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Access Control on NoSQL Databases

Initial Public Draft

Vincent C. Hu

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January 2024



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1 Abstract

- 2 NoSQL database systems and data stores often outperform traditional RDBMS in various
- 3 aspects, such as data analysis efficiency, system performance, ease of deployment,
- 4 flexibility/scalability of data management, and users' availability. However, with an increasing
- 5 number of people storing sensitive data in NoSQL databases, security issues have become
- 6 critical concerns. NoSQL databases suffer from vulnerabilities, particularly due to the lack of
- 7 effective support for data protection, including weak authorization mechanisms. As access
- 8 control is a fundamental data protection requirement of any database management system
- 9 DBMS, this document focuses on access control on NoSQL database systems.

10 Keywords

11 access control; attribute-based access control; authorization; database systems; No-SQL; SQL.

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101

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105 Executive Summary

- 106 NoSQL stands for "not only SQL" or "non-SQL," which typically refer to any non-relational
- 107 database that stores data in a format other than relational tables. It shifts away from relational
- 108 databases (RDBMS) for dealing with enormous and constantly growing data and infrastructure
- 109 needs and increasingly uses the Web 3.0 framework for big data and real-time web
- applications, including handling unstructured data like documents, emails, and social media.
- 111 NoSQL databases are particularly useful for managing unstructured or very large data objects
- stored across distributed and cooperating devices. Use cases for retrieving such data range
- from critical scenarios (e.g., storing financial data and healthcare records) to more casual
- applications (e.g., chat log data, video, and images, readings from smart devices). Major Web
- 115 2.0 companies have developed or adopted different flavors of NoSQL databases to meet their
- 116 growing data and infrastructure needs.
- 117 NoSQL database systems and data stores often outperform traditional RDBMS in various
- aspects, such as data analysis efficiency, system performance, ease of deployment,
- 119 flexibility/scalability of data management, and users' availability. However, with an increasing
- 120 number of people storing sensitive data in NoSQL databases, security issues have become
- 121 critical concerns. NoSQL databases suffer from vulnerabilities, particularly due to the lack of
- 122 effective support for data protection, including weak authorization mechanisms. As access
- 123 control is a fundamental data protection requirement of any database management system
- 124 DBMS, this document discusses access control on NoSQL database systems by illustrating the
- 125 NoSQL database types along with their support for access control models and describing
- 126 considerations from the perspective of access control.

127

128 1. Introduction

- 129 NoSQL stands for "not only SQL" or "non-SQL," which typically refer to any non-relational
- 130 database that stores data in a format other than relational tables. It emerged in the late 2000s,
- 131 triggered by the growing popularity of distributed systems, such as cloud computing and big
- data, which required a shift away from relational databases (RDBMS) toward NoSQL databases.
- 133 Organizations now deal with enormous and constantly growing data and infrastructure needs
- 134 or increasingly use the Web 3.0 framework for big data and real-time web applications,
- including handling unstructured data like documents, emails, and social media [AA, NO].
- 136 NoSQL databases are particularly useful for managing unstructured or very large data objects
- 137 stored across distributed and cooperating devices. Use cases for retrieving such data range
- 138 from critical scenarios (e.g., storing financial data and healthcare records) to more casual
- applications (e.g., chat log data, video, images, and readings from smart devices). Major Web
- 140 2.0 companies like Amazon (Dynamo), Google (BigTable), LinkedIn (Voldemort), and Facebook
- 141 (Cassandra) have developed or adopted different flavors of NoSQL databases to meet their
- 142 growing data and infrastructure needs. Their success has inspired many of today's NoSQL
- 143 applications [AA, CJ].
- 144 NoSQL database systems and data stores often outperform traditional RDBMS in various
- 145 aspects, such as data analysis efficiency, system performance, ease of deployment,
- 146 flexibility/scalability of data management, and users' availability. However, with an increasing
- 147 number of people storing sensitive data in NoSQL databases, security issues have become
- 148 critical concerns. NoSQL databases suffer from vulnerabilities, particularly due to the lack of
- 149 effective support for data protection, including weak authorization mechanisms. As access
- 150 control is a fundamental data protection requirement of any database management system
- 151 (DBMS) [FF], this document discusses access control on NoSQL database systems by illustrating
- the NoSQL database types along with their support for access control models and describing
- 153 considerations from the perspective of access control. Note that an access control system may
- store and manage access control data (e.g., subjects, objects, actions, and attributes) in
- external systems rather than the NoSQL database itself, which have a wide range of different
- 156 implementations are not discussed in this document.
- 157 This document is organized as follows:
- Section 1 is the introduction,
- Section 2 provides an overview of NoSQL database systems,
- Section 3 introduces access control models for NoSQL database systems,
- Section 4 describes considerations for NoSQL systems from the perspective of access control.
- Section 5 is the conclusion,
- References list articles referred by this document,
- Appendix A provides an example application of Graph model.

