

FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework

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Author: Acumen Security **Contributing Authors:** Solaris Security Engineering,

Oracle Security Evaluations – Global Product Security

Oracle Corporation World Headquarters 500 Oracle Parkway Redwood Shores, CA 94065 U.S.A. Worldwide Inquiries:

Phone: +1.650.506.7000 Fax: +1.650.506.7200 www.oracle.com



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1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This document is the Security Policy for the Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework designed by Oracle Corporation. The Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework is also referred to as 'the module' or 'module'. This Security Policy specifies the security rules under which the module shall operate to meet the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1. It also describes how Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework functions in order to meet the FIPS requirements, and the actions that operators must take to maintain the security of Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework.

This Security Policy describes the features and design of the Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework module using the terminology contained in the FIPS 140-2 specification. *FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules* specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module utilized within a security system protecting sensitive but unclassified information. The NIST/CSE Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) validates cryptographic modules to FIPS 140-2. Validated products are accepted by the Federal agencies of both the USA and Canada for the protection of sensitive or designated information.

1.2 Document Organization

The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:

- Oracle Non-Proprietary Security Policy
- Oracle Vendor Evidence document
- Finite State Machine
- Entropy Assessment Document
- Other supporting documentation as additional references

With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Documentation is proprietary to Oracle and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Oracle.

2 Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework

2.1 Functional Overview

The Oracle Solaris Cryptographic Framework is an architecture that enables applications in the Oracle Solaris operating system to use or provide cryptographic services. At a high level it consists of Userland Cryptographic Framework and Kernel Cryptographic Framework. This Security Policy is for the Kernel Cryptographic Framework.



3 Cryptographic Module Specification

3.1 Definition of the Cryptographic Module

The Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework module is a multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module as defined by the requirements of FIPS PUB 140-2. The module provides cryptographic functionality for the kernel module. The module provides encryption, decryption, hashing, signature generation and verification, secure random number generation, and message authentication functions. The module can leverage the algorithm acceleration from SPARC and X86 processors when available.

3.2 Cryptographic Boundary

The cryptographic module is a collection of kernel modules that, collectively, are known as the Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework. A representation of the cryptographic boundary is defined below:




Figure 1: Solaris Cryptographic Framework Cryptographic Boundary



3.3 FIPS 140-2 Validation Scope

The Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework is being validated to overall FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements. See Table 1 below.

Security Requirements Section	Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles and Services and Authentication	1
Finite State Machine Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
EMI/EMC	1
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

Table 1: FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements



3.4 Security Functions

3.4.1 Approved or Allowed Security Functions

The Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework module contains the following FIPS Approved Algorithms listed in Table 2:

Approved or Allowed Security Functions	Certificate			
Symmetric Encryption/Decryption				
AES: (CBC, ECB, CFB128, CTR, CCM, GCM); Encrypt/Decrypt; Key Size = 128, 192, 256	3935			
XTS ¹ ; Encrypt/Decrypt; Full/Partial Block; Key Size = 128, 256				
Triple-DES: TCBC(KO 1 e/d) ; TECB(KO 1 e/d)	2158			
Secure Hash Standard (SHS)				
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512_224, SHA-512_256 (Byte Only)	3243			
Data Authentication Code				
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, HMAC-SHA-512_224, HMAC-SHA-512_256, (KeySizes = KS < BS; KS = BS; KS > BS)	2556			
Asymmetric Algorithms				
RSA: FIPS186-4: ALG[RSASSA-PKCS1_V1_5] SIG(gen) (2048 SHA(224, 256, 384, 512)) (3072 SHA(224, 256, 384, 512)) SIG(Ver) (1024 SHA(1, 224, 256, 384, 512)) (2048 SHA(1, 224, 256, 384, 512)) (3072 SHA(1, 224, 256, 384, 512))	2010			
ECDSA: FIPS186-4: SigVer: CURVES(P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 P-521, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-163, B-233, B-283, B-571: (SHA-1))	861			
Random Number Generation				
NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1: Hash_Based DRBG : [Prediction Resistance Tested: Enabled (SHA-512)]	1142			

Table 2: FIPS Approved or Allowed Security Functions

Note that the DRBG requests 256 bits of entropy per GET function.

