



Juniper Networks SRX1400, SRX3400, and SRX3600 Services Gateways

Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security Policy

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Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA
408.745.2000
1.888 JUNIPER
www.juniper.net

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1 Introduction

The Juniper Networks SRX Series Services Gateways are a series of secure routers that provide essential capabilities to connect, secure, and manage work force locations sized from handfuls to hundreds of users. By consolidating fast, highly available switching, routing, security, and applications capabilities in a single device, enterprises can economically deliver new services, safe connectivity, and a satisfying end user experience. All models run Juniper’s JUNOS firmware – in this case, a specific FIPS-compliant version called JUNOS-FIPS, version 12.3X48-D30. The firmware image is junos-srx1k3k-12.3X48-D30.12-fips.tgz and the firmware Status service identifies itself as in the “Junos 12.3X48-D30.12 (FIPS edition)”.

This Security Policy covers the SRX1400, SRX3400, and SRX3600 models. They are meant for data centers, service provider networks, etc.

The cryptographic modules are defined as multiple-chip standalone modules that execute JUNOS-FIPS firmware on any of the Juniper Networks SRX-Series gateways listed in the table below.

Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Configurations

Model	Hardware Versions	Firmware	Distinguishing Features
SRX1400	SRX1400BASE-GE-AC or SRX1400BASE-GE-DC with SRX1K-NPC-SPC-1-10-40 or SRX3K-SPC-1-10-40	JUNOS-FIPS 12.3X48-D30	9 or 12 x 10/100/1000 + 0 or 3 10 GbE; 1 x single-wide SRX3000 IOC slot
SRX3400	SRX3400BASE-AC, SRX3400BASE-DC, or SRX3400BASE-DC2 with SRX3K-SPC-1-10-40	JUNOS-FIPS 12.3X48-D30	8x 10/100/1000 + 4 SFP; 4 IOC slots
SRX3600	SRX3600BASE-AC, SRX3600BASE-DC, or SRX3600BASE-DC2 with SRX3K-SPC-1-10-40	JUNOS-FIPS 12.3X48-D30	8x 10/100/1000 + 4 SFP; 6 IOC slots
All	JNPR-FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS		Tamper–Evident Seals

The modules are designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 overall:

Table 2 - Security Level of Security Requirements

Area	Description	Level
1	Module Specification	2
2	Ports and Interfaces	2
3	Roles and Services	3
4	Finite State Model	2
5	Physical Security	2
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Key Management	2
8	EMI/EMC	2
9	Self-test	2
10	Design Assurance	3
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A
	<i>Overall</i>	2

The modules have a limited operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 definitions. They include a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into these modules are out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.

The modules do not implement any mitigation of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140-2.

1.1 Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary

The physical forms of the module's various models are depicted in Figures 1-15 below. For all models, the cryptographic boundary is defined as the outer edge of the chassis. The SRX1400 excludes the SRX1K-NPC-SPC-1-10-40 from the requirements of FIPS 140-2 as described in Section 5.2. The module does not rely on external devices for input and output.




Figure 1 – SRX1400 Front View



Figure 2 – SRX1400 Bottom View



Figure 3 - SRX1400 Left View



Figure 4 - SRX1400 Right View



Figure 5 - SRX1K-NPC-SPC-1-10-40 (Excluded Component)



Figure 6 – SRX3400 Top View




Figure 7 – SRX3400 Bottom View



Figure 8 – SRX3600 Top View



Figure 9 – SRX3600 Bottom View

Table 3 - Ports and Interfaces

Port	Description	Logical Interface Type
Ethernet	LAN Communications	Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
Serial	Console serial port	Control in, Status out
Power	Power connector	Power in
Reset	Reset	Control in
LED	Status indicator lighting	Status out
USB	Firmware load port	Control in, Data in
WAN	SHDSL, VDSL, T1, E1	Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out

1.2 Mode of Operation

Follow the instructions in Section 5 to apply the tamper seals to the module. Once the tamper seals have been applied as shown in this document, the JUNOS-FIPS firmware image is installed on the device, and integrity and self-tests have run successfully on initial power-on, the module is operating in the Approved mode. The Crypto-Officer must ensure that the backup image of the firmware is also a JUNOS-FIPS image by issuing the *request system* snapshot command.