166 **2. Overview of NoSQL Database Systems**

- 167 Applications in web services, e-commerce, mobile computing, and social media require storing
- and processing vast amounts of structured and unstructured data driven by the significant
- 169 increase in global datasets known as "big data," which includes data with high volume, velocity,
- and variety. However, handling such immense data becomes increasingly complicated in terms
- 171 of processing and meeting users' requirements, such as scalability, performance control, high
- availability, low latency, workload distribution, and managing big data applications [AA].
- 173 Traditional RDBMSs often fall short when compared to NoSQL database systems, which utilize
- distributed and collaborative devices to store and retrieve data. NoSQL databases offer the
- 175 flexibility to rapidly adapt to changes in the software stack and allow data to be distributed
- across multiple servers and regions in the cloud, scale out instead of scaling up, and intelligently
- 177 geo-place data to optimize performance [MO].


178 2.1. Types of NoSQL Databases Systems

179 In general, there are four major types of NoSQL models: key-value, document, wide-column,180 and graph databases.

181 2.1.1. Key-Value Model

- 182 The key-value model, as shown in Fig. 1, stores data in a schemaless form, making them simple,
- 183 efficient, and powerful. In this model, each database item contains keys and corresponding
- values, similar to an RDBMS with only two columns (i.e., key and the value). Data can be
- 185 efficiently retrieved by using a unique key, which serves as an index like a hash table. The values
- 186 in a key-value NoSQL database can be simple data types, like strings and numbers, or complex
- 187 objects [HI]. The key-value model is primarily used for caching, session management, and
- 188 leaderboard applications [WT].

189



190 191

Fig. 1. Key-value database model

192 **2.1.2. Wide-Column Model**

The wide-column model, as shown in Fig. 2, stores data in tables, rows, and dynamic columns, 193 194 similar to the key-value model. However, the key in this model is an integration of the row, 195 column, and/or timestamp and refers to one or many columns as a "column family." Each 196 column family is equivalent to a table in an RDBMS, enabling analytics on a small number of 197 columns for data mining and web applications. This design allows for more efficient data 198 reading and retrieval with higher speed compared to traditional RDBMS [AA, HI]. It is well-199 suited for complex datasets and storing large amounts of data in distributed systems as it 200 enables the easy addition of new columns by creating new files, eliminating the need to rebuild 201 the entire table, as required in RDBMS [AA]. The model is usually optimized for specific use 202 cases (e.g., Facebook's Inbox search feature), allowing it to efficiently handle over 100 million 203 users continuously using the system [OG]. Other popular use cases of the wide-column model 204 include the Internet of Things (IoT), inventory management, and big data processing.

- 205
- 206

Column fa	mily 1				Column far	nily n	
Row 1]	ΙΓ	Row 1		
Column 1		Column n			Column 1		Column n
Value 1		Value 1			Value 1		Value 1
Value n		Value n			Value n		Value n
i Row n				i Row n			
Column 1		Column n			Column 1		Column n
Value 1		Value 1			Value 1		Value 1
Value n		Value n			Value n		Value n

207

208

Fig. 2. Wide-column database model

209 2.1.3. Document Model

210 The document model, as shown in Fig. 3, stores data in documents, similar to JSON, BSON, and

211 XML documents. In this model, data is organized into collections with a unique key that serves

as an index for fast querying. A collection contains documents without a schema. Rather, each

213 document contains pairs of fields and values of various types, such as strings, numbers,

Booleans, arrays, and others. The data within documents can include structured data, semi-


structured data (e.g., XML files), or unstructured data (e.g., text), which allows for a dynamic

216 structure and the easy modification, addition, or deletion of fields. This flexibility allows

documents to be stored and retrieved in a form that closely resembles the data objects used in

218 applications, reducing the need for data translation during application use [HI] and contributing

- to high performance and horizontal scalability. This model has applications in blog software,
- 220 content management systems [AA], and product catalogs, big data, and analytics [WT].
- 221



222

223

Fig. 3. Document database model

224 **2.1.4. Graph Model**

The graph model, as shown in Fig. 4, represents and stores data based on relationships. It is a schemaless model, and data is structured using nodes and edges. Nodes typically store data


entities, while edges represent the relationships or links between the data nodes. The model is

scalable but complex as it often utilizes shortest path algorithms to optimize data queries for


real-time results. In this model, the efficiency of a query depends on the number of

230 relationships among the nodes [HI]. Graph-based databases have various applications, such as

- 231 recommendation systems, social networking, identity and access management (IAM), and
- 232 content management [AA WT].
- 233



234 235



236 **2.2. Features of NoSQL Database Systems**

- 237 NoSQL databases offer flexible and simple data models, horizontal scalability, and fast (i.e.,
- 238 primitive) queries, as well as security deficiencies [MO]. Table 1 compares the features of
- 239 RDBMS with those of NoSQL databases [AH, SL].
- 240

