### Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2

### **Good Technology**

FIPSCrypto on G100

FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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#### 1. Introduction

#### 1.1 Purpose

The FIPSCrypto on G100 cryptographic module is a Software Dynamic Link Library (DLL) module that implements the TDES, AES, SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA-1 algorithms. This non-proprietary Security Policy describes how the crypto module meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and how to securely operate the module.

The module runs on the G100 wireless handheld. The G100 provides mobile professionals with a highly portable handheld for robust wireless access to corporate information. Powered by <u>GoodLink<sup>TM</sup> wireless corporate messaging system</u>, the G100 delivers a continuously synchronized wireless connection to Microsoft Exchange data so users can instantly access up-to-date corporate email; secure attachments, contacts, calendar, notes and tasks when traveling. The G100 also features <u>GoodInfo<sup>TM</sup></u> software for accessing vital company data stored in web-based applications and other Internet information.

#### 1.2 References

For more information on Good Technology and the GoodLink product visit <a href="http://www.good.com">http://www.good.com</a>.

Detailed information on the FIPS140-2 standard can be found at the NIST web site, <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval">http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval</a>.

### 2. Cryptographic Module Specification

The FIPSCrypto on G100, Version 1.9.3.7 is validated against FIPS 140-2 Level 1 to run on Good Technology's G100. The cryptographic module is a software-only module. The module is tested on a G100 (Good Technology's handheld) device running an eCos operating system version 1.3.1. The module is classified as a multi-chip standalone module. The logical cryptographic boundary contains the software modules that comprise the FIPSCrypto dynamic link library. The physical boundary of the module is defined as the enclosure of the Good Technology's handheld on which the module executes.

### 3. Cryptographic Module Ports And Interfaces

The physical ports to the cryptographic module are standard I/O ports found on the handheld device such as a USB port, wireless radio, Key Pad controller, Graphical Display controller. The logical interface to the module is an Application Programming Interface (API). The function calls, that represent the services provided by the module, act as the Control Input Interface. The parameters to the API act as the Data Input Interface. The parameters returned from the API act as the Data Output Interface. The Status Output interface is the error code and return values provided by each function in the API.

Interface	Logical Interface	Physical Port
Data Input	Parameters to the API	Wireless Radio Port, Key Pad controller, Graphical Display Controller, USB Port
Date Output	Parameters returned from the API	Wireless Radio Port, Key Pad Controller, Graphical Display Controller
Control Input	Exported API calls	Key Pad Controller, USB port
Status Output	Error code and return values provided by each function in the API	Wireless Radio, Graphical Display Controller
Power	N/A	Battery Port

Interface	Parameters	
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Data Input	Key, Key Length, Algorithm Context, Plain text, Cipher-text, Encode/Decode flag, IV, IV Length, Plain text Length, Cipher-text Length, Padding Mode, Counter, Counter length, Hash Input Data, Hash Input Data Length, Num Bytes, Buffer size
Data Output	Cipher-text block, Algorithm Context, Plain text block, Context, Cipher-text, Cipher-text Len, Plaintext, Plaintext Len, Digest, MAC value
Control Input	Aes_enc_key, Aes_enc_blk, Aes_dec_Key, Aes_dec_blk, SetKey, SetIV, SetCtr, Encode, Decode, getOutputLen, A_DES_EDE3_CBCEncryptInit, A_DES_EDE3_CBCEncryptyUpdate, A_DES_EDE3_CBCEncryptFinal, A_DES_EDE3_CBCDecryptInit, A_DES_EDE3_CBCDecryptUpdate, A_DES_EDE3_CBCDecryptFinal, A_SHAInit, A_SHAUpdate, A_SHAFinal, A_SHACopyContext, SetKey, GetMAC, GetMAC_N
Status Output	Getfipsenabled, Getfipstestsrun, Getfipstestspassed  CRYPTOERR_OK, CRYPTOERR_INVALIDENCODEKEY, CRYPTOERR_INVALIDDECODEKEY, CRYPTOERR_INVALIDKEY, CRYPTOERR_INVALIDDATA, CRYPTOERR_INVALIDIV, CRYPTOERR_INVALIDPADDING, CRYPTOERR_ENCODEFAIL, CRYPTOERR_DECODEFAIL, CRYPTOERR_INVALIDCTR, CRYPTOERR_BUFFERTOOSMALL, CRYPTOERR_FAIL, CRYPTOERR_INVALIDHMACKEY, CRYPTOERR_CANCEL, AE_OUTPUT_LEN, AE_INPUT_LEN

# 4. Roles, Services and Authentication

#### 4.1 Roles

The cryptographic module is a single operator software module that supports two authorized roles.

Roles
User Role
Crypto Officer Role

## 4.1.1 The Crypto-Officer Role

The operator takes on the role of a crypto-officer to perform tasks like, module installation and zeroization of the module. Other tasks performed by the crypto-officer include Key Entry, initiate the power-on self-tests on demand and check the status of the cryptographic module. The Crypto officer role has authorized access to the Triple DES, AES, SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA-1 algorithms.

