# Cryptographic Hash Function EDON-R

**Presented by** 

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# Outline

- Short history of EDON-R
- Specific design characteristics
- Known attacks on EDON-R
- Are there any one-way bijections embedded in EDON-R?
- SW/HW performance and memory requirements



# Short history of EDON-R

- Theoretical principles of EDON-R were described at the Second NIST Hash Workshop – 2006 in the presentation: Edon-R Family of Cryptographic Hash Functions
  - No concrete realization



# Short history of EDON-R


- Theoretical principles of EDON-R were described at the Second NIST Hash Workshop – 2006 in the presentation: Edon-R Family of Cryptographic Hash Functions
  - No concrete realization
- First implementation of Edon-R(256, 384, 512) published at http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/154
  - Big acknowledgement for Søren Steffen Thomsen, giving me comments about zero being a fixed point in that realization




# Short history of EDON-R


- Additionally, the following contributors joined the EDON-R (SHA-3) team:
  - Rune Steinsmo Ødegård Investigating the mathematical properties of defined quasigroups
  - Marija Mihova Investigating the differential properties in EDON-R operations
  - Svein Johan Knapskog (general comments and suggestions for improvements, proofreading)
  - Ljupco Kocarev (general comments and suggestions for improvements, proofreading)
  - Aleš Drápal (Theory of quasigroups and suggestions for improvements)
  - Vlastimil Klima (cryptanalysis and suggestions for improvements)









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










3.  $Hash = Take_n Least_Significant_Bits(P^{(N)})$ .

















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
```
For i = 1 to N


P^{(i)} = \mathcal{R}(P^{(i-1)}, M^{(i)});
```

3.  $Hash = Take_n Least_Significant_Bits(P^{(N)})$ .












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3.  $Hash = Take_n Least_Significant_Bits(P^{(N)}).$ 

 $\begin{array}{lll} \mbox{Function} & \mathcal{R}(\textbf{C}_0,\textbf{C}_1,\textbf{A}_0,\textbf{A}_1) & \mbox{is defined by} \\ & \mbox{quasigroup operations} \end{array}$ 



 $M^{(N)}$ 

 $\mathbf{M}_{0}^{(N)}$ 

 $\mathbf{X}_{0}^{(2)}$ 

 $X_{0}^{(2)}$ 

 $\mathbf{P}^{(N)}$ 

 $\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{1}}^{(N)}$ 

 $X_{1}^{(1)}$ 

 $X_{1}^{(2)}$ 

n-bit Hash

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
Quasigroup operations are defined on 256-bit or 512-bit operands.

 $\mathbf{X} * \mathbf{Y}$ 



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
Quasigroup operations are defined on 256-bit or 512-bit operands.





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Quasigroup operations are defined on 256-bit or 512-bit operands.



#### 16

#### Specific design characteristics for EDON-R

**Quasigroup operation of order** 2<sup>256</sup>

**Input:**  $X = (X_0, X_1, ..., X_7)$  and  $Y = (Y_0, Y_1, ..., Y_7)$ 

where  $X_i$  and  $Y_i$  are 32–bit variables.


**Output:**  $\mathbf{Z} = (Z_0, Z_1, \dots, Z_7)$  where  $Z_i$  are 32-bit variables.

**Temporary 32–bit variables:**  $T_0, \ldots, T_{15}$ .


| 1. | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$  | $\begin{array}{rrr} ROTL^{0}(\texttt{OxAAAAAAAA} & + \\ ROTL^{4}(\\ ROTL^{8}(\\ ROTL^{13}(\\ ROTL^{17}(\\ ROTL^{22}(\\ ROTL^{29}(\\ \end{array})$              | $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ |
|----|---|--|--|--|--|
| 2. | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$  | $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   |  |  |  |
| 3. | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$  | $\begin{array}{rccc} ROTL^{0}(\texttt{0x55555555} & + \\ ROTL^{5}(\\ ROTL^{9}(\\ ROTL^{11}(\\ ROTL^{15}(\\ ROTL^{20}(\\ ROTL^{27}(\\ \end{array}) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ |
| 4. | $\begin{array}{rcccc} Z_5 & \leftarrow & \\ Z_6 & \leftarrow & \\ Z_7 & \leftarrow & \\ Z_0 & \leftarrow & \\ Z_1 & \leftarrow & \\ Z_2 & \leftarrow & \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   | 6);<br>7);<br>5);<br>7);<br>3);                      |  |  |

 $\mathbf{X} * \mathbf{Y} \equiv \pi_1(\pi_2(\mathbf{X}) +_8 \pi_3(\mathbf{Y}))$ 






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
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


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


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**Quasigroup operation of order** 2<sup>256</sup>

**Input:**  $X = (X_0, X_1, ..., X_7)$  and  $Y = (Y_0, Y_1, ..., Y_7)$ 

where  $X_i$  and  $Y_i$  are 32–bit variables.

