Bomgar Corporation

B200™ and B300™ Remote Support Appliances
Firmware Version: 3.2.2FIPS; Software Version: 10.6.2FIPS; Hardware Versions: B200, B300, and B300 r1

FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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1   Introduction

1.1 Purpose

This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the B200™ and B300™ Remote Support Appliances from Bomgar Corporation. This Security Policy describes how the B200™ and B300™ Remote Support Appliances meet the security requirements of FIPS[1] 140-2 and how to run the modules in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the modules.

FIPS 140-2 – Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) website, which is maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Communication Security Establishment Canada (CSEC): http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp.

The B200™ and B300™ Remote Support Appliances are referred to in this document as Bomgar appliances, the cryptographic modules, or the modules.

1.2 References

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the modules in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the modules from the following sources:

- The Bomgar website (http://www.bomgar.com/fips) contains information on the full line of products from Bomgar Corporation.
- The CMVP website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm) contains contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related questions for the modules.

1.3 Document Organization

The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:

- Vendor Evidence document
- Finite State Model
- Other supporting documentation as additional references

This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security, Inc. under contract to Bomgar Corporation. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Documentation is proprietary to Bomgar Corporation and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Bomgar Corporation.

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[1] FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standard

2   B200™ and B300™ Remote Support Appliances

2.1 Overview

Bomgar Corporation specializes in appliance-based solutions for remote support. Their remote support appliances give support technicians secure remote control of computers over the Internet, LAN[2], or WAN[3]. The software works through firewalls with no pre-installed client on the remote computer. With the Bomgar Remote Support Appliances, a support technician can see the screen and control the system virtually as if physically present.

Figure 1 – Bomgar B200 (top) and B300 (bottom)

The B200™ and B300™ Remote Support Appliances (shown in Figure 1 above) enable the use of remote support in multiple areas of an organization in a way that is secure, integrated and manageable. The Bomgar appliances can integrate with LDAP[4] for secure user management, prevent sensitive data from being routed outside the organization, and support extensive auditing and recording of support sessions. The logging is performed by the Bomgar appliances, which allows for the review of all Customer and Support Representative interactions, including playback of all desktop screen data. The appliances also integrate with leading systems management and identity management solutions and include an Application Programming Interface (API) for deeper integration. With Bomgar, support managers can create support teams, customize queues, and report on all support activities. Network administrators can also monitor the Bomgar appliances using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).

The Bomgar appliances enable remote access to multiple common operating systems, including various Linux distributions. They also enable remote control of various kinds of systems, including laptops, desktops, servers, kiosks, point-of-sale systems, smartphones, and network devices.

The Bomgar appliances can work over internal and extended networks and can be internet-accessible. This allows support organizations to reduce less effective means of support by driving requests through custom support portals hosted on the appliances. The Bomgar appliances can route support requests to the appropriate technician or team and mediate connections between Customers and Support Representatives, allowing chat sessions, file downloads/uploads, screen-sharing, remote control of desktops, and access to system and diagnostic information.

To enable the functionality described above, Bomgar has implemented architecture that places the Bomgar appliances at the center of all communications (see Figure 2 below for a typical deployment scenario). The Bomgar appliances provide a platform upon which one or more support sites are constructed. Sites represent individual help centers, and multiple sites can be set up to support multiple departments or groups

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[2] LAN – Local Area Network
[3] WAN – Wide Area Network
[4] LDAP – Lightweight Directory Access Protocol

in a company. Each site would offer a web site interface using Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) for unauthenticated services and HTTP over TLS[5] (HTTPS) for authenticated services, in addition to accepting direct client connections over a protocol running on top of TLS.

Figure 2 – Typical Deployment[6]

The Bomgar appliances have two primary components that provide the appliances' functionality. The first is the Firmware that provides system-level configuration of Bomgar appliances. Settings such as IP[7] addresses and SSL/TLS configuration are all configured via the Firmware interface. The second component is made up of the software that provides site-level configuration, as well as the software clients that users interact with. The web interface behind the /login page is part of the software, as are the Representative Console, Customer Client, Connection Agent, and all other clients which are downloadable from the Bomgar appliances.