#### 4.1.1.1 The Crypto Officer Guide

The G100 handheld comes with the GoodLink Desktop Software. The Desktop software is installed on the desktop and is used by the Crypto Officer to install the cryptographic module onto the G100 handheld device in a secure environment using the USB port. The Crypto Officer starts up the Desktop Software and connects the G100 handheld to the USB port. The Crypto Officer then starts the software installation process that copies the cryptographic module onto the G100 handheld. Keys are installed onto the handheld as a part of this process. Upon completion of the installation process the module performs its power-on self-tests and enters an initialized state or error state. The crypto officer can then request services from the module. The Crypto Officer has the exclusive rights to perform Key Entry operations. The Desktop Installer can also be used by the Crypto Officer to perform Key Zeroization by selecting the "Remove User Data from this Handheld" option.

#### 4.1.2 The User Role

An operator can assume the User Role and access the cryptographic algorithms provided in the module, which are AES, TDES, SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA-1.

#### 4.1.2.1 The User Guide

The User can request services from the cryptographic module using the module's Logical interface. The User Role has authorized access to the Triple DES, AES, SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA-1 algorithms. The User can also initiate self-tests and check the status of the module. The cryptographic module provides information about the status of a requested operation to the user through the Status Output Interface. The following status codes are defined for the module.

Status Codes	Information
CRYPTOERR_OK	Operation completed successfully.
CRYPTOERR_INVALIDENCODEKEY	The key used for performing encryption
	operations is invalid.
CRYPTOERR_INVALIDDECODEKEY	The key used for performing decryption
	operations is invalid.
CRYPTOERR_INVALIDKEY	The key used for performing cryptographic
	operations is invalid.
CRYPTOERR_INVALIDDATA	The input data passed to the cryptographic

	module is invalid.
CRYPTOERR_INVALIDIV	The Initialization Vector input to the
	module is invalid.
CRYPTOERR_INVALIDPADDING	The padding of the encrypted blob is
	invalid.
CRYPTOERR_ENCODEFAIL	The encryption operation failed.
CRYPTOERR_DECODEFAIL	The decryption operation failed.
CRYPTOERR_INVALIDCTR	The Counter value input to the module is
	invalid.
CRYPTOERR_BUFFERTOOSMALL	The size of the buffer passed to the module
	is too small to perform the requested
	operation.
CRYPTOERR_INVALIDHMACKEY	The key used by the HMAC-SHA-1 is
	invalid.
CRYPTOERR_CANCEL	The module is in an error state. Check if
	the power-on self-tests have passed.
CRYPTOERR_FAIL	The module is in an error state. Check if
	the power-on self-tests have passed.
AE_CANCEL	The module is in an error state. Check if
	the power-on self-tests have passed.
AE_OUTPUT_LEN	The size of the buffer passed to the module
	is too small to perform the requested
	operation.
AE_INPUT_LEN	The size of the input data is invalid.

The operator of the module can also determine its status from the debugger screen. Enter the debugger screen by typing 'DEBUG' on the keypad and then type 'fips' on the command line and <ENTER>. Each of the modules' API functions is tested and the results are printed to the screen.

### 4.2 Services

The services provided by the cryptographic module are listed in the following table.

Services	Cryptographic Keys	Role (CO, User,	Access (R/W/X)
	and CSPs	Both)	
AES Encryption	AES secret key	CO, User	X
AES Encryption:	AES secret key	CO	X
Key Entry			
AES Decryption	AES secret key	CO, User	X
AES Decryption:	AES secret key	CO	X
Key Entry			

TDES Encryption	TDES secret Key	CO, User	X
TDES Encryption:	TDES secret Key	CO	X
Key Entry			
TDES Decryption	TDES secret Key	CO, User	X
TDES Decryption:	TDES secret Key	CO	X
Key Entry			
SHA-1 Hashing	SHA-1 hash	CO, User	X
HMAC-SHA-1	HMAC-SHA-1 Key	CO, User	X
HMAC-SHA-1:	HMAC-SHA-1 Key	CO	X
Key Entry			
Show Status	N/A	CO, User	X
Perform Self tests	N/A	CO, User	X

The following table presents a mapping of each cryptographic service provided by the module to its logical interface and the role assumed by the operator of the module to request those services.

Service	Logical Interface	Role
AES Encryption	aescrypt.c : aes_enc_blk	User, CO*
	aescbc.cpp : Encode	
	aescbc.cpp : SetIV	
	aescbc.cpp : getContext	
	aesctr.cpp : SetCtr	
	aesctr.cpp : getContext	
	aesctr.cpp: Encode	
	aesctr.cpp : getOutputLen	
AES Encryption:	aescrypt.c : aes_enc_key	CO
Key Entry	aescbc.cpp : SetKey	
	aesctr.cpp : SetKey	
AES Decryption	aescrypt.c : aes_dec_blk	User, CO
	aescbc.cpp: Decode	
	aescbc.cpp : SetIV	
	aescbc.cpp : getContext	
	aesctr.cpp : SetCtr	
	aesctr.cpp : getContext	
	aesctr.cpp: Encode	
	aesctr.cpp : getOutputLen	
AES Decryption:	aescrypt.c : aes_dec_key	CO
Key Entry	aescbc.cpp : SetKey	
	aesctr.cpp : SetKey	
TDES Encryption:	desedee.cpp : A_DES_EDE3_CBCEncryptInit	CO
Key Entry		
TDES Encryption	desedee.cpp : A_DES_EDE3_CBCEncryptUpdate	User, CO
	desedee.cpp : A_DES_EDE3_CBCEncryptFinal	

