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Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2

FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Level 3 Validation

Version 1.6 December 2011

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Giesecke & Devrient (G&D) Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2. This security policy describes how Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 [FIPS140-2] and how to run Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 in a secure FIPS 140-2 approved mode. This policy was prepared as part of the Level 3 FIPS 140-2 validation of Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2.

Throughout this document, the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 is referred to as the chip, the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2, and the module.

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 — *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST website at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.

1.2 References

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy and has been written in parts describing GlobalPlatform functionality. More information is available on Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 from the following sources:

- Overview information of Giesecke & Devrient products and services can be found at: <u>www.gi-de.com</u>
- For answers to technical or sales related questions, please refer to the contacts listed on the Giesecke & Devrient website at <u>www.gi-de.com</u>

[GPCS]	GlobalPlatform Card Specification, v2.1.1, March 2003
[ISO]	ISO/IEC 7816-3 : Second edition 1997-09-18, Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts - Part 3 : Electronic signals and transmission protocols, ISO/IEC FCD 7816-4: 2003 (Draft) Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4: Interindustry commands for interchange, Working draft dated 2003-01-17, ISO SC17 Document 17N2268T, ISO/IEC 7816-5 : 1994, Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts - Part 5 : Numbering system and registration procedure for application identifiers, ISO/IEC FCD 7816-6 : 2003 (Draft), Identification cards - Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts - Part 6 : Interindustry data elements for interchange – FCD dated 2003-01-17, ISO SC17 Document 17N2270T, ISO/IEC FCD 7816-8: 2003 (Draft), Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 8: Interindustry commands for a cryptographic toolbox. FCD dated 2003-01-17, ISO SC17 Document 17N2272T, ISO/IEC FCD 7816-9: 2003 (Draft), Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 9: Interindustry commands for card and file management. FCD dated 2003-01- 17, SC17 Document 17N2274T.
[JCS]	Java Card TM 2.2.1, Card Specification, October 2003, Sun Microsystems
[X9.31]	American Bankers Association, Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA), ANSI X9.31-1998, Washington, D.C., 1998.

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[FIPS140-2]	National Institute of Standards and Technology, FIPS 140 -2 Standard, 2002
[DES]	National Institute of Standards and Technology, Data Encryption Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46-3, October 25, 1999.

Table 1 References

1.3 Document Organization

The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document, the Submission Package contains:

- Vendor Evidence document
- Finite State Machine Model
- Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 Reference Manual
- Other supporting documentation as additional references

This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Giesecke & Devrient. With the exception of this non-proprietary Security Policy, the FIPS 140-2 Validation Submission Documentation is proprietary to Giesecke & Devrient and is releasable only under appropriate non-disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Giesecke & Devrient.

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2. Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 Cryptographic Module Specification

2.1 Overview

Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 was developed by G&D and constitutes a complete operating system for smart cards. Providing a complete set of International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Europay, MasterCard and Visa (EMV) and proprietary enhanced commands, the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 incorporates standards-based functionality along with its own optimized command set.

Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 is a single-chip cryptographic module. The firmware is implemented on three different NXP smart card controllers. Table 2 identifies the validated product configurations.

Product Model Name	Firmware Version	Hardware Version
Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2	CPDHxJC_RSEFI- 025CC073V202 [1]	P5CC073 M8.4 [1]
Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2	CPDIxJC_RSEFI- 025CD080V402 [2]	P5CD080 M8.4 [2], P5CD080 PDM1.1 [2]
Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2	CPDYxJC_RSEFI- 025CD144V503 [3]	P5CD144 M8.4 [3], P5CD144 PDM1.1 [3]

Table 2 Configurations

Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 contains an implementation of the GlobalPlatform (GP) Version 2.1.1 specification **[GPCS]**, which defines a secure infrastructure for post-issuance programmable smart cards. The GP specification defines a life cycle for GP compliant cards.

Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 offers Java Card technology [JCS] and GlobalPlatform 2.1.1 [GPCS] services to applets.

Other FIPS 140-2 validated applets may be downloaded on the chip. If an applet, which is not FIPS 140-2 validated, is loaded on this module, the module loses its FIPS 140-2 validation.

State transitions between states of the life cycle involve well-defined sequences of operations. Cards that have been issued are necessarily in a "SECURED" state. This means that the G&D Security Domain has been loaded onto the card plus a set of keys and a PIN through which the Cryptographic Officer can be authenticated.

Some highlighted features of Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 are:

- SHA-1 and SHA-256 Hash algorithms
- Compliant to ISO 7816 Parts 1-7 [ISO]

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- RSA up to 2048 bit modulus for:
 - o Digital signature generation and verification
 - Key generation
 - o Encryption/Decryption for key transport only
- Triple-DES Encryption/Decryption [DES]
- AES Encryption/Decryption
- DSA signature generation and verification

2.1.1 Modules

Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 is available in three different modules. The following table list their differences.

Module	P5CC073	P5CD080	P5CD144
Packaging	M8.4	M8.4, PDM1.1	M8.4, PDM1.1
EEPROM size	72 KB	80 KB	144 KB
Interfaces	Interfaces contact		Dual Interface
		(contact and	(contact and
		contactles)	contactles)

2.2 Physical Security with Well-Defined Interfaces

Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 is defined as a single-chip module for FIPS 140-2 purposes. The physical form of the module is a single chip coated in epoxy, with an attached faceplate and an ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface. It is intended to meet overall FIPS 140-2 Level 3 requirements (see Table 3 below).

Section	Section Title	Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	3
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	3
3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	3
4	Finite State Model	3
5	Physical Security	3
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Cryptographic Key Management	3
8	Electromagnetic	3
	Interference/Electromagnetic	
	Compatibility	
9	Self-tests	3

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Section	Section Title	Level
10	Design Assurance	3
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	3

Table 3 Intended Level per FIPS 140-2

2.2.1 The Chip modules: NXP P5CC073, NXP P5CD080 and NXP P5CD144




Figure 1 Block Diagram of the NXP chip types

The module is composed of a single chip micro-controller, coated in epoxy, with an attached faceplate, an ISO/IEC 14443 A contactless interface (for NXP P5CD080 and NXP P5CD144) and an ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface.