If the module was previously in a non-Approved mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer must zeroize the CSPs by following the instructions in Section 1.3.

Then, the CO must run the following commands to configure SSH to use FIPS Approved and FIPS allowed algorithms:

```
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh hostkey-algorithm ssh-ecdsa
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh hostkey-algorithm no-ssh-rsa
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh hostkey-algorithm no-ssh-dss
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh hostkey-algorithm no-ssh-ed25519
co@fips-srx# commit
```

The CO can change the preference of SSH key exchange methods using the following command:

```
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh key-exchange <method>
<method> - dh-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384,
group-exchange-sha1, or group-exchange-sha2
```

The CO can change the preference of SSH cipher algorithms using the following command:

```
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh ciphers <algorithm>
<algorithm> - 3des-cbc, aes128-cbc, aes128-ctr, aes192-cbc, aes192-ctr,
aes256-cbc, aes256-ctr
```

The CO can change the preference of SSH MAC algorithms or enable additional Approved algorithms using the following command:

```
co@fips-srx# set system services ssh macs <algorithm>
```



```
<algorithm> - hmac-sha1, hmac-sha1-96, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512,  
hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-  
etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
```

The “show version” command will indicate if the module is operating in FIPS mode (e.g. JUNOS Software Release [12.3X48-D30] (FIPS edition)), run “show system services ssh” to verify that only the FIPS Approved and FIPS allowed algorithms are configured for SSH as specified above.

1.3 Zeroization

The cryptographic module provides a non-Approved mode of operation in which non-Approved cryptographic algorithms are supported. When transitioning between the non-Approved mode of operation and the Approved mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer must run the following commands to zeroize the Approved mode CSPs:

```
co@fips-srx> start shell  
co@fips-srx% rm -P <keyfile>  
    <keyfile> - each persistent private or secret key other than the SSH  
    host keys and the X.509 keys for IKE.  
co@fips-srx% rm -P /var/db/certs/common/certificate-request/*  
co@fips-srx% exit  
co@fips-srx> request system zeroize
```

Note: The Cryptographic Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.

2 Cryptographic Functionality

The module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed in the Tables 4-6 below. Table 8 summarizes the high level protocol algorithm support. The module does not implement algorithms that require vendor affirmation.

2.1 Approved Algorithms

Table 4 - Data Plane Approved Cryptographic Functions

CAVP Cert.	Algorithm	Mode	Description	Functions
4329	AES [197]	CBC [38A]	Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256	Encrypt, Decrypt
2867	HMAC [198]	SHA-1	$\lambda = 96$	Message Authentication
		SHA-256	$\lambda = 128$	
3571	SHS [180]	SHA-1 SHA-256		Message Digest Generation
2222	Triple-DES [67]	TCBC [38A]	Key Size: 192	Encrypt, Decrypt

Table 5 - Control Plane Authentec Approved Cryptographic Functions

Cert	Algorithm	Mode	Description	Functions
4054	AES [197]	CBC [38A]	Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256	Encrypt, Decrypt
926	CVL	IKEv1 [135]	SHA 1, 256, 384	Key Derivation
		IKEv2 [135]	SHA 1, 256, 384	
1104	DSA [186]		(L = 2048, N = 224) (L = 2048, N = 256)	KeyGen
917	ECDSA[186]		P-256 (SHA 256) P-384 (SHA {256}, 384)	KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer
2646	HMAC [198]	SHA-1	$\lambda = 96, 160$	Message Authentication, KDF Primitive
		SHA-256	$\lambda = 128, 256$	
		SHA-384	$\lambda = 192, 384$	
N/A	KTS [38F]	(AES Cert. #4054 and HMAC Cert. #2646), (Triple-DES Cert. #2224 and HMAC Cert. #2646)		Key Wrapping/Unwrapping
2202	RSA [186]	PKCS1_V1_5	n=2048 (SHA 256) {n=3072 (SHA 256)}	SigGen, SigVer
3341	SHS [180]	SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-384		Message Digest Generation
2224	Triple-DES [67]	TCBC [38A]	Key Size: 192	Encrypt, Decrypt

