nuvoTon

NUVOTON
TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION

8 HASADNAOT STREET

HERZLIA, 46130

ISRAEL

NPCT6XX TPM 1.2

FIPS 140-2 SECURITY POLICY

DOCUMENT VERSION: 3.7

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1. MODULE DESCRIPTION

Nuvoton Trusted Platform Module ("MODULE") is a hardware cryptographic module that implements advanced cryptographic algorithms, including symmetric and asymmetric cryptography; as well as key generation and random number generation.

The Module is a SINGLE CHIP MODULE that provides cryptographic services utilized by external applications. The Module meets requirements of FIPS Pub 140-2.

The module meets commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, shock, and vibrations.

The FIPS 140-2 conformance testing was performed on two platforms specified below

NUVOTON NPCT6XX TPM 1.2

FIRMWARE VERSION: 5.81.0.0

HARDWARE VERSION 1: FB5C85D IN TSSOP28 PACKAGE

HARDWARE VERSION 2: FB5C85D IN QFN32 PACKAGE

HARDWARE VERSION 3: FB5C85D IN TSSOP28 PACKAGE

HARDWARE VERSION 4: FB5C85E IN QFN32 PACKAGE

Images depicting the Module are provided on the next page.

FIGURE 1: TPM 1.2 IMAGES

FB5C85D IN TSSOP28 PACKAGE



FB5C85D IN QFN32 PACKAGE



FB5C85E IN TSSOP28 PACKAGE



FB5C85E IN QFN32 PACKAGE



The PHYSICAL CRYPTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY of the Module is the outer boundary of the chip packaging.

A LOGICAL DIAGRAM of the Module is provided on the next page.




FIGURE 2: TPM 1.2 LOGICAL BLOCK DIAGRAM

The Module was tested to meet OVERALL SECURITY LEVEL 1 of the FIPS PUB 140-2 standard. The Security Level as per each section of FIPS PUB 140-2 is specified in the table on the next page.

TABLE 1: SECURITY LEVELS

FIPS 140-2 SECTION	SECURITY LEVEL
CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION	1
CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PORTS AND INTERFACES	1
ROLES, SERVICES AND AUTHENTICATION	1
FINITE STATE MODEL	1
PHYSICAL SECURITY	1
OPERATING ENVIRONMENT	N/A
CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT	1
EMI/EMC	1
SELF-TESTS	1
DESIGN ASSURANCE	1
MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS	N/A

2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONS

The cryptographic functions of the Module are outlined in the table below.

TABLE 2: CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONS

FUNCTION	KEYSIZE	USE	CERT NUMBER
APPROVED FUNCTIONS			
AES ENCRYPT MODES: ECB, CTR	128 вітѕ	ENCRYPTION	3093
RSA VERIFY	1024 & 2048 BITS	DIGITAL SIGNATURE VERIFICATION	1582
HMAC KEYED HASH HMAC-SHA-1	160 вітѕ	KEYED MESSAGE DIGEST	1938
SHS HASH	N/A	MESSAGE DIGEST	2554
GENERATION OF RSA KEYS FIPS 186-4	2048	KEY PAIR GENERATION	1582
FIPS 186-2 RNG	N/A	RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION	1315

		& SYMMETRIC KEY GENERATION	
Approved Services			
CVL SP 800-135 REV1	N/A	TPM KEY DERIVATION	373
ALLOWED FOR USE FUNCTION	S		
RSA KEY WRAPPING	2048 BITS	WRAP & UNWRAP SYMMETRIC KEYS	N/A
HARDWARE-BASED NON-APPROVED NON-DETERMINISTIC RNG (ENTROPY SOURCE).	N/A	GENERATE SEED & THE SEED KEY FOR THE RNG	N/A

In the Approved mode of operation the Module supports key size of 2048 bits for RSA key wrapping, which corresponds to the effective key strength of 112 bits.

The module supports key wrapping using the AES algorithm.

Note: no TPM protocol has been used or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

2.1 Non-Approved Non-Allowed Functions

The Module supports signature generation using RSA-SHA-1 which is used in the TPM IDENTITY service. This function is Non-Approved and is considered equivalent to plaintext or obfuscation.

3. PORTS AND INTERFACES

The physical ports of the Module are

- LPC Bus
- SPI Bus
- I2C Bus
- GPIO Bus

The logical interfaces and the mapping of the logical interfaces to the physical ports of the Module are described in the table below.

