

## MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SECURITY RESEARCH PROGRAM

Ray Vaughn  
Associate Vice President for Research  
Mississippi State University  
Critical Infrastructure Protection Center  
vaughn@research.msstate.edu

## Why this presentation?

This is an emerging and important area of information assurance that of cyber physical systems.

CPS instantiated in the industrial world can be view as control system security or sometimes called Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.

Control systems are computer based facilities, systems, and equipment used to remotely monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions.

These systems collect sensor measurements and operational data from the field, process and display this data, then relay control commands to local remote equipment. These commands may turn on or off electrical components, open or close pipeline flow, add chemicals to water supply, re route electricity, or perform other important functions.

## My observation and opinion...

- ◎ *This is an area where only a few are conducting serious research and even fewer are using the results of that work.*
- ◎ *This sector is exceptionally vulnerable*
- ◎ *There is a high payoff in terms of public observation/confidence if attacked*
- ◎ *A research priority of the US National Coordinating Office*
- ◎ *A research priority internationally*

## Reasons for Concern Now

*Haven't they always been critical?*

- ◎ Industry is heavily reliant on interconnected computer systems and computer systems are highly vulnerable to penetration
- ◎ Risk is elevated for interconnected systems
- ◎ Control systems are computer systems just smaller and more vulnerable
- ◎ Control systems are often old (10 years or so)
- ◎ Control systems are often connected to the internet, not managed by the IT professional staff, and have a heavy reliance on wireless communication.
- ◎ They are being attacked today....

## Why Is There A Problem?

### Control system side

- Top priority is reliability and availability, not security
- Traditionally relied on obscurity and isolation
- Trend: using general hardware and OS
- Owner/operator companies are in the hands of vendors
- Vendors often have backdoor modem lines
- Default passwords



### IT side

- Traditional security tools may not work for control systems
- IT people do not know control systems
- Enterprise networks are being connected to control systems
- Control systems are overlooked because they are not managed by IT

Adapted from Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P) presentation



## A basic view of connections



### Remote Terminal Units

### Protocols

- ANSI X3.28
- BBC 7200
- CDC Types 1 and 2
- Conitel 2020/2000/3000
- DCP 1
- DNP 3.0
- Gedac 7020
- IBM 3707
- Landis & Gyr 8979
- Pert
- PG&E
- QEI Micro II
- Redac 70H
- Rockwell
- SES 91
- Tejas 3 and 5
- TRW 9550
- Vancomm

### Programmable Logic Units

### Intelligent Electronic Device

### Things that concern us


- Data is sent in clear text
- Heavy use of wireless
- Protocols are not
- Data can be ch
- Connection
- Unpatch
- Improperly configured, inadequate protection



Who is looking for your SCADA infrastructure?

TEAM CYMRU

A world map showing various locations marked with colored dots (red, orange, yellow, green, blue) representing SCADA infrastructure. Below the map is a text box with the question 'Who is looking for your SCADA infrastructure?' and a logo for 'TEAM CYMRU' featuring a red dragon.



## Our Work at MSU...

- Based on four + years of research in MSU's SCADA security laboratory
- A side effect resulted in SCADA hacker arrest discussed later
- I will present several actual SCADA vulnerabilities that exist today not notional. These are repeatable and exist in the critical infrastructure.
- These are representative – there are many more...  
[http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/03/22/scada\\_exploits\\_released/](http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/03/22/scada_exploits_released/) - March 22, 2011
- Robert Wesley McGrew PhD candidate at MSU  
 McGrewSecurity.com has done a great deal of the work.

### Dozens of exploits released for popular SCADA programs

Giant bullseyes painted on industrial control software

The flaws, which reside in programs sold by Siemens, Iconics, 7-Technologies, Datac, and Control Microsystems, in many cases make it possible for attackers to remotely execute code when the so-called supervisory control and data acquisition software is installed on machines connected to the internet. Attack code was released by researchers from two separate security camps over the past week.

"SCADA is a critical field but nobody really cares about it," Luigi Auriemma, one of the researchers, wrote in an email sent to The Register. "That's also the reason why I have preferred to release these vulnerabilities under the full-disclosure philosophy."

The vulnerability dump includes proof-of-concept code for at least 34 vulnerabilities in widely used SCADA programs sold by four different vendors.