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¹ XTS mode can only be used for storage applications



3.4.2 Non-Approved But Allowed Security Functions

The following are considered non-Approved but allowed security functions:

Non-Approved But Allowed	Use
RSA	key wrapping, key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 192 bits of encryption strength

Table 3: Non-Approved but Allowed Security Functions

3.4.3 Non-Approved Security Functions

The following are considered non-Approved security functions:

Non-Approved Security Functions		
MD5	HMAC MD5	
MD4	RC4	
DES	Blowfish	
AES-XCBC-MAC	ECDSA Key Generation and Signature Generation	
Camelia	RSA (key wrapping, non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)	
Triple-DES(2-key option, encrypt/decrypt)		

Table 4: Non-Approved Security Functions

4 Module Ports and Interfaces

The module can be accessed by utilizing the API it exposes. This API is an Oracle-proprietary consumer interface. Table 5 below, shows the interfaces provided by the module.

FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface	Logical Port
Data Input	Input arguments to Oracle-proprietary API
Data Output	Output arguments to Oracle-proprietary API
Control Input	Oracle-proprietary API
Status Output	Return variables of Oracle-proprietary API
Power	N/A

Table 5: Mapping of FIPS 140 Logical Interfaces to Logical Ports



5 Operating System

5.1 Definition of Operating System Embodiment

The module runs on a general purpose operating system as defined in section 4.6 of FIPS PUB 140-2. The module uses a strong integrity test using HMAC-SHA-256.

5.2 Tested Configurations

The module was tested on the following configurations:

Hardware	Processor	Operating System
Oracle SPARC T5-1B Server	SPARC T5 (with and without acceleration)	Solaris 11.3
Oracle SPARC T7-2 Server	SPARC M7 (with and without acceleration)	Solaris 11.3
Oracle Server X5-2	Intel Xeon E5 (with and without acceleration)	Solaris 11.3

Table 6: Tested Operational Environments

5.3 Vendor Affirmed Configurations

Additionally, Oracle affirms that the module will function the same way and provide the same security services on any of the systems listed below².

S3 Core Processors

- Oracle SPARC T4-1
- Oracle Netra SPARC T4-1B
- Oracle SPARC T4-2
- Oracle SPARC T4-4
- Oracle SPARC T4-1B
- Oracle Netra SPARC T5-1B
- Oracle SPARC T5-2
- Oracle SPARC T5-4 Server
- Oracle SPARC T5-8 Server
- Oracle SPARC M5-32 Server
- Oracle SPARC M6-32 Server

S4 Core Processors

- Oracle SPARC T7-1 Server
- Oracle SPARC T7-4 Server

² The CMVP makes no claims as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment which is not listed on the validation certificate.



- Oracle SPARC M7-8 Server
- Oracle SPARC M7-16 Server
- Oracle SPARC S7-2 Server
- Oracle SPARC S7-2L Server
- Oracle MiniCluster S7-2 Engineered System
- Netra SPARC S7-2

X86 Systems

- Oracle Sun Blade X3-2B
- Oracle Sun Server X3-2
- Oracle Sun Server X3-2L
- Oracle Sun Blade X4-2B
- Oracle Sun Server X4-2
- Oracle Sun Server X4-2L
- Oracle Sun Server X4-4
- Oracle Sun Server X4-8
- Oracle Sun Server X5-2
- Oracle Sun Server X5-2L
- Oracle Sun Server X5-4
- Oracle Sun Server X5-8
- Oracle Netra Server X3-2
- Oracle Netra Server X5-2
- Oracle Server X5-2M
- Oracle Server X6-2
- Oracle Server X6-2L
- Oracle Server X6-2M
- Oracle Server X6-2S

Fujitsu further affirms that the module will function the same way and provide the same security services on any of the systems listed below.

Note: The following Fujitsu M10/12 SPARC systems using the SPARC64 processor are known by different product marketing names depending on locale and are otherwise identical:

- Fujitsu M10-1 is named the SPARC M10-1 in Japan.
- Fujitsu M10-4 is named the SPARC M10-4 in Japan.
- Fujitsu M10-4S is named the SPARC M10-4S in Japan.
- Fujitsu SPARC M12-1 is named the SPARC M12-1 in Japan.
- Fujitsu SPARC M12-2 is named the SPARC M12-2 in Japan.
- Fujitsu SPARC M12-2S is named the SPARC M12-2S in Japan.