The chip contains the processor, Read Only Memory (ROM - 200 kilobytes), Random Access Memory (RAM - 6144 bytes), Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM (EEPROM - 72 kilobytes (NXP P5CC073) -80 kilobytes (NXP P5CD080) 144 kilobytes (NXP P5CD144), co-processors, input/output (I/O), and timers. The power interface accepts voltages in the range of +5V +/-10% and +1,8V +/-10%.

The smart card controller provides a number of security features, including

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- High frequency detector
- High voltage detector
- Low frequency detector
- High temperature detector
- Low temperature detector

The chip is embedded in epoxy, which completely encapsulates the whole Integrated Circuit (IC). Only micro-wires connecting to the faceplate penetrate the epoxy, connecting to the faceplate interface of the module. Attempts to tamper with the module result in damage to the epoxy, the plastic card, or the metal faceplate (scratches, chips, dents, etc.).




Figure 2 Picture of the module faceplate

From the time of its manufacture, the card is in possession of the Cryptographic Officer until it is ultimately issued to the User. From that point, the card is in the physical possession of the User.

If the module is attacked through physical means, the attack will be evident due to the disturbance of the packaging of the card and module. The ICC is embedded within an epoxy coating that is extremely difficult to penetrate without leaving evidence of the attack. Further, the packaging itself, either M8.4 or PDM 1.1, is resistant to penetration.

For the hardware versions P5CC073 M8.4 [1], P5CD080 M8.4 [2] and P5CD144 M8.4 [3], strong enclosure is achieved by coating module components in a hard opaque tamper-evident epoxy. Physical removal of the epoxy will cause serious damage to the ICC such that all CSPs are destroyed.

For the hardware versions P5CD080 PDM1.1 [2] and P5CD144 PDM1.1 [3], the module's strong enclosure is achieved by opaque tamper-evident covering of the die. Physical removal or tampering with the top metal layer will cause serious damage to the cryptographic module such that all CSPs are destroyed.

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The module has been tested for and meets applicable Federal Communication Commission (FCC) Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) requirements for home use as defined in Subpart B of FCC Part 15.

2.2.2 The contact Interface

There is only one physical contact interface to the module, the faceplate, which contains eight contacts, pinned as defined in ISO 7816-2. All FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces map to this single faceplate as detailed in Table 4.

FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface	Physical Interface
Data Input Interface	Faceplate
Data Output Interface	Faceplate
Control Input Interface	Faceplate
Status Output Interface	Faceplate
Power Interface	Faceplate

Table 4 FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces

Additionally, the eight contacts of the faceplate can be mapped to the logical interfaces as depicted in Table 5.

Contact	Function	FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface
C1	Power supply	Power Interface
C2	Reset	Control Input Interface
C3	Clock	Control Input Interface
C4	Not connected	N/A
C5	Ground	Power Interface
C6	Not connected	N/A
C7	Input/Output for serial data	Data Input Interface, Data Output Interface, Control Input Interface, Status Output Interface
C8	Not connected	N/A

Table 5 Contact to Function Mapping

As described in ISO 7816-2, when the module is first inserted into the reader (also referred to as the terminal), a RST signal is transmitted to contact C2. Power is applied via contact C1; C7 is set to reception mode; and the external clock is established via contact C3. The I/O interface (C7) has reception and transmission modes. The smart card reader sends commands to the module and the module transmits responses using contact C7.

2.2.3 The contactless Interface

This interface operates in accordance with ISO/IEC 14443A; the T=CL protocol is supported according to ISO/IEC 14443-4.

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2.2.4 The cryptographic boundary

In the scope of this document, the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 is considered as a single chip implementation of a cryptographic module.

The cryptographic boundary for Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 is the single chip microcontroller, coated in epoxy, with an attached faceplate, and the ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface for the NXP P5CC073 and the dual interface (ISO/IEC 7816 contact and ISO/IEC 14443A contactless interfaces) for the NXP P5CD080 and NXP P5CD144.

The chip is therefore providing the physical boundary.

2.3 Finite State Machine Model

The card's system software undergoes a set of well-defined state transitions, as keys are stored on the card to establish Security Domains. Applets also progress through a set of well-defined state transitions as they are loaded, installed, and prepared for execution.

The Finite State Model for the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 is provided as a separate document.

2.4 Software Security

The firmware for the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 is protected from modification due to the fact that it is stored in ROM. This systems software is written primarily using a high-level programming language and the machine language specific to the underlying chip that allows for performance increase or to enhance security of the module.

It is loaded onto the module during manufacturing and does not allow for modification. An Error Detection Code (EDC) is calculated over the firmware during this installation and is checked at each power up. Attempts to modify the firmware require direct access to the IC and are prevented by the physical security described in section 2.2 above.

The card systems software includes an on-card Java Card Virtual Machine. Applets are isolated from each other due to the fact that each runs in a "Java sandbox". The Java Card language does not contain any constructs that allow cross-sandbox communication directly; any such communication must go by way of systems software mechanisms, which allow for implementation of strict security measures.

Each applet is loaded on the card within a Secure Channel which is protected by a TRIPLE-DES MAC. Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 also provides a Data Authentication Pattern for each loaded applet. This insures that the chip issuer has digitally signed each applet that is to be loaded on the chip, allowing prior security verification of each applet and avoiding the loading of any unauthorized applet during the manufacturing process.

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During the manufacturing process, only trusted (validated against FIPS 140-2) applets are loaded onto the chip. These include the Card Manager applet and the G&D Security Domain.

After completion of the manufacturing process (including pre-personalization) when the chip has reached its normal Operating Life Cycle State (Card Manager Secured State), only trusted FIPS 140-2 validated applets shall be loaded or installed onto the module. Furthermore, at the time of loading, these applets must be identified as part of the cryptographic module. The FIPS 140-2 validation testing targeted this specific configuration of smartcard and applets. Changes to that configuration (for example, loading another applet), would constitute a new module, and the new configuration would need to undergo 140-2 testing for FIPS 140-2 compliance.

