2</p> <p>FIPS 186-4</p> <p>PQG Gen: 2048 & 3072 (using SHA-2)</p> <p>PQG Ver: 1024, 2048 & 3072 (using SHA-1 and SHA-2)</p> <p>Key Pair: 2048-bit & 3072-bit</p> <p>Sig Gen: 2048-bit & 3072-bit (using SHA-2)</p> <p>Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 2048-bit & 3072-bit (using SHA-1 & SHA-2)</p>	<p>667</p>	<p>666</p>
<p>ECDSA, ECDSA2</p> <p>FIPS 186-4</p> <p>PKG: Curves (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409 & B-571)</p> <p>PKV: Curves All-P, K & B</p> <p>Sig Gen: Curves P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-283, B-409 & B-571 (SHA-2)</p> <p>SigVer: Curves P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-163, K-233, K-283, B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409 & B-571 (any SHA size)</p> <p>K-409 & K-571 (SHA-1)</p>	<p>320</p>	<p>319</p>

RSA (X9.31, PKCS #1.5, PSS) FIPS 186-2 ANSIX9.31 Sig Gen: 4096 bit (any SHA size) Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 1536-bit, 2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit (any SHA size) PKCS1 V1 5 Sig Gen: 4096-bit (any SHA size) Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 1536-bit, 2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit (any SHA size) PSS Sig Gen: 4096-bit (any SHA size) Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 1536-bit, 2048-bit, 3072-bit, 4096-bit (any SHA size) FIPS 186-4 ANSIX9.31 Sig Gen 2048-bit (using SHA-2) Sig Ver 1024-bit, 2048-bit & 3072-bit (any SHA size) PKCS1 V1 5 Sig Gen: 2048-bit & 3072-bit (using SHA-2) Sig Ver 1024-bit, 2048-bit & 3072-bit (any SHA size) PSS Sig Gen: 2048-bit & 3072-bit (using SHA-2) Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 2048-bit & 3072-bit (any SHA size)	1095	1094
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	1850	1849
Triple-DES TECB (KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only) TCBC (KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only) TCFB1 (KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only) TCFB8 (KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only) TCFB64 (KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only) TOFB (KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only) CMAC (KS: 3-Key; Generation/Verification; Block Size(s): Full / Partial)	1352	1351
SP 800-90A Rev.1 DRBG (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG ¹)	234	233

Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Certificates

¹ Note that AES-128 cannot be used in FIPS mode

2.1.3 Non-Approved Mode of Operation

The module supports a non-approved mode of operation. The algorithms listed in this section are not to be used by the operator in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.

The following algorithms shall not be used:

- RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
- EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
- AES XTS ((KS: XTS_128((e/d) (f/p)) KS: XTS_256((e/d) (f/p))
- CTR_DRBG with AES-128

The following algorithms are disallowed as of January 1, 2016 per the NIST SP 800-131A algorithm transitions:

- NIST-Recommended Random Number Generator Based on ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4
- Two-Key Triple DES Encryption

The following algorithm is disallowed as of October 29, 2015 per the removal from NIST SP 800-90A:

- Dual EC DRBG

The following algorithms are disallowed as of January 1, 2014 per the NIST SP 800-131A algorithm transitions:

- FIPS 186-2 DSA (using SHA-1):
PQG Gen- 1024-bit
Key Gen-1024-bit
Sig Gen-1024-bit
PQG Ver: 1024-bit
Sig Ver: 1024-bit
- FIPS 186-4 DSA
PQG Gen, 1024-bit (any SHA size)
Key Gen, 1024-bit
Sig Gen, 1024-bit (any SHA size), 2048-bit & 3072-bit using SHA-1
- FIPS 186-2 RSA
ANSIX9.31
Key Gen 1024 & 1536
ANSIX9.31
Sig Gen 1024 & 1536 (any SHA size); 2048, 3072 & 4096 using SHA-1
PKCSI V1 5
Sig Gen 1024 & 1536 (any SHA size) 2048, 3072 & 4096 using SHA-1
PSS

Sig Gen 1024 & 1536 (any SHA size) 2048, 3072 & 4096 using SHA-1

- FIPS 186-4 RSA **ANSIX9.31**
Sig Gen 1024 using SHA-1
PKCSI V1 5
Sig Gen 1024 using SHA-1
PSS
Sig Gen 1024 using SHA-1