**Output:**  $\mathbf{Z} = (Z_0, Z_1, \dots, Z_7)$  where  $Z_i$  are 32–bit variables.

**Temporary 32–bit variables:**  $T_0, \ldots, T_{15}$ .

| 1. | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$                  | $ROTL^0$ (oxaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa     | +<br>ROTL <sup>4</sup> (<br>ROTL <sup>13</sup> (<br>ROTL <sup>17</sup> (<br>ROTL <sup>22</sup> (<br>ROTL <sup>24</sup> (<br>ROTL <sup>29</sup> ( | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ | $\begin{array}{c} X_1 \\ X_1 \\ X_3 \\ X_2 \\ X_2 \\ X_2 \\ X_1 \end{array}$ | +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ | $egin{array}{c} X_2 \ X_3 \ X_4 \ X_5 \ X_3 \ X_5 \ X_5 \ X_5 \ X_4 \end{array}$ | + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + | $egin{array}{c} X_4 \ X_4 \ X_6 \ X_6 \ X_5 \ X_4 \ X_6 \ X_5 \ $ | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$   |
|----|---|--|--|--|--|---|--|---------------------------------------|---|--|
| 2. | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$                  | $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ | $T_{6};$<br>$T_{6};$<br>$T_{5};$<br>$T_{4};$<br>$T_{7};$<br>$T_{7};$<br>$T_{4};$<br>$T_{7};$   |  |  |   |  |                                       |   |  |
| 3. | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$                  | <i>ROTL</i> <sup>0</sup> (0x55555555                 | +<br>ROTL <sup>5</sup> (<br>ROTL <sup>9</sup> (<br>ROTL <sup>11</sup> (<br>ROTL <sup>20</sup> (<br>ROTL <sup>25</sup> (<br>ROTL <sup>27</sup> (  | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ | $Y_1 Y_1 Y_1 Y_1 Y_3 Y_1 Y_4 Y_2 Y_3$  | + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +   | $\begin{array}{c} Y_3 \\ Y_2 \\ Y_4 \\ Y_3 \\ Y_5 \\ Y_5 \end{array}$            | +<br>+<br>+<br>+<br>+<br>+            | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$  | $\begin{array}{rcl} & & Y_6); \\ - & & Y_5); \\ - & & Y_7); \\ - & & Y_5); \\ - & & Y_7); \\ - & & Y_7); \\ - & & Y_7); \end{array}$ |
|    | $\begin{array}{ccc} Z_5 & \leftarrow \\ Z_6 & \leftarrow \end{array}$ | $T_8 + (T_3 \oplus T_2) + (T_2 \oplus T_2)$          | $T_5 \oplus T_7$   | 5);<br>7);<br>7);                                    |  |   |  |                                       |   |  |

 $\mathbf{X} * \mathbf{Y} \equiv \pi_1(\pi_2(\mathbf{X}) + \mathbf{X} \pi_3(\mathbf{Y}))$ 



**Quasigroup operation of order** 2<sup>256</sup>

**Input:**  $X = (X_0, X_1, ..., X_7)$  and  $Y = (Y_0, Y_1, ..., Y_7)$ 

where  $X_i$  and  $Y_i$  are 32–bit variables.

**Output:**  $\mathbf{Z} = (Z_0, Z_1, \dots, Z_7)$  where  $Z_i$  are 32-bit variables.


**Temporary 32–bit variables:**  $T_0, \ldots, T_{15}$ .

| 1. | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$                                      | $\begin{array}{c} ROTL^{0}(\texttt{OxAAAAAAAA} \\ ROTL^{4}(\\ ROTL^{8}(\\ ROTL^{13}(\\ ROTL^{17}(\\ ROTL^{22}(\\ ROTL^{24}(\\ ROTL^{29}(\\ \end{array})$ | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ |
|----|---|--|--|--|--|
| 2. | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$                                      | $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   |  |  |  |
| 3. | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$                                      | $ROTL^{0}(0x55555555555555555555555555555555555$   | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ |
|    | $\begin{array}{rcl} T_5 & \leftarrow \\ T_6 & \leftarrow \\ T_7 & \leftarrow \end{array}$ | ROTL <sup>20</sup><br>ROTL <sup>25</sup><br>ROTL <sup>27</sup>   | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ | $\begin{array}{rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr$ |

 $\mathbf{X} * \mathbf{Y} \equiv \pi_1(\pi_2(\mathbf{X}) +_8 \pi_3(\mathbf{Y}))$ 


#### Rotations differ from each other for at least 2 positions.






Two orthogonal Latin Squares of order 8





Two orthogonal Latin Squares of order 8

Four corresponding nonsingular in (Z<sub>2</sub>, +, x) matrices.



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Four nonsingular in ( $Z_2$ , +, x) matrices.


$$\mathbb{A}_{1} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \qquad \mathbb{A}_{3} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \qquad \mathbb{A}_{4} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$



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Four nonsingular in  $(Z_2, +, x)$  matrices.