2.4.1 Command Structure

Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 provides a well-defined, static set of commands. A smart card reader sends these commands to the module and then responses are transmitted from the module to the reader. Only these commands are available to an operator, and only the faceplate interface may be used to access the module's functionality.

The details of these commands are defined in the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 Technical Specification Document that is included as a proprietary and private extension to this Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 Policy document.

Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 is only capable of operating in response to commands sent from the reader in what is called a command-response pair. The reader sends an Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU) to the module and module responds with an APDU.

The APDU sent by the reader consists of a header and a body. The header contains a class byte differentiating between ISO defined command and private commands, an instruction byte containing the command code, and parameters relating to the command. The body contains any data that is needed for the command and, if necessary, the length of the expected data.

The response APDU transmitted by the module consists of a body and a trailer. The body contains any data that is returned in response to the command and the trailer contains the status message.

This card also provides an additional set of on-card services through the Java Card APIs. The API classes and their associated methods are also defined in Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 Technical Specifications. These services are only available internally, to an applet loaded on the card. They cannot be accessed from outside the module.

3. ROLES & SERVICES

3.1 Roles

The Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 cryptographic module supports two roles: the Cryptographic Officer (CO) and the User.

The Cryptographic Officer: Is the on-card security controller and establishes his identity on the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module in TRIPLE-DES verification of a key set stored with the Card Manager application. Through mutual authentication between the Cryptographic Officer and the Card Manager a secure channel will be established so that access to security-critical information and services can be granted. The Card Manager applet is the Card Issuer Security Domain.

The User/Applet provider: The module supports a User role that has possession of the G&D Security Domain keyset and can request services provided by the G&D Security Domain instantiated on the card. The CO is responsible for instantiating the G&D Security Domain and thereby defining User roles. Up to 127 G&D Security Domain instances can be created if memory resources permit.

3.1.1 Identity based Authentication

Identification. The module supports a single identity: the Card Manager Security Officer who can assume both the CO and User role. The operator identifies himself by selecting his application and the key set inside the application. The application of the Cryptographic Officer is the Card manager. The application of the User/Applet provider is the G&D Security Domain. The selection of the application is done by a SELECT command.

The selection of the key set is done in the INITIALIZE UPDATE, the first command of the two commands that open the Secure Channel.

Authentication. The operator authenticates himself using a mutual authentication scheme comprising two commands INITIALIZE UPDATE and EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE. During this mutual authentication, the operator has to encrypt and TRIPLE-DES MAC a challenge sent by the card, proving knowledge of the TRIPLE-DES key set which was referenced during the identification.

Dedicated services are provided by the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module to manage the CardHolder PIN (Global PIN). Please note that the module provides functionality to change/unblock Global PIN. However, the module does not use the Global PIN to provide authentication to its users. Any applets loaded on the card may use this PIN for authenticating Card Holders as end-users of the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2.

3.2 Services

3.2.1 Crypto Officer Administrative Services

The Crypto Officer uses a command set for the administration of the G&D Security Domains and to load applets onto the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module. This command set includes the following commands.

- **DELETE ALL**: is used to delete all packages and applet instances installed from those packages that have been loaded after completion of the card via LOAD commands.
- **GET STATUS**: if the Card Manager is the current application, this command is used to retrieve Card Manager information according to a given search criteria.
- **PIN CHANGE / UNBLOCK**: this command replaces or unblocks the Global PIN (Card Holder PIN).
- **SET STATUS**: this command is used to modify the life cycle state of the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module or the life cycle state of an application.

Applets loaded onto the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module post-issuance must be FIPS 140-2 validated.

Applets are loaded through a Secure Channel established by the Crypto Officer with the Card Manager during the Identification/authentication process. The applet is divided in a series of blocks that fit in a LOAD command. The loading is managed in a series of LOAD commands, each one transmitting a block, encrypted and followed by a TRIPLE-DES MAC with the Secure Channel session keys established during the identification process. The correct transmission of each block of the applet and therefore of the whole applet is ensured by the TRIPLE-DES MAC.

Optionally a mechanism called "GP DAP" enables the applet provider to check that his applet has been correctly loaded independently of the Issuer. The following DAP verification modes may be used

- Single DES plus final Triple DES MAC as defined in [GPCS], C.5.1
- 2-key Triple DES MAC
- RSA with PKCS#1 Scheme as defined in [GPCS], C.5.2

The DES Load File Data Block Signature verification consists of a series of DES MAC verification, ended by a TRIPLE-DES MAC verification. All the DES and TRIPLE-DES MAC operations use the "GP DAP" TRIPLE-DES key, loaded in the G&D Security Domain. The FIPS configured card prevents an operator from using this method of DAP verification, as DES is not a FIPS approved algorithm.

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The full Triple DES DAP verification consists of a series of TRIPLE-DES MAC verification. All the TRIPLE-DES MAC operations use the "GP DAP" TRIPLE-DES key, loaded in the G&D Security Domain. Full TRIPLE-DES DAP verification is allowed in the Approved mode of operation.

The RSA Load File DAP is calculated using a PKCS#1 singature. The SHA-1 message digest is padded according to PKCS#1 V1.5 and encrypted with the private RSA key. DAP verification using RSA keys are allowed in the Approved mode of operation.

3.2.2 Crypto Officer & User services

The following commands are available for both the Crypto Officer and the User:

- **INSTALL (CO):** the INSTALL command instructs a Security Domain or the Card Manager which installation step it shall perform during an application installation process.
- LOAD (CO): the LOAD command loads the byte-codes of the Load File (package) defined in the previously issued INSTALL command.
- **DELETE:** the DELETE command deletes a Load File (package) or an Application (applet instance).
- EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE: this command is used by the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module to authenticate the host, establish the Secure Channel, and to determine the level of security required for all subsequent commands within the Secure Channel. A previous and successful execution of the INITIALIZE UPDATE command is required prior to processing this command.
- **PUT DATA**: this command is used to store or replace one tagged data object provided in the command data field.
- **PUT KEY**: this command is used to add, replace or modify a single key or key sets.

