Apple Inc.



Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0 FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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89	7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 ELE 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2	Random Number Generation	22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 23 24 24 24 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25

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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose

This document is a non-proprietary Security Policy for the Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0. It describes the module and the FIPS 140-2 cryptographic services it provides. This document also defines the FIPS 140-2 security rules for operating the module.

This document was prepared in fulfillment of the FIPS 140-2 requirements for cryptographic modules and is intended for security officers, developers, system administrators, and end-users.

FIPS 140-2 details the requirements of the Governments of the U.S. and Canada for cryptographic modules, aimed at the objective of protecting sensitive but unclassified information.

For more information on the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program please refer to the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval.

Throughout the document "Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0." "cryptographic module", "CoreCrypto" or "the module" are used interchangeably to refer to the Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0.

1.2 Document Organization / Copyright

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1.3 External Resources / References

The Apple website (http://www.apple.com) contains information on the full line of products from Apple Inc. For a detailed overview of the operating system macOS and its security properties refer to [MACOS] and [SEC]. For details on macOS releases with their corresponding validated modules and Crypto Officer Role Guides refer to the Apple Knowledge Base Article HT201159 - " Product security certifications, validations, and guidance for OS X" (<u>https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201159</u>)

The Cryptographic Module Validation Program website

(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html) contains links to the FIPS 140-2 certificate and Apple, Inc. contact information.

1.3.1 Additional References

- FIPS 140-2 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, "FIPS PUB 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules," May 2001
- FIPS 140-2 NIST, "Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic IG Module Validation Program," November 15, 2016
- FIPS 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, March 2012, Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
- FIPS 186-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013, Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
- FIPS 197 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
- FIPS 198 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198, July, 2008 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
- SP800-38 A NIST Special Publication 800-38A, "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation", December 2001
- SP800-38 C NIST Special Publication 800-38C, "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality", May 2004
- SP800-38 D NIST Special Publication 800-38D, "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", November 2007
- SP800-38 E NIST Special Publication 800-38E, "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices", January 2010
- SP800-38 F NIST Special Publication 800-38E, "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping", December 2012
- SP800-57P1NIST Special Publication 800-57, "Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General (Revised)," July 2012
- SP 800-90A NIST Special Publication 800-90, "Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators (Revised)," January 2012
- SP800-132 NIST Special Publication 800-132, "Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation", December 2010
- MACOS macOS Technical Overview <u>https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/#documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OS</u> X_Technology_Overview/About/About.html
- SEC Security Overview
 <u>https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/navigation/#section=Topics&topic=Securit</u>
 <u>Y</u>
 UG User Guide

Location: <u>https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201159</u>

1.4 Acronyms

Acronyms found in this document are defined as follows:				
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard			
BS	Block Size			
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program			
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining mode of operation			
CFB	Cipher Feedback mode of operation			
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program			
CSP	Critical Security Parameter			
CTR	Counter mode of operation			
DES	Data Encryption Standard			
DH	Diffie-Hellman			
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator			
ECB	Electronic Codebook mode of operation			
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography			
EC Diffie-Hellman	Diffie-Hellman based on ECC			
ECDSA	DSA based on ECC			
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility			
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference			
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard			
FIPS PUB	FIPS Publication			
GCM	Galois/Counter Mode			
HMAC	Hash-Based Message Authentication Code			
KAT	Known Answer Test			
KDF	Key Derivation Function			
API	Kernel Programming Interface			
KS	Key Size (Length)			
MAC	Message Authentication Code			
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology			
OFB	Output Feedback (mode of operation)			
OS	Operating System			
PBKDF	Password-based Key Derivation Function			
PCT	Pair-wise Consistency Test			
RNG	Random Number Generator			
SHS	Secure Hash Standard			
Triple-DES	Triple Data Encryption Standard			
TLS	Transport Layer Security			

Acronyms found in this document are defined as follows:

Cryptographic Module Specification 2

2.1 **Module Description**

The Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0 is a software cryptographic module running on a multi-chip standalone general-purpose computing platform.

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The cryptographic services provided by the module are:

- Data encryption / decryption •
- Random number generation
- Generation of hash values •
- Key wrapping •
- Message authentication •

- Key generation Signature generation / verification •
- Key derivation .