Table 1. Comparison of RDBMS and NoSQL features

Database Model	RDBMS	NoSQL
Database	Relational	Non-relational
Scheme	Fixed and structured	Dynamic and unstructured
Queries	Complex queries using JOIN	Unsupported
Scalable	Vertical	Horizontal
Properties	Atomicity, consistency, isolation, and durability (ACID)	Consistency (eventually), availability, partial tolerance (CAP)

241 2.2.1. Flexible Data Model

- 242 NoSQL databases provide flexible schemas that enable easy database changes and seamless
- 243 integration with database applications. For example, in document-based systems, documents
- 244 do not need to follow the same schema, which allows for faster creation and maintenance of
- 245 documents with minimal overhead.

246 **2.2.2. Horizontal Scalability**

- 247 NoSQL databases support horizontal scaling, which means that they handle increased capacity
- 248 by distributing data across multiple servers, thus avoiding the need to migrate to a larger server
- 249 when capacity exceeds the requirements of the current server. NoSQL key-value systems have a
- 250 simple structure with only two columns (i.e., key and the value), enabling horizontal scaling
- without the need for complex field joins. Similarly, wide-column systems can handle more
- complex data structures by adding new columns through the creation of a new file.

253 2.2.3. Fast Queries

- 254 NoSQL databases store data in a way that optimizes queries by utilizing simple and efficient
- 255 (i.e., primitive) query language [OG] without the need for join operations that can degrade
- 256 query performance in typically normalized DBMS using SQL. For example, in document systems
- 257 with open formats like XML and JSON, building a document does not require foreign keys. This
- allows for dynamic relationships between documents, making them independent of each other.
- 259 Wide-column systems are also designed for efficient data reading and retrieval, resulting in
- 260 better performance [HI].

261 **2.2.4. Security Deficiencies**

- 262 Despite their advantages, NoSQL databases lack a mechanism for handling and managing data
- 263 consistency and maintaining integrity constraints (e.g., using foreign keys). Additionally, they
- often have limited support for security at the database level [OG].

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
265 3. Access Control Model on NoSQL Database Systems

266 This section illustrates how to apply access control properties on NoSQL models assuming that

the access control system stores and manage access control data (e.g., subjects, objects, and attributes) in the NoSQL database.

269 **3.1. Relationship Structures of NoSQL Models**

- 270 Schemaless relationships between NoSQL data can be constructed using hierarchical structures.
- 271 The key-value, wide-column, and document models can be represented in a tree data structure,
- as shown in Fig. 5, with a maximum of five tree levels if the NoSQL database itself is
- 273 represented at the first (i.e., root) level.



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- 277

Fig. 5. Hierarchical structure relationships of the key-value, wide-column, and document models


278 Nodes in the second tree level represent the Tables, Column families, and Collections for key-

value, wide-column, and document models, respectively. Nodes in the third tree level represent

280 the data that can be indexed from the nodes in the second tree level, which are Key, Rows, and

- 281 Documents for the key-value, wide-column, and document models, respectively. Nodes in the
- fourth tree level represent the data that can be indexed from nodes in the third tree level,

- 283 which are values, Column IDs, and Fields for the key-value, wide-column, and document
- 284 models, respectively. Nodes in the fifth tree level represent the data that can be indexed from
- nodes in the fourth tree level. There is no offspring on this level for the key-value model. It is
- essential to consider these hierarchical structures when designing access control on NoSQL
- 287 databases to effectively leverage their schemaless nature and optimize data access.
- 288 Unlike hierarchical tree structures, the relationship structure of the graph model is represented
- by a directed graph, as shown in Fig. 6.
- 290



- 291
- 292
- 293

Fig. 6. Directed graph relationship structure of the graph model

294 In this model, each node can have more than one edge, which represent the connections or

relationships between nodes in the graph. The directed graph allows for complex and

interconnected data relationships, making it ideal for applications in which data connections

and dependencies are critical to the analysis and processing of information.

298 **3.2. Access Control Rules from NoSQL Relationship Structures**

Enforcing access control policies — especially for fine-grained access control on schemaless
NoSQL databases with data relationships in heterogeneous structures — presents challenges
due to the absence of a reference data model and related manipulation language. This
exacerbates the enforcement of access control policies on the protected data [CF]. Additionally,
managing access control on NoSQL databases is not as straightforward as it is for RDBMSs,
making it challenging to query "who can access what" in a straightforward manner. However,

205 any static access control policy model based on subjects and object attributes can still be

- any static access control policy model based on subjects and object attributes can still be
- 306 applied to NoSQL databases. The following sections describe how access control rules can be

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specified by attributes in the relationship structures for each of the NoSQL models presented inSec. 3.1.