TDES Decryption:	deseded.cpp : A_DES_EDE3_CBCDecryptInit	CO
Key Entry		
TDES Decryption	deseded.cpp : A_DES_EDE3_CBCDecryptUpdate	User, CO
	deseded.cpp : A_DES_EDE3_CBCDecryptFinal	
SHA-1 Hashing	gdsha.cpp : A_SHAInit	User, CO
	gdsha.cpp : A_SHAUpdate	
	gdsha.cpp : A_SHAFinal	
	gdsha.cpp : A_SHACopyContext	
HMAC-SHA-1	Sha1HMAC.cpp : GetMAC	User, CO
	Sha1HMAC.cpp : GetMAC_N	
HMAC-SHA-1:	Sha1HMAC.cpp : SetKey	CO
Key Entry		
Show Status	FipsCryptoMobi.cpp : getfipsenabled	User, CO
	FipsCryptoMobi.cpp: getfipstestspassed	
	FipsCryptoMobi.cpp: getfipstestsrun	
Self Tests	N/A	User, CO

CO- Crypto Officer Role

#### 4.2.1 Approved Mode Of Operation

The module only provides an Approved Mode Of operation. No special configuration is required to operate the Module in a FIPS 140-2 mode. In this mode all authorized roles can call the FIPS 140-2 approved algorithms and services.

#### 4.3 Authentication

The cryptographic module is validated at FIPS 140-2 Level 1 and does not provide role authentication for the authorized roles. The operator assumes these roles implicitly when invoking these services.

## 5. Physical Security

The cryptographic module is a software module that operates on the G100 platform. The G100 handheld device uses production grade components.

### 6. Operational Environment

On the G100 device the operational environment consists of 'eCos', a co-operative multitasking operating system running on an ARM-based processor.

### 7. Cryptographic Key Management

### 7.1 Key Generation

The cryptographic module does not perform key generation.

#### 7.2 Key Input/Output

The keys are input into the module in plain-text form by the crypto officer. Keys are not output from the module.

### 7.3 Key Storage

The module does not provide persistent storage for the keys used by the algorithms. The HMAC-SHA-1 key used for the integrity check is hard-coded into the module.

### 7.4 Key Zeroization

The keys are stored in memory on the device during the execution of an encryption/decryption or HMAC-SHA-1 calculation. At the completion of the operation the keys are zeroized. The other key is the HMAC-SHA-1 key used to perform the integrity check. The operator can zeroize this key using the GoodLink Desktop Installer. The Desktop Installer has an option available to remove the user data from the handheld. Selecting this option for a handheld running a FIPS validated crypto module would cause the flash memory of the handheld to be formatted overwriting the key with 'FE's.

The following is a table with the Key/CSP information:

CSPs	CSP Type	Generation	Storage Location	Key Usage	Key Zeroization
AES	Symmetric	External	Outside	Encryption/	N/A

key	Key		the	Decryption	
			module		
TDES	Symmetric	External	Outside	Encryption/	N/A
key	Key		the	Decryption	
			module		
HMAC	Symmetric	External	Hard-	Software	Desktop
-SHA-1	Key		coded into	Integrity Check	Installer
key			the		
			module		

### 7.5 Cryptographic Algorithms

The FIPSCrypto on G100 cryptographic module implements the FIPS approved algorithms, AES (Cert# 95), TDES (Cert# 209), SHA-1 (Cert# 185), HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert# 185, vendor affirmed to be FIPS-198 compliant).

#### 8. EMI/EMC

The cryptographic module is a software module. The module runs on the G100 devices. The G100 meets applicable Federal Communication Commission (FCC) Electromagnetic Interference and Electromagnetic Compatibility requirements for business use.

#### 9. Self Tests

#### **Power On Tests**

The cryptographic module performs algorithmic self-tests at startup time to ensure that the module is functioning properly. It also performs an integrity check using an approved HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm to validate the integrity of the module. These tests are initiated without user intervention at startup time or can be initiated by the user by resetting the device. The self-tests consist of a set of known answer tests to validate the working of the AES, Triple DES, SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA-1 algorithms.

### 10. Mitigation Of Other Attacks

The module is not designed to mitigate any other attacks.

### 11. Secure Operation

A configuration management system is set up using the Concurrent Versions System (CVS) to identify each component of the cryptographic module including documentation using a unique identification number. The crypto-officer installs the cryptographic module in FIPS 140-2 mode in a secure environment. The module implements only FIPS 140-2 approved algorithms and hence all cryptographic services provided by the module are FIPS 140-2 compliant. All the critical security functions performed by the module are tested at start-up or on demand. The module's integrity is also tested to prevent tampering, using an approved HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm.