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FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Proofpoint Cryptographic Module

Software Version 2.2

Document Version 1.1

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Overview

This document provides a non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the Proofpoint Cryptographic Module.

Table of Contents

1	Intro	duction	. 5
	1.1	About FIPS 140	5
	1.2	About this Document	5
	1.3	External Resources	5
	1.4	Notices	.5
	1.5	Acronyms	.6
2	Proo	fpoint Cryptographic Module	.7
	2.1	Cryptographic Module Specification	.7
	2.1.1	Validation Level Detail	7
	2.1.2	Approved Cryptographic Algorithms	7
	2.1.3	Non-Approved Algorithms	10
	2.2	Module Interfaces	12
	2.3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	13
	2.3.1	Operator Services and Descriptions	13
	2.3.2	Operator Authentication	14
	2.4	Physical Security	14
	2.5	Operational Environment	14
	2.6	Cryptographic Key Management	
	2.6.1	Random Number Generation	18
	2.6.2	Key/Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Authorized Access and Use by Role and Service/Function	18
	2.6.3	Key/CSP Storage	19
	2.6.4	Key/CSP Zeroization	19
	2.7	Self-Tests	19
	2.7.1	Power-On Self-Tests	20
	2.7.2	Conditional Self-Tests	21
	2.7.3	Cryptographic Function	21
	2.8	Mitigation of Other Attacks	21
3	Guid	ance and Secure Operation	22
	3.1	Crypto Officer Guidance	22
	3.1.1	Software Installation	22
	3.1.2	Additional Rules of Operation	22
	3.2	User Guidance	22
	3.2.1	General Guidance	22

List of Tables

Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms	6
Table 2 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section	7
Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Certificates	9
Table 4 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping	13
Table 5 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions	14
Table 6 – Module Keys/CSPs	18
Table 7 – Power-On Self-Tests	20
Table 8 – Conditional Self-Tests	21

List of Figures

Figure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram12

1 Introduction

1.1 About FIPS 140

Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules specifies requirements for cryptographic modules to be deployed in a Sensitive but Unclassified environment. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) run the FIPS 140 program. The NVLAP accredits independent testing labs to perform FIPS 140 testing; the CMVP validates modules meeting FIPS 140 validation. *Validated* is the term given to a module that is documented and tested against the FIPS 140 criteria.

More information is available on the CMVP website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.

1.2 About this Document

This non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Proofpoint Cryptographic Module from Proofpoint provides an overview of the product and a high-level description of how it meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2. This document contains details on the module's cryptographic keys and critical security parameters. This Security Policy concludes with instructions and guidance on running the module in a FIPS 140-2 mode of operation.

The Proofpoint Cryptographic Module may also be referred to as the "module" in this document.

1.3 External Resources

The Proofpoint website (<u>www.proofpoint.com</u>) contains information on Proofpoint services and products. The Cryptographic Module Validation Program website contains links to the FIPS 140-2 certificate and Proofpoint contact information.

1.4 Notices

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed in its entirety without modification.

1.5 Acronyms

	Advanced Encryption Standard				
NCI	Advanced Encryption Standard				
NSI	American National Standards Institute				
PI	Application Programming Interface				
MVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program				
0	Crypto Officer				
CCS	Canadian Centre for Cyber Security				
SP	Critical Security Parameter				
ES	Data Encryption Standard				
Н	Diffie-Hellman				
RBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator				
SA	Digital Signature Algorithm				
С	Elliptic Curve				
MC	Electromagnetic Compatibility				
MI	Electromagnetic Interference				
CC	Federal Communications Commission				
IPS	Federal Information Processing Standard				
PC	General Purpose Computer				
UI	Graphical User Interface				
MAC	(Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code				
AT	Known Answer Test				
1AC	Message Authentication Code				
1D	Message Digest				
IST	National Institute of Standards and Technology				
S	Operating System				
KCS	Public-Key Cryptography Standards				
RNG	Pseudo Random Number Generator				
SS	Probabilistic Signature Scheme				
NG	Random Number Generator				
SA	Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman				
HA	Secure Hash Algorithm				
SL	Secure Sockets Layer				
riple-DES	Triple Data Encryption Algorithm				
LS	Transport Layer Security				
SB	Universal Serial Bus				

The following table defines acronyms found in this document:

Table 1 – Acronyms and Terms

2 Proofpoint Cryptographic Module

2.1 Cryptographic Module Specification

The Proofpoint Cryptographic Module is the cryptographic core of PPS Email and Information Protection and related products and services.