2.1.1 Module Validation Level

The module is intended to meet requirements of FIPS 140-2 security level 1 overall. The following table shows the security level for each of the eleven requirement areas of the validation.

FIPS 140-2 Security Requirement Area	Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
EMI/EMC	1
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	1
Mitigation of Other Attacks	1

Table 1: Module Validation Level

2.1.2 **Module components**

In the following sections the components of the Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0 are listed in detail. There are no components excluded from the validation testing.

2.1.2.1 Software components

CoreCrypto has an API layer that provides consistent interfaces to the supported algorithms. These implementations include proprietary optimizations of algorithms that are fitted into the CoreCrypto framework.

2.1.2.2 Hardware components

AES-NI hardware acceleration is included within the cryptographic module boundary.

2.1.3 Tested Platforms

The module has been tested on the following platforms with and without AES-NI:

Manufacturer	Model	Operating System
Apple Inc. Mac mini with i5 CPU		macOS Sierra v10.12.2 ¹
· ••••		macOS Sierra v10.12.2
		macOS Sierra v10.12.2
Apple Inc.	MacBook with Core M CPU	macOS Sierra v10.12.2

Table 2: Tested Platforms

2.2 Modes of operation

The Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0 has an Approved and non-Approved mode of operation. The Approved mode of operation is configured by default and cannot be changed. If the device starts up successfully then CoreCrypto framework has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode. Any calls to the non-Approved security functions listed in Table 4 will cause the module to assume the non-Approved mode of operation.

The module transitions back into FIPS mode immediately when invoking one of the approved ciphers as all keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSP) handled by the module are ephemeral and there are no keys and CSPs shared between any functions. A re-invocation of the self-tests or integrity tests is not required.

Even when using this FIPS 140-2 non-approved mode, the module configuration ensures that the self-tests are always performed during initialization time of the module.

The module contains multiple implementations of the same cipher as listed below. If multiple implementations of the same cipher are present, the module automatically selects which cipher is used based on internal heuristics. This includes the hardware-assisted AES implementation (AES-NI).

The Approved security functions are listed in Table 3. Column four (Algorithm Certificate) lists the validation numbers obtained from NIST for successful validation testing of the implementation of the cryptographic algorithms on the platforms as shown in Table 2 under CAVP.

Refer to http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/index.html for the current standards, test requirements, and special abbreviations used in the following table.

Cryptographic Function	Algorithm	Options	Algorithm Certificate
Random Number Generation; Symmetric key generation	[SP 800-90] DRBG	CTR_DRBG Generic Software Implementation Key Size: 128 bit key size	1299, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305, 1306
3		CTR_DRBG AES Optimized Assembler Implementation Key Size: 128 bit key size	1307, 1308, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314

Approved Security Functions:

¹ macOS Sierra (version 10.12) is the thirteenth release of macOS (previously OS X). Throughout the document it is generically referred to as macOS Sierra.

