Withdrawn Draft

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Withdrawal Date October 29, 2020

Original Release Date December 11, 2019

Superseding Document

Status Final

- Series/Number NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-208
 - Title Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes
- Publication Date October 2020
 - DOI <u>https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-208</u>
 - CSRC URL https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-208/final

Additional Information



Recommendation for Statef
Hash-Based Signature Schem
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This publication is available free of charge fr https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-208-d
https://doi.org/10.0028/10151.51.800-208-0
COMPUTER SECURITY



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67	National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-208
68	Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-208, 54 pages (December 2019)
69	CODEN: NSPUE2
70	This publication is available free of charge from:
71	https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-208-draft

https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-208-draft

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85

86	Public comment period: December 11, 2019 through February 28, 2020
87 88 89 90	National Institute of Standards and Technology Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory 100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930 Email: <u>pqc-comments@nist.gov</u>
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103

Abstract

- 104 This recommendation specifies two algorithms that can be used to generate a digital signature,
- 105 both of which are stateful hash-based signature schemes: the Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS)
- 106 system and the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), along with their multi-tree variants,
- 107 the Hierarchical Signature System (HSS) and multi-tree XMSS (XMSS^{MT}).
- 108

Keywords

109 cryptography; digital signatures; hash-based signatures; public-key cryptography.

Document Conventions

- 111 The terms "**shall**" and "**shall not**" indicate requirements to be followed strictly in order to
- 112 conform to the publication and from which no deviation is permitted.
- 113 The terms "should" and "should not" indicate that among several possibilities one is
- 114 recommended as particularly suitable, without mentioning or excluding others, or that a certain
- 115 course of action is preferred but not necessarily required, or that (in the negative form) a certain
- 116 possibility or course of action is discouraged but not prohibited.
- The terms "may" and "need not" indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of thepublication.
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121

Conformance Testing

122 Conformance testing for implementations of the functions that are specified in this publication

123 will be conducted within the framework of the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program

124 (CAVP) and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). The requirements on these

implementations are indicated by the word "shall." Some of these requirements may be out-of-

scope for CAVP or CMVP validation testing, and thus are the responsibility of entities using,

127 implementing, installing, or configuring applications that incorporate this Recommendation.

128

Note to Reviewers

129 Sections 4 and 5 specify the parameter sets that are approved by this recommendation for LMS,

HSS, XMSS, and $XMSS^{MT}$. Given the large number of parameter sets specified in these two

131 sections, NIST would like feedback on whether there would be a benefit in reducing the number

132 of parameter sets that are approved, and if so, which ones should be removed.

133 While this recommendation does not allow cryptographic modules to export private keying

134 material, Section 7 describes a way in which a single key pair can be created with the one-time

135 keys being spread across multiple cryptographic modules. The method described in Section 7

136 involves creating a 2-level HSS or $XMSS^{MT}$ tree where the one-time keys associated with each of

137 the bottom-level trees can be created on a different cryptographic module.

138 NIST believes that it would be possible to create a one-level XMSS or LMS tree in which the

139 one-time keys are not all created and stored on the same cryptographic module. Key generation

140 would be more complicated to implement, though, as would be the steps that end users would

141 have to perform during the key generation process. However, a one-level tree would result in

- 142 shorter signatures.
- 143 NIST would like feedback on whether there is a need to be able to create one-level XMSS or
- 144 LMS keys in which the one-time keys are not all created and stored on the same cryptographic

145 module even though such an option would be more complicated to implement and use than the

146 two-level option that is already described in the draft.

Call for Patent Claims

- 148 This public review includes a call for information on essential patent claims (claims whose use
- 149 would be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements in this Information
- 150 Technology Laboratory (ITL) draft publication). Such guidance and/or requirements may be
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254 **1** Introduction

This publication supplements FIPS 186-4 [4] by specifying two additional digital signature schemes, both of which are stateful hash-based signature (HBS) schemes: the Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) system [2] and the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) [1], along with their multi-tree variants, the Hierarchical Signature System (HSS) and multi-tree XMSS (XMSS^{MT}). All of the digital signature schemes specified in FIPS 186-4 will be broken if largescale quantum computers are ever built. The security of the stateful HBS schemes in this publication, however, only depends on the security of the underlying hash functions—in

- 262 particular, the infeasibility of finding a preimage or a second preimage—and it is believed that 263 the security of hash functions will not be broken by the development of large-scale quantum
- 264 computers [20].
- 265 This recommendation specifies profiles of LMS, HSS, XMSS, and XMSS^{MT} that are appropriate
- for use by the U.S. Federal Government. This profile approves the use of some but not all of the
- 267 parameter sets defined in [1] and [2] and also defines some new parameter sets. The approved
- 268 parameter sets use either SHA-256 or SHAKE256 with 192- or 256-bit outputs. It requires that
- 269 key and signature generation be performed in hardware cryptographic modules that do not allow
- 270 secret keying material to be exported.

271 **1.1** Intended Applications for Stateful HBS Schemes

272 NIST is in the process of developing standards for post-quantum secure digital signature

- schemes [7] that can be used as replacements for the schemes that are specified in [4]. Stateful
- HBS schemes are not suitable for general use because they require careful state management that
- is often difficult to assure, as summarized in Section 1.2 and described in detail in [8].
- 276 Instead, stateful HBS schemes are primarily intended for applications with the following
- characteristics: 1) it is necessary to implement a digital signature scheme in the near future; 2)
- the implementation will have a long lifetime; and 3) it would not be practical to transition to a
- 279 different digital signature scheme once the implementation has been deployed.
- 280 An application that may fit this profile is firmware updates for constrained devices. Some
- 281 constrained devices that will be deployed in the near future will be in use for decades. These
- devices will need to have a secure mechanism for receiving firmware updates, and it may not be
- 283 practical to change the code for verifying signatures on updates once the devices have been
- deployed.

1.2 The Importance of the Proper Maintenance of State

286 In a stateful HBS scheme, a key pair consists of a large set of one-time signature (OTS) key

- 287 pairs. An HBS key pair may contain thousands, millions, or billions of OTS keys, and the signer
- 288 needs to ensure that no individual OTS key is ever used to sign more than one message. If an
- attacker were able to obtain digital signatures for two different messages created using the same
- 290 OTS key, then it would become computationally feasible for that attacker to forge signatures on
- arbitrary messages [13]. Therefore, as described in [8], when a stateful HBS scheme is
- implemented, extreme care needs to be taken in order to ensure that no OTS key is ever reused.

293 In order to obtain assurance that OTS keys are not reused, the signing process should be

294 performed in a highly controlled environment. As described in [8], there are many ways in which

seemingly routine operations could lead to the risk of one-time key reuse. The conformance

- requirements imposed in Section 8.1 on cryptographic modules that implement stateful HBS
- schemes are intended to help prevent one-time key reuse.

2981.3Outline of Text

- 299 The remainder of this document is divided into the following sections and appendices:
- Section 2, *Glossary of Terms, Acronyms, and Mathematical Symbols*, defines the terms, acronyms, and mathematical symbols used in this document. This section is *informative*.
- Section 3, *General Discussion*, gives a conceptual explanation of the elements used in stateful hash-based signature schemes (including hash chains, Merkle trees, and hash prefixes). This section may be used as either a high-level overview of stateful hash-based signature schemes or as an introduction to the detailed descriptions of LMS and XMSS provided in [1] and [2]. This section is *informative*.
- Section 4, *Leighton-Micali Signatures (LMS) Parameter Sets*, describes the parameter
 sets that are approved for use by this Special Publication with LMS and HSS.
- Section 5, *eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) Parameter Sets*, describes the parameter sets that are approved for use by this Special Publication with XMSS and XMSS^{MT}.
- Section 6, *Random Number Generation for Keys and Signatures*, states how the random data used in XMSS and LMS must be generated.
- Section 7, *Distributed Multi-Tree Hash-Based Signatures*, provides recommendations for distributing the implementation of a single HSS or XMSS^{MT} instance over multiple cryptographic modules.
- Section 8, *Conformance*, specifies requirements for cryptographic algorithm and module validation that are specific to modules that implement the algorithms in this document.
- Section 9, *Security Considerations*, enumerates security risks in various scenarios for
 stateful HBS schemes (with a focus on the problem of key reuse) and describes steps that
 should be taken to maximize the security of an implementation. This section is
 informative.
- Appendix A, *LMS XDR Syntax Additions*, describes additions that are required for the
 External Data Representation (XDR) syntax for LMS in order to support the new
 parameter sets specified in this document.
- Appendix B, XMSS XDR Syntax Additions, describes additions that are required for the XDR syntax for XMSS and XMSS^{MT} in order to support the new parameter sets specified in this document.

Appendix C, *Provable Security Analysis*, provides information about the security proofs
 that are available for LMS and XMSS. This section is *informative*.

331 2 Glossary of Terms, Acronyms, and Mathematical Symbols

332 2.1 Terms and Definitions

approvedFIPS-approved or NIST-recommended. An algorithm or technique
that is either 1) specified in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation, or 2)
adopted in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation and specified either (a)
in an appendix to the FIPS or NIST Recommendation, or (b) in a
document referenced by the FIPS or NIST Recommendation.