The B200™ and B300™ Remote Support Appliances are validated at the following FIPS 140-2 Section levels:

Table 1 – Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section

Section	Section Title	Level
1	Cryptographic Modules Specification	2
2	Cryptographic Modules Ports and Interfaces	2
3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
4	Finite State Model	2
5	Physical Security	2
6	Operational Environment	N/A[8]
7	Cryptographic Key Management	2
8	EMI/EMC[9]	2

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[5] TLS – Transport Layer Security
[6] Rep – Representative; SSL – Secure Socket Layer; DMZ – Demilitarized Zone; POS – Point of Sale; AD – Active Directory
[7] IP – Internet Protocol
[8] N/A – Not applicable

Section	Section Title	Level
9	Self-tests	2
10	Design Assurance	2
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

2.2 Modules Specification

The B200™ and B300™ Remote Support Appliances (running Firmware version 3.2.2FIPS and Software version 10.6.2FIPS on Hardware versions B200, B300 or B300 r1) are multi-chip standalone modules that meet overall Level 2 FIPS 140-2 requirements.

Physically, the modules are composed of the components of a standard server platform. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show a block diagram for the B200 and B300 respectively and identify the various components, connections, and information flows. The cryptographic boundary of the modules (denoted by the dotted lines in Figure 3 and Figure 4) is defined by the outer case of each appliance, which surrounds the complete set of hardware, firmware, and software components. Note that, though Figure 4 shows a single hard disk, the B300 can support up to four hard disks to support RAID[10] functionality. Additionally, please note that the B300 power supply is <u>not</u> included the within the cryptographic boundary.

KEY:
BIOS – Basic Input/Output System
CPU – Central Processing Unit
SATA – Serial Advanced Technology Attachment
SCSI – Small Computer System Interface
PCI – Peripheral Component Interconnect
PCIe – PCI express
HDD – Hard Disk Drive
DVD – Digital Video Disc
USB – Universal Serial Bus
RAM – Random Access Memory

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[9] EMI/EMC – Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
[10] RAID – Redundant Array of Independent Disks

Figure 3 – Block Diagram for B200 with Cryptographic Boundary

Physical Cryptographic Boundary

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Hardware
Management       RAM         Network          DVD

Clock
Generator                                     HDD

                North Bridge    SCSI/SATA
CPU(s)                          Controller

                                              Serial

Cache    PCI/PCIe              South Bridge    Audio
         Slots
                                              USB

Power    Graphics             BIOS    PCI/PCIe
Interface Controller                  Slots
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External
Power Supply

KEY:

BIOS – Basic Input/Output System	PCIe – PCI express
CPU – Central Processing Unit	HDD – Hard Disk Drive
SATA – Serial Advanced Technology Attachment	DVD – Digital Video Disc
SCSI – Small Computer System Interface	USB – Universal Serial Bus
PCI – Peripheral Component Interconnect	RAM – Random Access Memory

Figure 4 – Block diagram for B300 with Cryptographic Boundary

2.3 Module Interfaces

The modules' design separates the physical ports into four logically distinct and isolated categories. They are:

- Data Input
- Data Output
- Control Input
- Status Output

In addition, the modules receive power via a defined power input interface.

Data input/output are the network data packets utilizing the services provided by the modules. These packets enter and exit the modules through the network ports. Control input consists of both configuration and administration data entering the modules through the web interface and also the input for the power and

reset buttons. Status output consists of status information relayed via the LED[11] indicators and the web interface.

The physical ports and interfaces of the modules are depicted in Figure 5 and Figure 6 below.


1. Power Button   2. Reset Switch   3. Power On LED   4. HDD Activity LED   5. NIC1 (LAN1) LED   6. NIC2 (LAN2) LED   7. Overheat LED

1. Power Supply Connector   2. LAN1   3. LAN2

Figure 5 – Front and Rear View of B200

1. Power Button   2. Reset Switch   3. Power On LED   4. HDD Activity LED   5. NIC1 (LAN1) LED   6. NIC2 (LAN2) LED   7. Overheat LED   8. Universal Information LED   9. SAS Drive Bays

1. Power Interface   2. LAN1   3. LAN2

Figure 6 – Front and Rear View of B300

Of the ports and interfaces depicted in the figures above, only the following are enabled to be used in FIPS mode of operation:

- Network ports
- Power button
- Reset button
- Power connectors
- LEDs

Table 2 lists the physical interfaces available in the Bomgar appliances and also provides the mapping from the physical interfaces to logical interfaces as defined by FIPS 140-2.