Cryptographic Function	Algorithm	Options	Algorithm Certificate
		CTR_DRBG AES-NI Hardware Implementation Key Size: 128 bit key size	1291, 1292, 1293, 1294, 1295, 1296, 1297, 1298
		HMAC_DRBG Generic Software Implementation SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512)	1299, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305, 1306
	[FIPS 197] AES SP 800-38 A SP 800-38 C SP 800-38 D	Generic Software Implementation (Based on LibTomCrypt): Key Sizes: 128/192/256 bits Modes: ECB, CCM, CFB8, CFB128, CTR, GCM, KW, OFB, XTS	4215, 4216, 4217, 4218, 4219, 4220, 4221, 4222
	SP 800-38 E SP 800-38 F	Generic Software Implementation (Based on Gladman): Key Sizes: 128/192/256 bits Modes: CBC	4191, 4192, 4193, 4194, 4195, 4196, 4197, 4198
		Optimized Assembler Implementation: Key Sizes: 128/192/256 bits Modes: ECB, CBC, CCM, CFB8,	4223, 4224, 4225, 4226, 4227, 4228, 4229, 4230
		CFB128, CTR, GCM, KW, OFB, XTS AES-NI Hardware Implementation with Optimized Assembler Implementation of block chaining modes: Modes: ECB, CBC, CTR, GCM, XTS	4207, 4208, 4209, 4210, 4211, 4212, 4213, 4214
		Key Sizes: 128/192/256 bits AES-NI Hardware Implementation with Generic Software Implementation of block chaining modes:	4270, 4271, 4272, 4273, 4274, 4275, 4276, 4277
		Modes: CCM, CFB8, CFB128, KW, OFB Key Sizes: 128/192/256 bits	
	[SP 800-67] Triple-DES	3 Key Triple-DES (All Keys Independent) Modes: ECB, CBC, CFB8, CFB64, OFB, CTR with internal counter	2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290
	[FIPS186-4] RSA PKCS #1.5	GenKey9.31 (2048/3072) SigGenPKCS1.5 (2048/3072) SigVerPKCS1.5 (1024/2048/3072)	2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282,
	[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA ANSI X9.62	PKG: curves P-256, P-384 PKV: curves P-256, P-384 SIG(gen): curves P-256, P-384 SIG(ver): curves P-256, P-384	968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975
Message Digest	[FIPS 180-4] SHS	Generic Software Implementation SHA-1, SHA-2(224, 256, 384, 512)	3460, 3461, 3462, 3463, 3464, 3465, 3466, 3467

Cryptographic Function	Algorithm	Options	Algorithm Certificate
		using SSE:	3452, 3453, 3454, 3455, 3456, 3457, 3458, 3459
		SHA-1, SHA-2(224, 256)	
		Optimized Software Implementation not using SSE:	3444, 3445, 3446, 3450, 3449, 3447, 3448, 3451
		SHA-1, SHA-2(224, 256)	
		Optimized Software Implementation using AVX1:	3497, 3498, 3499, 3510
		SHA-1,SHA-224 SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	
		Optimized Software Implementation using AVX2:	3500, 3501, 3502
		SHA-1,SHA-224 SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	
Keyed Hash	[FIPS 198]	Generic Software Implementation	2762, 2763, 2764, 2765, 2766,
	HMAC	KS <bs, ks="">BS</bs,>	2767, 2768, 2769
		SHA-1, SHA-2(224, 256, 384, 512)	
		Key Size: at least 112 bits	
		Optimized Software Implementation using SSE:	2754, 2755, 2756, 2757, 2758, 2759, 2760, 2761
		KS <bs, ks="">BS</bs,>	
		SHA-1, SHA-2(224, 256)	
		Key Size: at least 112 bits	
		Optimized Software Implementation not using SSE:	2746, 2747, 2748, 2749, 2750, 2751, 2752, 2753
		KS <bs, ks="">BS</bs,>	
		SHA-1, SHA-2(224, 256)	
		Key Size: at least 112 bits	
		Optimized Software Implementation using AVX1:	2796, 2797, 2798, 2809
		SHA-1,SHA-224 SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	
		Optimized Software Implementation using AVX2:	2799, 2800, 2801
		SHA-1,SHA-224 SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	
KAS	[SP800-56A]	6.2.2.2 One-Pass Diffie-	CVL: 972, 973, 974, 975, 976,
		Hellman, C(1e, 1s, ECC CDH)	977, 978, 979
		Curves:P-256, P384	
Key Derivation	-	Password Based Key Derivation	Vendor Affirmed
	PBKDF	using HMAC with SHA-1 or SHA-2	

Cryptographic Function	Algorithm	Options	Algorithm Certificate
RSA	[SP 800-56B]	KTS-OAEP	Vendor Affirmed
Key Wrapping	RSA		

Table 3: Approved Security Functions

CAVEAT: The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy – 160-bits. The encryption strength for the AES Key Wrapping using 192 and 256 bit keys is limited to 160 bits due to the entropy of the seed source.

Note: PBKDFv2 is implemented to support all options specified in Section 5.4 of SP800-132. The password consists of at least 6 alphanumeric characters from the ninety-six (96) printable and human-readable characters. The probability that a random attempt at guessing the password will succeed or a false acceptance will occur is equal to 1/96^6. The derived keys may only be used in storage applications. Additional guidance to appropriate usage is specified in section 7.3.