The module's logical cryptographic boundary is the shared library files and their integrity check HMAC files. The module is a multi-chip standalone embodiment installed on a General Purpose Device.

All operations of the module occur via calls from host applications and their respective internal daemons/processes. As such there are no untrusted services calling the services of the module.

The module supports two modes of operation: Approved and non-Approved. The module will be in the FIPS-approved mode when all power up self-tests have completed successfully, and only Approved algorithms are invoked. See *Approved Cryptographic Algorithms* section below for a list of the supported Approved algorithms and *Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms* for allowed algorithms. The non-Approved mode is entered when a non-Approved algorithm is invoked. See *Non-Approved Algorithms* for a list of non-Approved algorithms.

2.1.1 Validation Level Detail

FIPS 140-2 Section Title	Validation Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services, and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	N/A
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility	1
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	1
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

The following table lists the level of validation for each area in FIPS 140-2:

Table 2 – Validation Level by FIPS 140-2 Section

2.1.2 Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

The module's cryptographic algorithm implementations have received the following certificate numbers from the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program:

Algorithm	CAVP Certificate
AES	4750
ECB (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)	
CBC (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)	
CFB1 (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)	
CFB8 (e/d; 128, 192, 256)	
CFB128 (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256) OFB (e/d; 128 , 192 , 256)	
CTR (ext only; 128 , 192 , 256)	
ССМ (КS: 128 , 192 , 256)	
CMAC (Generation/Verification) (KS: 128, 192, 256)	
GCM (KS: AES_128(e/d), AES_192(e/d), AES_256(e/d))	
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC- SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512	3164
DSA	1273
FIPS 186-4	
PQG Gen: 2048 & 3072 (using SHA-2)	
PQG Ver: 1024, 2048 & 3072 (using SHA-1 and SHA-2)	
Key Pair: 2048-bit & 3072-bit	
Sig Gen : 2048-bit & 3072-bit (using SHA-2)	
Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 2048-bit & 3072-bit (using SHA-1 & SHA-2)	
ECDSA	1185
FIPS 186-4	
Key Pair Generation: Curves (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-	
571, B-233, B-283, B-409 & B-571)	
PKV: Curves All P, K & B	
Sig Gen: (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-	
409 & B-571) (SHA-2)	
Sig Ver: Curves (P-192, P224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-	
571, B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409 & B-571) (using SHA-1 and SHA-2)	

Algorithm	CAVP Certificate
RSA (X9.31, PKCS #1.5, PSS)	2594
FIPS 186-2	
ANSIX9.31	
Key Gen: 4096-bit (using SHA-2)	
Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 1536-bit, 2048-bit, 3072-bit & 4096-bit (any SHA size)	
PKCS1 V1 5	
Sig Gen: 4096-bit (using SHA-2)	
Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 1536-bit, 2048-bit, 3072-bit & 4096-bit (any SHA size)	
PSS	
Sig Gen: 4096-bit (using SHA-2)	
Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 1536-bit, 2048-bit, 3072-bit & 4096-bit (any SHA size)	
FIPS 186-4	
ANSIX9.31	
Sig Gen: 2048-bit & 3072-bit (using SHA-2)	
Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 2048-bit, & 3072-bit (any SHA size)	
PKCS1 V1 5	
Sig Gen: 2048-bit & 3072-bit (using SHA-2)	
Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 2048-bit, & 3072-bit (any SHA size)	
PSS	
Sig Gen: 2048-bit & 3072-bit (using SHA-2)	
Sig Ver: 1024-bit, 2048-bit, & 3072-bit (any SHA size)	
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512	3893
Triple-DES	2524
TECB(KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)	
TCBC(KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)	
TCFB1(KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)	
TCFB8(KO1e/d, KO2d only)	
TCFB64 (KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)	
TOFB(KO 1 e/d, KO 2 d only)	
CMAC (KS: 3-Key; Generation/Verification; Block Size(s): Full / Partial)	
SP 800-90 DRBG (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG)	1631
CKG	Vendor Affirmed
Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Certificates	. ender / infined

Table 3 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Certificates

2.1.3 Non-Approved Algorithms

The module supports a non-approved mode of operation. The algorithms listed in this section are not to be used by the operator in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.