#### Two diffusion (bi-stochastic) matrices

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Innovation and Creativity

| Criteria   | Reasons   |  |  |  |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| 1. $L_1$ and $L_2$ are orthogonal Latin                          | 8 $w$ -bit variables belonging to <b>X</b> are to be mixed with 8                             |  |  |  |
|  | w-bit variables belonging to <b>Y</b> in such a way that all pairs                            |  |  |  |
| squares.   | are combined by some operation (addition, or XORing).   |  |  |  |
| 2. <b>Diff</b> $_{\pi_2}$ and <b>Diff</b> $_{\pi_3}$ do not have | The situation where $\mathbf{X} *_q \mathbf{\hat{Y}} = \mathbf{Z}$ and some difference either |  |  |  |
| 2  | in <b>X</b> or in <b>Y</b> will not affect some of the eight words of <b>Z</b> are            |  |  |  |
| zeroes.  | to be avoided.<br>This is an analogy to the "confusion" principle in                          |  |  |  |
|  | This is an analogy to the "confusion" principle in  |  |  |  |
| 2 Flomonte of the matrix <b>Diff</b>                             | cryptology. Choosing $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_2}$ with the biggest possible                        |  |  |  |
| 3. Elements of the matrix $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_2}$                | variance improves the resistance against cryptanalysis  |  |  |  |
| have the biggest possible variance.                              | because there is no regular pattern how the computations                                      |  |  |  |
|  | are performed.  |  |  |  |
|  | This is an analogy to the "diffusion" principle in  |  |  |  |
| 4. Elements of the matrix $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_3}$                | cryptology. Choosing $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_3}$ with the smallest possible                       |  |  |  |
| have the smallest possible                                       | variance increases the diffusion of the bit differences in the                                |  |  |  |
| variance.  | greatest possible way, with the smallest possible variances                                   |  |  |  |
|  | in the pattern of the computations that are performed.  |  |  |  |
| Table 2.0. Criteria for sheasing the Latin squares               |   |  |  |  |

Table 3.9: Criteria for choosing the Latin squares

| Criteria   | Reasons   |  |  |  |  |
|--|---|--|--|--|--|
| 1. $L_1$ and $L_2$ are orthogonal Latin squares.   | 8 <i>w</i> -bit variables belonging to <b>X</b> are to be mixed with 8<br><i>w</i> -bit variables belonging to <b>Y</b> in such a way that all pairs<br>are combined by some operation (addition, or XORing). |  |  |  |  |
|  | The situation where $\mathbf{X} *_{q} \dot{\mathbf{Y}} = \mathbf{Z}$ and some difference either   |  |  |  |  |
| $\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ L_1 = \end{array} \begin{bmatrix} \bigcirc & 7 & 1 & 3 & 2 & 4 & 6 & 5 \\ 4 & 1 & 7 & 6 & 3 & \bigcirc & 5 & 2 \\ 7 & \bigcirc & 4 & 2 & 5 & 3 & 1 & 6 \\ 1 & 4 & \bigcirc & 5 & 6 & 2 & 7 & 3 \\ 2 & 3 & 6 & 7 & 1 & 5 & \bigcirc & 4 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{array}{c} \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$   |  |  |  |  |
| ha $ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$  | $\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $  |  |  |  |  |
| 4. Elements of the matrix $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_3}$  | cryptology. Choosing $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_3}$ with the smallest possible   |  |  |  |  |
| have the smallest possible   | variance increases the diffusion of the bit differences in the  |  |  |  |  |
| variance.  | greatest possible way, with the smallest possible variances   |  |  |  |  |
|  | in the pattern of the computations that are performed.  |  |  |  |  |
| Table 3.9. Criteria for choosing the Latin squares   |   |  |  |  |  |

Table 3.9: Criteria for choosing the Latin squares

| Crite                                    | eria   | Reasons   |  |                                    |  |  |
|--|--|---|--|------------------------------------|--|--|
| 1. $L_1$ and $L_2$ are orthogonal Latin  |  | 8 $w$ -bit variables belonging to <b>X</b> are to be mixed with 8 |  |                                    |  |  |
| squat                                    | C  | <i>w-</i> bit va  | riables belonging to Y in su                             | ich a way that all pairs           |  |  |
|  |  |   | nbined by some operation (a                              |                                    |  |  |
| 2. <b>Diff</b> $_{\pi_2}$ and <b>Dif</b> | $f_{\pi}$ do not have  | The situa   | ation where $\mathbf{X} *_q \mathbf{Y} = \mathbf{Z}$ and | some difference either             |  |  |
| _  | 0  | in <b>X</b> or in   | n $\mathbf{Y}$ will not affect some of the               | he eight words of $\mathbf{Z}$ are |  |  |
| zero                                     | es.  |   | to be avoided  |                                    |  |  |
|  |  |   |  | on" principle in                   |  |  |
| 3. Elements of                           | $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_2}$  |   | $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_3}$                                  | e biggest possible                 |  |  |
|  | 232212   | 1 2   | (1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2)  | inst cryptanalysis                 |  |  |
| have the bigges                          | 1 2 1 3 2 2  | 2 2   | 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  | v the computations                 |  |  |
|  |  | 2 2   | 22122222   | *                                  |  |  |
|  |  |   |  | n" principle in                    |  |  |
| 4. Elements of                           | $ \begin{array}{c} 1 & 2 & 2 & 2 & 2 \\ 3 & 2 & 2 & 1 & 2 & 2 \\ \end{array} $ | 1 0   | 22221222<br>22221222                                     | e smallest possible                |  |  |
| have the sn                              |  |   | 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2                  | oit differences in the             |  |  |
| va:                                      | \2 2 2 2 1 2   | 2 2/  | (2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1)                                      | t possible variances               |  |  |
|  |  | in the  | pattern of the computations                              | s that are performed.              |  |  |