Cryptographic Function	Usage / Description	Caveat
AES	Optimized Assembler Implementation using AVX:	Non-Compliant
	Encryption / Decryption	
	Block Chaining Mode: GCM	
	64 bit word	
	Optimized Assembler Implementation using SSE3:	Non-Compliant
	Encryption / Decryption	
	Block Chaining Mode: GCM, CTR	
	64 bit word	
RSA	Encryption / Decryption	Non-Approved, but allowed:
Key Wrapping	RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5	RSA (Key wrapping; key establishment
	PKCS#1 v2.1	methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength).
RSA	ANSI X9.31	Non-Compliant
Signature	Signature Generation	
Generation /	Signature Verification	
Signature Verification /	Key Pair Generation	
Asymmetric Key Generation	Key Size: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed in Table 3	
Generation	PKCS1-v1_5	
	Signature Generation	
	Signature Verification	
	Key Size: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed in Table 3	

Non-Approved Security Functions:

Cryptographic Function	Usage / Description	Caveat
Diffie-Hellman	Key Agreement	Non-Approved, but allowed:
	ANSI X9.42, SP 800-56A	Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key
	Key sizes: Min 2048 bits, Max 3072 bits	establishment methodology provides
		112 or 128 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of
		encryption strength).
	Key sizes < 2048 bits	Non-Approved
EC Diffie-Hellman	Key Agreement	Non-Approved, but allowed:
	ANSI X9.63, SP 800-56A	EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key
	Bit length of ECC subgroup order P-256, P- 384	establishment methodology provides 128 bits or 160 bits of encryption strength - the strength for P-384 is limited by the entropy of the seed source as specified in the caveat).
Ed25519	Key Agreement	Non-Approved
	Sig(gen) Sig(ver)	
SP800-108	Key Based Key Derivation Function	Non-Compliant
KBKDF	Modes: CTR and Feedback	
SP800-56C	Key Derivation Function	Non-Compliant
ANSI X9.63	Hash based Key Derivation Function	Non-Approved
RFC6637	Key Derivation Function	Non-Approved
DES	Encryption / Decryption	Non-Approved
T D F 0	Key Size 56 bits	
Triple-DES	Encryption / Decryption	Non-Approved
	Two Key Implementation	New Oswarkingt
Triple-DES	Optimized Assembler Implementation	Non-Compliant
	Encryption / Decryption Mode: CTR	
CAST5	Encryption / Decryption	Non-Approved
	Key Sizes 40 to 128 bits in 8-bit increments	
RC4	Encryption / Decryption	Non-Approved
	Key Sizes 8 to 4096 bits	
RC2	Encryption / Decryption	Non-Approved
	Key Sizes 8 to 1024 bits	
MD2	Message Digest	Non-Approved
	Digest size 128 bit	
MD4	Message Digest	Non-Approved
	Digest size 128 bit	
MD5	Message Digest	Non-Approved, but allowed:
	Digest size 128 bit	Used as part of the TLS key establishment scheme only
RIPEMD	Message Digest	Non-Approved
	Digest size 128, 160, 256, 320 bits	

Cryptographic Function	Usage / Description	Caveat
ECDSA	PKG: curves P-224, P-521	Non-Compliant
	PKV: curves P-224, P-521	
	SIG(gen): curves P-224, P-521	
	SIG(ver): curves P-192, P-224, P-521	
	PKG: curves P-192	Non-Approved
	PKV: curves P-192	
	SIG(gen): curves P-192	
ECDSA	Key Pair Generation for compact point representation of points	Non-Approved
Integrated Encryption Scheme on elliptic curves	Encryption / Decryption	Non-Approved
Blowfish	Encryption / Decryption	Non-Approved
Hash_DRBG	Hash-DRBG using SHA1 derived from the SP800-90A without derivation function, without prediction resistance	Non-Compliant
AES-CMAC	AES-128 MAC generation	Non-Compliant
OMAC (One-Key CBC MAC)	MAC generation	Non-Approved

Table 4: Non-Approved Functions

The encryption strengths included in Table 4 for the key establishment methods are determined in accordance with FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance [IG] section 7.5 and NIST Special Publication 800-57 (Part1) [SP800-57P1].