333

334 2.2 Acronyms

335 Selected acronyms and abbreviations used in this publication are defined below.

EEPROM	Electronically erasable programmable read-only memory
EUF-CMA	Existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
HBS	Hash-based signature
HSS	Hierarchical Signature Scheme
IRTF	Internet Research Task Force
LM-OTS	Leighton-Micali One-Time Signature
LMS	Leighton-Micali signature
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OTS	One-time signature
QROM	Quantum random oracle model
RAM	Random access memory
RFC	Request for Comments
ROM	Random oracle model
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SHAKE	Secure Hash Algorithm KECCAK
SP	Special publication

VM	Virtual machine
$WOTS^+$	Winternitz One-Time Signature Plus
XDR	External Data Representation
XMSS	eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme
\mathbf{XMSS}^{MT}	Multi-tree XMSS

2.3 Mathematical Symbols

SHA-256(<i>M</i>)	SHA-256 hash function as specified in [3]
SHA-256/192(<i>M</i>)	T_{192} (SHA-256(<i>M</i>)), the most significant (i.e., leftmost) 192 bits of the SHA-256 hash of <i>M</i>
SHAKE256/256(<i>M</i>)	SHAKE256(<i>M</i> , 256), where SHAKE256 is specified in Section 6.2 of [5]
SHAKE256/192(<i>M</i>)	SHAKE256(<i>M</i> , 192), where SHAKE256 is specified in Section 6.2 of [5]
$T_{192}(X)$	A truncation function that outputs the most significant (i.e., leftmost) 192 bits of the input bit string <i>X</i>

General Discussion 339 3

340 At a high level, XMSS and LMS are very similar. They each consist of two components—a one-341 time signature (OTS) scheme and a method for creating a single, long-term public key from a 342 large set of OTS public keys. A brief explanation of OTS schemes and the method for creating a 343 long-term public key from a large set of OTS public keys can be found in Sections 3 and 4 of 344 [14].

345 3.1 **One-Time Signature Systems**

346 Both LMS and XMSS make use of variants of the Winternitz signature scheme. In the Winternitz 347 signature scheme, the message to be signed is hashed to create a digest; the digest is encoded as a 348 base b number; and then each digit of the digest is signed using a hash chain, as follows.

349 A hash chain is created by first randomly generating a secret value, x, which is the private key.

350 The size of x should generally correspond to the targeted strength of the scheme. So for the

351 parameter sets approved by this recommendation, x will be either 192 or 256 bits in length. The

352 public key, *pub*, is then created by applying the hash function, *H*, to the secret b-1 times,

353 $H^{b-1}(x)$. Figure 1 shows an example of a hash chain for the kth digit of a digest where b is 4.

354 The kth digit of the digest, N_k , is signed by applying the hash function, H, to the private key N_k

355

times, $H^{N_k}(x_k)$. In Figure 1, N_k is 1, and so the signature is $s_k = H^1(x_k) = H(x_k)$. The signature can be verified by checking that $pub_k = H^{b-1-N_k}(s_k)$. So in Figure 1, the signature 356

can be verified by checking that $pub_k = H^{4-1-1}(s_k) = H^2(s_k) = H(H(s_k))$. 357

$$x_k \longrightarrow H \longrightarrow s_k = H(x_k) \longrightarrow H \longrightarrow H(H(x_k)) \longrightarrow H \longrightarrow pub_k = H(H(x_k)))$$

358

Figure 1: A sample Winternitz chain

359 As noted in [14], simply signing the individual digits of the digest is not sufficient as an attacker

360 would be able to generate valid signatures for other message digests. For example, given $s_k =$

 $H(x_k)$, as in Figure 1, an attacker would be able to generate a signature for a message digest with 361

362 a kth digit of 2 by applying H to s_k once or to a message digest with a kth digit of 3 by applying

363 *H* to s_k twice. An attacker could not, however, generate a signature for a message digest with a 364 kth digit of 0 as this would require finding some value y such that $H(y) = s_k$, which would not

365 be feasible as long as *H* is preimage resistant.

366 In order to protect against the above attack, the Winternitz signature scheme computes a

- checksum of the message digest and signs the checksum along with the digest. For an *n*-digit 367
- message digest, the checksum is computed as $\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} (b-1-N_k)$. The checksum is designed so 368
- 369 that the value is non-negative and any increase in a digit in the message digest will result in the

370 checksum becoming smaller. This prevents an attacker from creating an effective forgery from a

371 message signature since the attacker can only increase values within the message digest and

372 cannot decrease values within the checksum. Figure 2 shows an example of a signature for a 32-bit message digest using b = 16. The digest is

written as eight hexadecimal digits, and a separate hash chain is used to sign each digit with each
 hash chain having its own private key.¹


	Digest							Chec	Checksum		
Digest	6	3	F	1	Е	9	0	В	3	D	
Private Key	<i>x</i> ₀	x_1	<i>x</i> ₂	<i>x</i> ₃	<i>X</i> 4	<i>x</i> 5	<i>x</i> ₆	<i>x</i> ₇	x_8	<i>X</i> 9	
Signature	$\mathrm{H}^{6}(x_{0})$	$H^{3}(x_{1})$	${ m H}^{15}(x_2)$	$H(x_3)$	$\mathrm{H}^{14}(x_4)$	$H^{9}(x_{5})$	x_6	$\mathrm{H}^{11}(x_7)$	$\mathrm{H}^{3}(x_{8})$	$\mathrm{H}^{13}(x_9)$	
Public Key	$\mathrm{H}^{15}(x_0)$	$H^{15}(x_1)$	${ m H}^{15}(x_2)$	$H^{15}(x_3)$	$\mathrm{H}^{15}(x_4)$	${ m H}^{15}(x_5)$	${ m H}^{15}(x_6)$	${ m H}^{15}(x_7)$	${ m H}^{15}(x_8)$	${ m H}^{15}(x_9)$	


376

Figure 2: A sample Winternitz signature

377 **3.2 Merkle Trees**

While a single, long-term public key could be created from a large set of OTS public keys by 378 379 simply concatenating the keys together, the resulting public key would be unacceptably large. 380 XMSS and LMS instead use Merkle hash trees [18], which allow for the long-term public key to be very short in exchange for requiring a small amount of additional information to be provided 381 382 with each OTS key. To create a hash tree, the OTS public keys are hashed once to form the 383 leaves of the tree, and these hashes are then hashed together in pairs to form the next level up. Those hash values are then hashed together in pairs, the resulting hash values are hashed 384 385 together, and so on until all of the public keys have been used to generate a single hash value,





388

Figure 3: A Merkle Hash Tree

- 389 Figure 3 depicts a hash tree containing eight OTS public keys. The eight keys are each hashed to
- 390 form the leaves of the tree, and the eight leaf values are hashed in pairs to create the next level up
- in the tree. These four hash values are again hashed in pairs to create h_{0-3} and h_{4-7} , which are

¹ If SHA-256 were used as the hash function, then the message digest would be encoded as 64 hexadecimal digits, and the checksum would be encoded as three hexadecimal digits.

- hashed together to create the long-term public key, h_{0-7} . In order for an entity that had already
- received h_{0-7} in a secure manner to verify a message signed using k_2 , the signer would need to provide h_3 , h_{01} , and h_{4-7} in addition to k_2 . The verifier would compute $h'_2 = H(k_2)$, $h'_{23} =$
- 395 $H(h'_2||h_3), h'_{0-3} = H(h_{01}||h'_{23}), \text{ and } h'_{0-7} = H(h'_{0-3}||h_{4-7}). \text{ If } h'_{0-7} \text{ is the same as } h_{0-7}, \text{ then } k_2$ 396 may be used to verify the message signature.

397 3.3 Two-Level Trees

398 Both [1] and [2] define single tree as well as multi-tree variants of their signature schemes. In an

- instance that involves two levels of trees, as shown in Figure 4, the OTS keys that form the
- 400 leaves of the top-level tree sign the roots of the trees at the bottom level, and the OTS keys that
- 401 form the leaves of the bottom-level trees are used to sign the messages. The root of the top-level
- 402 tree is the public key for the signature scheme.²
- 403 As described in Section 7, the use of two levels of trees can make it easier to distribute OTS keys
- 404 across multiple cryptographic modules in order to protect against private key loss. A set of OTS
- 405 keys can be created in one cryptographic module, and the root of the Merkle tree formed from
- 406 these keys can be published as the public key for the signature scheme. OTS keys can then be
- 407 created on multiple other cryptographic modules with a separate Merkle tree being created for
- 408 the OTS keys of each of the other cryptographic modules, and a different OTS key from the first
- 409 cryptographic module can be used to sign each of the roots of the other cryptographic modules.




Figure 4: A two-Level Merkle tree

- 410 While there are benefits in the use of a two-level tree, it results in larger signatures and slower
- 411 signature verification as each message signature will need to include two OTS signatures. For
- 412 example, if a message were signed using OTS key $k_{1,6}$ in Figure 4, the signature would need to

² While this section only describes two-level trees, HSS allows for up to eight levels of trees and XMSS^{MT} allows for up to 12 levels of trees.

413 include the signature on $r_{1,1}$ using $k_{0,1}$ in addition to the signature on the message using $k_{1,6}$.

414 **3.4 Prefixes and Bitmasks**

- 415 In order to strengthen the security of the schemes in both XMSS and LMS whenever a value is
- 416 hashed, a prefix is prepended to the value that is hashed. For example, when computing the
- 417 public key for a Winternitz signature from the private key in LMS as described in Section 3.1,
- 418 rather than just computing $pub_k = H^3(x_k) = H(H(H(x_k)))$ the public key is computed as
- 419 $pub_k = H\left(p_3 \mid \mid H(p_2 \mid \mid H(p_1 \mid \mid x_k))\right)$, where p_1, p_2 , and p_3 are each different values. The
- 420 prefix is formed by concatenating together various pieces of information, including a unique
- 421 identifier for the long-term public key and an indicator of the purpose of the hash (e.g.,
- 422 Winternitz chain or Merkle tree). If the hash is part of a Winternitz chain, then the prefix also
- includes the number of the OTS key, which digit of the digest or checksum is being signed, and
- 424 where in the chain the hash appears. The goal is to ensure that every single hash that is computed
- 425 within the LMS scheme uses a different prefix.
- 426 XMSS generates its prefixes in a similar way. The information described above is used to form
- 427 an address, which uniquely identifies where a particular hash invocation occurs within the
- 428 scheme. This address is then hashed along with a unique identifier for the long-term public key
- 429 (SEED) to create the prefix.
- 430 Unlike LMS, XMSS also uses bitmasks. In addition to creating the prefix, a slightly different
- 431 address is also hashed along with the SEED to create a bitmask. The bitmask is then exclusive-
- 432 ORed with the input before the input is hashed along with the prefix. Figure 5 illustrates an
- 433 example of this computation. In [1], the hash function is referred to as H, H msg, F, or PRF,
- 434 depending on where it is being used. However, in each case it is the same function, just with a
- 435 different prefix prepended in order to ensure separation between the uses.
- 436




Figure 5: XMSS hash computation with prefix and bitmask

437 4 Leighton-Micali Signatures (LMS) Parameter Sets

438 The LMS and HSS algorithms are described in RFC 8554 [2]. This Special Publication approves

the use of LMS and HSS with four different hash functions: SHA-256, SHA-256/192,

440 SHAKE256/256, and SHAKE256/192 (see Section 2.3). The parameter sets that use SHA-256

441 are defined in RFC 8554 [2]. The parameter sets that use SHA-256/192, SHAKE256/256, and

442 SHAKE256/192 are defined below.

443 When generating a key pair for an LMS instance, each LM-OTS key in the system **shall** use the

same parameter set, and the hash function used for the LMS system **shall** be the same as the hash

function used in the LM-OTS keys. The height of the tree (h) **shall** be 5, 10, 15, 20, or 25.