Table 6 - OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions

CAVP Cert.	Algorithm	Mode	Description	Functions
4056	AES [197]	CBC [38A] CTR [38A]	Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256	Encrypt, Decrypt
880	CVL	SSH [135]	SHA 1, 256, 384	Key Derivation
1216, 1399	DRBG [90A]	HMAC	SHA-256	Random Bit Generation
1096	DSA [186]		{{(2048, 224)} (2048, 256)}	KeyGen
909	ECDSA [186]		{P-224 (SHA 256)} P-256 (SHA 256) {P-384 (SHA 256)}	SigGen
			{P-224 (SHA 256)} P-256 (SHA 256) P-384 (SHA {256}, 384)	KeyGen, SigVer
2648	HMAC [198]	SHA-1	$\lambda = 96, 160$	Message Authentication DRBG Primitive
		SHA-256	$\lambda = 256$	
		SHA-512	$\lambda = 512$	
N/A	KTS [38F]	(AES Cert. #4056 and HMAC Cert. #2648), (Triple-DES Cert. #2223 and HMAC Cert. #2648)		Key Wrapping/Unwrapping
2087	RSA [186]		n=2048 (SHA 256) {n=3072 (SHA 256)}	KeyGen, SigGen, SigVer
	RSA [186-2]		{n=4096 (SHA 256)}	{SigGen}
3343	SHS [180]	SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-384		Message Digest Generation, KDF Primitive
		SHA-512		Message Digest Generation
2223	Triple-DES [67]	TCBC [38A]	Key Size: 192	Encrypt, Decrypt

2.2 Allowed Algorithms

Table 7 - Allowed Cryptographic Functions

Algorithm	Caveat	Use
Diffie-Hellman [IG] D.8	Provides between 112 and 192 bits of encryption strength.	key agreement; key establishment
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman [IG] D.8	Provides 128 or 192 bits of encryption strength.	key agreement; key establishment
NDRNG		Seeding the DRBG

2.3 Allowed Protocols

Table 8 - Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode

Protocol	Key Exchange	Auth	Cipher	Integrity
IKEv1, IKEv2	Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 224, 256) EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384	RSA 2048 Pre-Shared Secret ECDSA P-256 ECDSA P-384	Triple-DES CBC AES CBC 128/192/256	HMAC-SHA-1-96 HMAC-SHA-256-128 HMAC-SHA-384-192
IPsec ESP	IKEv1 or IKEv2 with optional: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, N = 224, 256) EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384 	IKEv1, IKEv2	3 Key Triple-DES CBC AES CBC 128/192/256	HMAC-SHA-1-96 HMAC-SHA-256-128
SSHv2	Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 7680, 8192; N = 256, 320, 384, 512, 1024) EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384	ECDSA P-256	Triple-DES CBC AES CBC 128/192/256 AES CTR 128/192/256	HMAC-SHA-1-96 HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-256 HMAC-SHA-512

These protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP or CMVP.

The IKE and SSH algorithms allow independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher and integrity. In Table 8 above, each column of options for a given protocol is independent, and may be used in any viable combination. These security functions are also available in the SSH connect (non-compliant) service.

2.4 Disallowed Algorithms

These algorithms are non-Approved algorithms that are disabled when the module is operated in an Approved mode of operation.

- ARCFOUR
- Blowfish
- CAST
- HMAC-MD5
- HMAC-RIPEMD160
- UMAC

2.5 Critical Security Parameters

All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this section.

Table 9 - Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)

Name	Description and usage
DRBG_Seed	Seed material used to seed or reseed the DRBG