Note: A Non-Approved function in Table 4 is that the function implements a non-Approved algorithm, while a Non-Compliant function is that the function implements an Approved algorithm but the implementation is not validated by the CAVP. Neither a Non-Compliant nor a Non-Approved function may be used in the Approved mode unless stated otherwise in Table 4.

2.3 Cryptographic Module Boundary

The physical boundary of the module is the physical boundary of the macOS device that contains the module. Consequently, the embodiment of the module is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module.

The logical module boundary is depicted in the logical block diagram given in Figure 1.

Device Physical Boundary




Figure 1: Logical Block Diagram

2.4 Module Usage Considerations

A user of the module must consider the following requirements and restrictions when using the module:

- AES-GCM IV is constructed in accordance with SP800-38D section 8.2.1. Users should consult SP 800-38D, especially section 8, for all of the details and requirements of using AES-GCM mode.
- When using AES, the caller must obtain a reference to the cipher implementation via the functions of ccaes_[cbc|ecb|...]_[encrypt]decrypt]_mode.
- When using SHA, the caller must obtain a reference to the cipher implementation via the functions ccsha[1|224|256|384|512]_di.
- In case the module's power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be re-distributed

3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces

The underlying logical interfaces of the module are the C language Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). In detail these interfaces are the following:

- Data input and data output are provided in the variables passed in the API and callable service invocations, generally through caller-supplied buffers. Hereafter, APIs and callable services will be referred to as "API."
- Control inputs which control the mode of the module are provided through dedicated parameters, as well as /var/db/FIPS/fips_data holding the HMAC check file.
- Status output is provided in return codes and through messages. Documentation for each API lists possible return codes. A complete list of all return codes returned by the C language APIs within the module is provided in the header files and the API documentation. Messages are documented also in the API documentation.

The module is optimized for library use within the macOS user space and does not contain any terminating assertions or exceptions. It is implemented as an macOS dynamically loadable library. The dynamically loadable library is loaded into the macOS application and its cryptographic functions are made available. Any internal error detected by the module is reflected back to the caller with an appropriate return code. The calling macOS application must examine the return code and act accordingly. There are two notable exceptions: (i) ECDSA and RSA do not return a key if the pair-wise consistency test fails; (ii) the DRBG algorithm loops a few iterations internally if the continuous test fails, eventually recovering from the error or causing a shutdown if the problem persists.

The function executing FIPS 140-2 module self-tests does not return an error code but causes the system to crash if any self-test fails – see Section 9.

The module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented return codes, thus indicating the module's status. It is the responsibility of the caller to handle exceptional conditions in a FIPS 140-2 appropriate manner.

Caller-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers.

Cryptographic bypass capability is not supported by the module.

4 Roles, Services and Authentication

This section defines the roles, services and authentication mechanisms and methods with respect to the applicable FIPS 140-2 requirements.

4.1 Roles

The module supports a single instance of the two authorized roles: the Crypto Officer and the User. No support is provided for multiple concurrent operators or a Maintenance operator.

Role	General Responsibilities and Services (details see below)
User	Utilization of services of the module listed in section 2.1 and 4.2.
Crypto Officer (CO)	Utilization of services of the module listed in section 2.1 and 4.2.

Table 5: Roles

4.2 Services

The module provides services to authorized operators of either the User or Crypto Officer roles according to the applicable FIPS 140-2 security requirements.

Table 6 contains the cryptographic functions employed by the module in the Approved mode. For each available service it lists, the associated role, the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) and cryptographic keys involved, and the type(s) of access to the CSPs and cryptographic keys.

CSPs contain security-related information (for example, secret and private cryptographic keys) whose disclosure or modification can compromise the main security objective of the module, namely the protection of sensitive information.