- 446 When generating a key pair for an HSS instance, the requirements specified in the previous
- 447 paragraph apply to each LMS tree in the instance. If the HSS instance has more than one level,
- then the hash function used for the tree at level 0 shall be used for every LMS tree at every other
- level. For each level, the same LMS and LM-OTS parameter sets **shall** be used for every LMS
- 450 tree at that level.

451 The LMS and LM-OTS parameter sets that are approved for use by this Special Publication are

452 specified in Sections 4.1 through 4.4. The parameters n, w, p, ls, m, and h specified in the tables

- 453 are defined in Sections 4.1 and 5.1 of [2].
- 454 Extensions to the XDR syntax in Section 3.3 of [2] needed to support the parameter sets defined
- in Sections 4.2 through 4.4 of this document are specified in Appendix A.

456 **4.1 LMS with SHA-256**

- 457 When generating LMS or HSS key pairs using SHA-256, the LMS and LM-OTS parameter sets
- 458 **shall** be selected from the following two tables, which come from Sections 4 and 5 of [2].
- 459

Table 1: LM-OTS parameter sets for SHA-256

LM-OTS Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	n	w	р	ls	sig_len
LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W1	0x00000001	32	1	265	7	8516
LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W2	0x0000002	32	2	133	6	4292
LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W4	0x0000003	32	4	67	4	2180
LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8	0x00000004	32	8	34	0	1124

Table 2: LMS parameter sets for SHA-256

LMS Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	m	h
LMS_SHA256_M32_H5	0x00000005	32	5
LMS_SHA256_M32_H10	0x0000006	32	10
LMS_SHA256_M32_H15	0x0000007	32	15
LMS_SHA256_M32_H20	0x0000008	32	20
LMS_SHA256_M32_H25	0x00000009	32	25

462

463 **4.2 LMS with SHA-256/192**

464 When generating LMS or HSS key pairs using SHA-256/192, the LMS and LM-OTS parameter 465 sets **shall** be selected from the following two tables.

466

Table 3: LM-OTS parameter sets for SHA-256/192

LM-OTS Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	n	w	р	ls	sig_len
LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W1	TBD	24	1	200	8	4828
LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W2	TBD	24	2	101	6	2452
LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W4	TBD	24	4	51	4	1252
LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W8	TBD	24	8	26	0	652

467

468

Table 4: LMS parameter sets for SHA-256/192

LMS Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	m	h
LMS_SHA256_M24_H5	TBD	24	5
LMS_SHA256_M24_H10	TBD	24	10
LMS_SHA256_M24_H15	TBD	24	15
LMS_SHA256_M24_H20	TBD	24	20
LMS_SHA256_M24_H25	TBD	24	25

470 **4.3** LMS with SHAKE256/256

- 471 When generating LMS or HSS key pairs using SHAKE256/256, the LMS and LM-OTS
- 472 parameter sets **shall** be selected from the following two tables.
- 473

Table 5: LM-OTS parameter sets for SHAKE256/256

LM-OTS Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	n	w	р	ls	sig_len
LMOTS_SHAKE_N32_W1	TBD	32	1	265	7	8516
LMOTS_SHAKE_N32_W2	TBD	32	2	133	6	4292
LMOTS_SHAKE_N32_W4	TBD	32	4	67	4	2180
LMOTS_SHAKE_N32_W8	TBD	32	8	34	0	1124

474 475

Table 6: LMS parameter sets for SHAKE256/256

LMS Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	m	h
LMS_SHAKE_M32_H5	TBD	32	5
LMS_SHAKE_M32_H10	TBD	32	10
LMS_SHAKE_M32_H15	TBD	32	15
LMS_SHAKE_M32_H20	TBD	32	20
LMS_SHAKE_M32_H25	TBD	32	25

476

477 **4.4 LMS with SHAKE256/192**

When generating LMS or HSS key pairs using SHAKE256/192, the LMS and LM-OTS
parameter sets shall be selected from the following two tables.

480

Table 7: LM-OTS parameter sets for SHAKE256/192

LM-OTS Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	n	w	р	ls	sig_len
LMOTS_SHAKE_N24_W1	TBD	24	1	200	8	4828
LMOTS_SHAKE_N24_W2	TBD	24	2	101	6	2452
LMOTS_SHAKE_N24_W4	TBD	24	4	51	4	1252
LMOTS_SHAKE_N24_W8	TBD	24	8	26	0	652

Table 8: LMS parameter sets for SHAKE256/192

LMS Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	m	h
LMS_SHAKE_M24_H5	TBD	24	5
LMS_SHAKE_M24_H10	TBD	24	10
LMS_SHAKE_M24_H15	TBD	24	15
LMS_SHAKE_M24_H20	TBD	24	20
LMS_SHAKE_M24_H25	TBD	24	25

483 5 eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) Parameter Sets

The XMSS and XMSS^{MT} algorithms are described in RFC 8391 [1]. This Special Publication 484

approves the use of XMSS and XMSS^{MT} with four different hash functions: SHA-256, SHA-485

256/192, SHAKE256/256, and SHAKE256/192 (see Section 2.3).³ The parameter sets that use 486

487 SHA-256 are defined in RFC 8391 [1]. The parameter sets that use SHA-256/192,

488 SHAKE256/256, and SHAKE256/192 are defined below.

489 The WOTS⁺ parameters corresponding to the use of each of these hash functions is specified in 490 the following table.

491

Table 9: WOTS ⁺ paramet	er sets
------------------------------------	---------

Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	F / PRF	n	w	len
WOTSP-SHA2_256	0x0000001	See Section 5.1	32	16	67
WOTSP-SHA2_192	TBD	See Section 5.2	24	16	51
WOTSP-SHAKE256_256	TBD	See Section 5.3	32	16	67
WOTSP-SHAKE256_192	TBD	See Section 5.4	24	16	51

492

The XMSS and XMSS^{MT} parameter sets that are approved for use by this Special Publication are 493

494 specified in Sections 5.1 through 5.4. The parameters n, w, len, h, and d specified in the tables 495 are defined in Sections 3.1.1, 4.1.1, and 4.2.1 of [1].

- Extensions to the XDR syntax in Appendices A, B, and C of [1] needed to support the parameter 496 497 sets defined in Sections 5.2 through 5.4 of this document are specified in Appendix B.

XMSS and XMSS^M[™] with SHA-256 498 5.1

When generating XMSS or XMSS^{MT} key pairs using SHA-256, the parameter sets shall be 499

500 selected from the following two tables, which come from Section 5 of [1]. Each of these uses the 501 WOTSP-SHA2 256 parameter set.

Table 10: XM	ASS parameter sets	for SHA-256
--------------	---------------------------	-------------

Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	n	W	len	h
XMSS-SHA2_10_256	0x0000001	32	16	67	10
XMSS-SHA2_16_256	0x0000002	32	16	67	16
XMSS-SHA2_20_256	0x0000002	32	16	67	20

³ The parameter sets specified in RFC 8391 [1] that use SHAKE128, SHAKE256, and SHA-512 are not approved for use by this Special Publication.

Table 11: XMSS^{M7} parameter sets for SHA-256

Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	n	w	len	h	d
XMSSMT-SHA2_20/2_256	0x00000001	32	16	67	20	2
XMSSMT-SHA2_20/4_256	0x0000002	32	16	67	20	4
XMSSMT-SHA2_40/2_256	0x0000003	32	16	67	40	2
XMSSMT-SHA2_40/4_256	0x00000004	32	16	67	40	4
XMSSMT-SHA2_40/8_256	0x00000005	32	16	67	40	8
XMSSMT-SHA2_60/3_256	0x00000006	32	16	67	60	3
XMSSMT-SHA2_60/6_256	0x0000007	32	16	67	60	6
XMSSMT-SHA2_60/12_256	0x0000008	32	16	67	60	12

504

505 For the parameter sets in this section, the functions F, H, H_msg, and PRF are as defined in

506 Section 5.1 of [1] for SHA2 with n = 32.

507 5.2 XMSS and XMSS^{MT} with SHA-256/192

508 When generating XMSS or XMSS^{*MT*} key pairs using SHA-256/192, the parameter sets **shall** be 509 selected from the following two tables. Each of these uses the WOTSP-SHA2_192 parameter 510 set.