DRBG_State	V and Key values for the HMAC_DRBG
SSH PHK	SSH Private host key. 1 st time SSH is configured, the keys are generated. ECDSA P-256. Used to identify the host.
SSH DH	SSH Diffie-Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private key used in SSH. Diffie-Hellman (N = 256 bit, 320 bit, 384 bit, 512 bit, or 1024 bit ¹), EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, or EC Diffie-Hellman P-384
SSH-SEK	SSH Session Key; Session keys used with SSH. Triple-DES (3key), AES, HMAC.
ESP-SEK	IPSec ESP Session Keys. Triple-DES (3 key), AES, HMAC.
IKE-PSK	Pre-Shared Key used to authenticate IKE connections.
IKE-Priv	IKE Private Key. RSA 2048, ECDSA P-256, or ECDSA P-384
IKE-SKEYID	IKE SKEYID. IKE secret used to derive IKE and IPsec ESP session keys.
IKE-SEK	IKE Session Keys. Triple-DES (3 key), AES, HMAC.
IKE-DH-PRI	IKE Diffie-Hellman private component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private key used in IKE. Diffie-Hellman N = 224 bit, EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, or EC Diffie-Hellman P-384
CO-PW	ASCII Text used to authenticate the CO.
User-PW	ASCII Text used to authenticate the User.

Table 10 – Public Keys

Name	Description and usage
SSH-PUB	SSH Public Host Key used to identify the host. ECDSA P-256.
SSH-DH-PUB	Diffie-Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key used in SSH key establishment. Diffie-Hellman (L = 2048 bit, 3072 bit, 4096 bit, 6144 bit, 7680 bit, or 8192 bit), EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, or EC Diffie-Hellman P-384
IKE-PUB	IKE Public Key RSA 2048, ECDSA P-256, or ECDSA P-384
IKE-DH-PUB	Diffie-Hellman public component. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman public key used in IKE key establishment. Diffie-Hellman L = 2048 bit, EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, or EC Diffie-Hellman P-384
Auth-UPub	SSH User Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate users to the module. ECDSA P-256 or P-384
Auth-COPub	SSH CO Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate CO to the module. ECDSA P-256 or P-384
Root CA	Juniper Root CA. ECDSA P-256 or P-384 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper Package CA at software load.
Package CA	Package CA. ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of Juniper Images at software load and also at runtime integrity.

¹ SSH generates a Diffie-Hellman private key that is 2x the bit length of the longest symmetric or MAC key negotiated.

3 Roles, Authentication and Services

3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles

The module supports two roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent operators, but does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces the separation of roles using either identity-based operator authentication.

The Cryptographic Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As root or super-user, the Cryptographic Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the module.

The User role monitors the router via the console or SSH. The user role may not change the configuration.

3.2 Authentication Methods

The module implements two forms of Identity-Based authentication, username and password over the Console and SSH as well as username and public key over SSH.

Password authentication: The module enforces 10-character passwords (at minimum) chosen from the 96 human readable ASCII characters. The maximum password length is 20 characters.

The module enforces a timed access mechanism as follows: For the first two failed attempts (assuming 0 time to process), no timed access is enforced. Upon the third attempt, the module enforces a 5-second delay. Each failed attempt thereafter results in an additional 5-second delay above the previous (e.g. 4th failed attempt = 10-second delay, 5th failed attempt = 15-second delay, 6th failed attempt = 20-second delay, 7th failed attempt = 25-second delay).

This leads to a maximum of seven (7) possible attempts in a one-minute period for each getty. The best approach for the attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts, and wait for a new getty to be spawned. This would allow the attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute (576 attempts per hour/60 mins); this would be rounded down to 9 per minute, because there is no such thing as 0.6 attempts. Thus the probability of a successful random attempt is $1/96^{10}$, which is less than 1/1 million. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is $9/(96^{10})$, which is less than 1/100,000.

ECDSA signature verification: SSH public-key authentication. Processing constraints allow for a maximum of 5.6e7 ECDSA attempts per minute. The module supports ECDSA (P-256 and P-384). The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is $5.6e7/(2^{128})$.

3.3 Services

All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 13 - lists the access to CSPs by each service.