The access types are denoted as follows:

- 'R': the item is read or referenced by the service
- 'W': the item is written or updated by the service
- 'Z': the persistent item is zeroized by the service

Service	Roles		CSPs &	Access	
	USER	CO	Crypto Keys	Туре	
Triple-DES Encryption / Decryption	X	Х	secret key	R	
AES Encryption / Decryption	Х	Х	secret key	R	
AES Key Wrapping	X	Х	secret key	R	
RSA Key Wrapping	x	х	RSA Private Key	R	
Secure Hash Generation	X	Х	none	N/A	
HMAC generation	X	Х	secret HMAC key	R	
RSA signature generation and verification	X	Х	RSA key pair	R W	
ECDSA signature generation and verification	X	Х	ECDSA key pair	R W	
Random number generation	X	х	Entropy input string, Nonce, V and K	R W Z	

Service	Roles		CSPs &	Access
	USER	CO	Crypto Keys	Туре
PBKDF Password-based key derivation	Х	X	secret key, password	R W Z
RSA (key pair generation)	Х	Х	Asymmetric key pair	R W
ECDSA (key pair generation)	Х	Х	Asymmetric key pair	R W
Diffie-Hellman Key agreement	Х	Х	Asymmetric keys (RSA/ECDSA key) and secret session key (AES/Triple-DES key)	RW
EC Diffie-Hellman Key agreement	Х	Х	Asymmetric keys (RSA/ECDSA key) and secret session key (AES/Triple-DES key)	RW
Release all resources of symmetric crypto function context	Х	Х	AES/Triple-DES key	Z
Release all resources of hash context	Х	х	HMAC key	Z
Release of all resources of Diffie-Hellman context for Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman	X	Х	Asymmetric keys (RSA/ECDSA) and secret session key (AES/Triple-DES)	Z
Release of all resources of asymmetric crypto function context	Х	Х	RSA/ECDSA keys	Z
Self-test	X	Х	Software integrity key	R
Show Status	Х	Х	None	N/A

Table 6: Approved and Allowed Services in Approved Mode

Service	Role	s	
	USER	со	Access Type
AES Encryption / Decryption	Х	Х	R
Modes:			
GCM, CTR			
Integrated Encryption Scheme on elliptic curves Encryption / Decryption	Х	Х	R
DES Encryption / Decryption	Х	х	R

Service	Role	s		
	USER	со	Access Type	
Triple-DES (Optimized Assembler Implementation) Encryption / Decryption Mode: CTR	Х	X	R	
Triple-DES (Two-Key implementation)	Х	Х	R	
Encryption / Decryption				
CAST5 Encryption / Decryption	Х	Х	R	
Blowfish Encryption / Decryption	Х	X	R	
RC4 Encryption / Decryption	Х	X	R W	
RC2 Encryption / Decryption	Х	Х	R W	
MD2 Hash	Х	Х	R W	
MD4 Hash	Х	X	R W	
MD5 Hash	Х	X	R W	
RIPEMD Hash	Х	Х	R W	
RSA Key Wrapping with RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 PKCS#1 v2.1	Х	X	R	
RSA ANSI X9.31 Signature Generation and Verification	Х	X	R W	
RSA PKCS1-v1_5 Signature Generation and Verification Key sizes: 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed	Х	Х	R W	
in table 3				
RSA ANSI X9.31 Key Pair Generation	Х	Х	R	
Key sizes (modulus): 1024-4096 bits in multiple of 32 bits not listed in table 3			W	
Public key exponent values: 65537 or larger				
ECDSA Key Pair Generation for compact point	Х	Х	R	
representation of points			W	

Service	Role	S	
	USER	со	Access Type
ECDSA	Х	Х	R W
PKG: curves P-192, P-224, P-521			
PKV: curves P-192, P-224, P-521			
SIG(gen): curves P-192,P-224, P-521			
SIG(ver): curves P-192,P-224 P-521			
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	Х	Х	R
Key Sizes < 2048 bits			W
Ed25519 Key agreement, Signature Generation,	Х	Х	R
Signature Verification			W
SP800-56C Key Derivation Function	Х	Х	R
			W
ANSI X9.63 Hash based Key Derivation Function using	Х	Х	R
			W
SP800-108 Key Derivation Function	Х	Х	R
Modes: Feedback, Counter			W
RFC6637 Key Derivation Function	Х	Х	R
			W
AES-CMAC AES-128 MAC Generation	Х	Х	R
			W
OMAC MAC Generation	Х	Х	R
			W
Hash_DRBG Random Number Generation	Х	Х	R
			W

Table 6b – Non-Approved Services in Non-Approved Mode

4.3 Operator authentication

Within the constraints of FIPS 140-2 level 1, the module does not implement an authentication mechanism for operator authentication. The assumption of a role is implicit in the action taken.