6 Roles and Services

The Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework implements two roles - a Crypto Officer Role (CO) and a User Role (U) that are implicitly assumed by operators based on the services they execute.

Table 7 gives a high level description of all services provided by the module and lists the roles allowed to invoke each service. The following abbreviations are used for roles:

X – Execute (includes read and write operations), Z – Zeroize

U	СО	Service Name	Service Description	Keys and CSP(s)	Access Type(s)
	X Run POSTs on-demand Restarting the appliance will force the FIPS self-tests to run when the module is loaded. Alternatively the appropriate API can also be called to run the on-demand self-test.		Software Integrity Key	Х	
	Х	Module Initialization	Use external cryptoadm utility to initialize the FIPS state.	N/A	N/A
	Х	Module Configuration	Use external cryptoadm utility to configure the module.	N/A	N/A
	Х	Zeroize Keys	Format operation on the host appliance's hard drive and power-cycle	All keys	Z
Х		Symmetric Encryption and Decryption	Encrypt/Decrypt data using a symmetric algorithm	Symmetric Keys	X
Х		Asymmetric Key establishment	Establish keys using RSA key wrapping	Asymmetric Private Key (RSA)	X
Х		Signature Generation	Generate RSA signatures	Asymmetric Private Key (RSA)	Х
Х		Signature Verification	Verify RSA and ECDSA signatures	No Key/CSP access but uses Asymmetric Public Key (RSA and ECDSA)	N/A
Х		Hashing	Perform a hashing operation on a block of data, using SHA algorithm	N/A	N/A
X		НМАС	Perform a hashing operation on a block of data, using a keyed Hashed Message Authentication Code with any of the hashing operations listed above	Keyed Hash Key (HMAC)	Х
Х		Random Number	Generate random numbers using SP 800-90A DRBG	DRBG V value	Х
		Generation		DRBG C value	X
				Entropy	X

Table 7: Services Authorized for Roles

Note: The services listed above can also be executed using non-approved algorithms (See Section 3.4.3) thereby making them non-approved services.



7 Key and CSP Management

The following keys, cryptographic key components and other critical security parameters are contained in the module.

CSP Name	Generation/Input	Input/Output	Storage	Use
Symmetric Keys (AES and Triple-	Entered via API	Input via API	RAM	Used for symmetric encryption and decryption
DES)				
Asymmetric Key pairs	Entered via API	Input via API	RAM	Used for RSA signature generation and verification
Keyed Hash Key (HMAC)	Generated internally via	Input via API	RAM	Used for keyed hashing (HMAC)
	DRBG and Entered via API			
DRBG V value	Generated internally via	N/A	RAM	Used as part of SP 800-90A DRBG
	entropy input			
DRBG C value	Generated internally via	N/A	RAM	Used as part of SP 800-90A DRBG
	entropy input			
Entropy	Entered via API	N/A	RAM	Used as part of SP 800-90A DRBG
Software Integrity Key (HMAC)	N/A	N/A	Disk	Installed as part of crypto module installation

Table 8: Cryptographic Keys and CSPs



8 Self-Tests

8.1 Power-Up Self-Tests

Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework performs the following power-up self-tests when power is applied to the module. These self-tests require no inputs or actions from the operator:

- Software Integrity Test (HMAC-SHA-256)
- AES (Encrypt/Decrypt) KAT
- Triple-DES (Encrypt/Decrypt) KAT
- HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
- RSA sign/verify KAT
- ECDSA sign/verify test
- DRBG KAT

When the module is in a power-up self-test state or error state, the data output interface is inhibited and remains inhibited until the module can transition into an operational state.

8.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The module performs the following conditional self-tests when called by the module:

- DRBG conditional test to verify that the output of DRBG is not the same as the previously generated value;
- DRBG Health Tests; and
- Entropy source conditional test to verify that the output of the entropy source to be used as seeding material into the FIPS Approved DRBG is not the same as the previously generated value.

9 Crypto-Officer and User Guidance

The module meets Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to place and keep the module in a FIPS-approved mode of operation.