Table 2 – Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces

FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface	Physical Port (B200)	Physical Port (B300)

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[11] LED – Light Emitting Diode

FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface	Physical Port (B200)	Physical Port (B300)
Data Input	Network ports	Network ports
Data Output	Network ports	Network ports
Control Input	Network ports, power button, reset switch	Network ports, power button, reset switch
Status Output	LEDs, network ports	LEDs, network ports
Power Input	Power connector	Power connectors

The cryptographic modules have a number of LEDs which indicate the state of the modules. The descriptions for the LEDs are listed in Table 3 for each module.

Table 3 – LED Descriptions

Model	LED	Condition	Description
B200	Power	On	System on
		Off	System off
	Hard Disk Drive (HDD)	On	IDE channel activity
		Blink	SAS/SATA drive or DVD-ROM drive activity
		Off	No HDD activity
	LAN1/LAN2	On	Linked
		Blink	Network activity
		Off	Disconnected
	Overheat/Fan	On	System overheat condition
		Blink	Fan failure
		Off	System normal
B300	Power	On	System on
		Off	System off
	HDD	Blink	HDD activity
		Off	No HDD activity
	LAN1/LAN2	On	Linked
		Blink	Network activity
		Off	Disconnected
	Overheat/Fan	On	System overheat condition
		Blink	Fan failure

Model	LED	Condition	Description
		Off	System normal
		Fast Blink Red (1x/ sec)	Fan fail
	Universal Information	Solid Red	CPU overheat
		Slow Blink Red (1x/ 4 sec)	Power fail
		Solid Blue	Local Unit Identifier (UID) button depressed

2.4 Roles and Services

As required by FIPS 140-2, the module supports a Crypto-Officer (CO) role and a User role. The User role comprises an Instance-Admin role and an Instance-User role.

The modules support role-based authentication for the Crypto-Officer and identity-based authentication for the Instance-Admin and Instance-User roles. Operators explicitly assume the role of Instance-Admin or Instance-User based on the authentication credentials used. The credentials used determine the services available to the operator.

2.4.1 Crypto-Officer Role

The Crypto-Officer role is the administrator for the modules and is responsible for the initial setup and configuration. The Crypto-Officer has administrator rights to monitor and manage the firmware component's configuration, manage the CO account, and reset the default Instance-Admin account passwords.

2.4.2 Instance-Admin Role

The Instance-Admin has administrator rights to monitor and manage the software instance's configuration, manage Instance-Admin accounts, and manage Instance-User accounts.

2.4.3 Instance-User Role

The Instance-User can access the support services in the modules based on the permissions set by the Instance-Admin. The Instance-Admin has to grant access to Instance-Users to access services on the modules.

2.4.4 Services

Services provided to authenticated operators are provided in Table 4 below. Please note that the keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) listed indicate the type of access required:

- Read: The CSP is read
- Write: The CSP is established, generated, modified, or zeroized

Table 4 – Mapping of Authenticated Operator Services to Inputs, Outputs, CSPs, and Type of Access