The following algorithms shall not be used:

- AES XTS ((KS: XTS_128((e/d) (f/p)) KS: XTS_256((e/d) (f/p)).
- EC Diffie Hellman
- RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides up to 256 bits of encryption strength

The following algorithms are disallowed as of January 1, 2016 per the NIST SP 800-131A algorithm transitions:

- Random Number Generator Based on ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4
- Two-Key Triple DES Encryption
- Dual EC DRBG

The following algorithms are disallowed as of January 1, 2014 per the NIST SP 800-131A algorithm transitions:

• FIPS 186-4 DSA	PQG Gen 1024-bit (any SHA size), 2048-bit & 3072-bit using SHA-1 Key Gen 1024-bit (any SHA size), 2048-bit & 3072-bit using SHA-1 Sig Gen 1024-bit (any SHA size), 2048-bit & 3072-bit using SHA-1
• FIPS 186-2 DSA	PQG Gen 1024-bit (any SHA size) Key Gen 1024-bit Sig Gen 1024-bit (any SHA size), 2048-bit & 3072-bit using SHA-1
FIPS 186-2 RSA ANSIX	9.31
	Key Gen 1024 & 1536
	ANSIX9.31 Sig Gen 1024 & 1536 (any SHA size); 2048, 3072 & 4096 using SHA-1
	PKCSI V1 5 Sig Gen 1024 & 1536 (any SHA size); 2048, 3072 & 4096 using SHA-1
	PSS Sig Gen 1024 & 1536 (any SHA size); 2048, 3072 & 4096 using SHA-1

• FIPS 186-4 RSA ANSIX9.31 Sig Gen 1024 using SHA-1

PKCSI V1 5

Sig Gen 1024 using SHA-1

PSS Sig Gen 1024 using SHA-1

FIPS 186-2 ECDSA Key Pair Generation: Curves P-192, K-163 & B-163
 Sig Gen Curves All P, K & B
 FIPS 186-4 ECDSA Key Pair Generation: Curves P-192, K-163 & B-163

Sig Gen Curves P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409 & B-571) (using SHA-1) P-192-, K-163 & B-163 (any SHA size)

• CVL (ECC CDH KAS)

The following algorithms are disallowed as of September 1, 2020 per the FIPS 186-2 transitions:


- FIPS 186-2 RSA (X9.31, PKCS #1.5, PSS)
 - ANSIX9.31
 - Key Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit & 4096-bit
 - Sig Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit (any SHA size)
 - Sig Gen: 4096-bit using SHA-1


o PKCS1 V1 5

- Sig Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit (any SHA size)
- Sig Gen: 4096-bit using SHA-1
- o PSS
 - Sig Gen: 2048-bit, 3072-bit (any SHA size)
 - Sig Gen: 4096-bit using SHA-1

2.2 Module Interfaces

The figure below shows the module's physical and logical block diagram:





The interfaces (ports) for the physical boundary include the computer keyboard port, mouse port, network port, USB ports, display and power plug. When operational, the module does not transmit any information across these physical ports because it is a software cryptographic module. Therefore, the module's interfaces are purely logical and are provided through the Application Programming Interface (API) that a calling daemon can operate. The logical interfaces expose services that applications directly call, and the API provides functions that may be called by a referencing application (see Section 2.3 – Roles, Services, and Authentication for the list of available functions). The module distinguishes between logical interfaces by logically separating the information according to the defined API.

The API provided by the module is mapped onto the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces: data input, data output, control input, and status output. Each of the FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces relates to the module's callable interface, as follows:

FIPS 140-2 Interface	Logical Interface	Module Physical Interface
Data Input	Input parameters of API function	Network Interface
	calls	
Data Output	Output parameters of API function	Network Interface
	calls	
Control Input	API function calls	Keyboard Interface, Mouse
		Interface
Status Output	For FIPS mode, function calls	Display Controller
	returning status information and	
	return codes provided by API	
	function calls.	
Power	None	Power Supply

Table 4 – Logical Interface / Physical Interface Mapping

As shown in Figure 1 – Module Boundary and Interfaces Diagram and Table 5 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions, the output data path is provided by the data interfaces and is logically disconnected from processes performing key generation or zeroization. No key information will be output through the data output interface when the module zeroizes keys.

2.3 Roles, Services, and Authentication

The module supports a Crypto Officer and a User role. The module does not support a Maintenance role. The User and Crypto-Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services implemented by the Module.