3.2.3 Unauthenticated services:

- **MANAGE CHANNEL:** this command is used to open or close a logical channel.
- **GET DATA:** the GET DATA command is used to retrieve a single data object. This command is available outside of a Secure Channel (no security condition). However, if issued within a Secure Channel, it must follow the same security level as defined in EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE.
- **SELECT:** this command is used for selecting an application (Card Manager or G&D Security Domain).

- **GET FREE SPACE**: GET FREE SPACE is used to display the largest free memory block for package loading or the complete available free EEPROM or the complete available Clear-On-Reset (COR) /Clear-On-Deselect (COD) space.
- INITIALIZE UPDATE: this command is used to initiate a Secure Channel with the Card Manager or a Security Domain. Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module and host session data are exchanged and session keys are generated by the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module upon completion of this command. However, the Secure Channel is not considered open until completion of a successful EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command that must immediately follow the INITIALIZE UPDATE command.

A user can initiate module self-tests by issuing a card reset and issuing an APDU command. The module provides a Get ATR service to retrieve the module ATR value on power-up.

All commands (except Manage Channel, Select, Initialize update, Get Free Space and Get Data) need a secured channel to be executed by either a CO or User. During the secure channel opening, the command access condition is specified ('CLEAR','MAC','MAC+ENC') and an access control is done on received commands.

Roles/Services	Crypto –Officer	User/Applet Providers	Unauthenticated
	(Card Manager	(G&D Security	(Any role)
	Security Domain)	Domain)	
INSTALL	X	Х	
LOAD	X	Х	
DELETE	Х	Х	
DELETE ALL	X		
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE	Х	Х	
GET DATA			X
GET FREE SPACE			X
GET STATUS	X		
INITIALIZE UPDATE			X
PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK	Х		
PUT DATA	Х	Х	
PUT KEY	Х	Х	
SELECT			X
MANAGE CHANNEL			X
SET STATUS	Х		

3.2.4 Relationship between Roles & Services

 Table 6 Relationship between Roles & Services

3.2.5 Applets Services

Applets that are developed and downloaded onto the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module shall use the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 Java Card APIs. These APIs are listed in a detailed

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separate proprietary document and are only accessible by on-card applets. The APIs containing cryptographic services are:

Key Generation/Exchange:

- RSA key pair generation: this API generates a pair of RSA keys.

- Key exchange: the RSA algorithm API supports key wrapping/unwrapping.

- DSA key pair generation: this API generates a pair of DSA keys as per FIPS 186-2.

Message Digest:

- SHA-1: this API performs a SHA-1 Message Digest.

- SHA-256: this API performs a SHA-256 Message Digest.

Random Numbers Generation:

- Secure Random Generation: this API generates a random data, using output from the ANSI X9.31 FIPS140-2 approved method (Deterministic RNG) xored with random data generated by Hardware Random Generator (Non-Deterministic RNG) provided by the chip.

Signature and Verification:

- RSA using SHA-1: for origin authentication and Data integrity verification.

- DSA using SHA-1: for origin authentication and Data integrity verification.

- TRIPLE-DES MAC: these APIs offer TRIPLE-DES MAC in CBC and ECB modes.

Encryption/Decryption:

- TRIPLE-DES: an API that offers TRIPLE-DES encryption and decryption services using CBC or ECB mode.

- AES: an APIs that offers AES encryption and decryption services using CBC or ECB mode

- RSA: ¹these APIs offer RSA up to key length of 2048-bit using various padding (no padding, PKCS1, ISO14888 and ISO9796).

The above stated algorithms shall be used only in a FIPS approved mode of operation and their use will be tested during the applet's FIPS 140-2 validation.

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¹ RSA Encrypt/Decrypt should only be used for key transport (key wrapping/unwrapping) in an Approved mode

The GP specification defines various GP APIs that may be used by the applets and that provide the same services as the Card Manager Commands (such as secure channel opening). In particular, the Global PIN verification may be implemented by the applets through the use of a dedicated API.

3.2.6 Card Cryptographic Functions

The cryptographic module provides a FIPS approved platform for applets that provide cryptographic services to end-user applications.

FIPS 140-2 validated algorithms in the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 cryptographic module provide cryptographic services; these include:

TRIPLE-DES (3 key TRIPLE-DES):

- •. The TRIPLE-DES (ECB/CBC mode) algorithm is used
 - for authenticating the Crypto Officer (EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command)
 - for encrypting data flow from the host to the card. The reverse direction is not encrypted; i.e. the data and the status words returned in response to an APDU are not encrypted.
 - . as a TRIPLE-DES MAC to authenticate the originator and to verify the integrity of the message
- TRIPLE-DES MAC is also used together for DAP verification
- TRIPLE-DES and TRIPLE-DES MAC functions are also provided as services to applets, through JavaCard APIs.

AES (128, 192 and 256-bit key-sizes):

• AES functions are only provided as services to applets through JavaCard APIs.

SHA-1:

•. The SHA-1 function is only provided as a service through Java APIs to applets.

SHA-256:

• The SHA-256 function is only provided as a service through Java APIs to applets.

RSA PKCS#1 (1024-2048 bit keys):

• RSA Signature Verification services are used during DAP verification.

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• RSA Sign/Verify functions are only provided as services to applets, through JavaCard APIs. The applet shall use RSA only for key wrapping/unwrapping or signature generation/verification.

DSA (1024 bit key sizes)

• DSA Sign/Verify is only provided as as services to applets through JavaCard APIs

• Only 1024 bit key sizes are allowed for use in FIPS mode

3.2.7 RNG

The cryptographic module offers a Secure RNG implementation in which the output from a FIPS approved PRNG compliant with ANSI X9.31 standard (Appendix A.2.4) xored with random data generated by Hardware Random Generator of the chip.