510

511

Table 12: XMSS parameter sets for SHA-256/192

Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	n	W	len	h
XMSS-SHA2_10_192	TBD	24	16	51	10
XMSS-SHA2_16_192	TBD	24	16	51	16
XMSS-SHA2_20_192	TBD	24	16	51	20

512

Table 13: XMSS^{M7} parameter sets for SHA-256/192

Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	n	w	len	h	d
XMSSMT-SHA2_20/2_192	TBD	24	16	51	20	2
XMSSMT-SHA2_20/4_192	TBD	24	16	51	20	4
XMSSMT-SHA2_40/2_192	TBD	24	16	51	40	2
XMSSMT-SHA2_40/4_192	TBD	24	16	51	40	4
XMSSMT-SHA2_40/8_192	TBD	24	16	51	40	8
XMSSMT-SHA2_60/3_192	TBD	24	16	51	60	3
XMSSMT-SHA2_60/6_192	TBD	24	16	51	60	6
XMSSMT-SHA2_60/12_192	TBD	24	16	51	60	12

515

516 For the parameter sets in this section, the functions F, H, H_msg, and PRF are defined as

517 follows:

• F: T_{192} (SHA-256(toByte(0, 4) || KEY || M))

- H: T_{192} (SHA-256(toByte(1, 4) || KEY || M))
- H_msg: T_{192} (SHA-256(toByte(2, 4) || KEY || M))
- PRF: T_{192} (SHA-256(toByte(3, 4) || KEY || M))

522 **5.3** XMSS and XMSS^{*MT*} with SHAKE256/256

523 When generating XMSS or $XMSS^{MT}$ key pairs using SHAKE256/256, the parameter sets **shall**

be selected from the following two tables. Each of these uses the WOTSP-SHAKE256 256

525

parameter set.

526

524

Table 14: XMSS parameter sets for SHAKE256/256

Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	n	w	len	h
XMSS-SHAKE256_10_256	TBD	32	16	67	10
XMSS-SHAKE256_16_256	TBD	32	16	67	16
XMSS-SHAKE256_20_256	TBD	32	16	67	20

527

Table 15: XMSS^{MT} parameter sets for SHAKE256/256

Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	n	w	len	h	d
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_20/2_256	TBD	32	16	67	20	2
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_20/4_256	TBD	32	16	67	20	4
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_40/2_256	TBD	32	16	67	40	2
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_40/4_256	TBD	32	16	67	40	4
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_40/8_256	TBD	32	16	67	40	8
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_60/3_256	TBD	32	16	67	60	3
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_60/6_256	TBD	32	16	67	60	6
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_60/12_256	TBD	32	16	67	60	12

530

531 For the parameter sets in this section, the functions F, H, H_msg, and PRF are defined as

532 follows:

• F: SHAKE256(toByte(0, 32) || KEY || M, 256)

- H: SHAKE256(toByte(1, 32) || KEY || M, 256)
- H_msg: SHAKE256(toByte(2, 32) || KEY || M, 256)
- PRF: SHAKE256(toByte(3, 32) || KEY || M, 256)

537 5.4 XMSS and XMSS^{MT} with SHAKE256/192

538 When generating XMSS or XMSS^{MT} key pairs using SHAKE256/192, the parameter sets **shall**

be selected from the following two tables. Each of these uses the WOTSP-SHAKE256_192parameter set.

541

Table 16: XMSS parameter sets for SHAKE256/192

Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	n	w	len	h
XMSS-SHAKE256_10_192	TBD	24	16	51	10
XMSS-SHAKE256_16_192	TBD	24	16	51	16
XMSS-SHAKE256_20_192	TBD	24	16	51	20

Table 17: XMSS^{M7} parameter sets for SHAKE256/192

Parameter Sets	Numeric Identifier	n	w	len	h	d
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_20/2_192	TBD	24	16	51	20	2
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_20/4_192	TBD	24	16	51	20	4
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_40/2_192	TBD	24	16	51	40	2
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_40/4_192	TBD	24	16	51	40	4
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_40/8_192	TBD	24	16	51	40	8
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_60/3_192	TBD	24	16	51	40	3
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_60/6_192	TBD	24	16	51	40	6
XMSSMT-SHAKE256_60/12_192	TBD	24	16	51	40	12

544

545 For the parameter sets in this section, the functions F, H, H_msg, and PRF are defined as 546 follows:

• F: SHAKE256(toByte(0, 4) || KEY || M, 192)

• H: SHAKE256(toByte(1, 4) || KEY || M, 192)

• H_msg: SHAKE256(toByte(2, 4) || KEY || M, 192)

• PRF: SHAKE256(toByte(3, 4) || KEY || M, 192)

552 6 Random Number Generation for Keys and Signatures

- 553 This section specifies requirements for the generation of random data that apply in addition to 554 the requirements that are specified in [2] for LMS and HSS and in [1] for XMSS and $XMSS^{MT}$.
- 555 Note: Variables and notations used in this section are defined in the relevant documents 556 mentioned above.

557 6.1 LMS and HSS Random Number Generation Requirements

- 558 The LMS key pair identifier, *I*, **shall** be generated using an **approved** random bit generator (see
- the SP 800-90 series of publications [6]) where the instantiation of the random bit generator
- 560 supports at least 128 bits of security strength.
- 561 The *n*-byte private elements of the LM-OTS private keys (x[i] in Section 4.2 of [2]) shall be
- 562 generated using the pseudorandom key generation method specified in Appendix A of [2]. The
- same SEED value shall be used to generate every private element in a single LMS instance, and
- 564 SEED shall be generated using an approved random bit generator [6] where the instantiation of
- 565 the random bit generator supports at least 8n bits of security strength.
- 566 If more than one LMS instance is being created (e.g., for an HSS instance), then a separate key
- 567 pair identifier, *I*, and SEED (if using the pseudorandom key generation method) **shall** be
- 568 generated for each LMS instance.
- 569 When generating a signature, the *n*-byte randomizer C (see Section 4.5 of [2]) shall be generated
- 570 using an **approved** random bit generator [6] where the instantiation of the random bit generator
- 571 supports at least 8n bits of security strength.

572 6.2 XMSS and XMSS^{MT} Random Number Generation Requirements

- 573 The *n*-byte values *SK PRF* and *SEED* **shall** be generated using an **approved** random bit
- generator (see the SP 800-90 series of publications [6]) where the instantiation of the random bit generator supports at least 8n bits of security strength.
- 576 The private *n*-byte strings in the WOTS⁺ private keys (sk[i] in Section 3.1.3 of [1]) shall be
- 577 generated using the pseudorandom key generation method specified in Section 3.1.7 of [1]:
- 578 $sk[i, j] = PRF(S \ ots[j], toByte(i, 32))$, where PRF is as defined in Section 5 for the parameter set
- being used. The private seed, S ots[j], for each WOTS⁺ private key, j, shall be as specified in
- 580 Section 4.1.11 of [1]: S ots[j] = PRF(S XMSS, toByte(j, 32)), where PRF is as defined in Section
- 581 5 for the parameter set being used. The private seed, *S_XMSS*, **shall** be generated using an
- 582 **approved** random bit generator [6] where the instantiation of the random bit generator supports
- at least 8n bits of security strength. If more than one XMSS key pair is being created within a
- 584 cryptographic module (including XMSS keys that belong to a single $XMSS^{MT}$ instance), then a
- separate random *S_XMSS* shall be generated for each XMSS key pair.

586 7 Distributed Multi-Tree Hash-Based Signatures

587 If a digital signature key will be used to generate signatures over a long period of time and

replacing the public key would be difficult, then storing the private key in multiple places to

589 protect against loss will be necessary. In the case of most digital signature schemes, this just 590 involves making copies of the private key. However, in the case of stateful HBS schemes, simply

590 involves making copies of the private key. However, in the case of stateful HBS schemes, simply 591 copying the private key would create a risk of OTS key reuse. An alternative that avoids this risk

is to have multiple cryptographic modules that each generate their own OTS keys and then create

593 a single instance that includes all of the public keys from all of the modules.

594 While it would also be possible to have one cryptographic module generate all of the OTS keys

and then distribute different OTS keys to each of the other cryptographic modules, doing so is

596 not an option for cryptographic modules conforming to this recommendation. Due to the risks

- associated with copying OTS keys, this recommendation prohibits exporting private keying
- 598 material (Section 8).

599 The easiest way to have OTS keys on multiple cryptographic modules without exporting private

600 keys is to use HSS or XMSS^{MT} with two levels of trees where each tree is instantiated on a

601 different cryptographic module. First, a top-level LMS or XMSS key pair would be created in a

602 cryptographic module. The top level's OTS keys would only be used to sign the roots of other

trees. Then, bottom-level LMS or XMSS key pairs would be created in other cryptographic

modules, and the public keys from those key pairs (i.e., the roots of their Merkle trees) would be

signed by OTS keys of the top-level key pair. The OTS keys of the bottom-level key pairs would

606 be used to sign ordinary messages. The number of bottom-level key pairs that could be created

607 would only be limited by the number of OTS keys in the top-level key pair.

608 **7.1 HSS**

609 In the case of HSS, the scheme described above can be implemented using multiple

610 cryptographic modules that each implement LMS without modifications. The top-level LMS

611 public key can be converted to an HSS public key by an external, non-cryptographic device. This

612 device can also submit the public keys of the bottom-level LMS keys to be signed by the top-

613 level LMS key. In HSS, the operation for signing the root of a lower-level tree is the same as the

operation for signing an ordinary message. Finally, this external device can submit ordinary

messages to cryptographic modules holding the bottom-level LMS keys for signing and then

616 combine the resulting LMS signatures with the top-level key's signature on the bottom-level

617 LMS public key in order to create the HSS signature for the ordinary messages (see Algorithm 8

618 and Algorithm 9 in [2]).

619 **7.2 XMSS^{MT}**

620 Distributing the implementation of an XMSS^{MT} instance across multiple cryptographic modules

621 requires each cryptographic module to implement slightly modified versions of the XMSS key

and signature generation algorithms provided in [1]. The modified versions of these algorithms

are provided in Section 7.2.1. The modifications are primarily intended to ensure that each

624 XMSS key uses the appropriate values for its layer and tree addresses when computing prefixes

and bitmasks. The modifications also ensure that every XMSS key uses the same value for SEED

and that the root of the top-level tree is used when computing the hashes of messages to be

627 signed.

628 Note that while Algorithm 15 in [1] indicates that an XMSS^{MT} secret key has a single SK_PRF

value that is shared by all of the XMSS secret keys, Algorithm 10' in Section 7.2.1 has each
 cryptographic module generate its own value for SK PRF. While generating a different SK PRF

631 for each cryptographic module does not exactly align with the specification in [1], doing so does

- 632 not affect either interoperability or security. SK PRF is only used to pseudorandomly generate
- the value *r* in Algorithm 16, which is used for randomized hashing, and any secure method for
- 634 generating random values could be used to generate *r*.