Table 3.9: Criteria for choosing the Latin squares

# $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_2}$ sign characteristics for EDON-R

| $(2 \ 3 \ 2 \ 2 \ 1 \ 2 \ 1 \ 2)$                    |                         |   |  |  |
|--|-------------------------|---|--|--|
|  |                         | Reasons   |  |  |
| $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ | l Latin                 | 8 <i>w</i> -bit variables belonging to $\mathbf{X}$ are to be mixed with 8 <i>w</i> -bit variables belonging to $\mathbf{Y}$ in such a way that all pairs |  |  |
| 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 1                                      |                         | are combined by some operation (addition, or XORing).   |  |  |
| 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1                                      | t have                  | The situation where $\mathbf{X} *_q \mathbf{Y} = \mathbf{Z}$ and some difference either   |  |  |
| 22221222   |                         | in <b>X</b> or in <b>Y</b> will not affect some of the eight words of <b>Z</b> are  |  |  |
|  |                         | to be avoided.<br>This is an analogy to the "confusion" principle in  |  |  |
|  |                         | This is an analogy to the "confusion" principle in  |  |  |
| 3. Elements of the matrix                            | Diff                    | cryptology. Choosing $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_2}$ with the biggest possible  |  |  |
|  | <u> </u>                | variance improves the resistance against cryptanalysis  |  |  |
| have the biggest possible v                          | variance.               | because there is no regular pattern how the computations  |  |  |
|  |                         | are performed.  |  |  |
|  |                         | This is an analogy to the "diffusion" principle in  |  |  |
| 4. Elements of the matrix                            | $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_3}$ | cryptology. Choosing $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_3}$ with the smallest possible   |  |  |
| have the smallest pos                                | sible                   | variance increases the diffusion of the bit differences in the  |  |  |
| variance.  |                         | greatest possible way, with the smallest possible variances   |  |  |
|  |                         | in the pattern of the computations that are performed.  |  |  |
|  |                         |   |  |  |

Table 3.9: Criteria for choosing the Latin squares

| Criteria   | Reasons  |   |  |  |  |
|--|--|---|--|--|--|
| 1. $L_1$ and $L_2$ are orthogonal Latin                          | 8 <i>w</i> -bit variables belonging to <b>X</b>                        | 2       2       1       2       2       2       2         2       2       2       1       2       2       2       2 |  |  |  |
| squares.   | <i>w</i> -bit variables belonging to <b>Y</b> in                       | 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2   |  |  |  |
| L L  | are combined by some operation   | 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2   |  |  |  |
| 2. <b>Diff</b> $_{\pi_2}$ and <b>Diff</b> $_{\pi_3}$ do not have | The situation where $\mathbf{X} *_q \mathbf{Y} = \mathbf{Z}$ ar        | 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2   |  |  |  |
|  | in <b>X</b> or in <b>Y</b> will not affect some of                     | (2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1)   |  |  |  |
| zeroes.  | to be avoided  | d   |  |  |  |
|  | This is an analogy to the "confusion" principle in                     |   |  |  |  |
| 3. Elements of the matrix <b>Diff</b> $_{\pi_2}$                 | cryptology. Choosing $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_2}$ with the biggest possible |   |  |  |  |
| have the biggest possible variance.                              | variance improves the resistance against cryptanalysis                 |   |  |  |  |
| nave the biggest possible variance.                              | because there is no regular pattern how the computations               |   |  |  |  |
|  | are performed.   |   |  |  |  |
|  | This is an analogy to the "diffu                                       | usion" principle in   |  |  |  |
| 4. Elements of the matrix $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_3}$                | cryptology. Choosing $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_3}$ with                      | n the smallest possible   |  |  |  |
| have the smallest possible                                       | variance increases the diffusion of the bit differences in the         |   |  |  |  |
| variance.  | greatest possible way, with the sma                                    | allest possible variances   |  |  |  |
|  | in the pattern of the computation                                      | ns that are performed.  |  |  |  |
| Table 2.0. Cuitaria for abagaing the Latin squares               |  |   |  |  |  |

Table 3.9: Criteria for choosing the Latin squares

 $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_3}$ 

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 $\gamma \gamma$ 

| Criteria   |                           | Reasons   |  |  |  |  |
|--|---------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| 1. $L_1$ and $L_2$ are orthogonal Latin squares.   |                           | 8 <i>w</i> -bit variables belonging to <b>X</b> are to be mixed with 8<br><i>w</i> -bit variables belonging to <b>Y</b> in such a way that all pairs<br>are combined by some operation (addition, or XORing). |  |  |  |  |
| 2  | Different Different house | The situation where $\mathbf{X} *_q \mathbf{Y} = \mathbf{Z}$ and some difference either   |  |  |  |  |
| 701000   |                           | ses of orthogonal Latin Sauares of order 8 from<br>e http://cs.anu.edu.au/people/bdm/data/latin.html  |  |  |  |  |
| 3<br>ha  | Latin Squares that comply | 2 <sup>30.6</sup> pairs of orthogonal isotopes. We found that<br>with all 4 criteria give diffusion matrices with<br>the minimal variance 1/9. We took the first such   |  |  |  |  |
|  |                           | are performed.  |  |  |  |  |
|  |                           | This is an analogy to the "diffusion" principle in  |  |  |  |  |
| 4. Elements of the matrix $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_3}$  |                           | cryptology. Choosing $\mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_3}$ with the smallest possible   |  |  |  |  |
| have the smallest possible                         |                           | variance increases the diffusion of the bit differences in the  |  |  |  |  |
|  | variance.                 | greatest possible way, with the smallest possible variances   |  |  |  |  |
|  |                           | in the pattern of the computations that are performed.  |  |  |  |  |
| Table 2.0. Critaria for changing the Latin squares |                           |   |  |  |  |  |

Table 3.9: Criteria for choosing the Latin squares

**Definition 12.** Let  $X, X', Y, Y' \in Q_q$  and let  $\Delta_X = X \oplus X'$  and  $\Delta_Y = Y \oplus Y'$  be two difference vectors. Let  $Z = X *_q Y$  and  $Z' = X' *_q Y'$ . The vector  $\mathcal{D}_{(\Delta_X, \Delta_Y)} = (\delta_0, \dots, \delta_7) \in (\mathbb{Z})^8$  is called *bit flip counter for the quasigroup operation*  $*_q$ , if every  $\delta_i$ ,  $i = 0, \dots, 7$  is a counter of the minimal number of bit flips that the quasigroup operation  $*_q$  performs to transfer the value Z to the value Z'.