309 3.2.1. Key-Value Model

- 310 In the key-value model, a subject's attributes can be specified through the link relationships
- from level 2 notes to level 3 nodes, as illustrated in Fig. 7.
- 312







Fig. 7. Example of defining subject and object attributes for the key-value model

For example, a subject and its attributes can be specified as *x* (Value *user*), *y* (Key *group*), and *z* (Table *department*). Similarly, an object and its attributes can be specified as *f* (Value *file*), *g* (Key *branch*), and *h* (Table *company*). Based on these attributes, an access control policy rule can be created to state that "user *x* in group *y* of department *z* can read file *f* managed by branch *g* of company *h*" using the relationships of the nodes. It is not necessary to include all levels of nodes except for the leaf to form a policy rule, but at least one node is required for a rule, such as "user *x* in group *y* can access objects managed by branch *h*."

322 **3.2.2. Wide-Column and Document Models**

323 In wide-column and document models, the attributes of subjects can be specified through any

324 link from level 2 through level 4 nodes or just one node, as shown in Fig. 8.



325



Fig. 8. Example of defining subject and object attributes for wide-column and document models

327 For example, a subject and its attributes can be specified as w (Value user), x (Column ID

- 328 *group*), *y* (Row *department*), and *z* (Column family *organization*) for the wide-column model.
- 329 Similarly, a subject and its attributes can be described as *w* (Value *user*), *x* (Field *group*), *y*
- 330 (Document *department*), and *z* (Collection *company*) for the document model. An object and its
- attributes can be specified as *f* (Value *file*), g (Column-ID *branch*), *h* (Row *division*), and *j*
- 332 (Column family *company*) for the wide-column model. For the Document model, an object and
- its attributes can be specified as f (Value file), g (Field branch), h (Document division), and j
- 334 (Collection *company*). Thus, access control based on attributes for the Wide-column model can
- be represented as follows: "The user win group x of department y in company z can read file f
- managed by branch *g* that belongs to division *h* in company *j*." Similar access control rules can
- be specified for the document model. In both models, an access control rule can be specified
- using only one node (i.e., attribute) without linking to the next level of nodes. This implies that
- the lower-level attributes inherit access permissions from the attributes above them. For
- 340 example, "Any users in group *x* can read objects that belong to division *h*."
- 341 In summary, an access control policy can be formally specified as a tuple with a finite number of
- 342 elements in a set: {database, non-tree nodes of attributes for subjects, leaf node for the subject
- 343 (optional), non-tree nodes of attributes for objects, leaf node for the object (optional), actions,

344 permission} for key-value, wide-column, and document models. Due to the limitations of 345 models based on node hierarchies, accessing data at the finest granularity level of the original 346 data resources becomes a challenge. For example, in wide-column databases, data has to be 347 organized within a collection in Column IDs. In document databases, data is typically stored 348 within Fields. However, there may be situations in which finer-grained access control is 349 required at a level beyond what the existing node structures can support, leading to a need for 350 more attributes in access control rules. In such cases, it becomes necessary to construct tree 351 branches horizontally to accommodate additional attributes. This approach adds complexity to 352 the implementation of the database system and can be challenging to manage effectively. Such 353 a lack of inherent support for fine-grained access control may require developers to find 354 creative solutions to achieve the desired level of access granularity, potentially leading to more 355 complex and less straightforward implementations. In addition to attributes for attribute-based 356 access control, role-based access control (RBAC) can also be implemented by assigning a layer

357 of nodes as roles.

358 3.2.3. Graph Model


359 Attributes in the graph model can be constructed differently since Graph edges do not

360 necessarily have hierarchical relationships between nodes. Instead, edges connected by nodes

361 may form cyclic relationships rather than a tree structure. As shown in Fig. 9, attributes in a

362 graph database can be described through a sequence of edges and/or nodes without

- 363 hierarchical relationships.
- 364



365


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Fig. 9. Example of defining subject and object attributes for a graph model

For example, a subject attribute can be described as user x (node) in (edge) group y (node) works for (edge) company z (node), and an object attribute can be described as file f (node)

369 managed by (edge) department *d* (node) belongs to (edge) organization *o* (node). An access

- 370 control policy based on attributes can then be specified, such as "the user x in group y who
- 371 works for company z can read file f managed by department d that belongs to organization o,"
- 372 or "any users in company *z* can read objects that belong to organization *o*" if only applied to
- attributes without specific subjects or objects.
- 374 Edges in the graph model are flexible and can be used to implement either an attribute or a
- permitted action in an access control rule. If implemented as a permitted action, the access
- 376 control rule can be directly embedded in the database, treating a sequence of links as the rule.
- 377 In other words, there is no need to store the access control rule outside of the database. An
- example graph in Fig. 10 contains the following nodes and edges: user x (node) in (edge
- directed to group *y* node) can read (edge directed to file *y* node).
- 380



381

382Fig. 10. Example of defining subject and object attributes for graph models using edges for permitted actions to383embed an access control policy

384 Unlike the key-value, wide-column, and document models, the graph model does not have 385 limitations on the number of edges and nodes connected in a sequence of relationships when 386 constructing attributes for subjects and objects. The graph model allows access to data at the 387 finest possible granularity that matches the original data resource thanks to the unlimited 388 extension of the graph topology. Consequently, when composing access control rules, the 389 graph model offers more flexibility and scalability but also introduces a more complex structure 390 compared to the three other models. Additionally, RBAC can also be applied if any edges or 391 nodes are assigned as roles instead of attributes. This flexibility in representing attributes and 392 roles makes the graph model suitable for various access control scenarios. Appendix A 393 describes an example application of this flexibility for implementations for a federated system 394 environment.

395 3.3. Access Control Model Implementations

- 396 While mandatory access control policies (MAC) (e.g., ABAC [SP 800-162] and RBAC [SF]),
- discretionary policies (DAC), and various context-based models [NISTIR 7316] can be
- 398 implemented in NoSQL databases using add-on applications, most current NoSQL

- 399 implementations enforce authorization at a higher level. Specifically, authorization mechanisms
- 400 are often implemented at a database level rather than at a more granular level [CF], such as the
- 401 document collection level or column family level. Some NoSQL systems apply different
- 402 enforcement mechanisms for different operation modes, such as read-only and read-write
- 403 permissions being set for users in unshared modes but lacking support for authorization in
- 404 shared modes [AA]. To support access control models, many research and commercial NoSQL
- databases propose or implement advanced enforcement mechanisms [CF] that vary from one
- 406 system to another and may include:
- 407 Modifying the format (schema) of the NoSQL structures according to the access control
 408 model
- Modifying the query methods according to the access control model [AA]
- Integrating an access control model in a NoSQL hierarchical level
- 411 Managing the heterogeneous, non-normalized, schemaless data of NoSQL databases
- 412 characterized by complex hierarchical structures can make it difficult to handle the dynamic
- 413 requirement of access control policies, such as conditional control (e.g., a rule regulating "no
- 414 access to data has a class greater than 10" or "no access for name field is empty").
- 415 The graph model's No-SQL structure of nodes and edges can leverage the pervasive capability
- 416 of semantic content and the fluency of machine-understandable knowledge of Semantic Web
- 417 technology. One important application is access control that manages federated resources in
- 418 federated access control environments, as demonstrated in Appendix A.

419 **4. Considerations of Access Control for NoSQL Systems**

- 420 NoSQL systems can handle fast-paced agile development, the storage of large volumes of
- 421 structured and semi-structured data, the requirements for scale-out architecture, and modern
- 422 application paradigms (e.g., microservices and real-time streaming) [MO]. However, they also
- 423 face many challenges with regard to access control, such as a lack of proper authentication,
- 424 encryption, dynamic model support, and fine-grained authorization (as described in Sec. 3.3).
- 425 Therefore, careful considerations need to be made when implementing access control on
- 426 NoSQL databases to address these issues effectively.

427 **4.1. Fine-Grained Access Control**

- 428 Fine-grained access control (FGAC), which determines the scope of data authorized to users,
- 429 plays a crucial role in access control mechanisms. However, due to the schemaless nature of
- 430 most NoSQL databases, access control mechanisms are often implemented at a coarse-grained
- 431 level. Unlike traditional RDBMS, where FGAC allows for the enforcement of access control at
- the cellular (e.g., row or column) level [FF], granular control is not available in current NoSQL
- databases. For example, some document NoSQL systems grant access control to the whole
- database or none [CJ]. This limitation hinders the ability to provide customized data protection
- 435 levels, which could enhance the usability and expansion of these systems. While additional
- 436 enforcement mechanisms can be implemented at various levels (e.g., a column family, column,
- 437 or row), these solutions may not be easily adapted to other NoSQL databases.
- 438 To address these challenges, various proposed solutions include identifying suitable
- 439 engineering approaches for encoding policies, defining an enforcement monitor, modifying the
- format of NoSQL structures, and adapting query methods according to access control models
- 441 within a NoSQL hierarchical level. Despite ongoing research efforts, the integration of FGAC into
- 442 NoSQL databases is still a work in progress [AA, FF].

443 **4.2. Security**

- 444 Due to NoSQL's distributed nature, security becomes a more significant concern compared to
- 445 center management-oriented RDBMS. From the perspective of data at rest and data in transit
- 446 (i.e., communications between databases), NoSQL databases generally provide weaker security
- 447 features when compared to RDBMS.
- 448 For data at rest, some NoSQL databases may allow users backdoor access to other users' data
- 449 due to poor logging and log analysis methods [ZA]. In some systems, authorization is applied at
- 450 a per-database level using a role-based approach, limiting certain roles to specific privileges at
- 451 different database levels. In contrast, some systems may provide no authorization by default,
- 452 allowing any action by any user [CJ]. In such cases, an external security enforcement
- 453 mechanism is essential. For example, some systems utilize metadata and provide management
- 454 functions based on the database structure implementing access control operations with
- 455 authorization principles. This allows different applications to implement their own access
- 456 control.

- 457 The security of data in transit and communications in horizontally scaled NoSQL databases is a
- 458 critical issue. Some systems use symmetric key algorithms to encrypted data based on the
- 459 NoSQL structure (i.e., types). For example, in a key-value system, the value of the key is the
- 460 encrypted data, including all of the other key values being concatenated and encrypted. When
- 461 a query is created, the system retrieves data entities and then uses the symmetric key to
- decrypt the data [ZM]. As a result, the data is protected by encryption even if the key is
- 463 intercepted while in transit between different NoSQL hosts.
- 464 Just like RDMBS, NoSQL databases are susceptible to injection attacks, which allow attackers to
- add malicious data to the NoSQL and cause unavailability and corrupt data. NoSQL injection
- 466 attacks typically occur when the attack string is parsed, evaluated, or concatenated into a
- 467 NoSQL API call. Attackers who are familiar with the syntax, data model, and underlying
- 468 programming language of the target database can design specific exploits, especially in cases
- 469 where server-side middleware (e.g., JavaScript, PHP) are heavily used to enhance database
- 470 performance. For example, an internal operator "\$where," designed to be used like the
 471 "where" clause in SQL, can accept sophisticated JavaScript functions to filter data. An attacker
- 472 can exploit this by passing arbitrary code or commands into the \$where operator as part of the
- 473 query. The Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP) Test Guide (v4) [OW] plans
- to include new procedures for testing NoSQL injections to assess NoSQL systems built upon
- 475 JavaScript and/or PHP engines that may possess similar vulnerabilities [CJ].
- 476 NoSQL databases are designed to meet the requirements of the analytical world of big data
- 477 with less emphasis on security during the design stage. Since they do not inherently embed
- 478 security features in the system itself, developers must impose security mechanisms in the
- 479 middleware using third-party tools without compromising scalability.

480 **4.3. Query Language**

- 481 There is currently no standard NoSQL query language in general or for a specific datastore
- 482 category. Instead, each database adopts its own unique query language. This lack of
- 483 standardization reduces interoperability among existing systems. For example, it is currently
- 484 not possible to write even a basic query that can be executed within several different NoSQL
- 485 systems. Similarly, data portability can be problematic since importing a dataset from one
- 486 NoSQL database to another often requires preliminary data manipulation activities, even when
- 487 dealing with the same data type (e.g., JSON objects). The heterogeneity of NoSQL databases
- 488 and the diversity of their query languages make defining a general FGAC enforcement solution
- 489 a complex task. Additionally, there is no systematic support for views, as in standard views for
- 490 RDBMS, which further adds to the challenge of achieving uniformity and standardization across
- 491 the NoSQL landscape [FF].

492 **4.4. Data Consistency**

- 493 Data consistency is essential for some access control models, especially dynamic models such as
- 494 RBAC sections, separation of duty, workflow control, and n-person control [HA]. These models
- 495 rely on a current and accurate access state maintained by consistent data to make access

- 496 permission decisions. However, most NoSQL databases are designed using a shared base
- 497 architecture across distributed commodity servers, which introduces the possibility of inherent
- data inconsistency among clustering nodes [CJ]. As a result, NoSQL databases do not always
- 499 guarantee consistent results as not all participating commodity NoSQL servers may be entirely
- synchronized with other servers that hold the latest information. Additionally, if a single
- 501 commodity server fails, it can lead to load imbalance among other commodity servers and 502 affect data availability [ZA]. This lack of strong data consistency may explain why NoSQL
- 503 databases have not been widely adopted to process critical financial transactions. Instead, it is
- 504 often the responsibility of developers to design applications that can work with the eventual
- 505 consistency model of NoSQL databases and to carefully weigh the trade-offs between data
- 506 consistency and performance impacts [CJ].

507 4.5. Performance

- 508 Performance is key in choosing a NoSQL database, particularly when dealing with high volumes
- 509 of data. However, security including access control is often a trade-off that impacts
- 510 performance. Many NoSQL databases come with default security settings that are either set to
- 511 none or minimum. Therefore, the most effective way to maintain performance while reducing
- 512 risk is to deploy these databases in an environment where proper security measures and
- 513 performance can be implemented and monitored.

