

FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY FOR SPECTRAGUARD[®] ENTERPRISE SENSOR

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FIPS 140-2 LEVEL-2 SECURITY POLICY FOR AIRTIGHT NETWORKS' SPECTRAGUARD[®] ENTERPRISE SENSOR

1. Introduction

This document describes the Security Policy for SpectraGuard[®] Enterprise Sensor cryptographic module from AirTight Networks, Inc. The Security Policy specifies the rules under which the module shall operate to meet Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 Level 2 requirements.

FIPS 140-2, *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*, describes the requirements for cryptographic modules. For more information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and the cryptographic module validation process see http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.

2. Module Specification

2.1. Module Specification for C-10: This security policy pertains to the SpectraGuard[®] Enterprise Sensor cryptographic module from AirTight Networks, Inc. The hardware version is SS-300-AT-C-10 and the firmware version is 6.2.39 with Patch 1 (designated as version 6.2.39p1 and hereafter referred to as Module). The Module is multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The Module contains following hardware components: System Processor, Wireless Subsystem, RAM, Flash Memory, Ethernet Network Interface which is POE (Power over Ethernet) capable, Console Interface, LED Interface, Power Inlet, and Pin-hole Reset Button.

The physical embodiment of the Module is shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1

2.2. Module Specification for C-60:


This security policy pertains to the SpectraGuard[®] Enterprise Sensor cryptographic module from AirTight Networks, Inc. The hardware version is SS-300-AT-C-60 and the firmware version is 6.7.U4.48FIPS. The Module is multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The Module contains following hardware components: System Processor, Wireless Subsystem, RAM, Flash Memory, Ethernet Network Interface which is POE (Power over Ethernet) capable, Console Interface, LED Interface, Power Inlet, and Pin-hole Reset Button.

The physical embodiment of the Module is shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2

Figure 3 shows cryptographic boundary for the Module and paths of data, control and status information flow across the cryptographic boundary.



The Module has limited operational environment. The firmware executes on a Linux operating system. Access to the operating system operations is restricted. Key components of the firmware include Command Line Interface (CLI) Application which is responsible for providing services to the User of the Module, Secure Shell (SSH) Server which facilitates access to the CLI Application for remote User, Sensor Application which is responsible for core intrusion detection function of the Module, and Cryptographic Libraries which are used to perform various cryptographic functions in the Module.

In its operation, the Module scans wireless signals using either internal or external antennas. The Module also sniffs traffic on the wired Network Interface to perform correlation between wired and wireless traffic. The Module transmits wireless signals through antennas to perform functions such as probing wireless devices and to disable undesirable wireless communications. The Module also transmits probing packets and packets to disable undesirable communications over the wired Network Interface. The Module reports wireless scanning and wired sniffing information to the Server and is also able to accept commands from the Server for its operation. By virtue of these operations, the Module ensures that wireless communication activity in its proximity complies with the specified security rules.

Ports and Interfaces

Physical ports on the Module and their mapping to FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces are shown in the table below.

Physical Port	FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface
Network Interface	Data input, data output, control input, status output,
	power (POE).
Console Interface	Data output, control input, status output.
Power Inlet	DC power enters via power inlet. It can also enter
	via the Network Interface which is POE (Power
	Over Ethernet) capable.
LEDs	Status output.
Antennas	Data input, data output.
Pin-hole Reset Button	Control input.
USB Port (SS-300 C-	Disabled, NA
60 only)	

Logical Interfaces

Description of logical interfaces on the Module is provided below.

Data Input	Data enters the Module via the antennas (internal or
	external). This data represents wireless transmissions
	detected in the wireless neighborhood of the antennas.