Table 11 - Authenticated Services

Service	Description	CO	User
Configure security	Security relevant configuration	x	
Configure	Non-security relevant configuration	x	
Secure Traffic	IPsec protected connection (ESP)	x	
Status	Show status	x	x
Zeroize	Destroy all CSPs	x	

SSH connect	Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and control (CLI)	x	x
IPsec connect	Initiate IPsec connection (IKE)	x	
Console access	Console monitoring and control (CLI)	x	x
Remote reset	Software initiated reset	x	

Table 12 - Unauthenticated traffic

Service	Description
Local reset	Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic	Traffic requiring no cryptographic services

Table 13 - CSP Access Rights within Services

Service	CSPs												
	DRBG_Seed	DRBG_State	SSH PHK	SSH DH	SSH-SEK	ESP-SEK	IKE-PSK	IKE-Priv	IKE-SKEYI	IKE-SEK	IKE-DH-PRI	CO-PW	User-PW
Configure security	--	E	GW	--	--	--	RW	RGW	--	--	--	RW	RW
Configure	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Secure traffic	--	--	--	--	--	E	--	--	--	E	--	--	--
Status	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Zeroize	--	Z	Z	--	--	--	Z	Z	--	--	--	Z	Z
SSH connect	--	E	E	GE	GE	--	--	--	--	--	--	E	E
IPsec connect	--	E	--	--	--	G	E	E	G	G	G	--	--
Console access	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	E	E
Remote reset	GEZ	G	--	Z	Z	Z	--	--	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z
Local reset	GEZ	G	--	Z	Z	Z	--	--	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z
Traffic	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

G = Generate: The module generates the CSP
R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output)
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP
W = Write: The CSP is updated or written to the module
Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.

3.4 Non-Approved Services

The following services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. The security functions provided by the non-Approved services are identical to the Approved counterparts with the exception of

SSH Connect (non-compliant). SSH Connect (non-compliant) supports the security functions identified in Section 2.4 and the SSHv2 row of Table 8.

Table 14 - Authenticated Services

Service	Description	CO	User
Configure security (non-compliant)	Security relevant configuration	x	
Configure (non-compliant)	Non-security relevant configuration	x	
Secure Traffic (non-compliant)	IPsec protected connection (ESP)	x	
Status (non-compliant)	Show status	x	x
Zeroize (non-compliant)	Destroy all CSPs	x	
SSH connect (non-compliant)	Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and control (CLI)	x	x
IPsec connect (non-compliant)	Initiate IPsec connection (IKE)	x	
Console access (non-compliant)	Console monitoring and control (CLI)	x	x
Remote reset (non-compliant)	Software initiated reset	x	

Table 15 - Unauthenticated traffic

Service	Description
Local reset (non-compliant)	Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic (non-compliant)	Traffic requiring no cryptographic services

4 Self-tests

Each time the module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self-tests are available on demand by power cycling the module.

On power up or reset, the module performs the self-tests described below. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one of the KATs fails, the module enters the Critical Failure error state.

The module performs the following power-up self-tests:

- Firmware Integrity check using ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256
- **Data Plane KATs**
 - AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
 - AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
 - Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
 - Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
- **Control Plane Authentec KATs**
 - RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
 - RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
 - ECDSA P-256 w/ SHA-256 Sign/Verify PCT
 - Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
 - Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-384 KAT
 - AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
 - AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
 - KDF-IKE-V1 KAT
 - KDF-IKE-V2 KAT
- **OpenSSL KATs**
 - SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
 - Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate.
 - ECDSA P-256 Sign/Verify PCT
 - EC Diffie-Hellman P-256 KAT
 - Derivation of the expected shared secret.
 - RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
 - RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
 - Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
 - Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
 - HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
 - SHA (256/384/512) KAT
 - AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
 - AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT

- KDF-SSH KAT
- Critical Function Test
 - The cryptographic module performs a verification of a limited operational environment, and verification of optional non-critical packages.

The module also performs the following conditional self-tests:

- Continuous RNG Test on the SP 800-90A HMAC-DRBG
- Continuous RNG test on the NDRNG
- Pairwise consistency test when generating ECDSA and RSA key pairs.
- Firmware Load Test (ECDSA signature verification)

5 Physical Security Policy

The module’s physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone device that meets Level 2 Physical Security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated, cold rolled steel, plated steel and brushed aluminum enclosure. There are no ventilation holes, gaps, slits, cracks, slots, or crevices that would allow for any sort of observation of any component contained within the cryptographic boundary. Tamper-evident seals allow the operator to tell if the enclosure has been breached. These seals are not factory-installed and must be applied by the Cryptographic Officer. (Seals are available for order from Juniper using part number JNPR-FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS.) The tamper-evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS mode of operation.