2.3.1 Operator Services and Descriptions

The module supports services that are available to users in the various roles. All of the services are described in detail in the module's user documentation. The following table shows the services available to the various roles and the access to cryptographic keys and CSPs resulting from services:

Service	Roles	CSP / Algorithm	Permission
Module initialization	Crypto	None	CO:
	Officer		execute
Symmetric	User	AES Key, Triple-DES Key	User:
encryption/decryption			read/write/execute
Digital signature	User	RSA Private Key, DSA Private Key, ECDSA	User:
generation		Private Key	read/write/execute
Digital Signature	User	RSA Public Key, DSA Public Key, ECDSA	User:
verification		Public Key	read/write/execute
Symmetric key	User	AES Key, Triple-DES Key	User:
generation			read/write/execute

Service	Roles	CSP / Algorithm	Permission
Asymmetric key User		DSA Private Key, ECDSA Private Key	User:
generation			read/write/execute
Keyed Hash (HMAC)	User	HMAC Key	User:
		HMAC SHA-1, HMAC SHA- 224, HMAC SHA-	read/write/execute
		256, HMAC SHA-384, HMAC SHA-512	
Message digest (SHS)	User	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-	User:
		512	read/write/execute
Random number	User	DRBG Internal State, DRBG Entropy	User:
generation			read/write/execute
Show status	Crypto	None	User and CO:
	Officer		execute
	User		
Self test	User	None	User:
			read/execute
Zeroize	Crypto	All CSPs	CO:
	Officer		read/write/execute
	User		

Table 5 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions

The operator is required to review the sections *Approved Cryptographic Algorithms, Non-Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms, Non-Approved Cryptographic Algorithms,* and *Guidance and Secure Operation* to ensure only approved algorithms are used

2.3.2 Operator Authentication

As required by FIPS 140-2, there are two roles (a Crypto Officer role and User role) in the module that operators may assume. As allowed by Level 1, the module does not support authentication to access services. As such, there are no applicable authentication policies. Access control policies are implicitly defined by the services available to the roles as specified in Table 5 – Module Services, Roles, and Descriptions.

2.4 Physical Security

This section of requirements does not apply to this module. The module is a software-only module and does not implement any physical security mechanisms.

2.5 Operational Environment

The module operates on a general purpose computer (GPC) running a general purpose operating system (GPOS). For FIPS purposes, the module is running on this operating system in single user mode and does not require any additional configuration to meet the FIPS requirements.

The module was tested on the following platform:

• CentOS 7.3 running on a Dell Optiplex 755 with an Intel Celeron processor

Compliance is maintained for other versions of the respective operating system family where the binary is unchanged. No claim can be made as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported to an operational environment which is not listed on the validation certificate.

The GPC(s) used during testing met Federal Communications Commission (FCC) FCC Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements for business use as defined by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part15, Subpart B. FIPS 140-2 validation compliance is maintained when the module is operated on other versions of the GPOS running in single user mode, assuming that the requirements outlined in NIST IG G.5 are met.

2.6 Cryptographic Key Management

Keys and CSPs	Storage Locations	Storage Method	Input Method	Output Method	Zeroization	Access
AES Key (128,	RAM	Plaintext	API call	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
192, 256 bits)			parameter		cleanse()	
						U: RWD
Encrypt/Decrypt						
operations						
Used to generate						
and verify MACs						
with AES as part						
of the CMAC						
algorithm.						
Triple-DES Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
(168 bits)			parameter		cleanse()	
						U: RWD
Used for						
Encrypt/Decrypt						
operations.						
Used for						
generating and						
verifying MACs						
with Triple- DES						
as part of the						
CMAC algorithm.						

The table below provides a complete list of Critical Security Parameters used within the module:

Keys and CSPs	Storage	Storage	Input	Output	Zeroization	Access
RSA Public Key	Locations RAM	Method Plaintext	Method API call	Method API call	nower cycle	CO: RWD
(1024 <i>,</i> 1536 <i>,</i>		FIGILITER	parameter	parameter	power cycle cleanse()	CO. RVD
2048, 3072, 4096			parameter	parameter	cleanse()	U: RWD
bits)						0.1110
51037						
RSA						
public/private						
keys used to sign						
and verify data.						
RSA Private Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call	API call	power cycle	CO: RWD
(2048, 3072,			parameter	parameter	cleanse()	
4096 bits)						U: RWD
RSA						
public/private						
keys used to sign						
and verify data.						
DSA Public Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call	API call	power cycle	CO: RWD
(1024, 2048, and			parameter	parameter	cleanse()	
3072 bits)						U: RWD
DSA						
public/private						
keys used to sign						
and verify data.						
DSA Private Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call	API call	power cycle	CO: RWD
(2048, and 3072			parameter	parameter	cleanse()	
bits)						U: RWD
201						
DSA muhlia (minata						
public/private						
keys used to sign						
and verify data. HMAC Key (≥ 112	RAM	Plaintext	API call	API call	power cycle	CO: RWD
bits)	NAIVI	Plaintext			cleanse()	CO. RVD
bits)			parameter	parameter		U: RWD
HMAC keys used						0.1100
to generate and						
verify MACs on						
data.						
Integrity Key	Module	Plaintext	None	None	None	CO: RWD
	Binary				-	
						U: RWD