Service	Description	Operator	Input	Output	CSP and Type of Access

Service	Description	Operator	Input	Output	CSP and Type of Access
Manage Bomgar appliance settings	Configure IP[12] and TLS settings	CO	Command	Command response	RSA public key – Read, Write RSA private key – Read, Write Session Key – Read, Write PRNG[13] seed – Read, Write CO Password – Read
Manage CO account	Manage CO officer account password	CO	Command	Command response	RSA public key – Read RSA private key – Read Session Key – Read, Write PRNG seed – Read, Write CO Password – Read, Write
Reset Instance-Admin password	Reset Instance-Admin account password	CO	Command	Command response	RSA public key – Read RSA private key – Read Session Key – Read, Write PRNG seed – Read, Write Instance-Admin Password – Write
Configure Instance-Admin accounts	Set up and monitor Instance-Admin accounts	CO, Instance-Admin	Command	Command response	RSA public key – Read RSA private key – Read Session Key – Read, Write PRNG seed – Read, Write Instance-Admin Password – Read, Write
Configure Instance-User accounts	Set up and monitor Instance-User accounts	Instance-Admin, Instance-User	Command	Command response	RSA public key – Read RSA private key – Read Session Key – Read, Write PRNG seed – Read, Write Instance-User Password – Read, Write
Execute self-tests	Perform power-up self-tests on demand	CO	Command	Command response	None
Monitor status	Monitor the status of the modules	CO	Command	Status information	RSA public key – Read RSA private key – Read
Zeroize keys	Zeroize plaintext keys	CO	Command	Command response	All CSPs – Write
Perform Representative Console service	Access and perform services for Representative Consoles	Instance-Admin, Instance-User	Command	Command response	RSA public key – Read RSA private key – Read Session Key – Read, Write PRNG seed – Read, Write Instance-Admin Password – Read Instance-User Password – Read
Manage instance settings	Manage instance configuration settings	Instance-Admin, Instance-User	Command	Command response	RSA public key – Read RSA private key – Read Session Key – Read, Write PRNG seed – Read, Write

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[12] IP – Internet Protocol
[13] PRNG – Pseudo Random Number Generator

2.4.5 Unauthenticated Operator Services

The modules provide a service to unauthenticated operators as listed in Table 5 below.

Table 5 – Unauthenticated Operator Service

Service	Description	Input	Output	CSP and Type of Access
Receive support service	Receive support services	Command	Command response	None

2.4.6 Authentication Mechanism

The Crypto-Officer can access the modules remotely over a TLS session. The Crypto-Officer authenticates to the modules using a user ID and password. Instance-Admins and Instance-Users authenticate themselves with a user ID and password combination. Instance-Admins and Instance-Users can also authenticate to the modules via one of the following configurable methods: LDAP, Kerberos, or RADIUS.

Table 6 lists the authentication mechanisms used by the modules.

Table 6 – Authentication Mechanism Used by the Modules

Authentication Type	Strength
Password	Passwords are required to be at least 6 characters in length and can be a maximum of 64 characters in length. Numeric, alphabetic (upper and lower cases), and keyboard/extended characters can be used, for a total of 95 characters to choose from. A six-character password will yield a total of 95^6 = 735,091,890,625 possible combinations.

2.5 Physical Security

The B200™ and B300™ Remote Support Appliances are multi-chip standalone cryptographic modules. Each is enclosed in a hard and opaque metal case that completely encloses all of the internal components of the module. Tamper-evident labels are applied to the cases to provide physical evidence of attempts to gain access to the modules' internal components. All of the modules' components are production grade. The placement of tamper-evident labels can be found in Section 3.1 of this document.

2.6 Operational Environment

The operational environment requirements do not apply to the Bomgar appliances. The modules provide only a limited operational environment; they do not provide a general-purpose operating system environment.

2.7 Cryptographic Key Management

The modules implement the FIPS-Approved algorithms listed in Table 7.

Table 7 – FIPS-Approved Algorithm Implementations

Algorithm	B200 Certificate Number	B300 Certificate Number
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in CBC[14], ECB[15], OFB[16], and CFB[17]128 modes (with 128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit keys)	1563	1563
Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) – CBC, ECB, OFB, CFB8, and CFB64 modes (with 2- and 3-key)	1027	1027
RSA[18] ANSI[19] X9.31 (key generation) – 1024-, 1536-, 2048-bit	762	762
RSA Public Key Cryptography Standard #1 (PKCS#1) v1.5 (sign/verify) – 1024-, 2048-, 3072-, and 4096-bit	762	762
RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS) (sign/verify) – 1024-, 2048-, 3072-, and 4096-bit	762	762
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512	1388	1388
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) using SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512	915	915
ANSI X9.31 A.2.4 PRNG	844	844

The modules also support the following non-FIPS-Approved algorithms:

- RSA key transport: 1024-, 1536-, 2048-, 3072-, 4096-bits (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 80 and 150 bits of encryption strength)
- RC4[20]
- RC4-40
- DES
- DES-40
- MD5[21]

The modules support the critical security parameters (CSPs) in Table 8.