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	Data enters the Module via the Network Interface. This data represents subset of packets traversing the subnet(s) to which the Module's Network Interface is connected.
Data Output	Data exits the Module via the antennas (internal or external). This data represents one or more of (i) wireless- side probing information, and (ii) transmissions used to disable certain wireless communications.
	Data exits the Module via the Network Interface. This data represents one or more of (i) reports about the wireless transmissions detected in the wireless neighborhood of the antennas, (ii) reports about the devices detected on the subnet(s) to which the Module's Network Interface is connected, (iii) wire-side probing information, (iv) transmissions used to block certain communications associated with devices on the subnet(s) where the Network Interface is connected.
	Data also exits the Module via the Console Interface. This data represents (i) reports about the wireless transmissions detected in the wireless neighborhood of the antennas, (ii) reports about the devices detected on the subnet(s) to which the Module's Network Interface is connected.
Control Input	Control input enters the Module via the Network Interface or the Console Interface. This input comprises of information such as network settings, Server discovery settings, status requests, password change, key change, mode change, configuration for wireless scanning, instructions to take actions on specific devices such as

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	probing, disabling etc.
	Control input to reset the Module to factory settings can also enter via the Pin-Hole Reset Button.
Status Output	Status output exits the Module via the Network Interface
	or the Console Interface. This output comprises of
	information such as network settings, version number,
	operation logs, results of self tests, mode of operation,
	and status of other configuration parameters.
	Status output can also exit the Sensor via the LED
	Interface. This Status output consists of information such
	as whether the Module is powered up, status of the
	Module's connectivity to the Server, status of the Wireless
	Subsystem etc.

On any physical port (wherever appropriate) output (data and status) is logically separated from input (data and control) by way of direction of information flow. Data output is logically separated from status output by way of networking protocols and application level identifiers. Data input is logically separated from control input by way of networking protocols and application level identifiers.

Modes of Operation

The Module is able to operate in FIPS (FIPS compliant) and non-FIPS (not compliant with FIPS) modes. Factory default setting is non-FIPS mode. User of the Module has to turn the Module into FIPS mode, whenever FIPS compliant operation is desired. Specific steps to turn the Module into FIPS mode are as follows:

- User logs into the Module over CLI (Command Line Interface). CLI login can be over console cable or SSH
- User invokes the "change mode" service by executing the "set FIPS mode" command to turn on the FIPS mode (after this command is

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executed, the Module reboots and the shared secret key (K) with Server is reset to factory default)

• Manually enters the new shared secret key (K) for secure communication with the Server using "set communication key" command.

Whether the Module is running in FIPS mode or not can be checked by the User by running "get FIPS mode" command over CLI.

In order to turn the Module that is operating in FIPS mode to non-FIPS mode, following steps are required:

- User logs into the Module over CLI
- User invokes the "change mode" service by executing the "set FIPS mode" command to turn off the FIPS mode (after this command is executed, the Module reboots and the shared secret key (K) with Server is reset to factory default)
- Manually enters the new shared secret key (K) for secure communication with the Server using "set communication key" command.

Compliance with FIPS Requirements

The Module meets FIPS 140-2 security requirements as follows.

Security Requirements Section	Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
Finite State Model	2
Physical Security	2
Operational Environment	2
Cryptographic Key Management	2
Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility	2
Self Tests	2
Design Assurance	2
Mitigation of Other Attacks	Not applicable

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3. Security Functions

The various security functions incorporated in the Module are described below.

a) Roles, Authentication, Services

The Module supports User and Crypto Officer roles. The User can access the Module over the Console Interface or the Network Interface. The Crypto Officer role is assumed by the Server when the Module connects to the Server.

User Role

The User accesses the Module over the Console Interface (using console wire) or the Network Interface. Information flowing in the console wire is plaintext. Access over the Network Interface is over SSH. User is authenticated to the Module using a password. Password should be at least 6 characters in length. This results in at least 308,915,776 combinations for the password (computed as 26 raised to the power 6). Thus the possibility of correctly guessing the password is less than 1 in 1,000,000.

The login attempt rate of the User is limited to 1 attempt every 3 seconds. In other words, there can be at most 20 login attempts per minute. This in combination with total possible combinations of the password ensures that multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a one-minute period have probability of success less than one in 100,000.

When the Module is power cycled, the User will have to re-authenticate. That is, the authentication state is forgotten after power cycle. When the Module is reset to factory default, the password for the User defaults to factory setting. The User password is not reset upon entering or exiting FIPS mode.

Crypto Officer can change User password when the Module is properly connected to the Server.