514 **4.6. Audit**

- 515 Most currently distributed monitoring and reporting tools focus on database performance (e.g.,
- 516 information about the system's running state and connecting clients) with limited support for
- 517 access auditing [CJ]. Approaches to implementing auditing functions in NoSQL databases may
- 518 depend on the type of NoSQL database being used, which may have their own specific methods
- and tools for implementing access auditing and security logging. For example, in wide-column
- 520 systems, auditing can be enabled on a per-node basis, allowing for maximum audit information
- 521 by turning on auditing on every node of the system. It is important to consider the specific
- 522 requirements and capabilities of the NoSQL database being used to ensure effective security
- 523 logging and monitoring.

524 **4.7. Environment Conditions Control**

- 525 Properly managing and ensuring situational awareness is crucial for maintaining a secure and
- 526 efficient NoSQL database environment. The environmental conditions can either be derived
- 527 from the NoSQL database itself or provided by an independent outside source. If the
- 528 environment conditions are derived from the NoSQL database itself, considering consistency
- 529 (Sec. 4.4) and performance (Sec. 4.5) is critical. However, if the environment conditions are
- 530 provided by an external source, addressing security issues (Sec. 4.2) is essential.

531 **4.8. Support for AI**

- 532 Formal documents (e.g., laws, statutes, regulations, memorandum, articles, etc.) are typically
- written in plain natural language (e.g., English) that may contain access control information. An
- artificial intelligence (AI) natural language processing (NLP) system can be used to render an
- access control policy by taking natural language documents as input and generating formal
- 536 access control rules. To achieve this, the natural language contents must first be converted into
- 537 a formal format. For example, "employees from the product division have to attend a security
- 538 training course to work on project X" is translated into a formal format for an access control 539 rule: "(user attribute = *employee* from *product division*) Λ (operation = *work*) Λ (resource
- attribute = project X) \wedge (condition = attended security training) \rightarrow (permission = grant)"
- 541 connected by Boolean operators.
- 542 To make this transformation possible, the AI NLP system must:
- a. Recognize if a sentence in the document can form access control rule(s)
- b. Build a dictionary used by the NPL system
- 545 c. Define grammar for formal access control rules¹
- 546 NoSQLs databases, especially graph systems, can parse and construct hierarchical order
- relationships between data, which is necessary for the AI analyst work in steps *a* and *b* above.
- 548 They provide a data structure to support AI NLP systems in rendering access control policy from
- 549 natural language documents and allow for more efficient and accurate translations of access
- 550 control information from formal documents to formal access control rules.

551 4.9. Combine RDBMS

- 552 Considering the specific requirements of an application, it may be beneficial to deploy both
- 553 RDBMS and NoSQL to process different data flows and achieve the optimal combined features
- of both types of databases. This hybrid approach can help leverage the strengths of each
- 555 database model while addressing their respective limitations [CJ].

¹ In term of NLP processes, the requirements might go through the following: 1) sentence segmentation: generate sentences (a list of strings); 2) tokenization: generates tokenized sentences (a list of lists of strings); 3) part-of-speech tagging: generate post-tagged sentences (list of lists of tuples); 4) entity recognition: generated chunked sentences (list of trees); and 5) relationship recognition: generate relations (list of tuples).

556 **5. Conclusion**

- 557 NoSQL database systems offer promising features, such as flexible data models, horizontal
- scaling, and fast queries that allow for data analysis efficiency, improved system performance,
- ease of deployment, flexibility/scalability of data management, and users' availability when
- 560 compared with RDBMS. However, despite these advantages, NoSQL databases lack a
- 561 mechanism for handling and managing data consistency and maintaining integrity constraints.
- 562 Additionally, they often have limited support for security at the database level. With an
- 563 increasing number of people storing sensitive data in NoSQL databases, security issues are
- 564 becoming critical concerns. Since access control is a fundamental data protection requirement
- 565 for any database management system, this document discusses access control on NoSQL
- 566 database systems by illustrating the NoSQL database types along with their support for access
- 567 control models and describing considerations from the perspective of access control.

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
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623 Appendix A.

624 A.1. Federation of Access Control

625 The availability of pervasive information will be greatly facilitated by the increase of globally 626 distributed and interconnected information services. To support this global architecture, 627 services that reside in groups of local networks (i.e., federations) interact with services that 628 reside in other federations. All member federations form a federated network. To achieve 629 networking in a global-computing framework, it is necessary to facilitate seamless access to 630 federated services through inter-federation resource sharing and inter-trust between limited 631 numbers of participating members of the global federation. However, the management of 632 access control on a multi-organization global environment does not scale well. Since the shared 633 resources of a federation are available both locally and conditionally globally, both the local and 634 global access control policies are integrated under one static access control system so as to not 635 violate the principles of the reference monitor. Therefore, it is challenging to 1) specify access 636 control rules that manage the dynamic trust relations among federated parties, 2) separate 637 local resource access control policy from global (federation) policy and risk the possible leaking 638 of authorization, and 3) share the access control profile among federated members providing 639 similar services. 640 The requirements for the interaction between global (or federation) and local access control