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Кеу	Key type	Generation	Entry	Storage	Use
Crypto-Officer initial keys (Kinit_enc, Kinit_mac, Kinit_kek)	112 bit Triple- DES keys	External by manufacturing	Pre-configured	Garbled in the module's non- volatile memory	Authentication of Crypto- Officer
Crypto-Officer static keys (K _{ENC} , K _{MAC} , K _{KEK})	112 bit Triple- DES keys	External by Crypto-Officer	Load in encrypted form with PUT KEY command	Garbled in the module's non- volatile memory	Authentication of Crypto- Officer Sensitive Data encryption
Session keys of Crypto-Officer (K _{SMAC} , K _{SENC})	112 bit Triple- DES keys	Authentication of Crypto- Officer	Generated on card during secure channel establishment	Garbled in volatile memory	Secured and or encrypted communication between terminal and module depending on security level of authentication.
Delegated Management Token Key (K _{Token})	1024 bit RSA key	External by Crypto-Officer	Load in encrypted form with PUT KEY command	Garbled in the module's non- volatile memory	Authorization of Delegated Management commands
Delegated Management Receipt Key (K _{Receipt})	112 bit Triple- DES key	External by Crypto-Officer	Load in encrypted form with PUT KEY command	Garbled in the module's non- volatile memory	Confirmation of command execution
RSA DAP verification key (PK _{DAP})	1024 bit RSA key	External by Crypto-Officer	Load in encrypted form with PUT KEY command	Garbled in the module's non- volatile memory	Load File Data Block Signature verification
TDES DAP verification key (K _{DAP})	112 bit Triple- DES key	External by Crypto-Officer	Load in encrypted form with PUT KEY command	Garbled in the module's non- volatile memory	Load File Data Block Signature verification
User keys (SDK _{ENC} , SDK _{MAC,} SDK _{KEK})	112 bit Triple- DES keys	External by Crypto-Officer	Load in encrypted form with PUT KEY command	Garbled in the module's non- volatile memory	Authentication of User
Session keys of User (SDK _{SENC,} SDK _{SMAC})	112 bit Triple- DES keys	Authentication of User	Generated on card during secure channel establishment	Garbled in volatile memory	Secured and or encrypted communication between

3.3 Critical Security Parameters (CSP):

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Security Policy for Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2, Version 1.6

Key	Key type	Generation	Entry	Storage	Use
					terminal and module depending on security level of authentication.
Global PIN	PIN	External – entered by Crypto-Officer	Load in encrypted form with PIN CHANGE / UPDATE command	Garbled in the module's non- volatile memory	
X9.31 PRNG keys	112 bit Triple- DES keys	Internal by HW random number generator of the module	Internally initialized with individual keys randomly selected by the module	Garbled in the module's non- volatile memory	Used by X9.31 PRNG
ANSI X9.31 seed	16 byte random number	Internal by HW random number generator of the module	Internally initialized with individual keys randomly selected by the module	Garbled in the module's non- volatile memory	Used by X9.31 PRNG

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4. SECURITY RULES

4.1 Identification & Authentication Security Rules

Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 implements Identity-based Access Control Rules for identifying and authenticating the Crypto Officer and the User/Applet Provider role.

User/Applet Provider Authentication: The User/Applet Provider must prove possession of the G&D Security Domain keyset composed of 3 TRIPLE-DES keys (SDK_{ENC}, SDK_{MAC} and SDK_{KEK}). SDK_{ENC}, SDK_{MAC} are used to derive the session keys used to encrypt, authenticate and check the integrity of the command data. SDK_{KEK} is used to encrypt keys transported within the APDU command. This is the same process as the Crypto Officer authentication (Initialize Update & External Authenticate commands) but it uses the TRIPLE-DES keys of the G&D Security Domain.

Crypto Officer Authentication: The Cryptographic Officer must prove possession of the Card Manager Key Set composed of 3 TRIPLE-DES keys (K_{ENC} , K_{MAC} and K_{KEK}). K_{ENC} , K_{MAC} are used to derive the session keys used to encrypt, authenticate and check the integrity of the command data. K_{KEK} is used to encrypt keys transported within the APDU command. This is the same process as the User authentication (Initialize Update & External Authenticate commands) and follows the GP 2.1.1 specifications [GPCS].

4.2 Applet Loading Security Rules

Only applets validated according to FIPS 140-2 shall be loaded onto the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 cryptographic module. Applets can only be loaded through a secure channel thus requiring TRIPLE-DES MAC verification over each Load block.

In the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module, the applet is always loaded by the Issuer (Cryptographic Officer) or authorized by Issuer in case of Delegated Management.

4.2.1 "GP Delegated Management"

If Delegated Management is used, the Crypto Officer has to set Delegate Management Keys for Token verification (K_{Token}) and Receipt generation ($K_{Receipt}$), install the G&D Security Domain with Delegated Management privilege and set Secure Channel keys of this Security Domain.

User of G&D Security Domain can load packages or install applications on the card, only if he/she establishes a secure channel and presents the card with a Token during the GP Install for Load command. The Token is a RSA signature generated by the Card Issuer using the Card Issuer private key to ensure that the Card Issuer has authorized the load process and the Load File or the install process. If the token verification is successful, the card processes the Load command and answers with a reciept, i.e. a TRIPLE-DES MAC generated by the Card, acknowledging that the operation was successfully performed. For details see GP 2.1.1 [GPCS].

4.2.2 "GP DAP"

If the G&D Security Domain is instantiated with a DAP verification privilege, an applet may be loaded with an optional DAP. If the G&D Security Domain is instantiated with mandated DAP verification privilege, a DAP is required.

The mechanism designated as "DAP" in GP 2.1.1 **[GPCS]** enables the applet provider to check, independently of the Issuer (Cryptographic Officer), that his applet has been correctly loaded. This check is done by MAC verification on the Load File. DAP may be generated either using TRIPLE-DES or RSA.