... came six days after a Moscow-based security firm called Gleg announced the availability of Agora SCADA+, which attempts to collect virtually all known SCADA vulnerabilities into a single exploit pack. The 22 modules include exploits for 11 zero-day vulnerabilities, said the company's Yuriy Gurkin in an email. It's not clear how much the package costs.



## Vulnerabilities in HMI Software

- GE Fanuc Proficy iFIX 4.5/5.0
- Insecure storage of passwords
- Authentication bypass
- Allows those with access to escalate privileges on the SCADA system
  - Lower-level personnel with physical access
  - Remote attackers with access via other/mainstream exploits


The screenshot shows a forum page with a header for 'plc.net.ru' and navigation links. Below the header is a table of forum topics. A blue arrow points from the URL 'http://plcforum.uz.ua/' to the forum page. The table lists various topics such as 'Industrial User Forum', 'SIMATIC Automation systems', 'OMRON', 'Allen-Bradley (Rockwell Automation)', 'Other PLC', 'SIMATIC HMI', 'Other HMI', 'Siemens Hardware & Software', and 'Siemens Hardware & Software'. Each row includes a topic title, a brief description, the number of topics and posts, and the date of the last post.

Topic	Topics	Posts	Last Post
Industrial User Forum	1156	4067	The Mar 05, 2009 3:02 pm
Allen-Bradley (Rockwell Automation)	134	1011	Wed Mar 04, 2009 3:49 am
Other PLC	770	2373	The Mar 05, 2009 5:47 pm
Other HMI	441	3208	Wed Mar 04, 2009 4:43 pm
Other HMI	476	1693	The Mar 05, 2009 3:54 pm
Siemens Hardware & Software	27	96	The Mar 03, 2009 7:45 pm
Siemens Hardware & Software	99	262	Wed Mar 04, 2009 3:51 pm
Siemens Hardware & Software	79	170	Sun Mar 22, 2009 5:09 pm
Siemens Hardware & Software	44	129	Wed Feb 25, 2009 7:10 am
Siemens Hardware & Software	338	1308	Fri Feb 27, 2009 9:25 pm
Siemens Hardware & Software	159	498	Wed Mar 04, 2009 11:58 pm

<http://plcforum.uz.ua/>

Sample Site where control system code is available and cracks are shared.

## Denial of Service



## An Actual Takedown

### Tracking and Trapping a Hacker

Wesley McGrew & Ray Vaughn  
Mississippi State University  
Critical Infrastructure Protection Center



Real-World HMI Security Incident

### Texas Hospital Control System Incident – late June to early July 2009

The image displays several overlapping windows from the hospital's control system. One window shows a 3D architectural rendering of the hospital building. Another window displays a color-coded floor plan or map of the facility. A third window shows a list of system components or status indicators. The interface is complex and technical, typical of an industrial control system (ICS) or SCADA.

Evidence of criminal activity scattered around the internet (YouTube, Myspace, Forums, etc.)

Plans were made for a 4th of July coordinated DDOS attack by the ETA

Suspect arrested by the FBI a week before the planned attacks, with evidence gathered by and analyzed at the MSU CSRC

The image features a close-up of a young man wearing a grey hoodie, looking slightly to the side. To his right is the logo for the Electronic Tribulation Army (ETA), which consists of the letters 'ETA' in a stylized, red, jagged font with a black outline. Below the logo, the text 'Elektronic Tribulation Army' is written in a smaller, red font. The background is dark and textured.

