

Stanley Wi-Q
Communication Server
Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-2 Security Policy

Prepared for:
UL/CMVP

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This document is non-proprietary

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Revision History

| Version | Release Date | Description of Change |
|----------------|---------------------|--|
| 1 | 05/07/2012 | Initial Release |
| 2 | 05/24/2012 | Added Windows Server 2008 to tables 2 & 3. Added Table 6 Access Rights. Added CSCM software version to Introduction section. |
| 3 | 06/19/2012 | Modified Roles section. Modified Service Inputs and Outputs table 5. Modified Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters section. |
| 4 | 06/22/2012 | Modified Physical Security section. |
| 5 | 02/26/2013 | Modified Physical Security section. Modified Services section and Service Inputs and Outputs table 5. Modified Power-Up Tests section. Removed Conditional Tests section. Removed Critical Function Tests section. |
| 6 | 04/18/2013 | Modified Module and Algorithms References table 2 and references to certification numbers. Modified FIPS 140-2 Configurations table 3. Added SHA-1 KAT to power up self tests section. |
| 7 | 09/30/2013 | Removed references to non-approved algorithms. Updated Table 2 Split Table 3 in to 3a and 3b. |



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1 Introduction

This document defines the security policies of the Stanley Wi-Q Communications Server Cryptographic Module, referred to as the CSCM for simplicity.

FIPS140-2 Stanley WiQ Communication Server software version tested: 3.0.27

2 Cryptographic Module Specification

The CSCM is a software solution that provides secure key retrieval and key transfer functions within the Stanley Wi-Q Wireless Access Control System.

| Security Component | Security Level |
|---|----------------|
| Cryptographic Module Specification | 1 |
| Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces | 1 |
| Roles, Services, and Authentication | 1 |
| Finite State Model | 1 |
| Operational Environment | 1 |
| Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters | 1 |
| Physical Security | N/A |
| EMI/EMC | 1 |
| Self-Tests | 1 |
| Design Assurance | 1 |
| Mitigation of Other Attacks | N/A |

Table 1. Module Security Levels

2.1 Description of Approved Mode

Prior to operation, RSAENH.dll (Microsoft Windows) must be put into the approved mode of operation. In order to ensure that RSAENH.dll is running in the approved mode, follow the instructions provided in the Security Policies for the respective Windows Operating Systems. The CMVP certificate numbers can be found in tables 3a and 3b.

Once RSAENH.dll is running in the approved mode of operation, the CSCM must be configured to run in Approved mode only, by means of a configuration application “WiQAdminApp.exe”. The module does not support switching to any Non-Approved modes once in operation. Once the module has been configured to run in Approved mode, it is placed into operation by starting the CSCM service. Once the service successfully completes its power-on self-tests, it is considered operational and running in Approved mode. Approved mode is indicated by the following status messages within the system:

Log File Indicator – “FIPS 140 Mode is True” log file audit

Non-FIPS FIPS configuration application “WiQConfigurator.exe” – “(FIPS140)” title bar



2.2 Supported Algorithms

The following algorithms are supported by the CSCM. The algorithms are provided by the RSAENH.DLL validated to FIPS 140-2 under the certificates below.

| CMVP Module Description | Operating system / CMVP Cert. Number | Approved Algorithms / CAVP Cert. Number | Other Algorithms |
|--|---|---|---|
| RSAENH.DLL Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider | Windows Server 2008 Cert. #1010 | AES (Cert. #739); DRBG (vendor affirmed); HMAC (Cert. #408); RSA (Certs. #353 and #355); SHS (Cert. #753); Triple-DES (Cert. #656) | RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 80 and 150 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 80 bits of encryption strength) |

Table 2. FIPS 140-2 Module and Algorithm References



2.3 Description of Cryptographic Boundary

The Stanley CSCM is a software only product, but for the purposes of the FIPS 140-2 validation, it is considered a multiple-chip standalone module. The logical cryptographic boundary is defined by the executable application file (WiQCommSvc.exe), the supporting libraries (WiQCommCore.dll, WiQPortal.dll, & WiQPortalServiceClient.dll), and Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH.dll). RSAENH.dll is a previously validated FIPS 140-2 module (Certs. #989, #1002, #1010, #1012, #1330, and #1337). The physical embodiment is the general purpose computer or hardware appliance on which the CSCM operates. The physical cryptographic boundary contains the general purpose computing hardware of the system executing the application. This system hardware includes the central processing unit(s), cache and main memory (RAM), system bus, and peripherals including disk drives and other permanent mass storage devices, network interface cards, keyboard, and any terminal devices.

The module was tested and found to be compliant with the FIPS 140-2 requirements on the following platforms:

| Operating Environment | Communication Server | RSAENH.DLL |
|----------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|
| Windows Server 2008, SP2** | Software Version 3.0.27 | Reference CMVP Cert. #1010** |

Table 3a. FIPS 140-2 Tested Configurations

** CMVP Certificate #1010 was tested on version Windows Server 2008 (which is Windows Server 2008 SP 1 at release date), while the Stanley Communication Server Cryptographic Module was tested on Windows Server 2008 SP2. The testing laboratory affirms that the differences between the two service packs do not interfere with the correct operation of the module.