#### **Theorem 3:** $\mathcal{D}_{(\Delta_X, \Delta_Y)} = \text{Diff}_{\pi_2} \cdot \Delta_X + \text{Diff}_{\pi_3} \cdot \Delta_Y$



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$$\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}\hline & \Delta_{\mathbf{X}} & \Delta_{\mathbf{Y}} \\ \hline & \overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}} & \mathcal{D}_{1} = \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{2}} \cdot \overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}} + \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{3}} \cdot \Delta_{\mathbf{X}} & \mathcal{D}_{2} = \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{2}} \cdot \mathcal{D}_{1} + \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{3}} \cdot \Delta_{\mathbf{Y}} \\ \hline & \mathbf{0} & \mathcal{D}_{3} = \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{2}} \cdot \mathbf{0} + \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{3}} \cdot \mathcal{D}_{1} & \mathcal{D}_{4} = \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{2}} \cdot \mathcal{D}_{3} + \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{3}} \cdot \mathcal{D}_{2} \\ \hline & \mathbf{0} & \mathcal{D}_{5} = \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{2}} \cdot \mathcal{D}_{3} + \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{3}} \cdot \mathbf{0} & \mathcal{D}_{6} = \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{2}} \cdot \mathcal{D}_{4} + \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{3}} \cdot \mathcal{D}_{5} \\ \hline & \overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{X}}} & \mathcal{D}_{7} = \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{2}} \cdot \overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{X}}} + \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{3}} \cdot \mathcal{D}_{5} & \mathcal{D}_{8} = \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{2}} \cdot \mathcal{D}_{7} + \mathbf{Diff}_{\pi_{3}} \cdot \mathcal{D}_{6} \end{array}$$



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|   | $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}} = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$             | $\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$                 |
|---|--|--|
| $\overline{\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{\mathbf{Y}}} = (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)$ | 0) (1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2) (28, 29, 28, 28, 29, 27, 28, 28) |  |
| 0   | (29, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28)                         | (844, 842, 844, 844, 842, 846, 844, 844)                         |
| 0   | (422, 421, 422, 422, 421, 423, 422, 422)                     | (18984, 18985, 18982, 18986, 18985, 18983, 18984, 18986)         |
| $\overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{X}}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)$       | (6330, 6331, 6330, 6330, 6332, 6328, 6329, 6330)             | (379716, 379715, 379721, 379713, 379716, 379717, 379715, 379712) |

**Table 3.6:** Vectors of minimal number of bit flips for the function  $\mathcal{R}$  when the initial difference vectors are  $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}} = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$  and  $\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ .

|      |   | $\mathbf{\Delta_X} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$                | $\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}} = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$                 |
|------|---|---|--|
|      | $\overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}} = (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1)$        | (2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 1, 1, 2)                                      | (29, 30, 32, 30, 31, 30, 29, 29)                                 |
|      | 0   | (28, 28, 28, 28, 27, 29, 29, 28)                              | (873, 872, 868, 872, 870, 872, 874, 874)                         |
|      | 0   | (422, 422, 420, 422, 421, 422, 423, 423)                      | (19406, 19409, 19406, 19406, 19406, 19405, 19405, 19407)         |
|      | $\overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{X}}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ | (6328, 6328, 6330, 6328, 6329, 6328, 6327, 6327)              | (386016, 386011, 386017, 386016, 386016, 386018, 386017, 386014) |
| Tabl | e 3.7: Vectors of a   | minimal number of bit flips for                               | or the function $\mathcal R$ when the initial difference         |
|      | vectors are   | $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ and $\Delta$ | $\mathbf{v} = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).$                         |