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[14] CBC – Cipher Block Chaining
[15] ECB – Electronic Codebook
[16] OFB – Output Feedback
[17] CFB – Cipher Feedback
[18] RSA – Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
[19] ANSI – American National Standards Institute
[20] RC – Rivest Cipher 4
[21] MD – Message Digest 5

Table 8 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs

CSP	CSP Type	Generation / Input	Output	Storage	Zeroization	Use
RSA private key	1024-, 1536-, 2048-, 3072-, or 4096-bit RSA private key	Internally generated or imported via a secure TLS session	Exits only via a secure TLS session	Hard disk in plaintext	By command or overwritten by another key or by factory reset	Key exchange for TLS sessions
RSA public key	1024-, 1536-, 2048-, 3072-, or 4096-bit RSA public key	Internally generated or imported via a secure TLS session	Exits in plaintext form	Hard disk in plaintext	By command or overwritten by another key or by factory reset	Key exchange for TLS sessions
Session key	• 128-bit AES CBC 128 key • 256-bit AES CBC 128 key • 192-bit TDES CBC 112 key	Internally generated	Exits in encrypted form during TLS handshake	Resides on volatile memory only in plaintext	By power cycle or session termination	Data encryption and decryption for TLS sessions
Crypto-Officer password	6-character minimum password	Enters the modules in encrypted form	Never exits the modules	Hard disk in hashed form	Overwritten by another password or zeroized by factory reset	Authenticates the CO
Instance-Admin password	6-character minimum password	Enters the modules in encrypted form	Never exits the modules	Hard disk in hashed form	Overwritten by another password or zeroized by factory reset	Authenticates the Instance-Admin
Instance-User password	6-character minimum password	Enters the modules in encrypted form	Never exits the modules	Hard disk in hashed form	Overwritten by another password or zeroized by factory reset	Authenticates the Instance-User
PRNG seed key	32 bytes of random value	Internally generated	Never exits the modules	Resides on volatile memory only in plaintext	By power cycle, session termination, or factory reset	Seeds the FIPS-Approved PRNG
PRNG seed	16 bytes of random value	Internally generated	Never exits the modules	Resides on volatile memory only in plaintext	By power cycle, session termination, or factory reset	Seeds the FIPS-Approved PRNG

2.8 EMI/EMC

The modules were tested and found conformant to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (i.e., for business use).

2.9 Self-Tests

2.9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests

The Bomgar appliances perform the following self-tests at power-up to verify the integrity of the software/firmware and the correct operation of the FIPS-Approved algorithm implementations employed by the modules:

- Software/Firmware integrity check using a SHA-1 EDC[22]
- AES Known Answer Test (KAT)
- TDES KAT
- RSA KATs (sign/verify and encrypt/decrypt)
- HMAC KATs (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512)
- SHA-1 KAT (note that all SHA-2 implementations are tested as part of the underlying mechanism of the HMAC SHA self-tests)
- ANSI X9.31 PRNG KAT

If any of the power-up self-tests fail, then the module enters an error state, logs the error to a file, and disables all cryptographic operations.

2.9.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The Bomgar appliances perform the following conditional self-tests:

- ANSI X9.31 A.2.4 PRNG Continuous RNG test: Verifying the correct operation of the PRNG algorithm implementation.
- RSA pair-wise consistency check (sign/verify and encrypt/decrypt): Verifying that a newly generated RSA key pair works properly.
- Software/Firmware load test: Verifying the upgrade packages. Upgrade packages are digitally-signed using RSA-4096, and are only loaded once the digital signature is verified.

If any of the conditional self-tests fail, then the modules enter a soft error state until the error can be cleared.

2.10 Mitigation of Other Attacks

This section is not applicable. The modules do not claim to mitigate any attacks beyond the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements for this validation.

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[22] EDC – Error Detection Code

3 Secure Operation

The B200™ and B300™ Remote Support Appliances meet Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to ensure that the modules are running securely.