- FIPS 186-2 ECDSA **PKG: Curves** P-192, K-163 & B-163
Sig Gen Curves All P, K & B
PKG: Curves (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409 & B-571)
PKV: Curves All P, K & B
Sig Ver: Curves All P, K & B

- FIPS 186-4 ECDSA **PKG: Curves** P-192, K-163 & B-163
Sig Gen Curves P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409 & B-571 (using SHA-1)
P-192, K-163 & B-163 (any SHA size)

- CVL (ECC CDH KAS) (non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)

The following algorithms are disallowed as of September 1, 2020 per the FIPS 186-2 transitions:

- FIPS 186-2 RSA (X9.31, PKCS #1.5, PSS)
 - **ANSIX9.31**
 - Key Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit & 4096-bit
 - Sig Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit (any SHA size)

 - **PKCS1 V1 5**
 - Sig Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit (any SHA size)

 - **PSS**
 - Sig Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit (any SHA size)

2.2 Module Interfaces

The figure below shows the module's physical and logical block diagram:




Figure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram

The interfaces (ports) for the physical boundary include the Data/power port, WIFI / BT Transceiver, RF Transceiver, and LCD. When operational, the module does not transmit any information across these physical ports because it is a software cryptographic module. Therefore, the module’s interfaces are purely logical and are provided through the Application Programming Interface (API) that a calling daemon can operate. The logical interfaces expose services that applications directly call, and the API provides functions that may be called by a referencing application (see Section 2.3 – Roles, Services, and Authentication for the list of available functions). The module distinguishes between logical interfaces by logically separating the information according to the defined API.

The API provided by the module is mapped onto the FIPS 140- 2 logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. Each of the FIPS 140- 2 logical interfaces relates to the module’s callable interface, as follows:

FIPS 140-2 Interface	Logical Interface	Module Physical Interface
Data Input	Input parameters of API function calls	Data/power port WIFI / BT Transceiver RF Transceiver

Data Output	Output parameters of API function calls	Data/power port WIFI / BT Transceiver RF Transceiver
Control Input	API function calls	Data/power port WIFI / BT Transceiver RF Transceiver LCD
Status Output	For FIPS mode, function calls returning status information and return codes provided by API function calls.	LCD
Power	None	Data/power port

Table 4 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping

As shown in Figure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram and Table 5 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions, the output data path is provided by the data interfaces and is logically disconnected from processes performing key generation or zeroization. No key information will be output through the data output interface when the module zeroizes keys.

2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication

The module supports a Crypto Officer and a User role. The module does not support a Maintenance role. The User and Crypto-Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services implemented by the Module.

2.3.1 Operator Services and Descriptions

The module supports services that are available to users in the various roles. All of the services are described in detail in the module’s user documentation. The following table shows the services available to the various roles and the access to cryptographic keys and CSPs resulting from services:

Service	Roles	CSP / Algorithm	Permission
Module initialization	Crypto Officer	None	CO: execute
Symmetric encryption/de encryption	User	AES Key, Triple-DES Key	User: read/write/execute
Digital signature	User	RSA Private Key, DSA Private Key	User: read/write/execute
Symmetric key generation	User	AES Key, Triple-DES Key	User: read/write/execute
Asymmetric key generation	User	RSA Private Key, DSA Private Key	User: read/write/execute

Service	Roles	CSP / Algorithm	Permission
Keyed Hash (HMAC)	User	HMAC Key HMAC SHA-1, HMAC SHA- 224, HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, HMAC SHA-512	User: read/write/execute
Message digest (SHS)	User	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	User: read/write/execute
Random number generation	User	DRBG Seed and Seed Key	User: read/write/execute
Show status	Crypto Officer User	None	User and CO: execute
Self test	User	All CSPs	User: read/execute
Zeroize	Crypto Officer User	All CSPs	CO: read/write/execute

Table 5 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions

2.3.2 Operator Authentication

As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles (a Crypto Officer role and User role) in the module that operators may assume. As allowed by Level 1, the module does not support authentication to access services. As such, there are no applicable authentication policies. Access control policies are implicitly defined by the services available to the roles as specified in Table 5 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions.

2.4 Physical Security

This section of requirements does not apply to this module. The module is a software-only module and does not implement any physical security mechanisms.

2.5 Operational Environment

The module operates on a general purpose device (GPD) running a general purpose operating system (GPOS). For FIPS purposes, the module is running on this operating system in single user mode and does not require any additional configuration to meet the FIPS requirements.

The module was tested on the following platforms:

Platform	Operating System	CPU(s)
iPad 3	iOS 5.1, 6, 7	ARM A5X
Galaxy Nexus	Android 4.0	ARM Cortex-A9

Table 6 – Tested Environments

Compliance is maintained for other versions of the respective operating system family where the binary is unchanged. The module, when compiled from the same unmodified source code, is vendor-affirmed to be FIPS 140-2 compliant when running on the following supported operating system(s)²:

- 64-bit iOS 7.1 on iPhone 5S
- Android 4.4 on Google Glass and compatible Android devices

The GPD(s) used during testing met Federal Communications Commission (FCC) FCC Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements for business use as defined by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part15, Subpart B. FIPS 140-2 validation compliance is maintained when the module is operated on other versions of the GPOS running in single user mode, assuming that the requirements outlined in NIST IG G.5 are met.

2.6 Cryptographic Key Management

The table below provides a complete list of Critical Security Parameters used within the module:

Keys and CSPs	Storage Locations	Storage Method	Input Method	Output Method	Zeroization	Access
AES Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call parameter	None	power cycle cleanse()	CO: RWD U: RWD
Triple-DES Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call parameter	None	power cycle cleanse()	CO: RWD U: RWD
RSA Public Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call parameter	None	power cycle cleanse()	CO: RWD U: RWD
RSA Private Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call parameter	None	power cycle cleanse()	CO: RWD U: RWD
DSA Public Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call parameter	None	power cycle cleanse()	CO: RWD U: RWD
DSA Private Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call parameter	None	power cycle cleanse()	CO: RWD U: RWD
HMAC Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call parameter	None	power cycle cleanse()	CO: RWD U: RWD

² Note that the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

Keys and CSPs	Storage Locations	Storage Method	Input Method	Output Method	Zeroization	Access
Integrity Key	NVRAM	Plaintext	None	None	None	CO: RWD U: RWD
EC DSA Private Key	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle cleanse()	CO: RWD U: RWD
EC DSA Public Key	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle cleanse()	CO: RWD U: RWD
HMAC DRBG Entropy	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle cleanse()	CO: RWD U: RWD
HMAC DRBG V Value (Seed Length)	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle cleanse()	CO: RWD U: RWD
HMAC DRBG Key	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle cleanse()	CO: RWD U: RWD
HMAC DRBG init_seed	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle cleanse()	CO: RWD U: RWD

R = Read W = Write D = Delete

Table 7 – Module Keys/CSPs

The application that uses the module is responsible for appropriate destruction and zeroization of the key material. The module provides functions for key allocation and destruction which overwrite the memory that is occupied by the key information with zeros before it is deallocated.

2.6.1 Random Number Generation

The module uses SP800-90A DRBGs for creation of asymmetric and symmetric keys.

The module accepts input from entropy sources external to the cryptographic boundary for use as seed material for the module’s Approved DRBGs. The calling application of the module shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the random bit generation mechanism as shown in NIST Special Publication 800-90A Table 2 (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG) and Table 3 (CTR_DRBG). At a minimum, the entropy source shall provide at least 128-bits of entropy to the DRBG.

The module performs continual tests on the random numbers it uses to ensure that the seed input to the Approved DRBGs do not have the same value. The module also performs continual tests on the output of the Approved DRBGs to ensure that consecutive random numbers do not repeat.

In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per NIST SP 800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed). The resulting symmetric key or asymmetric seed is an unmodified output from a DRBG.

The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with the RFC5288 and RFC5289 and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with [FIPS140-2_IG] IG A.5, provision 1 (“TLS protocol IV generation”); thus, the module is compliant with [SP800-52].

The module makes no assurance of the minimum strength of random strings and generated keys.

When entropy is externally loaded, the module makes no assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys.

2.6.2 Key/Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Authorized Access and Use by Role and Service/Function

An authorized application as user (the User role) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the module.

2.6.3 Key/CSP Storage

Public and private keys are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls or during power cycle. The module does not perform persistent storage of keys.

2.6.4 Key/CSP Zeroization

The application is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions from the API. The destruction functions then overwrite the memory occupied by keys with zeros and deallocates the memory. This occurs during process termination / power cycle. Keys are immediately zeroized upon deallocation, which sufficiently protects the CSPs from compromise.