9.1 Secure Setup and Initialization

- 1. Firstly, the Crypto Officer must create a BE based on current configuration and boot it:
- # beadm create S11.3-FIPS-140
- # beadm activate S11.3-FIPS-140
- # reboot
- 2. Upon successful reboot, in the new BE, enable FIPS 140 mode in the Cryptographic Framework:
- # cryptoadm enable fips-140

If the fips-140 package is not yet loaded, this command also loads the package.

3. After the consumers are configured, reboot the BE.



reboot

At this time the system should be in FIPS mode of operation. This can be verified by issuing the following command:

cryptoadm list fips-140

In the output at least the following providers should have FIPS 140 mode enabled:

- DES
- AES
- ECC
- SHA1
- SHA2
- RSA

9.2 Module Security Policy Rules

This section describes the rules for operating the module in FIPS-approved mode of operation.

9.2.1 Crypto-Officer Guidance

The Crypto-Officer is responsible for making sure the module is running in FIPS-Approved mode of operation and to ensure that only FIPS-Approved algorithms are utilized. Algorithms listed in Table 4, shall not be used in FIPS-Approved mode of operation.

9.2.1.1 Initialization

It is the Crypto-Officer's responsibility to configure the module into the FIPS-Approved mode.

9.2.1.2 Management

Using the commands available to the Crypto-Officer, outlined in Table 7, the cryptoadm utility can be used to configure and manage the module.

9.2.1.3 Zeroization

As shown in **Table 8**, certain keys are stored on the host appliance's hard drive. A format of the host appliance's hard-drive will zeroize all keys. Additionally keys in RAM can be zeroized via a power-cycle.

9.2.2 User Guidance

It is the responsibility of the User to ensure that only FIPS-Approved algorithms and providers are being utilized. The User is required to operate the module in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. In order to maintain FIPS-mode, the User must only utilize the module interfaces to call FIPS-Approved algorithms. Moreover for AES GCM, IVs must be generated internally only and must be at least 96-bits.



10 Mitigation of Other Attacks

This section is not applicable. The module does not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements for this validation.



Appendices

Acronyms, Terms and Abbreviations

Term	Definition	
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard	
BE	Boot Environment	
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program	
CSE	Communications Security Establishment of Canada	
CSP	Critical Security Parameter	
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator	
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm	
EDC	Error Detection Code	
HMAC (Keyed) Hash Message Authentication Code		
KAT Known Answer Test		
LED Light Emitting Diode		
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology		
POST Power On Self Test		
PUB	Publication	
RAM	Random Access Memory	
ROM Read Only Memory		
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm		
AES-NI	Advanced Encryption Standard – New Instructions	
TLS	Transport Layer Security	
SPARC	Scalable Processor Architecture	



References

The FIPS 140-2 standard, and information on the CMVP, can be found at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html. More information describing the Oracle Solaris Kernel Cryptographic Framework can be found on the Oracle web site at www.oracle.com.

This Security Policy contains non-proprietary information. All other documentation submitted for FIPS 140-2 conformance testing and validation is "Oracle - Proprietary" and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements.

Document	Author	Title
FIPS PUB 140-2	NIST	FIPS PUB 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules (Dec. 2002)
FIPS IG	NIST	Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program
FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex A	NIST	FIPS 140-2 Annex A: Approved Security Functions
FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex B	NIST	FIPS 140-2 Annex B: Approved Protection Profiles
FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex C	NIST	FIPS 140-2 Annex C: Approved Random Number Generators
FIPS PUB 140-2 Annex D	NIST	FIPS 140-2 Annex D: Approved Key Establishment Techniques
DTR for FIPS PUB 140-2	NIST	Derived Test Requirements (DTR) for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
NIST SP 800-67	NIST	Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm TDEA Block Cypher
FIPS PUB 197	NIST	Advanced Encryption Standard
FIPS PUB 198-1	NIST	The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
FIPS PUB 186-4	NIST	Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
FIPS PUB 180-4	NIST	Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
NIST SP 800-131A	NIST	Recommendation for the Transitioning of Cryptographic
Rev. 1		Algorithms and Key Sizes
NIST SP 800-90A	NIST	Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Rev. 1		Deterministic Random Bit Generators
PKCS#1	RSA Laboratories	PKCS#1 v1.5: RSA Cryptographic Standard

All of the above references are available at URL: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.