

# Aruba 3000 and 6000/M3 Mobility Controllers

with ArubaOS FIPS Firmware  
Non-Proprietary Security Policy  
FIPS 140-2 Level 2



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[www.arubanetworks.com](http://www.arubanetworks.com)

1344 Crossman Avenue  
Sunnyvale, California 94089  
Phone: 408.227.4500  
Fax 408.227.4550

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## Preface

This security policy document can be copied and distributed freely.

## Purpose of this Document

This release supplement provides information regarding the Aruba 3000 and 6000/M3 Mobility Controllers with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation from Aruba Networks. The material in this supplement modifies the general Aruba hardware and firmware documentation included with this product and should be kept with your Aruba product documentation.

This supplement primarily covers the non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Aruba Controller. This security policy describes how the controller meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2 and how to place and maintain the controller in a secure FIPS 140-2 mode. This policy was prepared as part of the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation of the product.

FIPS 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2, *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*) details the U.S. Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) website at:

<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html>

## Related Documents

The following items are part of the complete installation and operations documentation included with this product:

- *Aruba 6000 Mobility Controller Installation Guide*
- *Aruba 3000-series Mobility Controller Installation Guide*
- *ArubaOS 6.4 User Guide*
- *ArubaOS 6.4 CLI Reference Guide*
- *ArubaOS 6.4 Quick Start Guide*
- *ArubaOS 6.4 Upgrade Guide*
- *Aruba AP Installation Guides*

## Additional Product Information

More information is available from the following sources:

- The Aruba Networks Web-site contains information on the full line of products from Aruba Networks:  
<http://www.arubanetworks.com>
- The NIST Validated Modules Web-site contains contact information for answers to technical or sales-related questions for the product:  
<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html>

## Overview

The Aruba 6000 and 3000 series Mobility Controllers are network infrastructure devices providing secure, scalable solutions for enterprise Wi-Fi, network security policy enforcement, VPN services, and wireless intrusion detection and prevention. Mobility controllers serve as central points of authentication, encryption, access control, and network coordination for all mobile network services.

The controller configurations tested during the cryptographic module testing included:

- Aruba 3200-F1
- Aruba 3200-USF1
- Aruba 3400-F1
- Aruba 3400-USF1
- Aruba 3600-F1
- Aruba 3600-USF1
- M3mk1-S-F1 (used in both Aruba 6000-400-F1 and Aruba-6000-400-USF1 chassis)
- Aruba 6000-400-F1 and Aruba 6000-400-USF1 chassis (no more than four Aruba line cards, including the combinations among M3mk1-S-F1, LC-2G-1, LC-2G24F-1, or LC-2G24FP-1, in a single hardware configuration). Please note that the use of LC-2G-1, LC-2G24F-1 and LC-2G24FP-1 is optional, but at least one M3mk1-S-F1 is required in a single hardware configuration).
- FIPS Kit
  - 4011570-01 (Part number for Tamper Evident Labels)
- Firmware versions: ArubaOS 6.3.1.7-FIPS or ArubaOS 6.4.3.0-FIPS

Note: For radio regulatory reasons, Aruba 3200-USF1, Aruba 3400-USF1, Aruba 3600-USF1 and Aruba 6000-400-USF1 are to be sold in the US only. Aruba 3200-F1, Aruba 3400-F1, Aruba 3600-F1 and Aruba 6000-400-F1 must not be used for deployment in the United States. From a FIPS perspective, both -USF1 and -F1 models are identical and fully FIPS compliant.

## Physical Description

### Cryptographic Module Boundaries

For FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation, the Controller has been validated as a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The steel chassis physically encloses the complete set of hardware and firmware components and represents the cryptographic boundary of the controller. The cryptographic boundary is defined as encompassing the top, front, left, right, rear, and bottom surfaces of the chassis.

### Aruba 6000

Figure 1 - The Aruba 6000-400 controller chassis with M3 Mark I




Figure 1 shows the front of the Aruba 6000 controller chassis, and illustrates the following:

- In each Aruba 6000-400-F1 or Aruba 6000-400-USF1 controller chassis:
  - One M3mk1-S-F1 card is required to be installed in slot 0.
  - Up to three Aruba line cards (the combination of LC-2G-1, LC-2G24F-1, LC-2G24FP-1, or M3mk1-S-F1) can be installed in slots 1, 2 and 3 respectively

**Table 1** below lists a detailed line cards configuration in a single Aruba 6000-400-F1 or Aruba 6000-400-USF1 controller chassis.