Crypto Officer Role

Server assumes the role of Crypto Officer when the Module connects to it. The Crypto officer accesses the Module over the 128 bit AES-CBC encrypted tunnel. The Crypto Officer authenticates to the Module using a shared secret key

(referred herein as key K) which is 128 bit in length. Since there are 2^{128} combinations for the key, the possibility of correctly guessing the key is less than 1 in 1,000,000.

The key K is manually entered in the Module by the User. Crypto Officer can change the key K when the Module is properly connected to the Server.

The authentication is mutual authentication between the Module and the Server using challenge/response procedure. Each side sends a random challenge to the other side. The other side encrypts the challenge with key K using AES-CBC encryption and sends encrypted response to the issuing side. The issuing side decrypts the response to verify that originally issued challenge is found therein. The authentication attempt rate is limited to 1 attempt every 2 minutes.

When the Module is power cycled, the Crypto Officer will have to re-authenticate. That is, the authentication state is forgotten after power cycle. When the Module is reset to factory defafult, the shared secret key K defaults to factory setting. It will also be reset to factory default (zeroized) upon entering and exiting the FIPS mode of operation for the Module.

The following table summarizes strength of authentication for User and Crypto Officer roles.

Role	Auth. Credentials	Minimum Length	Maximum Length	Strength per Attempt	Strength per Minute
User	Password	6 characters	Unrestricted	Probability of success less than 1 in 308,915,776	Probability of success less than 1 in 15,445,788
Crypto Officer	Кеу	128 bits	128 bits	Probability of success is 1 in 2 ¹²⁸	Probability of success is 1 in 2 ¹²⁸

The services available to the User and the Crypto Officer are shown in the table below.

Service	User	Crypto Officer	Description
Login	Yes	No	Log into the Module to access CLI (Command Line Interface).
Operational settings	Yes	Yes	Configure operational settings such as network settings, wireless settings etc.
Change mode	Yes	No	Change mode of operation of the Module between FIPS and non-FIPS.
Change shared secret key (K)	Yes	Yes	Change shared secret key (K) used between the Module and the Server.
Change User password	Yes	Yes	Change password used to authenticate the User.
View self test result	Yes	No	Check result of self tests.
Perform on-demand self test (same as Reboot)	Yes	Yes	Perform self tests/reboot the Module.
Reset factory defaults (same as Zeroize)	Yes	No	Restore the Module to factory default state.
Show status	Yes	Yes	View status of operation of the Module.

b) Controlling Access to the Module for the First time

When the User turns the Module into FIPS mode, the User is required to change the shared secret key (K) from its factory default value. The User is required to put tamper resistant labels on the Module before installation. The User should also change the password from factory default value.

c) Encryption/Decryption

Various encryption/decryption functions are described below:

c.1) Communication with Server

Certain data output going out of the Network Interface of the Module and directed to the Server is encrypted. The control input from Server (Server commands) is also encrypted, and so is the status output from the Module to the Server.

Derivation and Transport of Session Key (SK)

After successful mutual authentication, the session key (SK) is randomly generated by the Server and transported to the Module encrypted by the key K using AES-CBC encryption. The session key is 128 bits in length.

Derivation of Message Encryption and Authentication Keys (MAK, MEK)

The message encryption key (MEK) and message authentication key (MAK) are derived via HMAC-SHA-1 of predetermined text using the session key SK as the secret key. The MEK is 128 bits in length and the MAK is 160 bits in length. The MAK is used for per-message HMAC-SHA-1 authentication and the MEK is used for per-message AES-CBC encryption between the Module and the Server. There is different pair of (MAK, MEK) in each direction – Module to Server and Server to Module. These key derivation procedures are in compliance with NIST Special Publication 800-108, *Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions*, October 2009.

Shared Secret Key (K) Management

After the User turns the Module into FIPS mode, the User is required to change the K from its factory default setting. The key K resets to factory default (zeroized) upon entering or existing the FIPS mode. The User has to manually input the new value of key K is the Module. During such times as the Module is properly connected to the Server, the shared secret key (K) can be electronically changed by the Server. The new key travels within AES tunnel from the Server to the Module. The User is required to zeroize the shared secret key either by resetting the module to factory default or by exiting the FIPS mode at such times as the Module is to be discarded. The plaintext key K is never outputted from the Module.

c.2) Data Output via Antennas

Payload of some wireless-side probing information transmitted from antennas is encrypted using 128 bit AES-CBC encryption using the MEK (from Module to Server) described above.

c.3) SSH Server

SSH server is used to support remote access for the User role. In FIPS mode, it uses following cryptographic algorithms: RSA (1024 bit) for host authentication, Diffie-Helman for key agreement (using Oakley DH Group 2 which uses a public key of size 1024 bits), AES-CBC for encryption, and HMAC-SHA-1 for message integrity. The SSH server authenticates the client using password.