3.1 Initial Setup

The following sections provide the necessary step-by-step instructions for the secure hardware installation of the B200™ and B300™ Remote Support Appliances, as well as the steps necessary to configure the modules for FIPS-Approved mode of operation. If you have any questions or if issues arise at any point during the installation and configuration of your Bomgar appliances, contact the Bomgar support team toll-free at 1-877-826-6427 x2 or internationally at +01-601-519-0123 x2.

3.1.1 B200 Hardware Setup

In order to set up the Bomgar B200, the following steps will need to be performed by the Crypto-Officer:

1. Inspect the tamper-evident labels as described in Section 3.1.2 below. The tamper evident labels shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation.
2. Follow the procedures included in the Hardware Setup Guide to install your B200 in your server rack.
3. After you have installed the Bomgar B200 per the Hardware Setup Guide, refer to the included Getting Started Guide and configure your network settings.
4. Once the Bomgar B200's network settings are correctly configured, return to Section 3.1.4.1 in this document to configure your B200 for FIPS mode.

3.1.2 B200 Label Inspection

The B200 will be shipped from the factory with all required labels pre-applied. Upon delivery, an authorized individual should ensure that the module was not tampered with during shipment and that the labels have been applied properly. . Also, tamper-evident labels shall be routinely inspected for damage by the Crypto-Officer, and replaced accordingly.

Inspect all tamper-evident labels that shipped pre-applied to the B200 chassis (see Figure 7 and Figure 8), ensuring that each label shows no sign of tampering and is properly placed. Any attempt to reposition or remove the label will result in the voiding of that label and leave a residue on the surface. If you find a label that is questionable in appearance, contact Bomgar support toll-free at 1-877-826-6427 x2 or internationally at +01-601-519-0123 x2.

Figure 7 – Tamper seal applied to the top, overlapping the galvanized metal cover and the front panel


Figure 8 – Tamper seal applied to the rear, overlapping the galvanized metal cover and rear steel bezel

3.1.3 B300 Hardware Setup

In order to set up the Bomgar B300, the following steps will need to be performed by an authorized individual:

1. Unpack the Bomgar B300 and remove the front bezel from the front of the B300:
    a. Loosen the set screw on the right side of the front bezel. This screw keeps the tab in place during shipping.
    b. Press the tab on the right side of the front bezel and pull the front bezel towards you, right side first.

2. Reseat the hard drives:
    a. Remove each of the hard drives by pressing the dark red buttons to unlatch the drive carrier handles. Use the handles to pull the drives about halfway out of the Bomgar chassis.
    b. As you reinsert each of the drives, the carrier handles will begin to close. Close the handles (you will feel them lock) and fully insert the drives into the B300 by firmly pressing on the left and right edges of the front of the drive carriers. Even if no movement is felt, this helps to ensure that the disk is completely engaged.
3. Reattach the B300's front bezel:
    a. Engage the left side of the faceplate first, taking care to align the stubs of the faceplate with the drilled holes in the left ear.
    b. Repeat on the right side and then tighten the set screw. Take care not to over tighten this screw.
4. Inspect the tamper-evident labels as described in Section 3.1.4 below. The tamper evident labels shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. If you find a label that is questionable in appearance, contact Bomgar support at 1-877-8-BOMGAR x2 or internationally at +01-601-519-0123 x2.
5. Follow the procedures included in the Hardware Setup Guide to install your B300 in your server rack.
6. After you have installed the Bomgar B300 per the Hardware Setup Guide, refer to the included Getting Started Guide and configure your network settings.
7. Once the Bomgar B300's network settings are correctly configured, return to Section 3.1.4.1 in this document to configure your B300 for FIPS mode.

3.1.4 B300 Label Inspection and Application

The B300 will be shipped from the factory with all required labels pre-applied except for the front bezel labels. This is to allow the end-user to reseat the drives upon receipt before affixing the front bezel to the appliance. Upon delivery, the Crypto-Officer should ensure that the module was not tampered with during shipment and that the labels have been applied properly. . Also, tamper-evident labels shall be routinely inspected for damage by the Crypto-Officer, and replaced accordingly.