**Table 1- 6000-400-F1 or 6000-400-USF1 Controller Chassis Configurations**

Slot 0	Slot 1	Slot 2	Slot 3
M3mk1-S-F1	x	x	x
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G-1	x	x
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G-1	LC-2G-1	x

M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G-1	LC-2G-1	LC-2G-1
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G-1	LC-2G24F-1	x
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G-1	LC-2G24F-1	LC-2G24F-1
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G-1	LC-2G24F-1	LC-2G24FP-1
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G-1	LC-2G24FP-1	x
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G-1	LC-2G24FP-1	LC-2G24FP-1
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24F-1	x	x
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24F-1	LC-2G24F-1	x
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24F-1	LC-2G24F-1	LC-2G24F-1
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24F-1	LC-2G24F-1	LC-2G24FP-1
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24F-1	LC-2G24FP-1	LC-2G24FP-1
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24FP-1	x	x
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24FP-1	LC-2G24FP-1	x
M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24FP-1	LC-2G24FP-1	LC-2G24FP-1
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	x	x
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G-1	x
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G-1	LC-2G-1
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G-1	LC-2G24F-1
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G-1	LC-2G24FP-1
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24F-1	x
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24F-1	LC-2G24F-1
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24F-1	LC-2G24FP-1
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24FP-1	x
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24FP-1	LC-2G24FP-1
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	x
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G-1
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24F-1



M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	LC-2G24FP-1
M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1	M3mk1-S-F1

An "x" represents an empty slot.

- Status indicator LEDs indicate power state, status of the device, and link activity.
- PS1, PS2, and PS3 are for Power Supply modules. The number of power supplies required for the system depends on the number of Line Cards installed, and whether to include redundancy for fault tolerance (please refer to the *Aruba 6000 Mobility Controller Installation Guide*). It is Crypto Officer's responsibility to install the power supplies. The two available power supplies are:
  - 200 W Power Supply (HW-PSU-200)
  - 400 W Power Supply (HW-PSU-400)

*When using more than one power supply, verify that they are all of the same type. Do not mix 200 W and 400 W power supplies in the same chassis.*

## Aruba 3000 Series

The Aruba 3000-series Controller chassis is a 1U non-modular chassis.

**Figure 2 - Aruba 3000-series Controller Chassis**




Figure 2 shows the front of the Aruba 3000-series Controller, and illustrates the following:

- System indicator LEDs indicate power state and status of the device.
- Four Gigabit Ethernet ports provide network connectivity.
- Optional 1000Base-X fiber optic ports provide network connectivity.
- Serial Console port is for connecting to a local management console.

## Intended Level of Security

The Aruba 3000 and 6000/M3 Controllers and associated modules are intended to meet overall FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements as shown in Table 2.

**Table 2 - Intended Level of Security**

Section	Section Title	Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	2
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
4	Finite State Model	2
5	Physical Security	2
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Cryptographic Key Management	2
8	EMI/EMC	2
9	Self-tests	2
10	Design Assurance	2
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A
<b>Overall</b>	<b>Overall module validation level</b>	<b>2</b>

## Physical Security

The Aruba Controller is a scalable, multi-processor standalone network device and is enclosed in a robust steel housing. The switch enclosure is resistant to probing and is opaque within the visible spectrum. The enclosure of the switch has been designed to satisfy FIPS 140-2 Level 2 physical security requirements.

For the Aruba 6000-400 the left, top, right, and bottom surfaces are irremovable. The rear panel can be removed by unscrewing fifteen screws. The switch has a number of components at front side, including four slots for supervisor and line cards, one fan tray, and three power supplies. Each of the components is attached with two screws.

For the Aruba 3000-series the left, right, front, rear, and bottom surfaces are irremovable. The top panel can be removed by unscrewing two screws. A metallic opaque shield is installed at the factory during manufacturing and cannot be removed by the User.

For physical security, the Aruba 6000-400 chassis requires Tamper-Evident Labels (TEs) to allow the detection of the opening of the chassis covers; the removal or replacement of any module or cover plate, and to block the Serial console port.

The Aruba 3000-series Controllers require Tamper-Evident Labels (TEs) to allow the detection of the opening of the chassis cover and to block the Serial console port.

To protect the Aruba 3000 and 6000/M3 Controllers from any tampering with the product, TEs should be applied by the Crypto Officer as covered under "Tamper-Evident Labels" in this document.

## Operational Environment

The operational environment is non-modifiable. The control plane Operating System (OS) is Linux, a real-time, multi-threaded operating system that supports memory protection between processes. Access to the underlying Linux implementation is not provided directly. Only Aruba Networks provided interfaces are used, and the CLI is a restricted command set.

## Logical Interfaces

All of these physical interfaces are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as described in the following table.

**Table 3 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces**

FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface	Module Physical Interface
Data Input Interface	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 10/100 Mbps Ethernet port</li><li>• 10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet ports</li></ul>
Data Output Interface	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 10/100 Mbps Ethernet port</li><li>• 10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet ports</li></ul>

**Table 3 - FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces**

Control Input Interface	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Power switch (Aruba 6000 only)</li><li>• Reset button (Aruba 6000 only)</li><li>• 10/100 Mbps Ethernet port</li><li>• 10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet ports</li><li>• Serial console port (disabled)</li></ul>
Status Output Interface	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 10/100 Mbps Ethernet port</li><li>• 10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet ports</li><li>• LEDs</li><li>• Serial console port (disabled)</li></ul>
Power Interface	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Power Supply</li><li>• POE (Aruba 6000 only)</li></ul>

Data input and output, control input, status output, and power interfaces are defined as follows:

Data input and output are the packets that use the firewall, VPN, and routing functionality of the modules.

- Control input consists of manual control inputs for power and reset through the power and reset switch. It also consists of all of the data that is entered into the controller while using the management interfaces.
- Status output consists of the status indicators displayed through the LEDs, the status data that is output from the controller while using the management interfaces, and the log file.
- LEDs indicate the physical state of the module, such as power-up (or rebooting), utilization level, activation state (including fan, ports, and power). The log file records the results of self-tests, configuration errors, and monitoring data.
- A power supply is used to connect the electric power cable. Operating power is also provided (Aruba 6000 only) to a compatible Power Over Ethernet (POE) device when connected. The power is provided through the connected Ethernet cable.

The controller distinguishes between different forms of data, control, and status traffic over the network ports by analyzing the packets header information and contents.

## Roles and Services

The Aruba Controller supports role-based authentication. There are two roles in the module (as required by FIPS 140-2 Level 2) that operators may assume: a Crypto Officer role and a User role. The Administrator maps to the Crypto-Officer role and the client Users map to the User role.

### Crypto Officer Role

The Crypto Officer role has the ability to configure, manage, and monitor the controller. Three management interfaces can be used for this purpose:

- SSHv2 CLI

The Crypto Officer can use the CLI to perform non-security-sensitive and security-sensitive monitoring and configuration. The CLI can be accessed remotely by using the SSHv2 secured

management session over the Ethernet ports or locally over the serial port. In FIPS mode, the serial port is disabled.

- Web Interface

The Crypto Officer can use the Web Interface as an alternative to the CLI. The Web Interface provides a highly intuitive, graphical interface for a comprehensive set of controller management tools. The Web Interface can be accessed from a TLS-enabled Web browser using HTTPS (HTTP with Secure Socket Layer) on logical port 4343.

- SNMP v3

The Crypto Officer can also use SNMPv3 to remotely perform non-security-sensitive monitoring using the 'get' and 'getnext' commands.

See the table below for descriptions of the services available to the Crypto Officer role.

**Table 4 - Crypto-Officer Services**

Service	Description	Input	Output	CSP Access
SSH v2.0	Provide authenticated and encrypted remote management sessions while using the CLI	SSHv2 key agreement parameters, SSH inputs, and data	SSHv2 outputs and data	6, 16 (read) 8, 9, 24, 25 (read/write)
SNMPv3	Provides ability to query management information	SNMPv3 requests	SNMPv3 responses	34, 35 (read) 36 (read/write)
IKEv1/IKEv2-IPSec	Provide authenticated and encrypted remote management sessions to access the CLI functionality	IKEv1/IKEv2 inputs and data; IPSec inputs, commands, and data	IKEv1/IKEv2 outputs, status, and data; IPSec outputs, status, and data	29, 30, 31, 32 (read) 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 (read/write) 17 (read) 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 (read/write)
Configuring Network Management	Create management Users and set their password and privilege level; configure the SNMP agent	Commands and configuration data	Status of commands and configuration data	36, 37 (read/write)

**Table 4 - Crypto-Officer Services**

Configuring Module Platform	Define the platform subsystem firmware of the module by entering Bootrom Monitor Mode, File System, fault report, message logging, and other platform related commands	Commands and configuration data	Status of commands and configuration data	None
Configuring Hardware Controllers	Define synchronization features for module	Commands and configuration data	Status of commands and configuration data	None
Configuring Internet Protocol	Set IP functionality	Commands and configuration data	Status of commands and configuration data	None
Configuring Quality of Service (QoS)	Configure QOS values for module	Commands and configuration data	Status of commands and configuration data	None
Configuring VPN	Configure Public Key Infrastructure (PKI); configure the Internet Key Exchange (IKEv1/IKEv2) Security Protocol; configure the IPSec protocol	Commands and configuration data	Status of commands and configuration data	19 (read/write)
Configuring DHCP	Configure DHCP on module	Commands and configuration data	Status of commands and configuration data	None
Configuring Security	Define security features for module, including Access List, Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA), and firewall functionality	Commands and configuration data	Status of commands and configuration data	14, 15, 16 (read/write)
Manage Certificates	Install, rename, and delete X.509 certificates	Commands and configuration data; Certificates and keys	Status of certificates, commands, and configuration	29, 30, 31, 32 (read/write)
HTTPS over TLS	Secure browser connection over Transport Layer Security acting as a Crypto Officer service (web management interface)	TLS inputs, commands, and data	TLS outputs, status, and data	29, 30, 31, 32 (read) 26, 27, 28 (read/write)

**Table 4 - Crypto-Officer Services**

Status Function	Cryptographic officer may use CLI "show" commands or view WebUI via TLS to view the controller configuration, routing tables, and active sessions; view health, temperature, memory status, voltage, and packet statistics; review accounting logs, and view physical interface status	Commands and configuration data	Status of commands and configurations	None
IPSec tunnel establishment for RADIUS protection	Provided authenticated/encrypted channel to RADIUS server	IKEv1/IKEv2 inputs and data; IPSec inputs, commands, and data	IKEv1/IKEv2 outputs, status, and data; IPSec outputs, status, and data	29, 30, 31, 32 (read) 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 (read/write) 17 (read) 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 (read/write)
Self-Test	Perform FIPS start-up tests on demand	None	Error messages logged if a failure occurs	None
Configuring Bypass Operation	Configure bypass operation on the module	Commands and configuration data	Status of commands and configuration data	None
Updating Firmware	Updating firmware on the module	Commands and configuration data	Status of commands and configuration data	None
Configuring Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Responder	Configuring OCSP responder functionality	OCSP inputs, commands, and data	OCSP outputs, status, and data	29, 30, 31, 32 (read)
Configuring Control Plane Security (CPSec)	Configuring Control Plane Security mode to protect communication with APs using IPSec and issue self signed certificates to APs	Commands and configuration data, IKEv1/IKEv2 inputs and data; IPSec inputs, commands, and data	Status of commands, IKEv1/IKEv2 outputs, status, and data; IPSec outputs, status, and data and configuration data, self signed certificates	29, 30, 31, 32 (read) 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 (read/write) 17 (read) 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 (read/write)

**Table 4 - Crypto-Officer Services**

Zeroization	Zeroizes all flash memory	Command	Progress information	All CSPs will be destroyed.
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## User Role

The User role can access the controller's IPSec and IKEv1/IKEv2 services. Service descriptions and inputs/outputs are listed in the following table:

**Table 5 - User Service**

Service	Description	Input	Output	CSP Access
IKEv1/IKEv2-IPSec	Access the module's IPSec services in order to secure network traffic	IPSec inputs, commands, and data	IPSec outputs, status, and data	29, 30, 31, 32 (read) 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 (read/write) 17 (read) 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 (read/write)
HTTPS over TLS	Access the module's TLS services in order to secure network traffic	TLS inputs, commands, and data	TLS outputs, status, and data	29, 30, 31, 32 (read) 26, 27, 28 (read/write)
EAP-TLS termination	Provide EAP-TLS termination	EAP-TLS inputs, commands and data	EAP-TLS outputs, status and data	29, 30, 31, 32 (read) 26, 27, 28 (read/write)
802.11i Shared Key Mode	Access the module's 802.11i services in order to secure network traffic	802.11i inputs, commands and data	802.11i outputs, status and data	33 (read) 35 (read/write)



802.11i with EAP-TLS	Access the module's 802.11i services in order to secure network traffic	802.11i inputs, commands and data	802.11i outputs, status, and data	29, 30, 31, 32 (read) 34, 35 (read/write)
Self-Tests	Run Power-On Self-Tests and Conditional Tests	None	Error messages logged if a failure occurs	None

## Authentication Mechanisms

The Aruba Controller supports role-based authentication. Role-based authentication is performed before the Crypto Officer enters privileged mode using admin password via Web Interface or SSHv2 or by entering enable command and password in console. Role-based authentication is also performed for User authentication.

This includes password and RSA/ECDSA-based authentication mechanisms. The strength of each authentication mechanism is described below.

**Table 6 - Estimated Strength of Authentication Mechanisms**

Authentication Type	Role	Strength
Password-based authentication (CLI and Web Interface)	Crypto Officer	Passwords are required to be a minimum of eight characters and a maximum of 32 with a minimum of one letter and one number. If six (6) integers, one (1) special character and one (1) alphabet are used without repetition for an eight (6) digit PIN, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in 251,596,800 (this calculation is based on the assumption that the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard has 10 Integer digits, 52 alphabetic characters, and 32 special characters providing 94 characters to choose from in total. The calculation should be $10 \times 9 \times 8 \times 7 \times 6 \times 5 \times 32 \times 52 = 251,596,800$ ). Therefore, the associated probability of a successful random attempt is approximately 1 in 8,386,560, which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
RSA-based authentication (IKEv1/IKEv2)	User	When using RSA based authentication, RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048 bits, thus providing 112 bits of strength. Assuming the low end of that range, the associated probability of a successful random attempt is 1 in $2^{112}$ , which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2.

ECDSA-based authentication (IKEv1/IKEv2)	User	ECDSA signing and verification is used to authenticate to the module during IKEv1/IKEv2. Both P-256 and P-384 curves are supported. ECDSA P-256 provides 128 bits of equivalent security, and P-384 provides 192 bits of equivalent security. Assuming the low end of that range, the associated probability of a successful random attempt is 1 in $2^{128}$ , which is less than 1 in 1,000,000 required by FIPS 140-2.
Pre-shared key-based authentication (IKEv1/IKEv2)	User	Same mechanism strength as Password-based authentication above.
Pre-shared key based authentication (802.11i)	User	Same mechanism strength as IKEv1/IKEv2 shared secret above.
EAP-TLS authentication	User	If RSA is used, 2048 bit RSA keys correspond to effective strength of $2^{112}$ ; If ECDSA (P-256 and P-384) is used, curve P-256 provides 128 bits of equivalent security, and P-384 provides 192 bits of equivalent security.

## Unauthenticated Services

The Aruba Controller can perform VLAN, bridging, firewall, routing, and forwarding functionality without authentication. These services do not involve any cryptographic processing.

Additional unauthenticated services include performance of the power-on self-test and system status indication via LEDs.

## Non-Approved Services

The following non-approved services are also available to the unauthenticated operators.

- Network Time Protocol (NTP) service
- Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) service
- VLAN service
- Network bridging service
- Network Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) service
- Packets routing, switching and forwarding

# Cryptographic Key Management

## Implemented Algorithms

FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms have been implemented in firmware and hardware.

- Hardware encryption acceleration is provided for bulk cryptographic operations for the following FIPS approved algorithms:
  - AES (Cert. #762)
  - Triple-DES (Cert. #667)
  - SHS (Cert. #769)
  - HMAC (Cert. #417)

The firmware supports the following cryptographic implementations.

- ArubaOS OpenSSL Module implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
  - AES (Cert. #2680)
  - CVL (Cert. #152)
  - DRBG (Cert. #433)
  - ECDSA (Cert. #469)
  - HMAC (Cert. #1666)
  - KBKDF (Cert. #16)
  - RSA (Cert. #1379)
  - SHS (Cert. #2249)
  - Triple-DES (Cert. #1607)

Note:

- RSA (Cert. #1379; non-compliant with the functions from the CAVP Historical RSA List)
  - ❖ FIPS186-2:
    - ALG[ANSIX9.31]: Key(gen)(MOD: 1024 PubKey Values: 65537)
    - ALG[RSASSA-PKCS1\_V1\_5]: SIG(gen): 1024, SHS: SHA-1/SHA-256/SHA-384/SHA-512, 2048, SHS: SHA-1
- ECDSA (Cert. #469; non-compliant with the functions from the CAVP Historical ECDSA List)
  - ❖ FIPS186-2:
    - SIG(gen): CURVES(P-256 P-384), SHS: SHA-1
- ArubaOS Crypto Module implementation supports the following FIPS Approved Algorithms:
  - AES (Cert. #2677)
  - CVL (Cert. #150)
  - ECDSA (Cert. #466)
  - HMAC (Cert. #1663)
  - RNG (Cert. #1250)
  - RSA (Cert. #1376)
  - SHS (Cert. #2246)
  - Triple-DES (Cert. #1605)

Note:

- RSA (Cert. #1376; non-compliant with the functions from the CAVP Historical RSA List)
  - ❖ FIPS186-2:
    - ALG[ANSIX9.31]: Key(gen)(MOD: 1024 PubKey Values: 65537)
    - ALG[RSASSA-PKCS1\_V1\_5]: SIG(gen): 1024, SHS: SHA-1/SHA-256/SHA-384/SHA-512, 2048, SHS: SHA-1
- ECDSA (Cert. #466; non-compliant with the functions from the CAVP Historical ECDSA List)
  - ❖ FIPS186-2:
    - SIG(gen): CURVES(P-256 P-384), SHS: SHA-1
- ArubaOS UBOOT Bootloader implements the following FIPS-approved algorithms:
  - RSA (Cert. #1380)
  - SHS (Cert. #2250)

### Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms Allowed in FIPS Mode

- Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)
- EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 128 or 192 bits of encryption strength)
- NDRNGs
- RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)

### Non-FIPS Approved Algorithms

The cryptographic module implements the following non-approved algorithms that are not permitted for use in the FIPS 140-2 mode of operations:

- DES
- HMAC-MD5
- MD5
- RC4

## Critical Security Parameters

The following are the Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) used in the controller.