The RSA public/private key pair for host authentication is randomly generated when the module is first booted, and thereafter on entering or exiting FIPS mode, or on reset to factory defaults. The Diffie-Hellman key agreement messages described below are digitally signed with RSA private key by the SSH Server. The RSA private key is never output from the Module.

The Diffie-Hellman key agreement procedure is used to first arrive at a common key between the SSH Server and the SSH Client. The common key is then used to derive message authentication key (160 bits long) and message encryption key (128 bits long) for the SSH session. The message authentication key is used for HMAC-SHA-1 integrity protection and the message encryption key is AES-CBC message encryption for messages sent in SSH session.

d) Summary of Passwords, Keys and Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)

Passwords, keys and CSPs used in the Module are summarized below, along with access control to them. The "read" access ("R") means ability to read value, the "write" ("W") access means ability to change value (including zeroization/reset to factory default and deletion), and the "execute" ("E") access means ability to use value for performing some function in obtaining a specific service.

Password/	Description	Access to Password
Key/		(U: User, CO: Crypto Officer;
CSP		Access right denoted in
		parentheses)
User Password	Used to authenticate the User.	"Change User password"
	Password should be at least 6	service: U (W), CO (W).
	characters in length. The User	"Reset factory defaults"
	password may be shared	service: U (W).
	between non-FIPS and FIPS	"Login" service: U (E).
	modes. The password is stored	
	in hashed form in non-volatile	
	memory.	
Shared Secret	Used to authenticate the	"Change shared secret key
Key (K)	Server. This key is 128 bits in	(K)" service: U (W), CO (W).
	length. It cannot be shared	"Change mode" and "Reset to
	between non-FIPS and FIPS	factory defaults" services: U
	modes. This key is stored in	(W).
	plaintext in non-volatile	
	memory, and is zeroized (reset	
	to factory default) upon	
	entering/exiting FIPS mode or	
	reset to factory default. The key	

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	K is never output from the Module.	
Session key (SK)	The key SK is used to derive encryption and authentication key pairs (MEK, MAK) for communication between the Module and the Server. The key SK is 128 bits in length and it cannot be shared between non-FIPS and FIPS modes. It is stored in plaintext in volatile memory. It is deleted upon termination of the session between the Module and the Server, power cycle, reboot, entering/exiting FIPS mode, or reset to factory default. The key SK is never output from the Module.	"Reboot" service: U (W), CO (W). "Change mode" and "Reset to factory defaults" services: U (W).
Outbound and Inbound Message Authentication Keys (MAKs)	The key MAK is used for authentication of messages between the Module and the Server. There is a different key MAK in outbound and inbound direction. Each key MAK is 160 bits in length. These keys cannot be shared between non- FIPS and FIPS modes. They are stored in plaintext in volatile memory, and are deleted upon	"Device settings", "Change shared secret key (K)", "Change User password", "Reboot", and "Show status" services: CO (E). "Reboot" service: U (W), CO (W). "Change mode" and "Reset to factory defaults" services: U (W).

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Outbound and Inbound Message Encryption Keys (MEKs)	termination of the session between the Module and the Server, power cycle, reboot, entering/exiting FIPS mode, or reset to factory default. These keys are never output from the Module. The key MEK is used for encryption of messages between the Module and the Server. There is a different key MEK in outbound and inbound direction. Each key MEK is 128 bits in length. These keys cannot be shared between non- FIPS and FIPS modes. They are stored in plaintext in volatile memory, and are deleted upon termination of the session between the Module and the Server, power cycle, reboot, entering/exiting FIPS mode, or	"Device settings", "Change shared secret key (K)", "Change User password", "Reboot", and "Show status" services: CO (E). "Reboot" service: U (W), CO (W). "Change mode" and "Reset to factory defaults" services: U (W).
	entering/exiting FIPS mode, or reset to factory default. These keys are never output from the Module.	
RSA Private Key for SSH Server	This is the private key component of the RSA key pair which is used for host authentication in SSH. The RSA private key is 1024 bits in	"Login" service over SSH: U (E) for private key. "Change mode" and "Reset to factory defaults" services: U (W).