The module relies upon the operating system for any operator authentication.

5 Physical Security

The Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0 is intended to operate on a multi-chip standalone platform. The device is comprised of production grade components and a production grade enclosure.

6 Operational Environment

The following sections describe the operational environment of the Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0.

6.1 Applicability

The Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0 operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1 specifications. It is part of macOS Sierra, a commercially available general-purpose operating system executing on the hardware specified in section 2.1.3.

6.2 Policy

The operating system is restricted to a single operator (single-user mode; i.e. concurrent operators are explicitly excluded).

When the operating system loads the module into memory, it invokes the FIPS Self-Test functionality, which in turn runs the mandatory FIPS 140-2 tests.

7 Cryptographic Key Management

The following section defines the key management features available through the Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0.

7.1 Random Number Generation

A FIPS 140-2 approved deterministic random bit generator based on a block cipher as specified in NIST SP 800-90A is used. The default Approved DRBG used for random number generation is a CTR_DRBG using AES-128 with derivation function and without prediction resistance. The module also employs a HMAC-DRBG for random number generation. The deterministic random bit generators are seeded by /dev/random. The /dev/random generator is a true random number generator that obtains entropy from interrupts generated by the devices and sensors attached to the system and maintains an entropy pool. The TRNG feeds entropy from the pool into the DRBG on demand. The TRNG provides 160-bits of entropy.

7.2 Key / CSP Generation

The following approved key generation methods are used by the module:

• The default Approved DRBG specified in section 7.1 is used to generate asymmetric key pairs for the ECDSA and RSA algorithm.

The module does not output any information or intermediate results during the key generation process. The RNG itself is single-threaded.

The cryptographic strength of the 192 and 256 bit AES keys as well as the ECDSA keys for the curve P-384, as modified by the available entropy, is limited to 160-bits.

7.3 Key / CSP Establishment

The module provides AES key wrapping, RSA key wrapping, Diffie-Hellman- and EC Diffie-Hellman-based key establishment services.

In addition the module also implements vendor affirmed PBKDFv2 algorithm. The PBKDFv2 function is provided as a service and returns the key derived from the provided password to the caller. The caller shall observe all requirements and should consider all recommendations specified in SP800-132 with respect to the strength of the generated key, including the quality of the salt as well as the number of iterations. The implementation of the PBKDFv2 function requires the user to provide this information.

7.4 Key / CSP Entry and Output

All keys are entered from, or output to, the invoking application running on the same device. All keys entered into the module are electronically entered in plain text form. Keys are output from the module in plain text form if required by the calling application. The same holds for the CSPs.

7.5 Key / CSP Storage

The Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0 considers all keys in memory to be ephemeral. They are received for use or generated by the module only at the command of the calling application. The same holds for CSPs.

The module protects all keys, secret or private, and CSPs through the memory protection mechanisms provided by the operating system. No process can read the memory of another process.

7.6 Key / CSP Zeroization

Keys and CSPs are zeroized when the appropriate context object is destroyed or when the system is powered down.

8 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)

The EMI/EMC properties of the Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0 are not meaningful for the software library. The devices containing the software components of the module have their own overall EMI/EMC rating. The validation test environments have FCC, part 15, Class B rating.

9 Self-Tests

FIPS 140-2 requires that the module perform self-tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition, the DRBG requires continuous verification. The FIPS Self-Tests application runs all required module self-tests. This application is invoked by the macOS startup process upon device initialization.

The execution of an independent application for invoking the self-tests in the libcorecrypto.dylib makes use of features of the macOS architecture: the module, implemented in libcorecrypto.dylib, is linked by libcommoncrypto.dylib which is linked by libSystem.dylib. The libSystem.dylib is a library that must be loaded into every application for operation. The operating system ensures that there is a strict CSP separation between the instances used by each application.

All self-tests performed by the module are listed and described in this section.