**Table 7 - CSPs/Keys Used in Aruba Controllers**

#	Name	CSPs type	Generation	Storage and Zeroization	Use
1	Key Encryption Key (KEK)	Triple-DES 168-bit key	Hardcoded during manufacturing	Stored in Flash. Zeroized by using command 'wipe out flash'	Encrypts IKEv1/IKEv2 Pre-shared key, RADIUS server shared secret, RSA private key, ECDSA private key, 802.11i pre-shared key and Passwords.
2	DRBG entropy input	SP800-90a DRBG (512 bits)	Derived using NON-FIPS approved HW RNG	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized on reboot.	DRBG initialization
3	DRBG seed	SP800-90a DRBG (384 bits)	Generated per SP800-90A using a derivation function	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized on reboot.	DRBG initialization
4	DRBG key	SP800-90a (256 bits)	Generated per SP800-90A	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized on reboot.	DRBG
5	DRBG V	SP800-90a (128 bits)	Generated per SP800-90A	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized on reboot.	DRBG
6	RNG seed	FIPS 186-2 RNG Seed (512 bits)	Derived using NON-FIPS approved HW RNG	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized on reboot.	Seed 186-2 General purpose (x-change Notice); SHA-1 RNG

7	RNG seed key	FIPS 186-2 RNG Seed key (512 bits)	Derived using NON-FIPS approved HW RNG	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized on reboot.	Seed 186-2 General purpose (x-change Notice); SHA-1 RNG
8	Diffie-Hellman private key	Diffie-Hellman private key (224 bits)	Generated internally during Diffie-Hellman Exchange	Stored in the volatile memory. Zeroized after the session is closed.	Used in establishing the session key for an IPSec session
9	Diffie-Hellman public key	Diffie-Hellman public key (2048 bits)  Note: Key size of DH Group 1 (768 bits) and DH Group 2 (1024 bits) are not allowed in FIPS mode.	Generated internally during Diffie-Hellman Exchange	Stored in the volatile memory. Zeroized after the session is closed.	Used in establishing the session key for an IPSec session
10	Diffie-Hellman shared secret	Diffie-Hellman shared secret (2048 bits)	Established during Diffie-Hellman Exchange	Stored in plain text in volatile memory, Zeroized when session is closed.	Key agreement in SSHv2
11	EC Diffie-Hellman private key	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (P-256 and P-384).	Generated internally during EC Diffie-Hellman Exchange	Stored in the volatile memory. Zeroized after the session is closed.	Used in establishing the session key for an IPSec session
12	EC Diffie-Hellman public key	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (P-256 and P-384).	Generated internally during EC Diffie-Hellman Exchange	Stored in the volatile memory. Zeroized after the session is closed.	Used in establishing the session key for an IPSec session
13	EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ( P-256 and P-384)	Established during EC Diffie-Hellman Exchange	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized when session is closed.	Key agreement in IKEv1/IKEv2
14	RADIUS server shared secret	8-128 character shared secret	CO configured	Stored encrypted in Flash with the KEK. Zeroized by changing (updating) the pre-shared key through the User interface.	Module and RADIUS server authentication

15	Enable secret	8-64 character password	CO configured	Store in ciphertext in flash. Zeroized by changing (updating) through the user interface.	Administrator authentication
16	User Passwords	8-64 character password	CO configured	Stored encrypted in Flash with KEK. Zeroized by either deleting the password configuration file or by overwriting the password with a new one.	Authentication for accessing the management interfaces, RADIUS authentication
17	IKEv1/IKEv2 Pre-shared key	64 character pre-shared key	CO configured	Stored encrypted in Flash with the KEK. Zeroized by changing (updating) the pre-shared key through the User interface.	User and module authentication during IKEv1, IKEv2
18	skeyid	HMAC-SHA-1/256/384 (160/256/384 bits)	Established during IKEv1 negotiation	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized when session is closed.	Key agreement in IKEv1
19	skeyid_d	HMAC-SHA-1/256/384 (160/256/384 bits)	Established during IKEv1 negotiation	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized when session is closed.	Key agreement in IKEv1
20	IKEv1/IKEv2 session authentication key	HMAC-SHA-1/256/384 (160 / 256 / 384 bits)	Established as a result of IKEv1/IKEv2 service implementation.	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized when session is closed.	IKEv1/IKEv2 payload integrity verification
21	IKEv1/IKEv2 session encryption key	Triple-DES (168 bits/AES (128/196/256 bits - 3 key Triple-DES only)	Established as a result of IKEv1/IKEv2 service implementation.	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized when session is closed.	IKEv1/IKEv2 payload encryption
22	IPSec session encryption keys	Triple-DES (168 bits / AES (128/196/256 bits - 3 key Triple-DES only)	Established during the IPSec service implementation	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized when the session is closed.	Secure IPSec traffic