2.7 Self-Tests

FIPS 140-2 requires that the module perform self tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition some functions require continuous verification of function, such as the random number generator. All of these tests are listed and described in this section. In the event of a self-test error, the module will log the error and will halt. The module must be initialized into memory to resume function.

The following sections discuss the module’s self-tests in more detail.

2.7.1 Power-On Self-Tests

Power-on self-tests are executed automatically when the module is loaded into memory. The module verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA1 digest computed at build time. If the fingerprints match, the power-up self-tests are then performed. If the power-up self-test is successful, a flag is set to place the module in FIPS mode.

TYPE	DETAIL
Software Integrity Check	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HMAC-SHA1 on all module components
Known Answer Tests ³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AES encrypt/decrypt • AES GCM • AES CCM • XTS-AES • AES CMAC • Triple-DES CMAC • EC Diffie-Hellman • HMAC-SHA1 • HMAC-SHA224 • HMAC-SHA256 • HMAC-SHA384 • HMAC-SHA512 • RSA • SHA-1 • SHA-224 • SHA-256 • SHA-384 • SHA-512 • SP 800-90 DRBG (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG) • Triple-DES encrypt/decrypt
Pair-wise Consistency Tests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DSA • RSA • ECDSA

Table 8 – Power-On Self-Tests

Input, output, and cryptographic functions cannot be performed while the Module is in a self-test or error state because the module is single-threaded and will not return to the calling application until the power-up self tests are complete. If the power-up self tests fail, subsequent calls to the module will also fail - thus no further cryptographic operations are possible.

2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The module implements the following conditional self-tests upon key generation, or random number generation (respectively):

³ Note that all SHA-X KATs are tested as part of the respective HMAC SHA-X KAT. SHA-1 is also tested independently.

TYPE	DETAIL
Pair-wise Consistency Tests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DSA • RSA • ECDSA
Continuous RNG Tests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Performed on all Approved DRBGs, the non-approved X9.31 RNG, and the non-approved DUAL_EC_DRBG

Table 9 – Conditional Self-Tests

2.7.3 Cryptographic Function

All security functions and cryptographic algorithms are performed in Approved mode.

The module verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA1 digest which is computed at build time. If this computed HMAC-SHA1 digest matches the stored, known digest, then the power-up self-test (consisting of the algorithm-specific Pairwise Consistency and Known Answer tests) is performed. If any component of the power-up self-test fails, an internal global error flag is set to prevent subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls. Any such power-up self test failure is a hard error that can only be recovered by reinstalling the module⁴. The power-up self-tests may be performed at any time by reloading the module.

No operator intervention is required during the running of the self-tests.

2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The Module does not contain additional security mechanisms beyond the requirements for FIPS 140-2 Level 1 cryptographic modules.

⁴ The initialization function could be re-invoked but such re-invocation does not provide a means from recovering from an integrity test or known answer test failure

3 Guidance and Secure Operation

3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance

3.1.1 Software Installation

The module is provided directly to solution developers and is not available for direct download to the general public. The module and its host application is to be installed on an operating system specified in Section 2.5 or one where portability is maintained.

3.1.2 Additional Rules of Operation

1. The writable memory areas of the module (data and stack segments) are accessible only by the application so that the operating system is in "single user" mode, i.e. only the application has access to that instance of the module.
2. The operating system is responsible for multitasking operations so that other processes cannot access the address space of the process containing the module.

3.2 User Guidance

3.2.1 General Guidance

The module is not distributed as a standalone library and is only used in conjunction with the solution.

The end user of the operating system is also responsible for zeroizing CSPs via wipe/secure delete procedures.

If the module power is lost and restored, the calling application can reset the IV to the last value used.

The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party to encounter this condition shall trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key in accordance with RFC 5246.

The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with the RFC5288 and RFC5289 and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with [FIPS140-2_IG] IG A.5, provision 1 ("TLS protocol IV generation"); thus, the module is compliant with [SP800-52].

In the event the `nonce_explicit` part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, either party (the client or the server) that encounters this condition shall trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key.

SHA-1 is not to be used for Signature Generation.

Triple-DES key usage should be limited to 2^{20} 64-bit blocks (1048576 64-bit blocks or 64Mb).