TABLE 3: PORTS AND INTERFACES

LOGICAL INTERFACE	DESCRIPTION	PHYSICAL PORTS
CONTROL INPUT INTERFACE	CONTROL INPUT COMMANDS ISSUED TO THE CHIP	LPC BUS SPI BUS 12C BUS GPIO BUS
STATUS OUTPUT INTERFACE	STATUS DATA OUTPUT BY THE	LPC BUS SPI BUS I2C BUS GPIO BUS
DATA INPUT INTERFACE	DATA PROVIDED TO THE CHIP AS PART OF THE DATA PROCESSING COMMANDS	LPC BUS SPI BUS 12C BUS GPIO BUS
DATA OUTPUT INTERFACE	DATA OUTPUT BY THE CHIP A PART OF THE DATA PROCESSING COMMANDS	LPC Bus SPI Bus I2C Bus GPIO Bus

Power	POWER INTERFACE OF THE	POWER PIN
INTERFACE	CHIP	GROUND PIN

The Module does not include a maintenance interface.

4 ROLES AND SERVICES

The OPERATOR ROLES implemented by the module are summarized in the table below.

TABLE 4: ROLES

ROLE	HIGH LEVEL DESCRIPTION
CRYPTO OFFICER	INSTALLS AND CONFIGURES THE PRODUCT AND MANAGES USERS
USER	EXECUTES CRYPTO ALGORITHMS AND GENERATES KEYS

The Module provides a set of SERVICES described in the table on the next page. For each service the table includes a description of the service, as well as lists roles in which the service is available.

TABLE 5: SERVICES

SERVICE	DESCRIPTION	ROLE
GET STATUS	THE MODULE IMPLEMENTS A GET STATUS COMMAND THAT RETURNS THE STATUS OF THE MODULE, INCLUDING SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF SELF-TESTS.	CRYPTO OFFICER
RUN SELF-TESTS	THE MODULE RUNS POWER-UP SELF-TESTS AUTOMATICALLY WHEN POWERED ON. ONE CAN EXECUTE SELF-TESTS ON DEMAND BY POWER-CYCLING THE MODULE.	CRYPTO OFFICER
ENCRYPT	USED TO ENCRYPT DATA	USER
ZEROIZE	USED TO ZEROIZE (IRREVERSIBLY DESTROY) MODULE'S CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS AND CSPS. THE KEYS AND CSPS STORED IN THE NON- VOLATILE AND VOLATILE MEMORY ARE ZEROIZED BY EXECUTING THE CORRESPONDING KEY/ENTITY ZEROIZATION COMMANDS:	CRYPTO OFFICER
	TPM_FLUSHSPECIFICTPM_OWNERCLEAR	
MAC & MAC VERIFY	USED TO CALCULATE AND VERIFY MAC FOR DATA	USER
KEY GENERATE	USED TO GENERATE KEYS	USER
RSA VERIFY	USED TO VERIFY DATA USING RSA	USER
RSA WRAP & UNWRAP	USED TO WRAP & UNWRAP CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS USING RSA	USER

KEY IMPORT	USED TO IMPORT KEYS	USER
TPM IDENTITY	USED TO AUTHENTICATE TPM IDENTITY TO OTHER PARTIES	USER
TPM ENDORSEMENT	USED TO PROVE TO OTHER PARTIES THAT TPM IS A GENUINE TPM	USER
Unbinding	USED TO UNBIND SYMMETRIC KEYS USING RSA PRIVATE BINDING KEY	USER
TPM GET RANDOM	USED TO GENERATE RANDOM DATA	USER
TPM STIR RANDOM	USED TO ADD ENTROPY TO THE RANDOM BIT GENERATOR	USER
INSTALL MODULE	INSTALLS MODULE	CRYPTO OFFICER
FIRMWARE UPDATE	UPDATES MODULE'S FIRMWARE	CRYPTO OFFICER

5. KEY MANAGEMENT

The table below specifies each cryptographic key utilized by the Module. For each key the table provides a description of its use; derivation or import; and storage.

NOTE: **READ** is defined as read access; **WRITE** is defined as write access.