The Cryptographic Officer is responsible for securing and having control at all times of any unused seals and the direct control and observation of any changes to the module, such as reconfigurations where the tamper-evident seals or security appliances are removed or installed to ensure the security of the module is maintained during such changes and the module is returned to a FIPS Approved state.

Table 16 - Physical Security Inspection Guidelines

Physical Security Mechanism	Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test	Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Tamper seals, opaque metal enclosure.	Once per month by the Cryptographic Officer.	Seals should be free of any tamper evidence.

If the Cryptographic Officer observes tamper evidence, it shall be assumed that the device has been compromised. The Cryptographic Officer shall retain control of the module and perform Zeroization of the module's CSPs by following the steps in Section 1.3 of the Security Policy.

5.1 General Tamper Seal Placement and Application Instructions

For all seal applications, the Cryptographic Officer should observe the following instructions:

- Handle the seals with care. Do not touch the adhesive side.
- Before applying a seal, ensure the location of application is clean, dry, and clear of any residue.
- Place the seal on the module, applying firm pressure across it to ensure adhesion. Allow at least 1 hour for the adhesive to cure.

5.2 SRX1400 (16 seals)

When using the SRX1k3k-2CFM-TRAY in slots 1 and 3, a SRX3k-SPC-1-10-40 may not be installed in slot 3. The SPC(s) may only be installed in slots 1 and/or 2.

An NPC installed in slot 3 is considered non-security relevant and excluded from the requirements of FIPS 140-2. It does not perform cryptography and a malfunction cannot cause other components to malfunction, disclose CSPs, or output plaintext data.

Tamper-evident seals must be applied to the following locations:

- The front of the module:
 - Four seals, horizontal, sticking to the far left sub-pane and one of the three adjacent sub-panes. The bottom two sub-panes should have one seal each, while the top one should have two.
 - One seal, vertical, spanning the three sub-panes adjacent to the far-left sub-pane. Should go about 1 cm to the left of the nearby RJ45 jack (labelled “AUX”).
 - One seal, vertical, applied around 3-5cm to the left of the power input. Should wrap around and stick to the bottom pane.

- One seal, vertical, on the top sub-pane. Should be in the vicinity of the “CONSOLE” RJ45 jack, and extend to the middle-right sub-pane and the top pane.
- One seal, horizontal, sticking to both middle panes (the ones with RJ45 jacks).
- Two seals, vertical, on the two bottom-right sub-panes. One should be immediately to the right of the power input, and the other layed across the blank far-right-bottom sub-pane. Both should stick to the bottom pane.
- Three seals, horizontal. Two stick to the top-right sub-pane, the other to the middle-right sub-pane. All three should wrap around and stick to the right of the module.
- One the right side of the module, ensure there are three seals wrapping around from the front of the module.
- The rear of the module:
 - Two seals, vertical, above and below the screw-hole on the right-ish side of the module. The upper one should touch the top pane; the lower one should touch the bottom pane.
- No seals needed on the left side of the module.



Figure 10: SRX1400 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement on Front & Right Side-13 Tamper Seals



Figure 11: SRX1400 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement on Left Side-Three Tamper Seals

5.3 SRX3400 (29 seals)

Tamper-evident seals must be applied to the following locations:

- Front Pane:
 - Eight seals, horizontal: three spanning the gaps between the far left sub-pane and each of the adjacent three sub-panes; three on the far right sub-panes, wrapping around and attaching to the right-side pane; and two in the middle, spanning the gaps between the bottom two sub-panes and middle two sub-panes (excluding the far left sub-pane).
 - Five seals, vertical: two on the “middle row” sub-panes (excluding the far left sub-pane), extending to both the above and below adjacent sub-panes; two on the “lower row” sub-panes (excluding the far left sub-pane again), wrapping around and attaching to the bottom pane; and one on the top sub-pane, wrapping around and attaching to the top pane.
- Back Pane:
 - Seven seals, horizontal: three spanning the gaps between the far right sub-pane and each of the adjacent three sub-panes; two on the upper-left and upper-middle sub-panes (one on each), wrapping around and attaching to the adjacent side pane (technically the right pane, but from the back pane it’s on the left); and two spanning the gaps between the two upper horizontal panes, and the two “middle row” horizontal panes (one for each gap).
 - Four seals, vertical: One on the lower-left pane, attaching to the right of the power receptacle and wrapping around onto the bottom pane; another two like it on the other two (blank) lower panes; and one more like the others on the bottom of the far-right pane. (All should wrap around and attach to the bottom pane.)
 - Five seals, vertical: two on the “upper row” sub-panes, attaching to both the adjacent “middle row” sub panes and the top pane; two on the “middle row” sub-panes, the left

one attaching to the sub-pane directly above it and the right one attaching to the sub-panes both above and below it; and one on the far right sub-pane, attaching to the top pane.