Recruitment

Celebrating 1,000,000 Posts

## Hack Forums





Thread / Author	Replies	Views	Rating	Last Post [Link]
BestDesign Recruitment (Pages: 1 2) Matu   EX	18	117	★★★★★	Today 12:52 PM Last Post: jebakumar1994
WebHax Crew - Members read important news (Pages: 1 2 3 4 ... last) THE BOSS	153	1,823	★★★★★	Today 12:38 PM Last Post: THE BOSS
Full: Stealers Group! (Pages: 1 2 3 4 ... last) Blower88	41	604	★★★★★	Today 12:33 PM Last Post: i RaT YoU
[NEW] Antimatter crew recruiting (Pages: 1 2 3 4 ... last) WhiteFlame	161	2,353	★★★★★	Today 12:31 PM Last Post: i RaT YoU
the Cash Crew (Pages: 1 2 3 4 ... last) Tombar	148	2,719	★★★★★	Today 12:14 PM Last Post: Newsh
The Gamers - Recruitment (Pages: 1 2 3 4 ... last) Mendocino	297	3,655	★★★★★	Today 12:06 PM Last Post: u994
iHack (Pages: 1 2 3 4 ... last) Toxic Gangster	41	495	★★★★★	Today 11:55 AM Last Post: accountlocked
The Wealth's back!!! (Pages: 1 2 3 4) ZannySlave	33	347	★★★★★	Today 09:40 AM Last Post: i RaT YoU
The Dark Side Co. - Recruitment OPEN AGAIN! (Pages: 1 2 3 4 ... last) GrrrNgr	346	4,524	★★★★★	Today 09:29 AM Last Post: i RaT YoU
[ETA] Recruiting White Hats ONLY [ETA] Dev//Null	7	103	★★★★★	Today 08:47 AM Last Post: Mon
[Recruiting] The Wisemen (Pages: 1 2 3 4 ... last) [Omne] Lucien Lechance	51	691	★★★★★	Today 02:26 AM Last Post: Blacklistw

The image shows an aerial photograph of a large, multi-story hospital building with a central tower. A blue window titled 'BACtrak Alarm' is overlaid on the bottom right of the image. The window contains the following text:

**BACtrak Alarm**

From: Dev 201, Enrol 100 (Steele Storage Humidity)  
 Time: Friday, 12/18/2008, 4:37:58PM  
 Process ID: 131 (lanuncable, log)  
 State change: low level -> normal  
 Alarm message: Steele Storage Humidity Normal  
 Link message: Steele Storage Humidity

Buttons: Acknowledge, Acknowledge All, Previous, Next, Options



- Called FBI and Texas DA's office on Monday
- FBI agent from Jackson drove up that afternoon to get the evidence
- Briefed agents on findings and notified them of new developments over the next few days
- Arrested as he arrived to work that Friday evening

4. There is probable cause to believe that **JESSE WILLIAM MCGRAW** has violated the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)(A) and §1030(c)(4)(B)(iv).

**1030(a)(5)(A)** Whoever . . . knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer.

**1030(c)(4)(B)(i)** the punishment for an offense under subsection (a) . . . of this section is - a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, in the case of - an offense under subsection (a)(5)(A) which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under this section, if the offense cause . . . a harm provided in subclauses (I) through (VI) of subparagraph (A)(iv), [that being (iv)], a threat to public health or safety;

15. On 6/24/2009, SAs Lynd and Singh spoke to the apartment manager at **2801 TRINITY OAKS DR, ARLINGTON, TX, 76001**, who confirmed that **JESSE WILLIAM MCGRAW** lives in apartment 328 based on his lease and that he and his wife had two vehicles on the lease, including a Nissan Altima. The apartment manager also provided a floor plan of apartment 328 and a verbal description of the apartment. The apartment manager also stated there was a camera over the door of apartment 328. It is Affian's experience that computer hackers who believe that they are under surveillance or in danger of being arrested use cameras to see who is at their doors in order to destroy evidence and / or flee if law enforcement or a rival hacker come to their residence. The manager stated that apartment 328 was in the first set of apartments on the right facing Trinity Oaks Drive and across the first breezeway and up one flight of stairs on the left side of the landing.

19. SA Singh was also told that a review of the HVAC computers had identified a malicious program on it which allowed unauthorized users to assume remote control of the system. Property management also noted that the HVAC system was continuing to experience problems, including a one hour outage of all five units controlled by the HVAC computer on 6/25/2009, which appeared to originate with the software controlling the HVAC system as none of the alarms which should have gone off did. They further noted that prior to the intrusion they have never experienced an incident where more than one or two units had problems at the same time.

Other Arts:

21. SAs Lynd and Singh also reviewed the documents provided by LT Hilbott which CW-1 had collected. Included in these documents was what appeared to be a compromise of the City of Dallas computer system by ETA, MCGRAW's hacker group. Based on the naming of this system in appeared to be a computer used by Dallas Police Department's

Case 3:09-mj-00207-BD Document 1 Filed 06/26/2009 Page 18 of 19

(DPD) aviation unit. Detective Bill Cox, a DPD officer working with the FBI in a task force role, confirmed that the computer was an aviation unit computer located at or near Love Field and that it was already known by DPD to have been compromised by an unauthorized individual. Other documents indicated that MCGRAW had also compromised computers used by the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA).