TABLE 6: CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS

AES USED TO ENCRYPT ENCRYPT GENERATED OR SYMMETRIC DATA READ IMPORTED BY THE MODULE, STORED IN KEYS KEY GEN OTP OR IN NON- WRITE VOLATILE FLASH IN PLAINTEXT KEY WRAP/UNWRAP WRITE KEY IMPORT WRITE ZEROIZE WRITE			SERVICE & ACCESS	ORIGIN & STORAGE
ENCRYPTION KEYS KEY GEN WRITE VOLATILE FLASH IN PLAINTEXT KEY WRAP/UNWRAP WRITE KEY IMPORT WRITE ZEROIZE	AES	USED TO ENCRYPT	ENCRYPT	GENERATED OR
KEYS KEY GEN WRITE VOLATILE FLASH IN PLAINTEXT KEY WRAP/UNWRAP WRITE KEY IMPORT WRITE ZEROIZE	SYMMETRIC	DATA	READ	IMPORTED BY THE
WRITE VOLATILE FLASH IN PLAINTEXT KEY WRAP/UNWRAP WRITE KEY IMPORT WRITE ZEROIZE	ENCRYPTION			Module, Stored in
PLAINTEXT KEY WRAP/UNWRAP WRITE KEY IMPORT WRITE ZEROIZE	KEYS		KEY GEN	OTP OR IN NON-
KEY WRAP/UNWRAP WRITE KEY IMPORT WRITE ZEROIZE			WRITE	VOLATILE FLASH IN
WRAP/UNWRAP WRITE KEY IMPORT WRITE ZEROIZE				PLAINTEXT
WRITE KEY IMPORT WRITE ZEROIZE			KEY	
KEY IMPORT WRITE ZEROIZE			WRAP/UNWRAP	
WRITE Zeroize			WRITE	
ZEROIZE			KEY IMPORT	
			WRITE	
WRITE			ZEROIZE	
			WRITE	

USED TO VERIFY		GENERATED OR
SIGNATURES ON	READ	IMPORTED BY THE
DATA		Module, Stored in
		VOLATILE RAM OR IN
		NON-VOLATILE FLASH
	WRITE	IN PLAINTEXT
	ZEROIZE	
	WRITE	
	KEY	
	WRAP/UNWRAP	
	WRITE	
	Key Import	
	WRITE	
USED TO WRAP	RSA	GENERATED OR
SYMMETRIC KEYS	WRAP/UNWRAP	IMPORTED BY THE
	READ	Module, Stored in
		VOLATILE RAM OR IN NON-VOLATILE FLASH
	KEY IMPORT	IN PLAINTEXT
	WRITE	
	RSA KEY GEN	
	WRITE	
	WRITE Zeroize	
	DATA USED TO WRAP	KEY GEN WRITE ZEROIZE WRITE KEY WRAP/UNWRAP WRITE KEY IMPORT WRITE USED TO WRAP SYMMETRIC KEYS KEY IMPORT WRAP/UNWRAP READ KEY IMPORT

	USED TO UNWRAP	RSA Wrap/Unwrap READ	GENERATED OR IMPORTED BY THE MODULE, STORED IN
			VOLATILE RAM OR IN
	RSA KEY G	RSA KEY GEN	NON-VOLATILE FLASH
		WRITE	IN PLAINTEXT
		KEY IMPORT	
		WRITE	
		ZEROIZE	
		WRITE	
IDENTITY KEYS	AUTHENTICATION	TPM IDENTITY	GENERATED OR
IDENTITY KEYS	AUTHENTICATION TOKENS USED TO	TPM IDENTITY READ	GENERATED OR IMPORTED BY THE
IDENTITY KEYS			
IDENTITY KEYS	TOKENS USED TO		IMPORTED BY THE
IDENTITY KEYS	TOKENS USED TO		IMPORTED BY THE MODULE, STORED IN
IDENTITY KEYS	TOKENS USED TO	READ	IMPORTED BY THE MODULE, STORED IN VOLATILE RAM OR IN
IDENTITY KEYS	TOKENS USED TO	READ RSA KEY GEN	IMPORTED BY THE MODULE, STORED IN VOLATILE RAM OR IN NON-VOLATILE FLASH
IDENTITY KEYS	TOKENS USED TO	READ RSA KEY GEN WRITE	IMPORTED BY THE MODULE, STORED IN VOLATILE RAM OR IN NON-VOLATILE FLASH
IDENTITY KEYS	TOKENS USED TO	READ RSA KEY GEN WRITE KEY IMPORT	IMPORTED BY THE MODULE, STORED IN VOLATILE RAM OR IN NON-VOLATILE FLASH