- 641 policies are complex because most access control mechanisms and models are not flexible
- 642 enough to arbitrarily combine and compose access control policies. Moreover, federated
- 643 resources are distributed and shared by interoperating between three services:
- Resource providers (RPs) store information for sharing with federated members. The
 information is managed locally by the resource contributors or administrators of the RP.
 The availability and integrity of the resource is the central operation goal.
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- 3. Resource consumers (RCs) are client applications that accept user requests for resources
 and forward those requests to an RM. Ideally, an RP should only have to communicate
 with one RM because the dissemination of shared resources is achieved by the RM. Only
 one connection between an RM and an RC is expected as well because the discovery of
 resource locations should be done by an RM, as illustrated in Fig. 11.
- 656



657

658

Fig. 11. Generic resource federation model

In reality, a federated community may be networked in a variety of architectures. The three

basic services may be incorporated or simplified such that more than one service is managed or

hosted in one physical system. However, these three services and their connections are

assumed to be essential for any resource-sharing federation, and the resource-sharing

663 protocols between them are composed by interlacing the following scenarios:

Scenario 1: The information request from an RC is sent to an RM and then directly
 relayed to an RP without passing the request to other RMs or RPs.

Scenario 2: A resource query cannot be satisfied by the connected RP, so the RM must collect and consolidate the partial results returned from more than one RP.

 Scenario 3: An RM does not have a direct or static connection to any RP that can provide the information as requested, so the resource discovery protocols need to be invoked to exchange information with other RMs that may have connections to other RPs with locations for the resources.


672 A.2. Graph NoSQL Implementation for AC Policies

673 To support accessibility and maintain the integrity of resource-sharing, access control policies

674 between the three services are required such that a service has its own policy for the

675 federation. Fig. 12 illustrates a generic scheme for a resource federation network and AC

- 676 policies associated with each of the services.
- 677



678 679

Fig. 12. Resource federation scheme

680 In addition to security between services in the lower-level communication mechanism (e.g.,

681 through a PKI infrastructure), support for the federation according to the access control policies

- 682 posted by the services requires access control functions to be implemented. These functions
- 683 manage and manipulate the types of enforcement rules listed below. Here, it is assumed that
- the policy for each service is maintained locally by the administration of the service.

685	• RP
686	(p1) share (or conditional) rules
687	(p2) non-share (or conditional) rules
688	• RM
689	(m1) list of trusted RPs
690	(m2) list of trusted RMs
691	(m3) credibility rules for m1 and m2 (e.g., RP A has more credential than RP B)
692 693	(m4) priority rules for m1 and m2 (e.g., RP A can be replaced by RP B — A "is a replacement" of B)
694 695	(m5) reference rules (information from RP A is composed of information from RPs B, C, and D — A "should be supplemented by" B, C, and D)
696 697	(m6) mediation rules (information from RP <i>A</i> cannot conflict with information from RP <i>B</i>)
698	• RC
699 700 701	(c1) reference rules (similar to the reference information in RM except at the application level such as logic operations (AND, OR, XOR) between collected information)
702 703 704	(c2) mediation rules (similar to the mediation information in RM except at the application level, such as data <i>a</i> from RM <i>X</i> cannot conflict with data <i>b</i> from RM <i>Y</i>)
705 706	(c3) constraint rules (for RMs, such as no information older than 10 days can be trusted)
707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718	Rules p1, p2, m1, m2, and c3 contain resource availability information, while m3, m4, m5, m6, c1, and c2 contain information for trust management. Each rule is an access control policy assertion enforced upon two of the RPs, RMs, or RCs. Such a formal relationship can be annotated as members of a set that contains the binary relationships that the rule set is enforced upon: Rule $x = \{\dots, (S_X, S_Y), \dots\}$, where S_X service is related to service S_Y by the enforcement of Rule x . For example, <i>Credential</i> = $\{\dots, (S_1, S_2), \dots\}$ says that the resource from RP S_1 has more credentials than RP S_2 and <i>Replace</i> = $\{\dots, (S_1, S_2), \dots\}$ says that the resource from RP S_1 should be requested if RP S_2 is not available. Thus, by conventional set operations, an access control trust management policy can be composed and combined through the Boolean or closure properties of the sets of trust management rules. A trust management rule can be expressed by a relationship pair (S_X, S_Y) in a set that contains the type of rule such that the pair in the set Rule x , which are subject S_X and predicate Rule x , and object S_Y [HS] can be supported

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- by the Graph NoSQL in the form of node S_X edge rule x node S_Y for an access control policy rule.
- For example, *Replace* = {.... (S_X , S_Y)} is translated into S_X and can replace S_Y of a triple in a
- 721 graph NoSQL model.