Keys and CSPs	Storage Locations	Storage Method	Input Method	Output Method	Zeroization	Access
ECDSA Private	RAM	Plaintext	API call	API call	power cycle	CO: RWD
Key (PKG : Curves			parameter	parameter	cleanse()	
(P-224, P-256, P-				P		U: RWD
384, P-521, K-						••••••
233, K-283, K-						
409, K-571, B-						
233, B-283, B-						
409 & B-571)						
PKV: Curves All						
Р, К & В						
)						
,						
ECDSA keys						
public/private						
keys used to sign						
and verify data.						
ECDSA Public Key	RAM	Plaintext	API call	API call	power cycle	CO: RWD
(PKG : Curves (P-			parameter	parameter	cleanse()	
224, P-256, P-			parameter	parameter		U: RWD
384, P-521, K-						•••••
233, K-283, K-						
409, K-571, B-						
233, B-283, B-						
409 & B-571)						
PKV: Curves All						
P, K & B						
)						
,						
ECDSA keys						
public/private						
keys used to sign						
and verify data.						
DRBG Internal	RAM	Plaintext	None	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
state (V,C , Key					cleanse()	
value)						U: RWD
V and key are						
used as part of						
HMAC and CTR						
DRBG process. V						
and C are used as						
part of HASH						
DRBG process.						

Keys and CSPs	Storage Locations	Storage Method	Input Method	Output Method	Zeroization	Access
DRBG Entropy	RAM	Plaintext	API call	None	power cycle	CO: RWD
			parameter		cleanse()	
Entropy input						U: RWD
strings used as						
part of the DRBG						
process.						

R = Read W = Write D = Delete

Table 6 – Module Keys/CSPs

Please note that keys can be generated by the module for the services that require those keys, but the keys will always be input via an API call.

The application that uses the module is responsible for appropriate destruction and zeroization of the key material. The module provides functions for key allocation and destruction which overwrite the memory that is occupied by the key information with zeros before it is deallocated.

2.6.1 Random Number Generation

The module uses SP800-90A DRBGs for creation of asymmetric and symmetric keys.

The module accepts input from entropy sources external to the cryptographic boundary for use as seed material for the module's Approved DRBGs. The calling application of the module shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the random bit generation mechanism as shown in NIST Special Publication 800-90A Table 2 (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG) and Table 3 (CTR_DRBG). At a minimum, the entropy source shall provide at least 128-bits of entropy to the DRBG.

The module performs continual tests on the random numbers it uses to ensure that the seed and seed key input to the Approved DRBGs do not have the same value. The module also performs continual tests on the output of the Approved DRBGs to ensure that consecutive random numbers do not repeat.

In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per NIST SP 800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed). The resulting symmetric key or asymmetric seed is an unmodified output from a DRBG.

The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with the RFC5288 and RFC5289 and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with [FIPS140-2_IG] IG A.5, provision 1 ("TLS protocol IV generation"); thus, the module is compliant with [SP800-52].

2.6.2 Key/Critical Security Parameter (CSP) Authorized Access and Use by Role and Service/Function

An authorized application as user (the User role) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the module.

2.6.3 Key/CSP Storage

Public and private keys are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls or during power cycle. The module does not perform persistent storage of keys.

2.6.4 Key/CSP Zeroization

The application is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions from the API. The destruction functions then overwrite the memory occupied by keys with zeros and deallocates the memory. This occurs during process termination / power cycle. Keys are immediately zeroized upon deallocation, which sufficiently protects the CSPs from compromise.

2.7 Self-Tests

FIPS 140-2 requires that the module perform self tests to ensure the integrity of the module and the correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition some functions require continuous verification of function, such as the random number generator. All of these tests are listed and described in this section. In the event of a self-test error, the module will log the error and will halt. The module must be initialized into memory to resume function.

The following sections discuss the module's self-tests in more detail.