635 Section 7.2.2 describes the steps that an external, non-cryptographic device needs to perform in 636 order to implement XMSS^{MT} key and signature generation using a set of cryptographic modules

that implement the algorithms in Section 7.2.1. While Algorithms 10' and 12' in Section 7.2.1

- have been designed to work with XMSS^{MT} instances that have more than two layers, the
- algorithms in Section 7.2.2 assume that an XMSS^{MT} instance with exactly two layers is being

```
640 created.
```

641 **7.2.1** Modified XMSS Key Generation and Signature Algorithms

642 Algorithm 10': XMSS' keyGen

```
643
       // L needs to be in the range [0 ... d-1]
644
       // t needs to be in the range [0 ... 2^{((d-1-L)(h/d))} - 1]
645
       Input: level L, tree t,
646
              public key of top-level tree PK MT (if L \neq d - 1)
647
       Output: XMSS public key PK
648
       // Example initialization for SK-specific contents
649
       idx = t * 2^{(h / d)};
650
       for (i = 0; i < 2^{(h / d)}; i++) {
651
         wots sk[i] = WOTS genSK();
652
       }
653
       Initialize SK PRF with an n-byte string using an approved
654
       random bit generator [6], where the instantiation of the
655
       random bit generator supports at least 8n bits of security
656
       strength.
657
       setSK PRF(SK, SK PRF);
658
       // SEED needs to be generated for the top-level XMSS key.
659
       // For all other XMSS keys, the value needs to be copied from
660
       // the top-level XMSS key.
661
       if (L = d - 1) {
         Initialize SEED with an n-byte string using an approved
662
663
         random bit generator [6], where the instantiation of the
664
         random bit generator supports at least 8n bits of security
665
         strength.
666
       } else {
```

```
667
         SEED = getSEED(PK MT);
668
       }
669
       setSEED(SK, SEED);
670
       setWOTS SK(SK, wots sk);
671
       ADRS = toByte(0, 32);
       ADRS.setLayerAddress(L);
672
673
       ADRS.setTreeAddress(t);
674
       root = treeHash(SK, 0, h / d, ADRS);
675
       // The "root" value in SK needs to be the root of the top-level
676
       // XMSS tree, as this is the value used when hashing the message
677
       // to be signed.
678
       if (L = d - 1) {
679
         SK = L || t || idx || wots sk || SK PRF || root || SEED
680
       } else {
681
         SK = L || t || idx || wots sk || SK PRF || getRoot(PK MT) || SEED
682
       }
683
       PK = OID || root || SEED
684
     Algorithm 12': XMSS' sign
685
       Input: Message M
686
       Output: signature Sig
687
       idx sig = getIdx(SK);
       setIdx(SK, idx sig + 1);
688
689
       L = getLayerAddress(SK);
690
       t = getTreeAddress(SK);
691
       ADRS = toByte(0, 32);
692
       ADRS.setLayerAddress(L);
693
       ADRS.setTreeAddress(t);
694
       if ( L > 0 ) {
695
         // M must be the n-byte root from an XMSS public key
696
         byte[n] r = 0 // n-byte string of zeros
697
        byte[n] M' = M
698
       } else {
699
         byte[n] r = PRF(getSK PRF(SK), toByte(idx sig, 32));
700
         byte[n] M' = H msg(r || getRoot(SK) || (toByte(idx sig, n)), M);
701
       }
702
       idx leaf = idx sig - t * 2^{(h / d)};
703
       Sig = idx sig || r || treeSig(M', SK, idx leaf, ADRS);
```

704 **7.2.2** XMSS^{MT} External Device Operations

705 XMSS^MT external device keygen

706 Input: No input

```
707
       // Generate top-level key pair on a cryptographic module
708
       PK MT = XMSS' keyGen(1, 0, NULL);
709
       t = 0;
710
       for each bottom-level key pair to be created {
711
         // Generate bottom-level key pair on a cryptographic module
712
         PK[t] = XMSS' keygen(0, t, PK MT);
713
         // Submit root of bottom-level key pair's public key
714
         // to be signed by the top-level key pair.
715
         SigPK[t] = XMSS' sign(getRoot(PK[t]));
716
         // If the public key on the bottom-level tree was created using
717
         // a tree address of t, then its root needs to be signed by OTS
718
         // key t of the top-level tree. If it wasn't, then try again.
719
         if (qetIdx(SiqPK[t]) \neq t) {
720
           t = getIdx(SigPK[t]) + 1;
           PK[t] = XMSS' keygen(0, t, PK MT);
721
722
           SigPK[t] = XMSS' sign(getRoot(PK[t]));
723
         }
724
         t = t + 1;
725
       }
726
     XMSS^MT external device sign
727
       Input: Message M
728
       Output: signature Sig
729
       // Send XMSS' sign() command to one of the bottom-level key pairs
730
       Sig tmp = XMSS' sign(M);
731
       idx sig = getIdx(Sig tmp);
732
       t = (h / d) most significant bits of idx sig;
733
       // Append the signature of the signing key pair's root
734
       // (just the output of treeSig, not idx sig or r).
735
       Sig = Sig tmp || getSig(SigPK[t]);
```

736 8 Conformance

737 8.1 Key Generation and Signature Generation

738 Cryptographic modules implementing signature generation for a parameter set shall also 739 implement key generation for that parameter set. Implementations of the key generation and 740 signature algorithms in this document shall only be validated for use within hardware 741 cryptographic modules. The cryptographic modules shall be validated to provide FIPS 140-2 or 742 FIPS 140-3 [19] Level 3 or higher physical security, and the operational environment shall be *limited.*⁴ In addition, a cryptographic module implementing the key generation or signature 743 744 algorithms shall only operate in an approved mode of operation and shall not implement a 745 bypass mode. The cryptographic module **shall not** allow for the export of private keying 746 material.

- 747 In order to prevent the possible reuse of an OTS key, when the cryptographic module accepts a
- request to sign a message, the cryptographic module **shall** update the state of the private key in
- non-volatile storage before exporting a signature value or accepting another request to sign a
- 750 message.
- 751 Cryptographic modules implementing LMS key and signature generation **shall** support at least
- one of the LM-OTS parameter sets in Section 4. For each LM-OTS parameter set supported by a
- ryptographic module, the cryptographic module **shall** support at least one LMS parameter set
- from Section 4 that uses the same hash function as the LM-OTS parameter set. Cryptographic
- modules implementing LMS key and signature generation **shall** generate random data in
- accordance with Section 6.1.
- 757 Cryptographic modules implementing XMSS key and signature generation **shall** implement
- Algorithm 10 and Algorithm 12 from [1] for at least one of the XMSS parameter sets in Section
- 759 5. Cryptographic modules supporting implementation of XMSS^{MT} key and signature generation
- **shall** implement Algorithm 10' and Algorithm 12' from Section 7.2.1 of this document for at

161 least one of the XMSS^{MT} parameter sets in Section 5. Cryptographic modules implementing

- 762 XMSS or XMSS^{MT} key and signature generation **shall** generate random data in accordance with
- 763 Section 6.2.

764 8.2 Signature Verification

765 Cryptographic modules implementing LMS signature verification shall support at least one of

- the LM-OTS parameter sets in Section 4. For each LM-OTS parameter set supported by a
- 767 cryptographic module, the cryptographic module shall support at least one LMS parameter set
- 768 from Section 4 that uses the same hash function as the LM-OTS parameter set.
- 769 Cryptographic modules implementing XMSS signature verification **shall** implement Algorithm
- 14 of [1] for at least one of the parameter sets in Section 5. Cryptographic modules implementing
- 771 XMSS^{MT} signature verification **shall** implement Algorithm 17 of [1] for at least one of the
- parameter sets in Section 5.

⁴ See Section 4.6 of FIPS 140-2 [19].

9 Security Considerations

774 9.1 One-Time Signature Key Reuse

Both LMS and XMSS are stateful signature schemes. If an attacker were able to obtain
signatures for two different messages created using the same one-time signature (OTS) key, then
it would become computationally feasible for that attacker to create forgeries [13]. As noted in
[8], extreme care needs to be taken in order to avoid the risk that an OTS key will be reused
accidentally. While the conformance requirements in Section 8.1 prevent many of the actions
that could result in accidental OTS key reuse, cryptographic modules still need to be carefully
designed to ensure that unexpected behavior cannot result in an OTS key being reused.

782 In order to avoid reuse of an OTS key, the state of the private key must be updated each time a

signature is generated. If the private key is stored in non-volatile memory, then the state of the key must be updated in the non-volatile memory to mark an OTS key as unavailable before the

corresponding signature generated using the OTS key is exported. Depending on the

environment, this can be nontrivial to implement. With many operating systems, simply writing

the update to a file is not sufficient as the write operation will be cached with the actual write to

788 non-volatile memory taking place later. If the cryptographic module loses power or crashes

before the write to non-volatile memory, then the state update will be lost. If a signature were

exported after the write operation was issued but before the update was written to non-volatile

791 memory, there would be a risk that the OTS key would be used again after the cryptographic

module starts up.

793 Some hardware cryptographic modules implement monotonic counters, which are guaranteed to

increase each time the counter's value is read. When available, using the current value of a

monotonic counter to determine which OTS key to use for a signature may be very helpful in

avoiding unintentional reuse of an OTS key.

797 9.2 Fault Injection Resistance

Fault injection attacks involve the intentional introduction of an error at some point during the

execution of an algorithm, such as by varying the voltage supplied to a device executing the

algorithm, causing it to produce the wrong output, and providing the attacker with additional

801 information. These attacks are most relevant for users of embedded cryptographic devices where

802 an adversary may have physical access to the signing device and thus can control its operations.