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| _     |   | $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}} = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$   | $\mathbf{\Delta}_{\mathbf{Y}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$   |     |
|-------|---|--|---|-----|
|       | $\overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$   | (1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2)   | (28, 29, 28, 28, 29, 27, 28, 28)  |     |
|       | 0   | (29, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28)   | (844, 842, 844, 844, 842, 846, 844, 844)  |     |
|       | 0   | (422, 421, 422, 422, 421, 423, 422, 422)   | (18984, 18985, 18982, 18986, 18985, 18983, 18984, 18986)  |     |
|       | $\overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{X}}} = (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1)$  | (6330, 6331, 6330, 6330, 6332, 6328, 6329, 6330)   | 379710 37971 37972 37971 37971 37971 37971 37971 37971  |     |
| Table | 23.   |  |   | nce |
|       | Note  | the variance   | of the elements!  | ,   |
| _     | Note  | <b>The Variance</b><br>$\Delta_{\mathbf{X}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$   | of the elements:<br>$\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}} = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$   |     |
| _     | $\overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)$  |  |   |     |
| _     |   | $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$   | $\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}} = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$  |     |
| _     | $\overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)$   | $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ (2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 1, 1, 2)  | $\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}} = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ (29, 30, 32, 30, 31, 30, 29, 29)   |     |
|       | $\overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)$ <b>0</b>  | $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ $(2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 1, 1, 2)$ $(28, 28, 28, 28, 27, 29, 29, 28)$ $(422, 422, 420, 422, 421, 422, 423, 423)$  | $\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}} = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ (29, 30, 32, 30, 31, 30, 29, 29) (873, 872, 868, 872, 870, 872, 874, 874)  |     |
|       | $\overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)$ $0$ $0$ $\overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{X}}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ | $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ $(2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 1, 1, 2)$ $(28, 28, 28, 28, 27, 29, 29, 28)$ $(422, 422, 420, 422, 421, 422, 423, 423)$ $(6328, 6328, 6330, 6328, 6329, 6328, 6327, 6327)$ | $\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}} = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ $(29, 30, 32, 30, 31, 30, 29, 29)$ $(873, 872, 868, 872, 870, 872, 874, 874)$ $(19406, 19409, 19406, 19406, 19406, 19405, 19405, 19407)$ | nce |

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|   | $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}} = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ | $\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$         |
|---|--|--|
| $\overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ | (1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2)                         | (28, 29, 28, 28, 29, 27, 28, 28)                         |
| 0   | (29, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28, 28)             | (844, 842, 844, 844, 842, 846, 844, 844)                 |
| 0   | (422, 421, 422, 422, 421, 423, 422, 422)         | (18984, 18985, 18982, 18986, 18985, 18983, 18984, 18986) |
| $\overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{X}}} = (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1)$        | (6330, 6331, 6330, 6330, 6332, 6328, 6329, 6330) | 379710 379715 379721 379713 379716 37971 379713 37971    |
| ıble 3.   |  | reno   |

## Note the variance of the elements!

**Theorem 4.** The variance of the elements of the  $D_i$ , i = 1, ..., 8 decreases (relative to the minimal element in the vectors  $D_i$ , i = 1, ..., 8), with every row of quasigroup string transformations in the compression function  $\mathcal{R}$ .

0

(422, 422, 420, 422, 421, 422, 423, 423)

(19406, 19409, 19406, 19406, 19406, 19405, 19405, 19407)

 $\overline{\Delta_{\mathbf{X}}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) \qquad (6328, 6328, 6330, 6328, 6329, 6328, 6327, 6327) \qquad (386016, 386017, 386016, 386016, 386018, 386017, 386014)$ 

**Table 3.7:** Vectors of minimal number of bit flips for the function  $\mathcal{R}$  when the initial difference vectors are  $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$  and  $\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}} = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ .

#### EDON-R is provably resistant against differential cryptanalysis

**Theorem 5.** Let  $\mathcal{D}_i = (\delta_0^{(i)}, \delta_1^{(i)}, \dots, \delta_7^{(i)})$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 8$  be a vector of minimal number of bit flips for the function  $\mathcal{R}$  where the size of the word is w bits (w = 32, 64), and let  $\Delta_{D_i} = (\Delta_{D_0}^{(i)}, \Delta_{D_1}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{D_7}^{(i)}) = (\Delta_0^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{w}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{2w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{2w}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{7w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{7w}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{8w-1}^{(i)})$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 8$  (where  $\Delta_j^{(i)} \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $j = 0, \dots, 8w - 1$ ) are the corresponding differentials in the intermediate variables  $\Delta_{D_i}$  for some initially chosen differentials  $\Delta_X$  and  $\Delta_Y$  (where at least one of them is a non-zero differential). If the number of bit flips for every single bit is equally distributed then the probabilities that every difference bit  $\Delta_j^{(i)}$  is 0 or 1 are given as:

$$Pr(\Delta_{j}^{(i)} = 0 | \Delta_{\mathbf{X}}, \Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}) = 0.5 + \epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}},$$
$$Pr(\Delta_{j}^{(i)} = 1 | \Delta_{\mathbf{X}}, \Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}) = 0.5 - \epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}},$$

where  $\mu = \left\lfloor \frac{j}{w} \right\rfloor$  and  $\epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}} \leq 0.5 \left( \frac{w-2}{w} \right)^{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}}$ .



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**Theorem 5.** Let  $\mathcal{D}_i = (\delta_0^{(i)}, \delta_1^{(i)}, \dots, \delta_7^{(i)})$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 8$  be a vector of minimal number of bit flips for the function  $\mathcal{R}$  where the size of the word is w bits (w = 32, 64), and let  $\Delta_{D_i} = (\Delta_{D_0}^{(i)}, \Delta_{D_1}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{D_7}^{(i)}) = (\Delta_0^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{w}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{2w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{2w}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{7w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{7w}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{8w-1}^{(i)})$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 8$  (where  $\Delta_j^{(i)} \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $j = 0, \dots, 8w - 1$ ) are the corresponding differentials in the intermediate variables  $\Delta_{D_i}$  for some initially chosen differentials  $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}}$  and  $\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}$  (where at least one of them is a non-zero differential). If the number of bit flips for every single bit is equally distributed then the probabilities that every difference bit  $\Delta_j^{(i)}$  is 0 or 1 are given as:

$$Pr(\Delta_{j}^{(i)} = 0 | \Delta_{\mathbf{X}}, \Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}) = 0.5 + \epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}},$$
$$Pr(\Delta_{j}^{(i)} = 1 | \Delta_{\mathbf{X}}, \Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}) = 0.5 - \epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}},$$

where  $\mu = \left\lfloor \frac{j}{w} \right\rfloor$  and  $\epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}} \leq 0.5 \left( \frac{w-2}{w} \right)^{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}}$ .