Stanley Security Solutions affirms that the module also executes (as described in this security policy) on the following operating systems:

| Operating Environment | Communication Server | RSAENH.DLL |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| Windows XP Professional, SP3 | Software Version 3.0.27 | Reference CMVP Cert. #989 |
| Windows Vista (Ultimate), SP1 | | Reference CMVP Cert. #1002 |
| Windows Server 2003, SP2 | | Reference CMVP Cert. #1012 |
| Windows 7 Ultimate Edition | | Reference CMVP Cert. #1330 |
| Windows Server 2008 (R2) | | Reference CMVP Cert. #1337 |

Table 3b. FIPS 140-2 Vendor Affirmed Configurations

The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when ported and executed in an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.

2.4 Block Diagram

Cryptographic Boundaries of Stanley Wi-Q Access Control Management module




Figure 1. Block Diagram



3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces

The CSCM provides the following ports and interfaces:

| CSCM Module | | |
|----------------------|---|-----------------|
| Ports and Interfaces | | |
| Interface | Logical | Physical |
| Data Input | | |
| | Data read from Access Control database | GPC Disk |
| | Data received via Secure TCP from an external AMS Portal Gateway (PG) | Ethernet Port |
| | Data read from a configuration file | GPC Disk |
| Data Output | | |
| | Data written to Access Control Database | GPC Disk |
| | Data sent via Secure TCP to an external AMS Portal Gateway (PG) | Ethernet Port |
| | | |
| Control Input | | |
| | Data read from Access Control database | GPC Hard Disk |
| | Data received via Secure TCP from an external AMS Portal Gateway (PG) | Ethernet Port |
| | Data read from a configuration file | GPC Hard Disk |
| Status Output | | |
| | Log Files | GPC Hard Disk |
| | Data written to Access Control Database | GPC Hard Disk |
| Power Input | NA | PC Power Supply |

Table 4. Ports and Interfaces



4 Roles and Services

4.1 Roles

The CSCM supports two distinct roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The CO is the individual(s) responsible for creating and managing cryptographic keys through the key life cycle, while the User is the individual(s) who retrieves data encryption keys and uses them for secure communications. Assumption of roles is defined by selection of services in a Level 1 device. Roles are assumed by the selection of the services.

4.2 Services

- SSL session key negotiation - Negotiate secure SSL communications with Portal Gateway
- Secure data transmission – WCF SSL method calls with Portal Gateway
- Show status - Log file indicating approved mode status
- Self-test – SHA-1 Software integrity and SHA-1 KAT tests executed at startup.
- Database interaction - SQL calls to interact with the database

4.3 Service Inputs and Outputs

The CSCM roles are assumed by the selection of the following services:

| Service | user | CO | data input | data output | status output |
|-------------------------------------|------|----|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| SSL session key negotiation | | x | none | none | pass/fail |
| secure data transmission encryption | x | | none | SSL encrypted | pass/fail |
| secure data transmission decryption | x | | SSL encrypted | none | pass/fail |
| show status | x | | none | none | plaintext |
| self-tests | x | | none | none | pass/fail |
| database interaction | x | | encrypted | encrypted | plaintext |

Table 5. Service Inputs and Outputs



5 Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters

The CSCM provides secure management of the following CSPs:

- Segment Keypad Key (AES Encrypted session key)
- Segment Credential Key (AES Encrypted session key)
- SSL Certificate (AES Encrypted SSL information)
- SHA1 Software Integrity HASH (AES Encrypted)
- AES HardCoded Key

| CSP | CO Role - Access Rights | User Role - Access Rights |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| Segment Keypad Key | read only | read only |
| Segment Credential Key | read only | read only |
| SSL Certificate | read only | read only |
| SHA1 Software Integrity HASH | read only | read only |
| AES HardCoded Key | read only | read only |

Table 6. Access Rights

5.1 AES Keypad & Credential Key

These keys (Segment Sign-On keys) are input and AES encrypted using a (non-FIPS) configuration application. The CSCM retrieves AES encrypted session keys, AES decrypts, and wraps in SSL tunnel to deliver to the external Portal Gateway devices for use in the secure wireless communication.

5.2 SSL Certificates

The certificates are generated using a (non-FIPS) configuration application. The CSCM retrieves AES encrypted certificates, AES decrypts, and uses the certificates to negotiate secure SSL communications.



6 Physical Security

The CSCM is a software only module and as such, the physical security is accomplished by installation of the software on a GPC. The GPC physical security is accomplished by production grade components.

Self – Tests

6.1 Power-Up Tests

Upon user assumption of role or manual re-start the CSCM performs known-answer tests for the following cryptographic functions:

- SHA-1 Software Integrity Test
- SHA-1 KAT

Upon successful completion of the power-up self-tests; the following is output to the log file:
“FIPS 140 Mode is True”

If power-up self-tests do not complete successfully, the following is output to the log file:
“Self Test Failed. Stopping Service”. Then the module will exit.

In addition to the self-tests described above, the RSAENH.dll cryptographic module performs its own self-tests as described in the security policies associated with the RSAENH.dll Module (reference Tables 3a and 3b).

7 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The CSCM does not mitigate any attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2