1. Inspect all tamper-evident labels that shipped pre-applied to the Bomgar B300 chassis (see Figure 9), ensuring that each label shows no sign of tampering and is properly placed. Any attempt to reposition or remove the label will result in the voiding of that label and leave a residue on the surface. If you find a label that is questionable in appearance, contact Bomgar support toll-free at 1-877-826-6427 x2 or internationally at +01-601-519-0123 x2.
2. To apply the front bezel labels, first you must clean the top surface and front bezel of the B300 with isopropyl alcohol in the area where the tamper-evident labels will be placed.
3. Holding label by edges, place label on surface as indicated in the figures below.
4. Apply the included tamper-evident labels by rubbing gently across entire label to ensure adhesion to the surface.
    NOTE: Any attempt to reposition or remove the label will result in the voiding of that label and leave a residue on the surface.
5. Allow the labels to fully adhere to the B300 within 24 hours in a physically secure environment before placing it in the intended environment.

**Figure 9 – Rear metallic bezel seal (Left) and Sealed top cover (Right)**


Figure 10 – Sealed front bezel to chassis top (Left) and Sealed front bezel to chassis bottom (Right)


Figure 11– Sealed top chassis to left power supply (Left) and Sealed top chassis to right power supply (Right)

3.1.4.1 B200 and B300 FIPS Mode Configuration

Once all necessary initialization procedures have been performed as described in the preceding sections, the modules need to be configured to comply with FIPS 140-2 requirements. Once configured as described in this section, the modules will be considered to be in FIPS-Approved mode, which can be verified at any time by viewing the SSL Configuration page and ensuring it matches Figure 13 (NOTE: Figure 13 is identical for both the B200 and B300 with the exception of the heading).

FIPS-Approved Mode Configuration

Log into the Bomgar Appliance Administrative Interface (e.g. support.example.com/appliance) and configure your settings as described below[23]:

1. Navigate to the **IP Configuration** page under the **Networking** tab (see Figure 12 below).
2. Click the default **169.254.1.1** IP address to edit it.
3. Set the **Telnet Server** setting to **Simplified**.
4. Click the **Save Changes** button to commit these configuration changes.

**Figure 12 – IP Configuration Page**

5. Navigate to the **SSL Configuration** page under the **Security** tab (see Figure 13 below).
6. Disable SSLv2 by ensuring that the **Allow SSLv2** checkbox is cleared.
7. Disable SSLv3 by ensuring that the **Allow SSLv3** checkbox is cleared
8. Ensure that only FIPS-Approved cipher suites are enabled:
   a. TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
   b. TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
9. Click the **Save** button to commit these configuration changes.

---

[23] **NOTE**: The module comes preloaded with a default password. The Crypto-Officer is responsible for changing this password before proceeding with the configuration steps.

Figure 13 – SSL Configuration Page

3.1.5 Firmware/Software Version Verification

To ensure that the modules are running the validated versions of the module Firware and Software, operators should compare the running versions to those documented in this Security Policy. To obtain the version of the Firmware, an operator must visit the **/appliance** site, which is the interface used by the Crypto-Officer. To obtain the software version, an operator must visit the **/login** site, which requires the use of the credentials of the Instance-Admin role. Upon signing in, both display the "Status" page by default, showing the version number ("3.2.2fips (FIPS 140-2) (29180)" and "10.6.2fips (FIPS 140-2) (29326)").

3.2 FIPS Mode Compliance

Any time the modules deviate from the configuration detailed in Section 3.1.4.1 above, the modules will be considered to be in a non-FIPS-Approved mode of operation.

Additionally, the guidance provided below must be followed to ensure that the modules remain in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. Failure to do so will result in non-compliance.

- When entering OR leaving FIPS-Approved mode, navigate to the **Basics** page under the **Status** tab of the **/appliance** interface and clear all existing CSPs by clicking the **Reset Appliance to Factory Defaults** button.

 **NOTE:** All Firmware and Software will be completely uninstalled after reset.

Figure 14 – Status Basics Page

- Never install software or firmware versions other than those listed on the cover page of this security policy. Only the software and firmware versions listed, are considered part of the validated configuration.