			The state of the s
RSA PRIVATE BINDING KEYS	USED TO UNBIND (UNWRAP) A KEY BOUND BY AN EXTERNAL ENTITY	READ RSA KEY GEN	GENERATED OR IMPORTED BY THE MODULE, STORED IN VOLATILE RAM OR IN NON-VOLATILE FLASH
		WRITE	IN PLAINTEXT
		ZEROIZE WRITE	
HMAC KEYS	USED TO CALCULATE AND VERIFY MAC CODES FOR DATA	MAC/MAC VERIFY READ	GENERATED OR IMPORTED BY THE MODULE, STORED IN VOLATILE RAM OR IN NON-VOLATILE FLASH
		KEY GEN READ	IN PLAINTEXT
		KEY IMPORT WRITE	
		ZEROIZE WRITE	
RNG SEED	USED TO SEED THE RNG	KEY GEN READ	GENERATED BY THE MODULE USING THE NON-APPROVED NON- DETERMINISTIC
		RSA KEY GEN READ	HARDWARE RNG (ENTROPY SOURCE) STORED IN VOLATILE RAM IN PLAINTEXT
		ZEROIZE WRITE	

RNG SEED KEY	USED TO SEED THE RNG	KEY GENERATE READ RSA KEY GEN READ ZEROIZE WRITE	MODULE USING THE
ENDORSEMENT KEY	AUTHENTICATION TOKEN USED TO PROVE TO THE EXTERNAL PARTIES THAT TPM IS A GENUINE TPM	ENDORSEMENT	INSTALLED AT THE FACTORY
	USED FOR HMAC AUTHENTICATION OF DATA	KEY GENERATE WRITE MAC/MAC VERIFY READ	GENERATED BY THE MODULE
FIRMWARE UPDATE KEY	USED TO VERIFY SIGNATURE ON FIRMWARE UPDATES	FIRMWARE UPDATE READ	INSTALLED AT THE FACTORY

The key zeroization service is executed by running the following two commands in sequence:

- TPM_FLUSHSPECIFIC

- TPM_OWNERCLEAR

All keys and CSPs that are subject to the key zeroization requirements of FIPS 140-2 are zeroized by executing the key zeroization service.

The module implements power-up cryptographic algorithm tests that are described in the table below.

6. POWER-ON SELF TESTS

The Module implements a power-up integrity check using a 128-bit error detection code.

The module implements power-up cryptographic algorithm tests that are described in the table below.

TABLE 7: SELF-TESTS

CRYPTO FUNCTION	TEST TYPE
AES CTR ENCRYPT	KNOWN ANSWER TEST (ENCRYPT)
RSA VERIFY	KNOWN ANSWER TEST (VERIFY)
HMAC KEYED HASH	KNOWN ANSWER TEST (KEYED HASH)
SHS HASH	KNOWN ANSWER TEST (HASH)
RNG RANDOM NUMBER	Known Answer Test

GENERATION (GENERATE RANDOM BLOCK)

7. CONDITIONAL SELF-TESTS

The Module executes continuous RNG test on each execution of the FIPS 186-2 RNG.

The Module executes continuous RNG test on each execution of the non-Approved hardware non-deterministic RNG (entropy source).

The Module executes conditional pair-wise consistency check for RSA public-private key pairs each time an RSA key pair is generated using FIPS 186-4 key pair generation algorithm.

The module executes the firmware update test during the firmware update. The digital signature is verified on the firmware image using RSA(SHA-256) algorithm utilizing a 2048-bit firmware update key.

If any of the conditional or power-on self-tests fail, the Module enters an error state where both data output and cryptographic services are disabled.

8. CRYPTO OFFICER GUIDANCE

To install the Module in the Approved Mode of operation, the following steps must be followed:

- The Module must be physically controlled during the installation
- The Module must be placed on the PCB as described in the Module technical specifications
- The module normally would come from the manufacturer pre-configured with *TpmInit* script already executed. If the initialization sequence has not been executed by the manufacturer, the Crypto Officer shall initialize the module as described in Nuvoton "NPCT6xx Initialization and Configuration" document. This includes running the the *TpmInit* script with the *-fips* flag.

9. USER GUIDANCE

The users shall take security measures to protect tokens used to authenticate the user to the Module.

NOTE: authentication is not covered by the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 requirements.

10. ACRONYMS

AES Advanced Encryption Algorithm

CPU Central Processing Unit

EMC Electro Magnetic Compatibility

EMI Electro Magnetic Interference

FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard

GPIO General Purpose Input Output bus

HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code

I2C Inter-integrated circuit bus

LPC Low Pin Count bus

OTP One Time Programmable Memory

PCB Printed Circuit Board

RAM Random Access Memory

RNG Random Number Generator

RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman

SHS Secure Hash Standard

SP Special Publication

SPI Serial Peripheral Interface bus

TCG Trusted Computing Group

TIS TPM Interface Specification

TPM Trusted Platform Module