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#### EDON-R is provably resistant against differential cryptanalysis

**Theorem 5.** Let  $\mathcal{D}_i = (\delta_0^{(i)}, \delta_1^{(i)}, \dots, \delta_7^{(i)})$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 8$  be a vector of minimal number of bit flips for the function  $\mathcal{R}$  where the size of the word is w bits (w = 32, 64), and let  $\Delta_{D_i} = (\Delta_{D_0}^{(i)}, \Delta_{D_1}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{D_7}^{(i)}) = (\Delta_0^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{w}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{2w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{2w}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{7w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{8w-1}^{(i)})$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 8$  (where  $\Delta_j^{(i)} \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $j = 0, \dots, 8w - 1$ ) are the corresponding differentials in the intermediate variables  $\Delta_{D_i}$  for some initially chosen differentials  $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}}$  and  $\Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}$  (where at least one of them is a non-zero differential). If the number of bit flips for every single bit is equally distributed then the probabilities that every difference bit  $\Delta_j^{(i)}$  is 0 or 1 are given as:

$$Pr(\Delta_{j}^{(i)} = 0 | \Delta_{\mathbf{X}}, \Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}) = 0.5 + \epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}},$$
$$Pr(\Delta_{j}^{(i)} = 1 | \Delta_{\mathbf{X}}, \Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}) = 0.5 - \epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}},$$

where  $\mu = \left\lfloor \frac{j}{w} \right\rfloor$  and  $\epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}} \leq 0.5 \left( \frac{w-2}{w} \right)^{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}}$ .



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#### EDON-R is provably resistant against differential cryptanalysis

**Theorem 5.** Let  $\mathcal{D}_i = (\delta_0^{(i)}, \delta_1^{(i)}, \dots, \delta_7^{(i)})$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 8$  be a vector of minimal number of bit flips for the function  $\mathcal{R}$  where the size of the word is w bits (w = 32, 64), and let  $\Delta_{D_i} = (\Delta_{D_0}^{(i)}, \Delta_{D_1}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{D_7}^{(i)}) = (\Delta_0^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{2w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{2w}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{7w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{7w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{8w-1}^{(i)})$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 8$  (where  $\Delta_j^{(i)} \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $j = 0, \dots, 8w - 1$ ) are the corresponding differentials in the intermediate variables  $\Delta_{D_i}$  for some initially chosen differentials  $\Delta_X$  and  $\Delta_Y$  (where at least one of them is a non-zero differential). If the number of bit flips for every single bit is equally distributed then the probabilities that every difference bit  $\Delta_j^{(i)}$  is 0 or 1 are given as:

$$Pr(\Delta_{j}^{(i)} = 0 | \Delta_{\mathbf{X}}, \Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}) = 0.5 + \epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}},$$
$$Pr(\Delta_{j}^{(i)} = 1 | \Delta_{\mathbf{X}}, \Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}) = 0.5 - \epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}},$$

where  $\mu = \left\lfloor \frac{j}{w} \right\rfloor$  and  $\epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}} \leq 0.5 \left( \frac{w-2}{w} \right)^{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}}$ .



#### EDON-R is provably resistant against differential cryptanalysis

**Theorem 5.** Let  $\mathcal{D}_i = (\delta_0^{(i)}, \delta_1^{(i)}, \dots, \delta_7^{(i)})$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 8$  be a vector of minimal number of bit flips for the function  $\mathcal{R}$  where the size of the word is w bits (w = 32, 64), and let  $\Delta_{D_i} = (\Delta_{D_0}^{(i)}, \Delta_{D_1}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{D_7}^{(i)}) = (\Delta_0^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{w}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{2w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{2w}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{7w-1}^{(i)}, \Delta_{7w}^{(i)}, \dots, \Delta_{8w-1}^{(i)})$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, 8$  (where  $\Delta_j^{(i)} \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $j = 0, \dots, 8w - 1$ ) are the corresponding differentials in the intermediate variables  $\Delta_D$  for some initially chosen differentials  $\Delta_X$  and  $\Delta_Y$  (where at least one of them is a non-zero differential). If the number of bit flips for every single bit is equally distributed then the probabilities that every difference bit  $\Delta_j^{(i)}$  is 0 or 1 are given as:

$$Pr(\Delta_{j}^{(i)} = 0 | \Delta_{\mathbf{X}}, \Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}) = 0.5 + \epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}},$$
$$Pr(\Delta_{j}^{(i)} = 1 | \Delta_{\mathbf{X}}, \Delta_{\mathbf{Y}}) = 0.5 - \epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}},$$

where 
$$\mu = \left\lfloor \frac{j}{w} \right\rfloor$$
 and  $\epsilon_{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}} \leq 0.5 \left(\frac{w-2}{w}\right)^{\delta_{\mu}^{(i)}}$ .