23	IPSec session authentication keys	HMAC-SHA-1 (160 bits)	Established during the IPSec service implementation	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized when the session is closed.	User authentication
24	SSHv2 session keys	AES (128/196/256 bits)	Established during the SSHv2 key exchange	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized when the session is closed.	Secure SSHv2 traffic
25	SSHv2 session authentication key	HMAC-SHA-1 (160-bit)	Established during the SSHv2 key exchange	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized when the session is closed.	Secure SSHv2 traffic
26	TLS pre-master secret	48 byte secret	Externally generated	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized when the session is closed.	TLS key agreement
27	TLS session encryption key	AES 128/192/256 bits	Generated in the module during the TLS service implementation	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized when the session is closed.	TLS session encryption
28	TLS session authentication key	HMAC-SHA-1/256/384 (160/256/384 bits)	Generated in the module during the TLS service implementation	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized when the session is closed.	TLS session authentication
29	RSA Private Key	RSA 2048 bit private key	Generated in the module	Stored in flash memory encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by the CO command <b>write erase all</b> .	Used by TLS and EAP-TLS/PEAP protocols during the handshake, used for signing OCSP responses, and used by IKEv1/IKEv2 for device authentication and for signing certificates
30	RSA Public key	RSA 2048 bit public key	Generated in the module	Stored in flash memory encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by the CO command <b>write erase all</b> .	Used by TLS and EAP-TLS/PEAP protocols during the handshake, used for signing OCSP responses, and used by IKEv1/IKEv2 for device authentication and for signing certificates



31	ECDSA Private Key	ECDSA suite B P-256 and P-384 curves	Generated in the module	Stored in flash memory encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by the CO command <b>write erase all</b> .	Used by TLS and EAP-TLS/PEAP protocols during the handshake.
32	ECDSA Public Key	ECDSA suite B P-256 and P-384 curves	Generated in the module	Stored in flash memory encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by the CO command <b>write erase all</b> .	Used by TLS and EAP-TLS/PEAP protocols during the handshake.
33	802.11i Pre-Shared Key (PSK)	8-63 character 802.11i pre-shared secret for use in 802.11i (SP 800-108) key derivation	CO configured	Stored in flash memory encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by the CO command <b>write erase all</b> .	Used by the 802.11i protocol
34	802.11i Pair-Wise Master key (PMK)	802.11i secret key (256-bit)	Derived during the EAP-TLS/PEAP handshake	Stored in the volatile memory. Zeroized on reboot.	Used by the 802.11i protocol
35	802.11i session key	AES-CCM key (128 bits), AES-GCM key (128/256 bits)	Derived from 802.11 PMK	Stored in plaintext in volatile memory. Zeroized on reboot.	Used for 802.11i encryption
36	SNMPv3 authentication password	8-64 character password	CO configured	Stored in flash memory encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by the CO command <b>write erase all</b> .	Used for SNMPv3 authentication
37	SNMPv3 privacy password	8-64 character password	CO configured	Stored in flash memory encrypted with KEK. Zeroized by the CO command <b>write erase all</b> .	Used to derive SNMPv3 session key
38	SNMPv3 session key	AES-CFB key (128 bits)	Derived from SNMPv3 privacy password using an approved KDF	Stored in volatile memory. Zeroized on reboot.	Secure channel for SNMPv3 management

## Self-Tests

The Aruba Controller performs both power-up and conditional self-tests. In the event any self-test fails, the controller will enter an error state, log the error, and reboot automatically.

The following self-tests are performed:

ArubaOS OpenSSL Module:

- AES (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
- Triple-DES (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
- DRBG KAT
- RSA KAT
- ECDSA Sign/Verify
- SHS (SHA1, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512) KATs
- HMAC (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384 and HMAC-SHA512) KATs

ArubaOS Crypto Module

- AES (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
- Triple-DES (encrypt/decrypt) KAT
- SHA (SHA1, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512) KAT
- HMAC (HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384 and HMAC-SHA512) KAT
- RSA KAT
- ECDSA Sign/Verify
- FIPS 186-2 RNG KAT

ArubaOS UBoot BootLoader Module

- Firmware Integrity Test: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048 bits) signature verification with SHA-1

Aruba Hardware Known Answer Tests:

- AES (encrypt/decrypt) KATs
- AES-CCM KAT
- AES-GCM KAT
- Triple-DES(encrypt/decrypt) KATs
- HMAC (HMAC-SHA1) KAT

The following Conditional Self-tests are performed in the controller:

ArubaOS OpenSSL Module

- Bypass Tests (Wired Bypass Test and Wireless Bypass Test)
- CRNG Test to Approved RNG (DRBG)
- ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- RSA Pairwise Consistency Test

ArubaOS Crypto Module

- CRNG Test to Approved RNG (FIPS 186-2 RNG)
- ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
- RSA Pairwise Consistency Test

## ArubaOS UBoot BootLoader Module

- Firmware Load Test - RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (2048 bits) signature verification

### Conditional Tests on Hardware:

- CRNG Test to non-Approved RNGs

Self-test results are logged in a log file. Upon successful completion of the power-up self tests, the module logs a KATS: passed message into a log file. Confirm the file update by checking the associated time of the file.