As identified in Section 3.2.1, only DAP verification using full TRIPLE-DES or RSA may be used in the Approved mode of operation.

This process is described in detail in the Reference Manual Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2.

4.3 Access Control Security Rules

• Keys must be loaded through a secure channel and encrypted with the K_{kek}. Therefore the keys are always loaded in encrypted form.

• Global PIN is set through a secure channel and encrypted with the K_{kek}. Therefore the PIN is always transferred in encrypted form.

4.4 Physical Security Rules

The physical security of the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 cryptographic module is designed to meet FIPS 140-2 level 3 requirements. A hard opaque epoxy is used to encapsulate the module to meet level 3 requirements. Once it is manufactured, the Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module belongs to the Cryptographic Officer until it is ultimately issued to the end user.

4.5 Key Management Security Policy

4.5.1 Cryptographic key generation

TRIPLE-DES Session key derivation for Secure Channel conforming to GlobalPlatform Card Specification v2.1.1 **[GPCS]**. The random data required for opening a Secure Channel is generated using the FIPS140-2 approved ANSI X9.31 PRNG **[X9.31]** xored with random data generated by Hardware Random Generator of the chip.

RSA and DSA key pair generation using FIPS140-2 approved ANSI X9.31 PRNG **[X9.31]** xored with random data generated by Hardware Random Generator of chip.

4.5.2 Cryptographic key entry/output

If Keys are imported they shall always be encrypted with the Key Encryption Key and transferred by using the Put Key command within a secure channel.

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During this process, the keys are double encrypted (using the Session Key and the Key Encryption Key) if the Secure Channel security level is set to MAC+ENC.

The Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module replaces initialization key set (Kinit_enc, Kinit_mac, Kinit_kek) of Card Manager with first new keyset loaded into Card Manager using the PUT KEY command.

Security Domain (Card Manager and G&D Security Domain) Keysets loaded onto the card can be deleted using the Delete APDU or replaced by reloading another key set for Crypto Officer and User using the Put Key command.

Public key output is in non encrypted format. Other than public keys, no secret and private keys can be output from the module.

4.5.3 Cryptographic key storage

The Keys contain the following parameters:

- Key id, which is the ld of the key,
- Algo Id, which determines which algorithm to be used,
- Integrity Check value for the key.

Symmetric keys are garbled by XOR calculation with card individual random number.

Secret part x of DSA key is garbled by multiplication with card individual random number.

Exponent of RSA private key is garbled by multiplication with card individual random number.

DP and DQ of RSA CRT private key is garbled by multiplication with card individual random number.

P and Q of RSA CRT private key is garbled by modulo calculation with card individual random number.

PQ of RSA CRT private key is garbled by XOR calculation with card individual random number.

RSA public key is not garbled.

Garbled keys are considered plaintext for the purpose of FIPS 140-2 compliance.

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4.5.4 Cryptographic key zeroization

The Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module zeroizes cryptographic session keys K_{SMAC} and K_{SENC} of Security Domain (Card Manager and G&D Security Domain) when closing of a secure channel.

The key(s) for "GP DAP" K_{DAP}, PK_{DAP} can only be updated. To delete DAP verification key(s), the Security Domain containing the key must be deleted. This operation deletes all the keys contained in the Security Domain.

The keys loaded for Delegated Management K_{Token} and K_{Receipt} can be zeroized by overwriting them with new values using the Put Key command or using the Delete command.

The Global PIN can be zeroized by overwriting with a new value.

Key Management Details can be found in section 6.

All keys including PRNG TRIPLE-DES key for FIPS140-2 approved ANSI X9.31 PRNG [X9.31] and the Global PIN can be zeroized by setting the card state to TERMINATED with the SET STATUS command.

4.6 Approved mode

The cryptographic module supports FIPS mode of operation at all times. Note that while the module provides certain non-Approved functions as internal services to applets loaded on the card (via the JavaCard API), these services are not accessible to operators of the module and have only been listed for the benefit of applet developers. It is the responsibility of the applet developer to develop applets that use the provided JavaCard API functions in a FIPS 140-2 compliant manner.

Please note that the configuration tested for this FIPS 140-2 validation has no applets loaded on it (except for the Card Manager) which makes it impossible to access these non-Approved functions and hence the module remains in FIPS mode of operation at all times. Please refer to section 2.4 of this document for further details.

The non-Approved functions provided by the card are:

- DSA modulus sizes less than 1024-bits (i.e., 512-bits and 768-bits DSA)
- DES and DES MAC
- RSA Encrypt/Decrypt

The ATR value returned by the module during power-up serves as an Approved mode indicator. The ATR returned by Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2, version CPDHxJC RSEFI-025CC073V202 [1] is: ATR = 3B 74 18 00 00 73 66 74 65

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The ATR returned by Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2, version CPDIxJC_RSEFI-025CD080V402 [2] is:

ATR = 3B 7A 18 00 00 73 66 74 65 2D 63 64 30 38 30

The ATR returned by Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2, version CPDYxJC_RSEFI-025CD144V503 [3] is: ATR = 3B 7A 18 00 00 73 66 74 65 20 63 64 31 34 34

The value returned by the module after sending the Get Data command: **80 CA DF 7C 49** serves as an Approved mode indicator.

