Lesamnta: A Family of Hash Functions

First SHA-3 Candidate Conference

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Overview

Design principle

- Specification
- Preliminary analysis
- Performance figures
- Conclusion
 - What's special about Lesamnta

Design principle of Lesamnta

Support 224/256/384/512-bit hash length

Security

- Provable security
 - Collision resistance, Preimage resistance
 - Resistance of length-extension attacks
 - HMAC Resistance
 - Indifferentiability from random oracle
- Evaluate resistance against major known attacks
 - Resistance against Wang et al 's attacks on SHA-1

Performance

- In software, efficiently implemented on 8/16/32/64-bit CPU's
- In hardware, implementation with small number of gate count or fast implementation is possible

Specifications of Lesamnta-256/512

Block-cipher-based construction

Domain extension


Strengthened MD with an output function (MDO)

The output function prevents length extension attacks


Compression function and output function


Matyas-Meyer-Oseas mode

Enables to reduce the security of the hash function to the security of the underlying block cipher




n-bit message block and *n*-bit chaining variable for Lesamnta-*n* (*n*= 256 or 512) Copyright © 2009, Hitachi, Ltd. All rights reserved.







The F function for Lesamnta-512



The G function for Lesamnta-256





Preliminary analysis

Provable security

The security of Lesamnta is reduced to the security of the underlying block ciphers.

- Collision resistant if the compression & output functions are CR.
- Preimage resistant in the ideal cipher model
- Indifferentiable from random oracle in the ideal cipher model
 - Resistant against length-extension attacks.
- HMAC is PRF if the underlying block ciphers are independent PRPs.

Attack-based security analysis

The best results on attacks are due to the known-key distinguisher.

Algorithm	Attack	Target Function	Number of Rounds	Attack complexity
Lesamnta-256	Collision finding	Hash function	16	2 ⁹⁷
	Pre-image finding	Compression function	16	2 ¹⁹³
	Second pre-image Finding	Hash function	16	2 ¹⁹³
Lesamnta-512	Collision finding	Hash function	16	2 ¹⁹³
	Pre-image finding	Compression function	16	2 ³⁸⁵
	Second pre-image Finding	Hash function	16	2 ³⁸⁵

- Lesamnta block ciphers are secure against a variety of known attacks.
- Difficult to apply differential style attacks to Lesamnta
 - Provable property on differential characteristic probabitliy
 - Limited degree of freedom due to small size of message block (256(512) bits) Copyright © 2009, Hitachi, Ltd. All rights reserved.

Performance figures

Software Implementation

Lesamnta was implemented in the assembly language.

			Execution time		Memory requirements		
CPU	Implementa tion method	Message digest size	Bulk Speed (cycles/ byte)	One- block message (cycles/ message)	Constant data (bytes)	Code length (bytes)	RAM (bytes)
8-bit ^(*1)	Speed opt.	256	631	47312	256	1118	66
	Area opt.	256	901	69678	256	456	68
32-bit ^(*2)	Speed opt.	256	59.2	4750	-	-	-
		512	54.5	8827	-	-	-
64-bit ^(*2)	Speed opt.	256	52.7	4318	-	-	-
		512	51.2	8373	-	-	-

*1: Atmel AVR ATmega8515 Processor (8-bit mode) with AVR Studio^(*3) 4 simulator.

*2: Intel Core2 Duo E6600 processor (32/64-bit mode).

*3: AVR Studio is a registered trademark of Atmel Corporation

Hardware implementation

 We made estimations for speed and gate count of several different hardware architectures of Lesamnta-256/512.

Hash bit length	Architecture	Gate count (kgates)	Max. frequency (MHz)	Throughput (Mbps)
256	Speed opt.	190.1	282.5	6026.4
	Balance opt.	68.0	636.9	3623.5
	Area opt.	20.7	169.8	336.9
512	Speed opt.	393.0	234.2	9992.2
	Balance opt.	144.9	571.4	6501.6
	Area opt.	44.3	144.1	571.9

90 nm standard CMOS Cell library

Conclusion

(What's special about Lesamnta?)

Security

- Based on the security of the underlying block ciphers
- Large security margin against known attacks

Performance

- Efficient in a wide range of environments including ubiquitous systems
 - Efficient on 8-bit platforms
 - Efficient on short messages
- Fast on future processors with instructions of AES round function

Additional PRF modes

- Key-prefix mode:
 - Simply feeds *K* ||*M* to Lesmanta as an input (*K*: key, *M*: message).
 - More efficient than HMAC
- Keyed-via-IV mode