### Arrest and Indictment

United States District Court  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

**JUN 26 2009**

CRIMINAL DIVISION

CASE NUMBER: 3:09-cr-00207-BD

**JESSE WILLIAM MCGRAW**  
also known as Ghost Doctor, PhantomEvaLenses,  
Harvard Daniel Bertha, Harvard William McGraw,  
and Howard Rogers  
2801 Trinity Oaks Dr, Apt 328  
Arlington, Texas, 76001

I, the undersigned complainant being duly sworn state the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Between April 2009 and June 2009, in Dallas, Dallas County, in the Northern District of Texas **JESSE WILLIAM MCGRAW** did:

knowingly cause the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, in that **MCGRAW** downloaded a malicious code into a computer located at 9301 North Central Expressway, Dallas, Texas, the building that houses the Carrel Clinic, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caused damage without authorization, to a protected computer, and the harm threatened public health and safety;

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)(A) and §1030(c)(4)(B)(i).

I further state that I am a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and that this complaint is based on the facts set out in the attached affidavit.

Continued on the attached sheet and made a part hereof. (X) Yes ( ) No

*[Signature]*  
Agent Singh, Special Agent  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Based upon this complaint, the Court finds that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. Sworn to before me, and subscribed to my process.

JUNE 26, 2009 at Dallas, Texas  
Date City and State

**JEFF KAPLAN**  
United States Magistrate Judge  
Name and Title of Judicial Officer

Case 3:09-cr-00207-BD Document 1 Filed 07/02/2009 Page 18 of 19

**ORIGINAL**

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION

**JUN 26 2009**

CRIMINAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

**JESSE WILLIAM MCGRAW (I)**  
also known as Ghost Doctor

INDICTMENT

The Grand Jury Charges:



**COUNT ONE**  
Transmitting a Malicious Code  
(18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)(A) and §1030(c)(4)(B)(i))

From or about April 2009 and continuing through to or about June 2009, in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas, defendant **Jesse William McGraw**, also known as Ghost Doctor, did knowingly cause the transmission of a program, code, and command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caused damage without authorization to a protected computer and its contents contents and communication and reveal by the Carrel Clinic, located at 9301 North Central Expressway, Dallas, Texas, that is a computer used to maintain patient medical records for the diagnosis and treatment of the Carrel Clinic patients, in that **McGraw** transmitted a malicious program, code, and command that gave **McGraw** the potential to modify and impair medical examinations, diagnoses, treatments, or care of one or more individuals.

In violation of 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)(A) and §1030(c)(4)(B)(i).

Indictment Page 1





### Leader of Hacker Gang Sentenced to 9 Years For Hospital Malware

By [Kevin Poulsen](#) | March 18, 2011 | 7:56 pm | Categories: [Hacks and Cracks](#)

The former leader of an anarchistic hacking group called the Electronic Tribulation Army was sentenced Thursday to 9 years and 2 months in prison for installing malware on computers at a Texas hospital.

Jesse William McGraw, aka "GhostExodus," was also ordered to pay \$31,881 in restitution and serve three years of supervised release following his prison term.

McGraw, 26, of Arlington, Texas, came to FBI's attention in 2009 after he shot a YouTube video of himself staging an "infiltration" mission at an office building, in which he's seen dramatically skulking through the halls and installing RxBot on a desktop computer. According to the government, the Electronic Tribulation Army was building a modest botnet to attack rival hacker gangs, including Anonymous — which at the time was known more for ambitious pranks than for the hacktivism that has since made it famous.

<http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/03/ghostexodus-2/>

### Take-away

- Low skill can lead to heavy consequences in SCADA attacks
- Human-Machine Interface security is important and flawed today
- Physical security can be the Achilles heal
- Taking action on serious incidents that present themselves is important
- Vendors of SCADA hardware and software need to consider security during the design phase

## Conclusions

- ◉ We're going to see more incidents involving SCADA security breaches in the future
- ◉ This is an area needing much more research
- ◉ Its an international problem and would benefit from international cooperation
- ◉ We are developing a strong partnership between MSU, Queensland University of Technology and AUS CERT