The response to Get Data in the approved mode returned by Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2, version CPDHxJC_RSEFI-025CC073V202 [1] is:

Response (the last bits): 0C 08 00 00 6F FD 00 00 00 00 90 00

The response to Get Data in the approved mode returned by Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2, version CPDIxJC_RSEFI-025CD080V402 [2] is:

Response (the last bits): 0C 08 00 00 6F FD 6F FD 00 00 90 00

The response to Get Data in the approved mode returned by Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2, version CPDYxJC_RSEFI-025CD144V503 [3] is:

Response (the last bits): 0C 08 00 00 6F FD 6F FD 00 00 90 00

5. SECURITY POLICY CHECK LIST TABLES

5.1 ROLES & REQUIRED AUTHENTICATION

Role	Type of authentication	Authentication data
Crypto Officer	TRIPLE-DES authentication	TRIPLE-DES keys (Crypto Officer Security Domain)
User/Applet Provider	TRIPLE-DES authentication	TRIPLE-DES keys (G&D Security Domain)

Table 7 Roles and required authentication

5.2 STRENGTH OF AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS

Authentication Mechanism	Strength of Mechanism
ILRIPLE-DES AUMENTICATION	Probability that a random attempt succeeds is less than 1 in 1,000,000

Table 8 Strength of authentication mechanisms

5.3 SERVICES AUTHORIZED FOR ROLES

Role	Authorized Services
Crypto Officer	All CO Services as listed in Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2
User/Applet Provider	Only User Services as listed in Section 3.2.2

Table 9 Services authorized for roles

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5.4 ACCESS RIGHTS WITHIN SERVICES

CSP	Service	Role	Types of Access
TRIPLE-DES CO keys:			
K _{ENC} , K _{MAC} , K _{KEK} , K _{Token} ,	PUT KEY command	Crypto Officer	Write
K _{Receipt}			
TRIPLE-DES CO Keys:	INITIALIZE UPDATE &	Crute Officer	Execute
K _{ENC} , K _{MAC}	EXTERNAL AUTH	Crypto Officer	Execute
	PUT KEY, PIN		
TRIPLE-DES CO Key: K _{KEK}	CHANGE/UNBLOCK commands (encryption of the loaded Key or	Crypto Officer	Execute
	PIN)		
TRIPLE-DES CO Session	INITIALIZE UPDATE &	Crypto Officer	Create
Keys: K _{SENC} , K _{SMAC}	EXTERNAL AUTH		
TRIPLE-DES CO Session	Message encryption	Crypto Officer	Execute
Key: K _{SENC}	meeeage eneryphen		Executo
TRIPLE-DES CO Session	Message integrity	Crypto Officer	Execute
Key: K _{SMAC}			
TRIPLE-DES User Keys:			
SDK_{ENC} , SDK_{MAC} , SDK_{KEK}	PUT KEY command	User	Write
K _{DAP}			
TRIPLE-DES User Keys:	INITIALIZE UPDATE &	User	Execute
SDK _{ENC} , SDK _{MAC}	EXTERNAL AUTH	0001	Executo
TRIPLE-DES User Key:	PUT KEY command	User	Execute
SDK _{KEK}	(encryption of the loaded Key)	0361	
TRIPLE-DES User Session	INITIALIZE UPDATE &	User	Create
Keys: SDK _{SENC} , SDK _{SMAC}	EXTERNAL AUTH	0361	Cleale
TRIPLE-DES User Session	Message encryption	User	Execute
Key: SDK _{SENC}	Message encryption	0361	Execute
TRIPLE-DES User Session	Message integrity	User	Execute
Key: SDK _{SMAC}	Message megniy	USEI	LACCULE
"GP DAP" TRIPLE-DES		Cravata Officar	\\/rito
Key: K _{DAP}	PUT KEY command	Crypto Officer	Write
"GP DAP" RSA Key: PK _{DAP}	PUT KEY command	Crypto Officer	Write
	LOAD command		
"GP DAP" TRIPLE-DES	(MAC verification by G&D	Crypto Officer and	Execute
Key: K _{DAP}	Security Domain)	User	Executo
	LOAD command		
"GP DAP" RSA Key: PK _{DAP}	(MAC verification by G&D	Crypto Officer and	Execute
	Security Domain)	User	
Delegated Management			
TRIPLE-DES key K _{Receipt}	PUT KEY command	Crypto Officer	Write
Delegated Management			
	LOAD command	Crypto Officer	Execute
TRIPLE-DES key K _{Receipt}			
Global PIN	PIN CHANGE/UNBLOCK	Crypto Officer	Write
TRIPLE-DES PRNG key	INITIALIZE UPDATE command	Crypto Officer and	Execute
	and RSA, DSA key generation	User	

Table 10 Access rights within services

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6. CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT

The Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 with Applets smart card includes the following keys:

• Initialization Key set (K_{init_enc}, K_{init_mac} K_{init_kek}) is used only for the first Card Manager key-set loading.

• Security Domain (Card Manager and G&D Security Domain) key sets each containing three TRIPLE-DES keys stored in EEPROM. Each key is 112-bits.

1. K_{ENC} or SDK_{\text{ENC}} used for Cryptographic Officer or User authentication per GP Specification

2. K_{MAC} or SDK_{\text{MAC}} used for Cryptographic Officer or User authentication per GP Specification

3. K_{KEK} or SDK_{KEK} used as Key Wrapping Key for encrypting keys input into the module using the Put Key command

- Secure Channel session keys K_{SENC} and K_{SMAC} of Cryptographic Officer or SDK_{SENC} and SDK_{SMAC} of User. These are 112-bit TRIPLE-DES keys stored in RAM
- "GP DAP" TRIPLE-DES key K_{DAP}, a 112-bit TRIPLE-DES key used for DAP verification using TRIPLE-DES MAC.
- "GP DAP" RSA key PK_{DAP}, a 1024-bit public key used for DAP verification using RSA signature verification.
- TRIPLE-DES PRNG key used with FIPS140-2 approved ANSI X9.31 PRNG **[X9.31]** is generated using Hardware Random Generator of chip during initialization.
- Delegated Management 1024-bit RSA key K_{Token} for Token verification to check if Delegated Management command is authorized by Crypto Officer.
- Delegated Management 112-bit TRIPLE-DES key K_{Receipt} for Receipt generation to prove successful execution of Delegated Management command.

All keys can be zeroized by setting the card state to TERMINATED.