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	length. It cannot be shared	
	between non-FIPS and FIPS	
	modes. This key is stored in	
	plaintext in non-volatile	
	memory. The RSA key pair is	
	generated when the Module is	
	first booted, and thereafter on	
	entering or exiting FIPS mode,	
	or on reset to factory default.	
	The RSA private key is never	
	output from the Module.	
		"Login" service over SSH: U (E)
Diffie-Hellman	This is the private key	for private key.
Private Key for	component of the Diffie-	"Reboot" service: U (W), CO
SSH Server	Hellman key pair which is	(W).
	generated and used for key	"Change mode" and "Reset to
	agreement at the time of	factory defaults" services: U
	establishment of SSH session.	(W).
	The Diffie-Hellman private key	(**).
	is 1024 bits in length. This key	
	cannot be shared between non-	
	FIPS and FIPS modes. It is	
	stored in plaintext in volatile	
	memory. This key is deleted	
	upon termination of the SSH	
	session, power cycle, reboot,	
	entering/exiting FIPS mode, or	
	reset to factory default. The	
	Diffie-Hellman private key is	
	never output from the Module.	
	The key establishment	

		1
	methodology provides 80 bits	
	of encryption strength.	
SSH per- session message authentication keys (outbound and inbound)	There is one 160-bit key for message authentication in each direction in the SSH session. These keys cannot be shared between non-FIPS and FIPS modes. They are stored in plaintext in volatile memory. These keys are generated at the time of SSH session establishment. They are deleted upon termination of the SSH session, power cycle, reboot, entering/exiting FIPS mode, or reset to factory default. These keys are never output from the Module.	All User services when obtained over SSH: U (E). "Reboot" service: U (W), CO (W). "Change mode" and "Reset to factory defaults" services: U (W).
SSH per- session message encryption keys (outbound and inbound)	There is one 128-bit key for message encryption in each direction in the SSH session. These keys cannot be shared between non-FIPS and FIPS modes. They are stored in plaintext in volatile memory. These keys are generated at the time of SSH session establishment. They are deleted upon termination of the SSH session, power cycle,	All User services when obtained over SSH: U (E). "Reboot" service: U (W), CO (W). "Change mode" and "Reset to factory defaults" services: U (W).

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	reboot, entering/exiting FIPS mode, or reset to factory default. These keys are never output from the Module.	
Seed and Seed Key	Seed (128 bits) and seed key (256 bits) are used for random number generation. Random number generator obtains its seed and seed key by reading bytes from the /dev/urandom device. Seed and seed key cannot be shared between non- FIPS and FIPS modes. The seed and the seed key are stored in volatile memory in plaintext. They are deleted from memory on power cycle, reboot, entering/exiting FIPS mode, or reset to factory default. Seed and seed key are never output from the Module.	"Reboot" service: U (W), CO (W). "Change mode" and "Reset to factory defaults" services: U (W).

Public Keys:

The following public keys are used in the Module in FIPS mode:

 RSA Public Key for SSH Server (1024 bits): It is the public key counterpart of the private key used for host authentication in SSH. It cannot be shared between non-FIPS and FIPS modes. This key is stored in plaintext in nonvolatile memory. The RSA key pair is generated when the Module is first booted, and thereafter on entering or exiting FIPS mode, or on reset to factory default. It is output from the Module to the SSH client, when the client attempts connection to the SSH server in the Module.

Diffie-Hellman Public Key for SSH Server (1024 bits): It is the public key component of the private key used for key agreement at the time of establishment of SSH session. It cannot be shared between non-FIPS and FIPS modes. This key is stored in plaintext in volatile memory. It is deleted upon termination of the SSH session, power cycle, reboot, entering/exiting FIPS mode, or reset to factory default. It is output from the Module to the SSH client, when the client attempts connection to the SSH server in the Module.