803 Fault injection attacks have been shown to be effective against hash-based signatures, though

they are more severe when used against stateless schemes like SPHINCS and its variants [9][10].

805 With hash-based signatures, the attack works by forcing the cryptographic device to sign two

806 different messages with the same OTS key. The attack takes advantage of the schemes where

807 multiple levels of Merkle trees are used and the roots of lower-level trees are signed using a one-

time signature (XMSS^{MT} and HSS) [10]. In some cases, the signatures on these roots are

809 recomputed each time a message is signed. Under normal circumstances, this is acceptable since

810 it just involves using an OTS key multiple times to sign the same message. However, by

811 injecting a fault that introduces an error in the computation of the Merkle tree root at any of the

812 non-top layers, an attacker can cause the device to sign a different message under the same key.

813 With both a valid and a faulty signature, the attacker can "graft" a new subtree into the hierarchy

- 814 and produce universal forgeries.
- 815 The faulted signature remains a valid signature, so checking that the signature verifies is
- 816 insufficient to detect or prevent this attack. The only reliable way to prevent this attack is to
- 817 compute each one-time signature once, cache the result, and output it whenever needed. When
- 818 implementing multiple levels of trees as described in Section 7, this is the only option since no
- 819 cryptographic module will use any OTS more than once. If multiple levels of trees are
- 820 implemented within a single cryptographic module, it is recommended to cache a single, one-
- time signature per layer of subtrees, refreshing them when a new subtree is used for signing [10].
- 822 While this prevents an attacker from learning about the secret key when a corrupted signature is
- 823 cached, it does result in the cached one-time signature being incorrect and thus prevents the
- 824 hash-based signature scheme from working.

825 9.3 Hash Collisions

- 826 In LMS and XMSS, as in the other **approved** digital signature schemes [4], the signature
- 827 generation algorithm is not applied directly to the message but to a *message digest* generated by
- the underlying hash function. The security of any signature scheme depends on the inability of an
- 829 attacker to find distinct messages with the same message digest.
- 830 There are two ways that an attacker might find these distinct messages. The attacker could look
- 831 for a message that has the same message digest as a message that has already been signed (a
- second preimage), or the attacker could look for any two messages that have the same message
- digest (a generic collision) and then try to get the private key holder (i.e., signer) to sign one of
- them [21]. Finding a second preimage is much more difficult than finding a generic collision,
- and it would be infeasible for an attacker to find a second preimage with any of the hash
- 836 functions allowed for use in this recommendation.
- LMS and XMSS both use randomized hashing. When a message is presented to be signed, a
- random value is created and prepended to the message, and the hash function is applied to this
- 839 expanded message to produce the message digest. Prepending the random value makes it
- 840 infeasible for anyone other than the signer to find a generic collision as finding a collision would
- 841 require predicting the randomizing value. The randomized hashing process does not, however,
- 842 impact the ability for a signer to create a generic collision since the signer, knowing the private
- 843 key, could choose the random value to prepend to the message.
- 844 The 196-bit hash functions in this recommendation, SHA-256/196 and SHAKE256/196, offer
- significantly less resistance to generic collision searches than their 256-bit counterparts. In
- particular, a collision of the 196-bit functions may be found as the number of sampled inputs
- approaches 2^{96} , as opposed to 2^{128} for the 256-bit functions, and it may be possible for a signer
- 848 with access to an extremely large amount of computing resources to sample 2^{96} inputs.
- 849 Consequently, one tradeoff for the use of 196-bit hash functions in LMS and XMSS is the
- 850 weakening of the verifier's assurance that the signer will not be able to change the message once
- the signature is revealed. This possibility does not affect the formal security properties of the
- schemes because it remains the case that only the signer could produce a valid signature on a
- 853 message.

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856 Appendix A—LMS XDR Syntax Additions

In order to support the LM-OTS and LMS parameter sets defined in Sections 4.2 through 4.4, the XDR syntax in Section 3.3 of [2] is extended as follows.

```
859
         /* one-time signatures */
860
861
         enum lmots algorithm type {
862
           lmots sha256 n24 w1 = TBD,
863
           lmots sha256 n24 w2 = TBD,
864
           lmots sha256 n24 w4 = TBD,
865
           lmots sha256 n24 w8 = TBD,
866
           lmots shake n32 w1 = TBD_{r}
867
           lmots shake n32 w2 = TBD,
868
           lmots shake n32 w4 = TBD_{r}
869
           lmots shake n32 w8 = TBD,
870
           lmots shake n24 w1 = TBD,
871
           lmots shake n24 w2 = TBD,
872
           lmots shake n24 w4 = TBD,
873
           lmots shake n24 w8 = TBD
874
         };
875
876
         typedef opaque bytestring24[24];
877
878
         struct lmots signature n24 p200 {
879
           bytestring24 C;
880
           bytestring24 y[200];
881
         };
882
883
         struct lmots signature n24 p101 {
884
           bytestring24 C;
885
           bytestring24 y[101];
886
         };
887
888
         struct lmots signature n24 p51 {
889
           bytestring24 C;
890
           bytestring24 y[51];
891
         };
892
893
         struct lmots signature n24 p26 {
894
           bytestring24 C;
895
           bytestring24 y[26];
896
         };
897
898
         union lmots signature switch (lmots algorithm type type) {
899
          case lmots sha256 n24 w1:
900
            lmots signature n24 p200 sig n24 p200;
```

{

901	case lmots_sha256_n24_w2:
902	lmots signature n24 p101 sig n24 p101;
903	case lmots sha256 n24 w4:
904	lmots_signature_n24_p51
905	case lmots_sha256_n24_w8:
906	lmots signature n24 p26 sig n24 p26;
907	case lmots shake n32 w1:
908	
909	case lmots_shake_n32_w2:
910	<pre>lmots_signature_n32_p133 sig_n32_p133;</pre>
911	case lmots shake n32 w4:
912	<pre>lmots_signature_n32_p67 sig_n32_p67;</pre>
913	
	case lmots_shake_n32_w8:
914	<pre>lmots_signature_n32_p34 sig_n32_p34;</pre>
915	case lmots shake n24 w1:
916	lmots signature n24 p200 sig n24 p200;
917	case lmots shake n24 w2:
918	
	<pre>lmots_signature_n24_p101 sig_n24_p101;</pre>
919	case lmots_shake_n24_w4:
920	<pre>lmots_signature_n24_p51 sig_n24_p51;</pre>
921	case lmots shake n24 w8:
922	lmots signature n24 p26 sig n24 p26;
923	};
924] /
724	
005	
925	/* hash-based signatures (hbs) */
925 926	/* hash-based signatures (hbs) */
926	
926 927	enum lms_algorithm_type {
926 927 928	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD,</pre>
926 927 928 929	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD,</pre>
926 927 928 929 930	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD,</pre>
926 927 928 929	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD,</pre>
926 927 928 929 930	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD,</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD,</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD,</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD,</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD,</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD,</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD,</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h25 = TBD, lms_sha</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, </pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h10 = TBD, </pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_shake</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_shake</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_shake</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_shake</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_shake</pre>
926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945	<pre>enum lms_algorithm_type { lms_sha256_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_sha256_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n32_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h5 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h10 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h15 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h20 = TBD, lms_shake_n24_h25 = TBD, lms_shake_</pre>

```
948
          case lms sha256 n24 h5:
949
          case lms shake n24 h5:
950
            bytestring24 path n24 h5[5];
          case lms sha256 n24 h10:
951
952
         case lms shake n24 h\overline{10}:
953
            bytestring24 path n24 h10[10];
954
          case lms sha256 n24 h15:
955
          case lms shake n24 h15:
956
            bytestring24 path n24 h15[15];
957
          case lms sha256 n24 h20:
958
         case lms shake n24 h20:
959
            bytestring24 path n24 h20[20];
960
          case lms sha256 n24 h25:
961
         case lms shake n24 h25:
962
            bytestring24 path n24 h25[25];
963
964
         case lms shake n32 h5:
965
            bytestring32 path n32 h5[5];
966
          case lms shake n32 h10:
967
            bytestring32 path n32 h10[10];
968
          case lms shake n32 h15:
969
            bytestring32 path n32 h15[15];
970
          case lms shake n32 h20:
971
            bytestring32 path n32 h20[20];
972
          case lms shake n32 h25:
973
            bytestring32 path n32 h25[25];
974
         };
975
976
         struct lms key n24 {
           lmots algorithm type ots alg_type;
977
978
           opaque I[16];
979
           opaque K[24];
980
         };
981
982
         union lms public key switch (lms algorithm type type) {
983
          case lms sha256 n24 h5:
984
          case lms sha256 n24 h10:
985
          case lms sha256 n24 h15:
986
          case lms sha256 n24 h20:
987
          case lms sha256 n24 h25:
988
          case lms shake n24 h5:
989
          case lms shake n24 h10:
990
          case lms shake n24 h15:
991
          case lms shake n24 h20:
992
          case lms shake n24 h25:
993
               lms key n24 z n24;
994
```

995	case lms shake n32 h5:
996	case lms shake n32 h10:
997	case lms_shake_n32_h15:
998	case lms shake n32 h20:
999	case lms shake n32 h25:
1000	lms_key_n32 z_n32;
1001	};
1002	