2.7.1 Power-On Self-Tests

Power-on self-tests are executed automatically when the module is loaded into memory. The module verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA1 digest computed at build time. If the fingerprints match, the power-up self-tests are then performed. If the power-up self-tests are successful, a flag is set to indicate the module is in FIPS mode (the operator is still required to follow the guidance in Section 3 to ensure the module is running in FIPS-approved mode of operation).

ТҮРЕ	DETAIL		
Software Integrity Check	HMAC-SHA1 on all module components		
Known Answer Tests ¹	AES ECB mode encrypt/decrypt 128-bit key length		
	• AES CCM mode encrypt/decrypt 192-bit key length		
	AES GCM mode encrypt/decrypt 256-bit key length		
	• AES CMAC CBC mode, encrypt/decrypt with 128,		
	192, 256-bit key lengths		
	• SHA-1		
	HMAC-SHA1		
	HMAC-SHA224		
	HMAC-SHA256		
	HMAC-SHA384		
	HMAC-SHA512		
	• RSA sign/verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-256, PKCS#1		
	 SP 800-90A DRBG (Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG, CTR_DRBG) 		
	• Triple-DES ECB mode encrypt/decrypt 3-key		
	Triple-DES CMAC CBC mode generate/verify 3-key		
Pair-wise Consistency Tests	• DSA sign/verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-384		
	• ECDSA keygen/sign/verify using P-224, K-233 and		
	SHA512		
	RSA (legacy test)		

Table 7 – Power-On Self-Tests

Input, output, and cryptographic functions cannot be performed while the Module is in a self-test or error state because the module is single-threaded and will not return to the calling application until the power-up self tests are complete. If the power-up self tests fail, subsequent calls to the module will also fail - thus no further cryptographic operations are possible.

The Module performs power-up self-tests automatically during loading of the module by making use of default entry point (DEP) and no operator intervention is required.

¹ Note that all SHA-X KATs are tested as part of the respective HMAC SHA-X KAT. SHA-1 is also tested independently.

2.7.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The module implements the following conditional self-tests upon key generation, or random number generation (respectively):

ТҮРЕ	DETAIL
Pair-wise Consistency Tests	• DSA
	 RSA (legacy test not run in FIPS mode)
	• ECDSA
Continuous RNG Tests	 Performed on all Approved DRBGs, the non- approved X9.31 RNG, and the non-approved DUAL_EC_DRBG
	Please note the DRBG is Tested as required by [SP800-
	90A] Section 11

Table 8 – Conditional Self-Tests

2.7.3 Cryptographic Function

The module verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA1 digest which is computed at build time. If this computed HMAC-SHA1 digest matches the stored, known digest, then the power-up self-test (consisting of the algorithm-specific Pairwise Consistency and Known Answer tests) is performed. If any component of the power-up self-test fails, an internal global error flag is set to prevent subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls. Any such power-up self test failure is a hard error that can only be recovered by reinstalling the module². The power-up self-tests may be performed at any time by reloading the module.

No operator intervention is required during the running of the self-tests.

2.8 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The Module does not contain additional security mechanisms beyond the requirements for FIPS 140-2 Level 1 cryptographic modules.

² The initialization function could be re-invoked but such re-invocation does not provide a means from recovering from an integrity test or known answer test failure

3 Guidance and Secure Operation

3.1 Crypto Officer Guidance

3.1.1 Software Installation

The module is provided directly to solution developers and is not available for direct download to the general public. The module and its host application are to be installed on an operating system specified in Section 2.5 or one where portability is maintained.

3.1.2 Additional Rules of Operation

- 1. The writable memory areas of the module (data and stack segments) are accessible only by the application so that the operating system is in "single user" mode, i.e. only the application has access to that instance of the module.
- 2. The operating system is responsible for multitasking operations so that other processes cannot access the address space of the process containing the module.

3.2 User Guidance

3.2.1 General Guidance

The module is not distributed as a standalone library and is only used in conjunction with the solution.

The end user of the operating system is also responsible for zeroizing CSPs via wipe/secure delete procedures.

If the module power is lost and restored, the calling application must ensure that any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are redistributed.

The counter portion of the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party to encounter this condition shall trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key in accordance with RFC 5246.

The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with the RFC5288 and RFC5289 and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with [FIPS140-2_IG] IG A.5, provision 1 ("TLS protocol IV generation"); thus, the module is compliant with [SP800-52].

In the event the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, either party (the client or the server) that encounters this condition shall trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key.

The same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 2¹⁶ 64- bit blocks of data in accordance with IG A.13.

At a minimum, the entropy source shall provide at least 128-bits of entropy to the DRBG