9.1 Power-Up Tests

The following tests are performed each time the Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0 starts and must be completed successfully for the module to operate in the FIPS approved mode. If any of the following tests fails the device fails to startup. To invoke the self-tests on demand, the user may reboot the system.

Algorithm	Modes	Test
Triple-DES	CBC	KAT (Known Answer Test)
		Separate encryption / decryption operations are performed
AES implementations selected by the	CBC, ECB, GCM, XTS	KAT
module for the corresponding environment		Separate encryption / decryption
AES-128		operations are performed
DRBG (CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG; tested separately)	N/A	КАТ
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC- SHA-512	N/A	КАТ
RSA	SIG(ver), SIG(gen)	KAT, pair-wise consistency checks
	Encrypt/decrypt	Separate encryption / decryption operations are performed
ECDSA	SIG(ver), SIG(gen)	pair-wise consistency checks
Diffie-Hellman "Z" computation	N/A	КАТ
EC Diffie-Hellman "Z" computation	N/A	КАТ

9.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithm Tests

Table 7: Cryptographic Algorithm Tests

9.1.2 Software / Firmware Integrity Tests

A software integrity test is performed on the runtime image of the Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0. The CoreCrypto's HMAC-SHA256 is used as an approved algorithm for the integrity test. If the test fails, then the device powers itself off.

9.1.3 Critical Function Tests

No other critical function test is performed on power up.

9.2 Conditional Tests

The following sections describe the conditional tests supported by the Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0.

9.2.1 Continuous Random Number Generator Test

The Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0 performs a continuous random number generator test, whenever the DRBG is invoked.

In addition, the seed source implemented in the operating system kernel also performs a continuous self-test.

9.2.2 Pair-wise Consistency Test

The Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module, v7.0 does generate asymmetric keys and performs all required pair-wise consistency tests, the signature generation and verification tests, with the newly generated key pairs.

9.2.3 SP 800-90A Assurance Tests

The Apple macOS CoreCrypto Module performs a subset of the assurance tests as specified in section 11 of SP 800-90A, in particular it complies with the mandatory documentation requirements and performs know-answer tests.

9.2.4 Critical Function Test

No other critical function test is performed conditionally.

10 Design Assurance

10.1 Configuration Management

Apple manages and records source code and associated documentation files by using the revision control system called "Git."

The Apple module hardware data, which includes descriptions, parts data, part types, bills of materials, manufacturers, changes, history, and documentation are managed and recorded. Additionally, configuration management is provided for the module's FIPS documentation.

The following naming/numbering convention for documentation is applied.

<evaluation>_<module>_<os>_<doc name>_<doc version (##.##)>

Example: FIPS_CORECRYPTO_MACOS_US_SECPOL_3.0

Document management utilities provide access control, versioning, and logging. Access to the Git repository (source tree) is granted or denied by the server administrator in accordance with company and team policy.

10.2 Delivery and Operation

The CoreCrypto is built into macOS Sierra. For additional assurance, it is digitally signed.

10.3 Development

The Apple crypto module (like any other Apple software) undergoes frequent builds utilizing a "train" philosophy. Source code is submitted to the Build and Integration group (B & I). B & I builds, integrates and does basic sanity checking on the operating systems and apps that they produce. Copies of older versions are archived offsite in underground granite vaults.

10.4 Guidance

The following guidance items are to be used for assistance in maintaining the module's validated status while in use.

10.4.1 Cryptographic Officer Guidance

The Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved algorithms listed in Table 4. If the device starts up successfully then CoreCrypto has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode.

10.4.2 User Guidance

As above, the Approved mode of operation is configured in the system by default and can only be transitioned into the non-Approved mode by calling one of the non-Approved algorithms listed in Table 4. If the device starts up successfully then CoreCrypto has passed all self-tests and is operating in the Approved mode.

11 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module protects against the utilization of known Triple-DES weak keys. The following keys are not permitted:

{0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE}, {0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E}, {0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1}, {0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE}, {0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01}, {0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1}, {0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E}, {0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1}, {0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1,0x01}, {0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE}, {0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E}, {0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E}, {0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E,0x01}, {0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE}, {0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1}