

On the practical cost of Grover for AES key recovery

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Aims

- Assess impact of Grover on AES for near-term quantum hardware.
- Estimate logical implementation and parallelisation overheads on any hardware. igodotLogical qubit-cycles.
- Estimate error correction overheads when using planar surface code. ightarrowSurface code cycles and physical qubit count.



Grover's algorithm

- Quantum algorithm to solve the unstructured search problem. igodot
- Can be applied to key recovery for AES with key size k. ullet
- Succeeds with high probability after $(\pi/4)\sqrt{2^k}$ quantum AES queries. ightarrow
 - For AES-128, Grover takes around 2⁶⁴ quantum AES queries compared with 2¹²⁷ classical queries for brute force exhaustion.



Grover's algorithm

- However, the square-root speed-up headline neglects significant details: •
 - The cost of quantum AES implementations. ullet
 - The fact that the AES queries must be sequential. ullet
 - The overheads from quantum error correction. ullet



Oracle implementation

- Different implementations optimise for different metrics. ullet
- We use Jang et al. "Quantum analysis of AES", IACR ePrint 2022/683:
 - Minimises (circuit depth)² x (number of qubits). ullet

| AES Key Size | Depth | Qubits | Depth ² x Qubits |
|--------------|-------|--------|-----------------------------|
| 128 | 731 | 3428 | 2 ^{30.8} |
| 192 | 874 | 3748 | 2 ^{31.4} |
| 256 | 1025 | 4036 | 2 ^{32.0} |



Maximum depth

| Max donth | Cycle time | | | |
|-----------------|---------------|---------------|------------|--|
| | 1µs | 200ns | 1ns | |
| 240 | 12.7 days | 2.55 days | 18.3 mins | |
| 2 ⁴⁸ | 8.92 years | 1.78 years | 3.26 days | |
| 2 ⁵⁶ | 2,280 years | 457 years | 2.28 years | |
| 264 | 585,000 years | 117,000 years | 585 years | |



Parallelisation

- Limiting maximum depth limits number of iterations that can be performed. ightarrow
- Reducing number of iterations by a factor of S reduces success probability by S². ightarrow
- Alternatively, we can split the search space into subsets of size N/S^{2.} ightarrow
- Either way, S^2 quantum processors are needed to cover the same search space. ullet
- Overall costs (compute cost x time taken) have increased by a factor of S. ightarrow



Costing Methodology – When Parallelisation Is Required

- 1. Calculate number of AES iterations per run from the implementation depth and MAX DEPTH choice. $N_{iter} = \frac{D_{max}}{D_{AFS}}$
- 2. Calculate the number of quantum processors needed, i.e. find S such that. $N_{iter} = \left(\frac{\pi}{4}\right) \frac{2^{k/2}}{\sqrt{s}}$
- 3. Calculate the total number of logical qubits required. $W_{tot} = SW_{AES}$
- 4. Calculate the cost in terms of number of logical qubit cycle $C_{tot} = W_{tot} D_{max} = SW_{AES} D_{max} = \left(\frac{4}{2^{k/2}\pi} N_{iter}\right)^{-2}$

es.
²

$$W_{AES}D_{max} = 2^k \left(\frac{\pi}{4}\right)^2 \frac{D_{AES}^2 W_{AES}}{D_{max}}$$

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AES-128 logical costs

Using logical qubit-cycles accounts for the non-trivial cost of idle qubits. ullet

| Max depth | Grover iterations | Parallel instances | Logical qubits | Logical qubit-cycles |
|------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| 2 ⁴⁰ | 2 ^{30.5} | 2 ^{66.3} | 2 ^{78.1} | 2 ^{118.1} |
| 2 ⁴⁸ | 2 ^{38.5} | 2 ^{50.3} | 2 ^{62.1} | 2 ^{110.1} |
| 2 ⁵⁶ | 2 ^{46.5} | 2 ^{34.3} | 2 ^{46.1} | 2 ^{102.1} |
| 2 ⁶⁴ | 2 ^{54.5} | 2 ^{18.3} | 2 ^{30.1} | 2 ^{94.1} |
| \sim | 2 ^{63.7} | 1 | 2 ^{12.7} | 2 ^{85.9} |



Quantum error correction

- Important to distinguish between perfect logical qubits and noisy physical qubits. ightarrow
- Logical qubits are built from many physical qubits using quantum error correction. ightarrow
- The planar surface code is currently the best studied QEC scheme. ightarrow
 - Exponentially suppresses errors as code distance d increase. ullet
 - Uses $2d^2 1$ physical qubits to produce one logical qubit. \bullet



Quantum error correction

- All error correction schemes have quantum gates that cannot be applied directly. \bullet
- These can instead be applied by producing "magic states", which can be ightarrowcombined with basic gates to produce the desired non-basic gate.
- Creating high accuracy magic states will be done via magic state distillation, ulletwhich creates them by combining many lower accuracy states.
- Magic state distillation requires additional quantum hardware, known as magic ulletstate factories or distilleries.



AES-128 surface code costs

| | 10 ⁻⁴ physical error | | 10 ⁻⁶ physical error | |
|------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Maximum depth | Physical qubits | Surface code cycles | Physical qubits | Surface code cycles |
| 2 ⁴⁰ | 2 ^{97.1} | 2 ^{128.7} | 2 ^{91.6} | 2 ^{125.0} |
| 2 ⁴⁸ | 2 ^{81.7} | 2 ^{120.9} | 2 ^{76.7} | 2 ^{117.4} |
| 2 ⁵⁶ | 2 ^{66.3} | 2 ^{112.8} | 2 ^{62.9} | 2 ^{111.5} |
| 2 ⁶⁴ | 2 ^{51.1} | 2 ^{105.3} | 2 ^{48.1} | 2 ^{104.2} |



AES-128 overheads

| • | Logical implementation: | 31 bits | |
|---|-------------------------|-------------|------|
| • | Parallelisation: | 8 - 32 bits | (de |
| • | Error correction: | 6 - 10 bits | (de |
| | Distillation: | 1 - 3 bits | (ind |

These are not entirely independent: less parallelisation needs more error correction.

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pending on maximum depth)

pending on physical error rate)

cluded in error correction overhead)



Potential cost reductions

- Smaller AES implementations.
- Faster cycle times.
- Better physical error rates.
- More efficient error correcting codes.



Conclusions

- The practical security impact of Grover with existing techniques on plausible ulletnear-term quantum hardware is limited.
 - Bounding the length of time an adversary is prepared to wait introduces unavoidable overheads from parallelisation.
 - Error correction adds further overheads, but these are less significant.
 - Early post-quantum migration efforts should focus on traditional public-key algorithms.



Thank you.





AES-128: Physical qubits





AES-128: Surface code cycles