7. STANDARDS-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY

The Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 module implements strong, standards-based cryptography. It includes the following FIPS-approved algorithms:

- Triple-DES (3 key TRIPLE-DES) (ECB and CBC modes)
- AES (128, 192, 256-bit key sizes) (ECB and CBC modes)
- SHA-1
- SHA-256
- DSA
- RSA CRT
- RSA Sign/Verify
- PRNG based on ANSI X9.31 [X9.31] Appendix A.2.4

7.1 Non FIPS-approved algorithms

- DSA modulus sizes less than 1024-bits (i.e., 512-bits and 768-bits DSA)
- DES and DES MAC
- RSA Encrypt/Decrypt

7.2 Self-Tests

The Sm@rtCafé Expert 3.2 runs startup and conditional self-tests to verify that it is functioning properly. These startup self-tests are performed before the module processes the first command it receives after a Reset. Conditional self-tests are executed whenever specific conditions are met.

7.2.1 Power-Up Self Tests

The self-tests include:

Software Integrity Tests: The module checks the integrity of its firmware: ROM: 16 bit hardware CRC Firmware in EEPROM: 16 bit hardware CRC Java Code in EEPROM: 16 bit hardware CRC Cryptographic Algorithm KATs: Known Answer Tests (KATs) are run at power-up for the following algorithms: Triple-DES KAT Triple-DES MAC KAT

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AES KAT DSA Sign/Verify test SHA-1 KAT SHA-256 KAT RSA Sign/Verify KAT RSA CRT KAT ANSI 9.31 Software RNG KAT

7.2.2 Conditional Tests

Conditional RSA Pairwise Consistency Check: After generating an RSA key pair, the module performs a sign/verify with that key pair to ensure that the key pair is correct. **Conditional DSA Pairwise Consistency Check:** After generating a DSA key pair, the module performs a sign/verify with that key pair to ensure that the key pair is correct. **Continuous RNG test:** On every output generated by ANSI X9.31 and hardware RNG the module performs a comparison with previously generated random block. The 8 first bytes generated by the ANSI X9.31 PRNG and the hardware RNG are only used for doing this continuous comparison and never used for any service like cryptographic calculations. If generated numbers are equal to previous generated numbers, this selftest fails.

If any of these self-tests fail, the module will halt all operations until it is reset.

If module fails a self-test, the module sends the self-test failure indicator and enters the error state. No further communication is possible with the module until it is removed from the terminal and re-inserted or terminal resets the module.

Software/Firmware Load Test: A TRIPLE-DES CBC MAC on the applet Load File is verified whenever an applet is loaded onto the cryptographic module since applet loading always takes place within a Secure Channel. If Security Domain Applet with mandated DAP privilege is installed and the DAP signature verification key is set in this Security Domain, every Package loaded onto the Card has to provide a DAP value (TRIPLE-DES MAC or RSA Signature), which is verified using the K_{DAP} or PK_{DAP}, respectively.

If TRIPLE-DES MAC or DAP verification fails, package load is terminated. For more details see GP 2.1.1 **[GPCS]**.

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8. MITIGATION OF ATTACKS

The module implements countermeasures for three attacks commonly used against smart cards: simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), and timing analysis. These attacks work by monitoring the power consumption (SPA, DPA) or timing of operations during cryptographic processing in order to gain information about sensitive content, such as secret keys.

The module's IC has a co-processor for performing DES and Triple-DES operations. This co-processor was specifically designed by NXP to counter SPA, DPA, and timing analysis attacks. G&D has conducted testing of the module's DES and Triple-DES processing for resistance to these attacks and found that no information was leaked during this processing via these attacks.

The module's RSA implementation has been hardened against SPA, DPA, fault and timing analysis using a variety of techniques. For timing analysis, the timing of the RSA implementation does not correlate to the inputs to the implementation. To counter SPA, conditional jumps based on the exponent and squares were avoided. Randomization of the base and exponent is employed to counter DPA. G&D has conducted testing of the module's RSA processing for resistance to these attacks and found that no information was leaked during this processing via these attacks.

9. SECURITY POLICY CHECK LIST TABLES

9.1 Roles AND Required Authentication

Role	Type of authentication	Authentication data
Crypto Officer	GP secure channel mutual	GP secure channel TDES key set of
	authentication protocol	three
User/Applet Provider	GP secure channel mutual	GP secure channel TDES key set of
	authentication protocol or TDES	three or Unblock PIN XAUT TDES key

9.2 Strength of authentication Mechanisms

Authentication Mechanism	Strength of Mechanism
TDES authentication	> 1:2 ¹¹²
PIN	> 1:1,000,000 for decimal PIN

9.3 Services authorized for Roles

Role	Authorized Services
Crypto Officer	The Card Security Controller role services are listed in Section 5.1
User/Applet Provider	The Application Operator role services are listed in Section 5.1

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9.4 Mitigation of Other Attacks

Other Attacks	Mitigation Mechanism	Specific Limitations
Simple Power Analysis	Counter Measures against SPA	N/A
Differential Power Analysis	Counter Measures against DPA	N/A
Timing Analysis	Counter Measures against Timing Analysis	N/A
Differential Fault Analysis	Counter Measures against Differential Fault Analysis	s N/A

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10. ACRONYMS

ANSI	American National Standards Institute
APDU	Application Protocol Data Unit
ATR	Answer-To-Reset
CBC	Cipher-Block Chaining
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CO	Crypto Officer
CRT	Chinese Remainder Theorem
DAP	Data Authentication Pattern
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DPA	Differential Power Analysis
EDC	Error Detection Code
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
EMV	Europay Mastercard and Visa
EEPROM	Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM
FCC	Federal Communication Commission
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
G&D	Giesecke & Devrient
GHC	Generalized Hamming Code
I/O	Input/Output
IC	Integrated Circuit
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
JCRE	Java Card [™] Runtime Environment
KAT	Known Answer Test
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MD5	Message Digest algorithm 5
N/A	Not Applicable
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
GP	GlobalPlatform
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standards
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
PRNG	Pseudo Random Number Generator
PUK	Personal Unblocking Key
RAM	Random Access Memory
RNG	Random Number Generator
ROM	Read Only Memory
RSA	Rivest Shamir and Adleman
ROM	Read Only Memory
RSA	Rivest Shamir and Adleman
RST	Reset
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA	Simple Power Analysis

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