Additional Keys:

The following additional keys are used in FIPS mode. They are not considered CSPs.

- When a new User password is set by the Crypto Officer through the Sensor-Server communication tunnel, in addition to the AES message encryption key (MEK) used to protect all data sent through the tunnel, the new password is also ciphered by a fixed factory-defined 128 bit AES key. This factory-defined ciphering key cannot be changed or zeroized. For FIPS 140-2 purposes, this additional ciphering is considered equivalent to plaintext.
- Some wire-side probing information contains ciphered information which is considered equivalent to plaintext. The keys used for this ciphering process are derived using proprietary techniques.

e) Summary of Cryptographic Algorithms

The Module implements the following FIPS approved or allowed algorithms.

Algorithm	Validation Certificate	Firmware Version	Usage	Keys/CSPs
AES	#1310 #2609	6.2.39p1 6.7.U4.48FIPS	Encrypt/decrypt	Shared secret key (K), message encryption key (MEK), SSH per-session message encryption key
SHA-1	#1199 #2193	6.2.39p1 6.7.U4.48FIPS	Hashing	None
HMAC-SHA-1	#763 #1617	6.2.39p1 6.7.U4.48FIPS	Message integrity, key derivation	Shared secret key (K), session key (SK), message authentication key (MAK), SSH per- session message authentication key
RSA	#628 #1335	6.2.39p1 6.7.U4.48FIPS	Digital signature	RSA private key
PRNG	#732 #1235	6.2.39p1 6.7.U4.48FIPS	Random number generation	Seed and seed key
Diffie-Hellman	Non- approved, but allowed	6.2.39p1 6.7.U4.48FIPS	Key establishment	Diffie-Hellman keys

The module also implements the following algorithms for ciphering of certain information (which is considered equivalent to plaintext) mentioned above.

Algorithm	Usage	Keys
AES	Cipher/de-cipher	Password ciphering key and probing information ciphering key

4. Self Tests

The Module always reboots when FIPS mode is entered. At boot time, firmware integrity check is done using MD5 checksum of the firmware.

Algorithm	Test
MD5	Firmware integrity

If the firmware integrity test passes, the Module performs following power-up self tests:

Algorithm	Test
AES	КАТ
RSA	КАТ
PRNG	KAT
HMAC-SHA-1	KAT
SHA-1	КАТ

If any of the above tests fails, the Module goes to the Error State.

During operation, the module performs following conditional self tests:

Algorithm	Test
RSA	Pairwise consistency
PRNG	Continuous

If any of the above tests fails, the Module enters the Error State.

In the Error State, the Module does not output any data on the Data Output interface. The results of the above tests can be viewed by the User by accessing the Module over the Console Interface.

When the User attempts changing the shared secret key (K), manual key entry test is performed. If the test succeeds, new key is accepted. Else, new key is rejected.

Algorithm	Test
	Manual key entry

It is also possible to perform on-demand self test by rebooting the Module.

5. Physical Security

The Module is made from production-grade components, which are encased within an opaque, hard, production-grade enclosure. The Module meets commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, shock and vibration.

Tamper resistant labels:

The tamper labels shall be applied for the Module to operate in a FIPS approved mode of operation. There are in total 13 labels, which shall be applied on the Module as shown in the following Figures 3, 4, and 5. Before applying the labels, it is recommended that the surface of the Module which will receive the labels be cleaned with dry cloth or tissue paper. The labels should be applied to keep about 2 mm ventilation openings as shown in the Figures.

The Module must be periodically inspected by the User for evidence of tampering, at least once every three months.

Customers can order the tamper resistant labels from the vendor (part number SS-FIPS-TPL). They may order 13 labels per Sensor unit and may also order spare. User is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused labels.

FRONT Dewer LABEL 10 LABEL 9 2 mm L L 9 5 5 A A В В AirTight Е Е ((4)) L L 13 11 ((φ)) LABEL 12 LABEL 8

Tamper Resistant Lables for C-10:






Figure 5

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SIDES







Tamper Resistant Lables for C-60

FRONT:



Figure 7

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BACK:



Figure 8

SIDES:



Figure 9

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