1003 Appendix B—XMSS XDR Syntax Additions

1004 In order to support the XMSS parameter sets defined in Sections 5.2 through 5.4, the XDR 1005 syntax in Appendices A, B, and C of [1] is extended as follows.

```
1006 B.1 WOTS<sup>+</sup>
```

```
1007
          /* ots algorithm type identifies a particular
1008
             signature algorithm */
1009
1010
          enum ots algorithm type {
1011
            wotsp-sha2 192
                             = TBD,
            wotsp-shake256 256 = TBD_{,}
1012
1013
            wotsp-shake256 192 = TBD,
1014
          };
1015
1016
          /* Byte strings */
1017
1018
          typedef opaque bytestring24[24];
1019
1020
          union ots signature switch (ots algorithm type type) {
1021
1022
            case wotsp-sha2 192:
1023
            case wotsp-shake256 192:
1024
              bytestring24 ots sig n24 len51[51];
1025
1026
            case wotsp-shake256 256:
1027
              bytestring32 ots sig n32 len67[67];
1028
          };
1029
1030
          union ots pubkey switch (ots algorithm type type) {
1031
            case wotsp-sha2 192:
1032
            case wotsp-shake256 192:
1033
              bytestring24 ots pubk n24 len51[51];
1034
1035
            case wotsp-shake256 256:
1036
              bytestring32 ots pubk n32 len67[67];
1037
          };
1038
      B.2 XMSS
1039
          /* Definition of parameter sets */
```

```
      1040

      1041
      enum xmss_algorithm_type {

      1042
      xmss-sha2_10_192 = TBD,

      1043
      xmss-sha2_16_192 = TBD,

      1044
      xmss-sha2_20_192 = TBD,

      1045
      xmss-sha2_20_192 = TBD,
```

```
1046
            xmss-shake256 10 256 = TBD,
1047
            xmss-shake256 16 256 = TBD,
1048
            xmss-shake256 20 256 = TBD,
1049
1050
            xmss-shake256 10 192 = TBD,
1051
            xmss-shake256 16 192 = TBD,
            xmss-shake256 20 192 = TBD,
1052
1053
          };
1054
1055
          /* Authentication path types */
1056
1057
          union xmss path switch (xmss algorithm type type) {
            case xmss-sha2 10 192:
1058
            case xmss-shake256 10 192:
1059
              bytestring24 path n24 t10[10];
1060
1061
1062
            case xmss-shake256 10 256:
1063
              bytestring32 path n32 t10[10];
1064
1065
            case xmss-sha2 16 192:
1066
            case xmss-shake256 16 192:
              bytestring24 path n24 t16[16];
1067
1068
1069
            case xmss-shake256 16 256:
1070
              bytestring32 path n32 t16[16];
1071
1072
            case xmss-sha2 20 192:
1073
            case xmss-shake256 20 192:
1074
              bytestring24 path n24 t20[20];
1075
1076
            case xmss-shake256 20 256:
1077
              bytestring32 path n32 t20[20];
1078
          };
1079
1080
          /* Types for XMSS random strings */
1081
1082
          union random string xmss switch (xmss algorithm type type) {
1083
            case xmss-sha2 10 192:
1084
            case xmss-sha2 16 192:
            case xmss-sha2 20 192:
1085
1086
            case xmss-shake256 10 192:
            case xmss-shake256 16 192:
1087
1088
            case xmss-shake256 20 192:
1089
             bytestring24 rand n24;
1090
1091
            case xmss-shake256 10 256:
1092
            case xmss-shake256 16 256:
```

```
1093
            case xmss-shake256 20 256:
1094
              bytestring32 rand n32;
1095
          };
1096
1097
          /* Corresponding WOTS+ type for given XMSS type */
1098
1099
          union xmss ots signature switch (xmss algorithm type type) {
1100
            case xmss-sha2 10 192:
1101
            case xmss-sha2 16 192:
1102
            case xmss-sha2 20 192:
1103
              wotsp-sha2 192;
1104
1105
            case xmss-shake256 10 256:
1106
            case xmss-shake256 16 256:
1107
            case xmss-shake256 20 256:
1108
             wotsp-shake256 256;
1109
1110
            case xmss-shake256 10 192:
1111
            case xmss-shake256 16 192:
            case xmss-shake256 20 192:
1112
1113
              wotsp-shake256 192;
1114
          };
1115
1116
          /* Types for bitmask seed */
1117
1118
          union seed switch (xmss algorithm type type) {
1119
            case xmss-sha2 10 192:
1120
            case xmss-sha2 16 192:
            case xmss-sha2 20 192:
1121
1122
            case xmss-shake256 10 192:
            case xmss-shake256 16 192:
1123
            case xmss-shake256 20 192:
1124
1125
             bytestring24 seed n24;
1126
1127
            case xmss-shake256 10 256:
            case xmss-shake256 16 256:
1128
1129
            case xmss-shake256 20 256:
1130
              bytestring32 seed n32;
1131
          };
1132
1133
          /* Types for XMSS root node */
1134
1135
          union xmss root switch (xmss algorithm type type) {
1136
            case xmss-sha2 10 192:
            case xmss-sha2 16 192:
1137
1138
            case xmss-sha2 20 192:
1139
            case xmss-shake256 10 192:
```

```
1140case xmss-shake256_16_192:1141case xmss-shake256_20_192:1142bytestring24 root_n24;114311441144case xmss-shake256_10_256:1145case xmss-shake256_16_256:1146case xmss-shake256_20_256:1147bytestring32 root n32;
```

```
1148 };
```

1149 **B.3 XMSS^{MT}**

1150	/* Definition of parameter sets */
1151	
1152	enum xmssmt_algorithm_type {
1153	
1154	$xmssmt-sha2_20/2_192 = TBD,$
1155	$xmssmt-sha2_20/4_192 = TBD,$
1156	$xmssmt-sha2_40/2_192 = TBD,$
1157	$xmssmt-sha2_40/4_192 = TBD,$
1158	$xmssmt-sha2_40/8_192 = TBD,$
1159	$xmssmt-sha2_60/3_192 = TBD,$
1160	$xmssmt-sha2_60/6_192 = TBD,$
1161	$xmssmt-sha2_{60}/12_{192} = TBD,$
1162	
1163	xmssmt-shake256 20/2 256 = TBD,
1164	xmssmt-shake256 20/4 256 = TBD,
1165	xmssmt-shake256 40/2 256 = TBD,
1166	xmssmt-shake256_40/4_256 = TBD,
1167	xmssmt-shake256 40/8 256 = TBD,
1168	xmssmt-shake256_60/3_256 = TBD,
1169	xmssmt-shake256_60/6_256 = TBD,
1170	xmssmt-shake256 60/12 256 = TBD,
1171	
1172	xmssmt-shake256 20/2 192 = TBD,
1173	xmssmt-shake256 20/4 192 = TBD,
1174	xmssmt-shake256 40/2 192 = TBD,
1175	xmssmt-shake256 40/4 192 = TBD,
1176	xmssmt-shake256 40/8 192 = TBD,
1177	xmssmt-shake256_60/3_192 = TBD,
1178	xmssmt-shake256_60/6_192 = TBD,
1179	xmssmt-shake256_60/12_192 = TBD,
1180	};
1181	
1182	<pre>/* Type for XMSS^MT key pair index */</pre>
1183	/* Depends solely on h */
1184	

```
1185
          union idx sig xmssmt switch (xmss algorithm type type) {
1186
            case xmssmt-sha2 20/2 192:
1187
            case xmssmt-sha2 20/4 192:
1188
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/2 256:
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/4 256:
1189
1190
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/2 192:
1191
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/4 192:
1192
              bytestring3 idx3;
1193
1194
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/2 192:
1195
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/4 192:
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/8 192:
1196
1197
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/2 256:
1198
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/4 256:
1199
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/8 256:
1200
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/2 192:
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/4 192:
1201
1202
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/8 192:
1203
              bytestring5 idx5;
1204
1205
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/3 192:
1206
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/6 192:
1207
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/12 192:
1208
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/3 256:
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/6 256:
1209
1210
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/12 256:
1211
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/3 192:
1212
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/6 192:
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/12 192:
1213
1214
              bytestring8 idx8;
1215
          };
1216
1217
          union random string xmssmt switch (xmssmt algorithm type type) {
1218
            case xmssmt-sha2 20/2 192:
1219
            case xmssmt-sha2 20/4 192:
1220
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/2 192:
1221
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/4 192:
1222
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/8 192:
1223
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/3 192:
1224
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/6 192:
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/12 192:
1225
1226
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/2 192:
1227
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/4 192:
1228
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/2 192:
1229
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/4 192:
1230
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/8 192:
1231
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/3 192:
```

```
1232
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/6 192:
1233
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/12 192:
1234
              bytestring24 rand n24;
1235
1236
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/2 256:
1237
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/4 256:
1238
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/2 256:
1239
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/4 256:
1240
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/8 256:
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/3 256:
1241
1242
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/6 256:
1243
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/12 256:
1244
              bytestring32 rand n32;
1245
          };
1246
1247
          /* Type for reduced XMSS signatures */
1248
1249
          union xmss reduced (xmss algorithm type type) {
1250
            case xmssmt-sha2 20/2 192:
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/4 192:
1251
1252
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/6 192:
1253
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/2 192:
1254
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/4 192:
1255
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/6 192:
1256
              bytestring24 xmss reduced n24 t61[61];
1257
1258
            case xmssmt-sha2 20/4 192:
1259
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/8 192:
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/12 192:
1260
1261
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/4 192:
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/8 192:
1262
1263
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/12 192:
1264
              bytestring24 xmss reduced n24 t56[56];
1265
1266
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/2 192:
1267
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/3 192:
1268
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/2 192:
1269
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/3 192:
1270
              bytestring24 xmss reduced n24 t71[71];
1271
1272
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/2 256:
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/4 256:
1273
1274
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/6 256:
1275
              bytestring32 xmss reduced n32 t77[77];
1276
1277
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/4 256:
1278
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/8 256:
```

```
1279
          case xmssmt-shake256 60/12 256:
1280
              bytestring32 xmss reduced n32 t72[72];
1281
1282
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/2 256:
1283
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/3 256:
1284
              bytestring32 xmss reduced n32 t87[87];
1285
          };
1286
1287
          /* xmss reduced array depends on d */
1288
1289
          union xmss reduced array (xmss algorithm type type) {
1290
            case xmssmt-sha2 20/2 192:
1291
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/2 192:
1292
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/2 256:
1293
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/2 256:
1294
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/2 192:
1295
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/2 192:
1296
              xmss reduced xmss red arr d2[2];
1297
1298
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/3 192:
1299
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/3 256:
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/3 192:
1300
              xmss reduced xmss red arr d3[3];
1301
1302
1303
            case xmssmt-sha2 20/4 192:
1304
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/4 192:
1305
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/4 256:
1306
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/4 256:
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/4 192:
1307
1308
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/4 192:
1309
              xmss reduced xmss red arr d4[4];
1310
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/6 192:
1311
1312
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/6 256:
1313
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/6 192:
1314
              xmss reduced xmss red arr d6[6];
1315
1316
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/8 192:
1317
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/8 256:
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/8 192:
1318
1319
              xmss reduced xmss red arr d8[8];
1320
1321
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/12 192:
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/12 256:
1322
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/12 192:
1323
1324
              xmss reduced xmss red arr d12[12];
1325
          };
```

```
1326
          /* Types for bitmask seed */
1327
1328
1329
          union seed switch (xmssmt algorithm type type) {
1330
            case xmssmt-sha2 20/2 192:
1331
            case xmssmt-sha2 20/4 192:
1332
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/2 192:
1333
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/4 192:
1334
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/8 192:
1335
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/3 192:
1336
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/6 192:
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/12 192:
1337
1338
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/2 192:
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/4 192:
1339
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/2 192:
1340
1341
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/4 192:
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/8 192:
1342
1343
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/3 192:
1344
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/6 192:
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/12 192:
1345
1346
              bytestring24 seed n24;
1347
1348
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/2 256:
1349
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/4 256:
1350
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/2 256:
1351
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/4 256:
1352
            case xmssmt-shake256 40/8 256:
1353
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/3 256:
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/6 256:
1354
            case xmssmt-shake256 60/12 256:
1355
1356
              bytestring32 seed n32;
1357
1358
          };
1359
1360
          /* Types for XMSS^MT root node */
1361
1362
          union xmssmt root switch (xmssmt algorithm type type) {
1363
            case xmssmt-sha2 20/2 192:
1364
            case xmssmt-sha2 20/4 192:
1365
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/2 192:
1366
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/4 192:
            case xmssmt-sha2 40/8 192:
1367
1368
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/3 192:
1369
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/6 192:
            case xmssmt-sha2 60/12 192:
1370
1371
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/2 192:
1372
            case xmssmt-shake256 20/4 192:
```