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| $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}} = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) \qquad \qquad \Delta_{\mathbf{Y}} = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ |                             |                             |                             |  |
|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| w = 32  | w = 64                      | w = 32                      | w = 64                      |  |
| $\epsilon \leq 2^{-1.09}$   | $\epsilon \leq 2^{-1.05}$   | $\epsilon \leq 2^{-3.51}$   | $\epsilon \leq 2^{-2.24}$   |  |
| $\epsilon \leq 2^{-3.61}$   | $\epsilon \leq 2^{-2.28}$   | $\epsilon \leq 2^{-79.40}$  | $\epsilon \leq 2^{-39.57}$  |  |
| $\epsilon \leq 2^{-40.20}$  | $\epsilon \leq 2^{-20.28}$  | $\epsilon \leq 2^{-1768.4}$ | $\epsilon \leq 2^{-870.45}$ |  |
| $\epsilon \leq 2^{-590.20}$   | $\epsilon \leq 2^{-290.85}$ | $\epsilon \leq 2^{-35356}$  | $\epsilon \leq 2^{-17393}$  |  |

**Table 3.8:** Upper bounds for the deviations  $\epsilon$ . The probability that a bit will have a differential  $\Delta = 1$  is  $0.5 - \epsilon$ , and the probability that a bit will have a differential  $\Delta = 0$  is  $0.5 + \epsilon$ . The initial difference vectors are  $\Delta_X = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$  and  $\Delta_Y = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ .



EDON-R has double size chaining (pipe) values

- For n=224, 256, chaining value has 512 bits.
- For n=384, 512, chaining value has 1024 bits
- Gives resistance against length-extension attack
- Gives resistance against multi-collision attack



## Known attacks on EDON-R

#### 1. Khovratovic and Nikolic

- Free-start collisions in Edon-R
- Using free-start collisions to launch preimage attack with TIME ~ O(2<sup>2n/3</sup>) and MEMORY ~ O(2<sup>2n/3</sup>) i.e. the attack has this property:

TIME \* MEMORY >  $2^{n + n/3}$  >>  $2^{n}$ 

**2. Klima:** EDON-R is **"almost"** as ordinary strengthened MD design.

 That "almost" is in the small additional factor of 2<sup>65</sup> to the generic multicollision attack that comes from the Merkle-Damgård strengthening.



## Known attacks on EDON-R

#### 1. Khovratovic and Nikolic


- Free-start collisions in Edon-R
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- **2. Klima:** EDON-R is **"almost"** as ordinary strengthened MD design.
  - That "almost" is in the small additional factor of 2<sup>65</sup> to the generic multicollision attack that comes from the Merkle-Damgård strengthening.

Idea to defend from both attacks <u>without changing anything in the</u> <u>definition of the compression function</u>

Make the Merkle-Damgård strengthening of EDON-R to be 129 bits (instead of the current 65 bit strengthening).



# Are there one-way bijections embedded in EDON-R?




| * | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 |



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# Are there one-way bijections embedded in EDON-R?




| * | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 |

1. Fix  $C_0=1$ ,  $C_1=0$ ,  $B_0=2$ ,



## Are there one-way bijections embedded in **EDON-R**?



| * | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 |
| 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 |

Fix  $C_0 = 1$ ,  $C_1 = 0$ ,  $B_0 = 2$ , 2. For every  $A_0$  in {0,1,2,3}, compute:  $X_0^{(3)}$ , 1. 2. X<sub>0</sub><sup>(2)</sup>, 3.  $X_0^{(1)}$ ,

4.  $A_1^{-}$ , 5.  $X_1^{(1)}$ ,

6. X<sub>1</sub><sup>(2)</sup>,

7.  $X_1^{(3)}$ ,

8.

B<sub>1</sub>,




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1.

## Are there one-way bijections embedded in **EDON-R**?



Fix 
$$C_0=1$$
,  $C_1=0$ ,  $B_0=2$ ,  
For every  $A_0$  in {0,1,2,3},  
compute:

X<sub>0</sub><sup>(3)</sup>, X<sub>0</sub><sup>(2)</sup>, X<sub>0</sub><sup>(1)</sup>,

2.

3.

- The mapping:  $A_0 \rightarrow B_1$  is a bijection.
- Knowing  $A_0$ , it is easy to compute  $B_1$ .
- However: Knowing  $B_1$ , it is "hard" to find  $A_0$ .
- For tiny quasigroups of order 4 we found that 144 quasigroups. 4. give bijections for every value of  $C_0$ ,  $C_1$  and  $B_0$ .




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Bo

 $\mathbf{B}_1$ 

 $\mathbf{C}_0$ 

# Are there one-way bijections embedded in EDON-R?





25-28 Feb 2009, Leuven, Belgium, The First SHA-3 Candidate Conference, Cryptographic Hash Function EDON-R

## SW/HW performance and memory requirements

Software performances of the optimized C implementation on the NIST reference platform

Intel C++ v11.0.66, in 64-bit mode EDON-R 224/256 achieves **4.54 cycles/byte** 

Intel C++ v11.0.66, in 64-bit mode EDON-R 384/512 achieves **2.29 cycles/byte** 

#### HW – gate count

EDON-R 224/256, ~13,000 gates

EDON-R 384/512, ~25,000 gates

Memory requirements

EDON-R 224/256 needs 256 bytes

EDON-R 384/512 needs 512 bytes

#### 8-bit MCU (ATmega16, ATmega406)

EDON-R 224/256, compiled C code produces ~6KB of machine instructions, speed 616 cycles/bytes

EDON-R 384/512, compiled C code produces ~38KB of machine instructions, speed 1857 cycles/bytes



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## Thank you for your attention!



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