- When using the module's administrative interface, do not use the **Advanced Support** page under the **Support** tab of the **/appliance** interface. Doing so will result in non-compliance.

Figure 15 – Advanced Support Page

- Enforce minimum password requirements for the Instance-Admin and Instance-User roles using the **Security** page under the **Management** tab.

Figure 16 – Security Page

- When using the management interface, do not use the **Support** page under the **Management** tab of the /login interface.

Figure 17 – Support Page

- Never install a Bomgar software package via the **Software Management** page under the **Management** tab of the /login interface. Instead, ensure that any received Bomgar software packages are FIPS-Approved, and upload them from the **Updates** page under the **Support** tab of the administrative interface (e.g. support.example.com/appliance). You should always upload updates manually rather than using the auto-update feature. To maintain compliance, only the software update versions listed in this security policy are to be used.

3.3   Crypto-Officer Guidance

The Crypto-Officer can initiate the execution of self-tests and can access the modules' status reporting capability. Self-tests can be initiated at any time by power cycling the modules.

3.3.1 Management

It is the responsibility of the Crypto-Officer to ensure that the modules are set up to run securely. Please refer to Section 3.2 for guidance that the Crypto-Officer must follow for the modules to be considered in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. Additionally, the Crypto-Officers should be careful to protect any secret/private keys in their possession.

For details regarding the management of the modules, please refer to the appropriate Bomgar appliance Administrative User's Guide.

3.3.2 Status Monitoring

Error message and status review is the responsibility of the Crypto-Officer. When any of the modules' self-tests fail, the module reports an error message which can be viewed over a network connection. This connection is set using the **IP Configuration** page under the **Networking** tab as shown in Figure 12 in Section 3.1.4.1. Issuing the command "telnet [ip-address-assigned-to-network-port]" brings up the following options:

1. Show Error Message
2. Shutdown the Device
3. Reboot the Device

4. Reset the Device to Factory Default
5. Done

Issuing the **Show Error Message** command will display the reported error message.

3.3.3 Zeroization

Session keys are zeroized at the termination of the session but are also cleared when the module is power-cycled. All other CSPs may be zeroized by either:

- issuing the **Reset Appliance to Factory Defaults** command (found on the **Basics** page under the **Status** tab) and rebooting the module, or
- selecting the **Reset the Device to Factory Default** option from a telnet session and rebooting the module.

The zeroization of keys and CSPs is immediate, providing insufficient time for an attacker to compromise them. The Crypto-Officer must wait until the module has successfully rebooted in order to verify that zeroization has completed.

3.4 Instance-Admin and Instance-User Guidance

The Instance-Admins do not have the ability to configure sensitive information on the modules, with the exception of the Instance-User and their own passwords. The Instance-Admin has the ability to configure the password strength policy for Instance-Admins and Instance-Users. Please refer to Section 3.2 above for guidance that should be followed for the modules to be considered in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation.

Instance-Users do not have the ability to configure sensitive information on the modules, with the exception of their passwords. The Instance-Admins and Instance-Users shall employ strong passwords that meet or exceed the password strength requirements documented in Section 2.4.6 of this document, and must not reveal their passwords to anyone.

4   Acronyms

This section describes the acronyms used in this document.

Table 9 – Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
AD	Active Directory
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
API	Application Programming Interface
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CFB	Cipher Feedback
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO	Crypto-Officer
CSEC	Communication Security Establishment Canada
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
ECB	Electronic Codebook
EDC	Error Detection Code
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
HDD	Hard Disk Drive
HMAC	(Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol over TLS
IP	Internet Protocol
IPMI	Intelligent Platform Management Interface
KAT	Known Answer Test
LAN	Local Area Network
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LED	Light Emitting Diode
MD5	Message Digest 5
N/A	Not Applicable
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OFB	Output Feedback

Acronym	Definition
PCI	Peripheral Component Interconnect
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standard
POS	Point of Sale
PRNG	Pseudo Random Number Generator
PSS	Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RAID	Redundant Array of Independent Disks
RC4	Rivest Cipher 4
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TDES	Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS	Transport Layer Security
UID	Unit Identifier
USB	Universal Serial Bus
WAN	Wide Area Network

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