Forgery and Partial Key Recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using Hash Collisions

2nd NIST Hash Function Workshop

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Outline

- Background and motivation
- Summary of results
  - Various attacks on HMAC/NMAC
    - Using special collisions of underlying hash function
- Closer look — partial key-recovery attacks
  - How to recover *entire* inner key
- Practical implications

(Not included in CD-Rom)

- New observations on 2nd preimage resistance (eSPR & rSPR)
  - MD5, reduced SHA-1

HMAC and NMAC

- *Hash-based* message authentication code (MAC)
  - Proposed by Bellare, Canetti, Krawczyk in 1996
- HMAC has been widely implemented in practice
  - Standards: SSL/TLS, SSH, IPsec, etc.
  - Usages: MAC, PRF, random oracle, etc.
- Construction
  - NMAC: $\mathrm{NMAC}_{(k1,\,k2)}(m) = F_{k1}(F_{k2}(m))$
  - HMAC: $(k1, k2) = \mathrm{KDF}(k)$
    $\mathrm{HMAC}_k(m) = \mathrm{NMAC}_{(k1,k2)}(m)$
    - $F_k(m) = F(k, m)$ is a hash function with IV = secret key k

Related attacks on MDx

- We studied existing attacks on MDx, especially
  - Pseudo-collision attack on MD5 [DB 93]
  - Collision attack on SHA-0 [CJ 98]
  - Collision attack on reduced SHA-1 [BCJCJL 05]
  - 2nd pre-image attack on MD4 [YWZW 05]

- *Differential paths* in above attacks can be used to construct *distinguishing attacks* on f_k
  - For MD4, SHA-0, reduced SHA-1, f_k is not a PRF
  - For MD5, f_k is not a PRF against *related-key attacks*

Summary of our results

- Attacks on HMAC/NMAC-MDx
  - Distinguishing attacks
  - Forgery attacks
  - Partial key-recovery attacks
    - Can recover *entire k2 (128 or 160 bits)*

$F_{k1}(F_{k2}(m))$

- Complexity (estimated # MAC queries)
  - NMAC-MD5 [related-key attacks] : 2^{47} queries
  - HMAC/NMAC-MD4: 2^{58} queries
  - HMAC/NMAC-SHA0: 2^{84} queries
  - reduced HMAC/NMAC-SHA1: ~ 2^{40} queries
    - inner function is reduced to 34 rounds

- Biham and Yin (8/24/06, *not included in CD-Rom*)
  - 40-round NMAC-SHA1 [related-key attacks] : ~2^{55} queries
  - 40-round HMAC-SHA1: ~ 2^{110} queries

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Trade-offs:
#queries: 2^t
success prob: 2^{t-q}
$(1 < t < q)$

Kim, Biryukov, Preneel, Hong [SCN'06]
- Independent work on distinguishing and forgery attacks

Partial key-recovery attacks on NMAC-MD5
(related-key setting)

- High-level steps
  - Generate random messages and query the two NMAC oracles until obtaining a collision
    - $\text{NMAC}_{(k1,\ k2)}(m) = \text{NMAC}_{(k1,\ k2')}(m)$
  - Modify certain bits of *m* to create a set of new messages
    - Based on *new message modification techniques*
  - Check whether the set of new messages yield a new collision
    - Each yes/no answer roughly reveals *one bit* of internal state
  - Step through the computation of $F_{k2}(m)$ backwards to obtain the initial state – the inner key *k2*

Danger of hash collisions

- It is *not* surprising that hash collisions are useful for key recovery
  - Several earlier attacks on MACs use collisions

- Reason 1:
  - Collision path contains useful information about the internal hash computation $F_{k2}(m)$, and hence the initial secret key *k2*
- Reason 2:
  - Outer function F_{k1} in HMAC/NMAC does not hide collisions of inner function F_{k2}

Implications of our results

- HMAC-MD4
  - Should no longer be used in practice
- Our results complement designers' analysis
  - Designers show that HMAC/NMAC is secure *assuming* f_k is a PRF
  - We show that attacks are possible if f_k is *not* a PRF
- HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA1
  - No immediate practical threats
- Proper differential paths are crucial
  - Collision attacks, 2nd preimage attacks, and attacks on HMAC require paths with *different* properties
  - *Automated* method is a promising way to search for suitable paths

2nd preimage resistance (SPR)

- Compression function *f(c,m)*
- Goal of attacker S:
  - present *(c,m)* and *(c',m')* s.t.
    - *(c,m) ≠ (c',m')*
    - *f(c,m) = f(c',m')*

Variants of CR & SPR

	Attacker is given	Attacker picks
pseodo-CR		*c, m, c', m'*
CR	fixed *c=c'*	*m, m'*
SPR	fixed *c=c'* *random m*	*m'*

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- Sort of known
  - MD4, SHA-0 are not eSPR, rSPR
    - Since they are not SPR
- New observations
  - MD5 is not eSPR, rSPR
    - workload O(1)
    - success prob = 2^{-48}
  - 40-round SHA-1 is not eSPR, rSPR, SPR [Biham, Yin]

Variants of CR & SPR

	Attacker is given	Attacker picks
pseodo-CR		*c, m, c', m'*
CR	fixed *c=c'*	*m, m'*
eSRP	*"somewhat" random c random m*	*c', m'*
rSPR	*random c, m*	*c', m'*
SPR	fixed *c=c' random m*	*m'*

Thank you very much !

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