Figure 12: SRX3400 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement on Front and Right Side-13 Tamper Seals



Figure 13: SRX3400 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement on Rear-16 Tamper Seals

5.4 SRX3600 (35 seals)

Tamper-evident seals must be applied to the following locations:

- Front Pane:
 - Ten seals, horizontal: five on the far left sub-pane, attaching to each of the adjacent sub-panes (one on each); five on the rightmost edges of the sub-panes touching the right edge (one on each), wrapping around and attaching to the right pane.
 - Eight seals, vertical: One on each of the horizontal sub-panes, attaching to the sub-panes immediately above and below it. The bottom-most sub-panes should have their seals wrap around and attach to the bottom pane, same for the top-most sub pane and the top pane. For the sub-pane with the various jacks/receptacles, the seal should be to the left of all the RJ45 jacks.
- Back Pane:
 - Nine seals, horizontal: these are divided between the “middle three rows”, with three seals for each – one between the two horizontal sub-panes, one on the left sub-pane wrapping around and attaching to the (relative) left pane, and one on the right horizontal sub-pane attaching to the far-right pane.
 - Three seals, vertical: one on each of the lowermost sub-panes (*including* the far right pane), all wrapping around and attaching to the bottom pane.
 - Five seals, vertical: one on each of the uppermost sub-panes (*including* the far right pane once more), all wrapping around and touching the top pane. (The power receptacles are each on their own pane.)



Figure 14: SRX3600 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement on Front and Right Side-18 Tamper Seals



Figure 15: SRX3600 Tamper-Evident Seal Placement on Rear and Bottom- 17 Tamper Seals

6 Security Rules and Guidance

The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term *must* in this context specifically refers to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all other statements indicate a security rule implemented by the module.

1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any cryptographic services.
3. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the module.
6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not support manual key entry.
9. The module does not output intermediate key values.
10. The module requires two independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputting plaintext CSPs.
11. The cryptographic officer must determine whether firmware being loaded is a legacy use of the firmware load service.
12. The cryptographic officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.

7 References and Definitions

The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.

Table 17 - References

Abbreviation	Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2]	<i>Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001</i>
[SP800-131A]	<i>Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, January 2011</i>
[IG]	<i>Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program</i>
[135]	<i>National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1, December 2011.</i>
[186]	<i>National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013.</i>
[186-2]	<i>National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-2, January 2000.</i>
[197]	<i>National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001</i>
[38A]	<i>National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001</i>
[38D]	<i>National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007</i>
[38F]	<i>National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F, December 2012</i>
[198]	<i>National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008</i>
[180]	<i>National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015</i>
[67]	<i>National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Special Publication 800-67, May 2004</i>
[90A]	<i>National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A, June 2015.</i>

Table 18 - Acronyms and Definitions

Acronym	Definition
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
ESP	Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
ICV	Integrity Check Value (i.e. Tag)
IKE	Internet Key Exchange Protocol
IOC	Input/Output Card
IPsec	Internet Protocol Security
MD5	Message Digest 5
NPC	Network Processing Card
RE	Routing Engine
RSA	Public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithms
SPC	Services Processing Card
SSH	Secure Shell
Triple-DES	Triple - Data Encryption Standard

Table 19 - Datasheets

Model	Title	URL
SRX1400	SRX Series Service Gateways for small to mid size data center, enterprise, and service provider network deployments	https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datasheets/1000336-en.pdf
SRX3400 SRX3600	SRX Series Service Gateways for small to mid size data center, enterprise, and service provider network deployments	https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datasheets/1000267-en.pdf