1373	case xmssmt-shake256 40/2 192:
1374	case xmssmt-shake256 40/4 192:
1375	case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_192:
1376	case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_192:
1377	case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_192:
1378	<pre>case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_192:</pre>
1379	<pre>bytestring24 root_n24;</pre>
1380	
1381	<pre>case xmssmt-shake256_20/2_256:</pre>
1382	case xmssmt-shake256_20/4_256:
1383	case xmssmt-shake256_40/2_256:
1384	case xmssmt-shake256_40/4_256:
1385	case xmssmt-shake256_40/8_256:
1386	<pre>case xmssmt-shake256_60/3_256:</pre>
1387	case xmssmt-shake256_60/6_256:
1388	<pre>case xmssmt-shake256_60/12_256:</pre>
1389	<pre>bytestring32 root_n32;</pre>
1390	};

1391

1392 Appendix C—Provable Security Analysis

This appendix briefly summarizes the formal security model and proofs of security of the LMS
and XMSS signature schemes and provides a short discussion comparing these models and
proofs.

1396 C.1 The Random Oracle Model

1397 In the *random oracle model* (ROM), there is a publicly accessible random oracle that both the 1398 user and the adversary can send queries to and receive responses from at any time. A random 1399 oracle *H* is a hypothetical, *interactive* black-box algorithm that obeys the following rules:

- 14001. Every time the algorithm H receives a new input string s, it generates an output t1401uniformly at random from its output space and returns the response t. The algorithm H1402then records the pair (s, t) for future use.
- 1403
 1403
 1404
 2. If the algorithm *H* is ever queried in the future with some prior input *s*, it will always return the same output *t* according to its recorded memory.
- 1405 Alternatively, the random oracle H can be described as a non-interactive but *exponentially large* 1406 look-up table initialized with truly random outputs t for each possible input string s.
- 1407 To say that a cryptographic security proof is done in the random oracle model means that every
- 1408 use of a particular function (for example, in the case here, the compression function that is used
- 1409 to perform hashes) is replaced by a query to the random oracle *H*. This simplifies security claims
- 1410 as, for example, it becomes easy to prove upper bounds on the likelihood of producing a second
- 1411 preimage within a fixed number of queries to *H*. On the other hand, (compression) functions in
- 1412 the real world are neither interactive nor have exponentially large descriptions, so they cannot
- 1413 truly behave like a random oracle.
- 1414 It is therefore desirable to have a cryptographic security proof that avoids using the random
- 1415 oracle model. However, this often leads to less efficient cryptographic systems, or it is not yet
- 1416 known how to perform a proof without appealing to the random oracle model, or both. So, as a
- 1417 matter of real-world pragmatism, the ROM is commonly used.

1418 C.2 The Quantum Random Oracle Model

- 1419 The *quantum random oracle model* (QROM) is similar to the ROM, except it is additionally
- 1420 assumed that all parties (in particular, the adversary) have quantum computers and can query the
- 1421 random oracle H in superposition. (In the real world, the random oracle H is still instantiated as a
- 1422 compression function or similar, as per the cryptosystem's specification.) While this complicates
- security claims as compared to the ROM, it more accurately models the power of an adversary
- 1424 that has access to a large-scale quantum device for its cryptanalysis when attacking a real-world 1425 scheme.

1426 C.3 LMS Security Proof

1427 In [11], the author considers a particular experiment in the random oracle model in which the

- adversary is given a series of strings with prefixes (in a randomly chosen but structured manner)
- and hash targets. The attacker's goal is to find one more string that has the same prefix and hash
- 1430 target as any of its input strings. The author proves an upper bound on the adversary's ability to
- 1431 compute first or second preimages from these strings (by querying the compression function
- 1432 modeled as a random oracle).
- 1433 Then, the author reduces the problem of forging a signature in LMS to this stated experiment,
- 1434 concluding that the same upper bounds apply to the problem of producing forgeries against
- 1435 LMS. This random oracle model proof critically depends on the randomness of the prefixes used
- 1436 in LMS, which means that LMS in the real world critically depends on the pseudorandomness of
- the prefixes.
- 1438 Further, in [15], the same proof is carried out in the QROM.

1439 C.4 XMSS Security Proof

- In [12], a security analysis for the *original* (academic publication) version of XMSS is givenunder the following assumptions:
- 14421. The function family $\{f_k\}$ used to construct Winternitz signatures is pseudorandom. This1443means that if the bit string k is chosen uniformly at random, then an adversary given1444black-box access to the function f_k cannot distinguish this black box from a random1445function within a polynomial number of queries (except with negligible probability).
- 1446 2. The hash function family $\{h_k\}$ is second preimage-resistant. This means that if bit strings 1447 *k* and *m* are chosen uniformly at random, then an adversary given *k* and *m* cannot 1448 construct $m' \neq m$ such that $h_k(m') = h_k(m)$ in polynomial time (except with negligible 1449 probability).
- 1450 The proof in [12] asserts that if both of these assumptions are true, then XMSS is existentially 1451 unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) in the standard model.
- However, in the *current* version of XMSS^{MT} [1], the security analysis differs somewhat. In the standard model, [17] shows that XMSS^{MT} is EUF-CMA. Further, [16] shows that XMSS^{MT} is post-quantum existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks with respect to the QROM.
- 1456 In a little more detail, the current version of XMSS uses two types of assumptions:
- 14571. A standard model assumption that the hash function h_k , used for the one-time1458signatures and tree node computations, is post-quantum, multi-function, multi-target1459preimage-resistant.
- 14602. A (quantum) random oracle model assumption that the pseudorandom function f_k , used1461to generate pseudorandom values for randomized hashing and computing bitmasks as1462blinding keys, may be validly modeled as a quantum random oracle H.

1463 C.5 Comparison of the Security Models and Proofs of LMS and XMSS

Generally speaking, both LMS and XMSS are supported by sound security proofs under
commonly used cryptographic hardness assumptions. That is, if these cryptographic assumptions
are true, then both schemes are provably shown to be existentially unforgeable under chosen
message attack, even against an adversary that has access to a large-scale quantum computer for
use in its forgery attack.

The main difference between these schemes' security analyses comes down to the use (and the degree of use) of the random oracle or quantum random oracle models. Along these lines, the difference between the (standard model/real world) cryptographic assumption that some function family $\{f_k\}$ is pseudorandom and the use of the random oracle model is briefly pointed out. For a function f_k to be a pseudorandom function in the real world, it should be the case that the bit string k used as the key to the function remains private, meaning that it is not in the view of the

adversary at any point of the security experiment. On the other hand, a random oracle *H* achieves

1476 the same pseudorandomness (or even randomness) properties of a pseudorandom function f_k , but 1477 there is no key k necessarily associated with the random oracle. Indeed, all inputs to the random

1477 there is no key k necessarily associated with the random oracle. Indeed, all inputs to the random 1478 oracle H may be known to all parties and, in particular, to the adversary. Therefore, using the

random oracle model clearly involves making a stronger assumption about the (limits of the)

1480 cryptanalytic power of the adversary.

1481 That said, a security proof is either *entirely* a "real world proof," which does not use the random

oracle model, or it appeals to the random oracle methodology in some manner. The security

1483 analysis of the current version of XMSS only uses the random oracle *H* when performing

1484 randomized hashing and computing bitmasks, whereas LMS uses the random oracle *H* to a

1485 greater degree (modeling the compression function as a random oracle). However, it remains the

1486 case that both schemes in their modern form are ultimately proven secure using the ROM and

1487 QROM.

1488 Therefore, the cryptographic hardness assumptions made by LMS and XMSS in order to achieve

1489 existential unforgeability under chosen message attack (EUF-CMA) may be viewed as

substantially similar and worthy of essentially equal confidence. As such, the practitioner's

1491 decision to deploy one scheme or the other should primarily depend on other factors, such as the

1492 efficiency demands for a given deployment environment or the other security considerations

1493 enumerated earlier in this document.