In the event of a hardware KATs failure, the log file records one of the following messages depending on the algorithm being validated:

- AES256 HMAC-SHA1 hash failed
- AES256 Encrypt failed
- AES256 Decrypt Failed
- 3DES HMAC-SHA1 hash failed
- 3DES Encrypt failed
- 3DES Decrypt Failed
- DES HMAC-SHA1 hash failed
- DES Encrypt failed
- DES Decrypt Failed
- HW KAT test failed for AESCCM CTR. Rebooting
- AESCCM Encrypt Failed

This text is followed by this message:

```
The POST Test failed!!!!  
Rebooting...
```

## Alternating Bypass State

The controller implements an alternating bypass state when:

- a port is configured in trusted mode to provide unauthenticated services
- a configuration provides wireless access without encryption

The alternating bypass status can be identified by retrieving the port configuration or the wireless network configuration.

## Installing the Controller

This chapter covers the physical installation of the Aruba 3000 and 6000/M3 Controllers with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation. The Crypto Officer is responsible for ensuring that the following procedures are used to place the controller in a FIPS-approved mode of operation.

This chapter covers the following installation topics:

- Precautions to be observed during installation
- Requirements for the controller components and rack mounting gear
- Selecting a proper environment for the controller
- Mounting the controller in a rack
- Connecting power to the controller

## Pre-Installation Checklist

You will need the following during installation:

- Aruba 3000 and 6000/M3 Controller components.
- Aruba 3000 and 6000/M3 rack mounting kit.
- Phillips or cross-head screwdriver.
- Equipment rack.
- Aruba power cord for each power supply, rated to at least 10 A with IEC320 connector.
- Adequate power supplies and electrical power.
- Cool, non-condensing air 0 to 40 °C (32 to 104 °F). May require air conditioning.
- Management Station (PC) with 10/100 Mbps Ethernet port and SSHv2 software.
- A 4- or 8-conductor Category 5 UTP Ethernet cable.

## Precautions

- Installation should be performed only by a trained technician.
- Dangerous voltage in excess of 240 VAC is always present while the Aruba power supply is plugged into an electrical outlet. Remove all rings, jewelry, and other potentially conductive material before working with this product.
- Never insert foreign objects into the chassis, the power supply, or any other component, even when the power supplies have been turned off, unplugged, or removed.
- Main power is fully disconnected from the controller only by unplugging all power cords from their power outlets. For safety reasons, make sure the power outlets and plugs are within easy reach of the operator.
- Do not handle electrical cables that are not insulated. This includes any network cables.
- Keep water and other fluids away from the product.
- Comply with electrical grounding standards during all phases of installation and operation of the product. Do not allow the controller chassis, network ports, power supplies, or mounting brackets to contact any device, cable, object, or person attached to a different electrical ground. Also, never connect the device to external storm grounding sources.
- Installation or removal of the chassis or any module must be performed in a static-free environment. The proper use of anti-static body straps and mats is strongly recommended.
- Keep modules in anti-static packaging when not installed in the chassis.
- Do not ship or store this product near strong electromagnetic, electrostatic, magnetic or radioactive fields.
- Do not disassemble chassis or modules. They have no internal user-serviceable parts. When service or repair is needed, contact Aruba Networks.

## Product Examination

The units are shipped to the Crypto Officer in factory-sealed boxes using trusted commercial carrier shipping companies. The Crypto Officer should examine the carton for evidence of tampering. Tamper-evidence includes tears, scratches, and other irregularities in the packaging.

## Package Contents

The product carton should include the following:

- Aruba 3000 or 6000/M3 Controller
- Rack mounting kit
- Aruba User Documentation CD
- Tamper-Evident Labels

## Minimum Configuration for the Aruba 6000-400

The Aruba 6000-400 controller chassis must include the following basic components:

- One modular switch chassis
- One fan tray
- One Aruba M3mk1-S-F1 card in slot 0
- Power Supply



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The number and type of power supplies required depends on the number of line cards installed in the chassis (refer to the *Aruba 6000 Mobility Controller Installation Guide*). It is the Crypto Office's responsibility to install all required power supplies during module setup phase.

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The controller is shipped with all required modules installed.



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The Aruba 3000 series do not have minimum configurations, as they are fixed configuration chassis.

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## Tamper-Evident Labels

After testing, the Crypto Officer must apply Tamper-Evident Labels (TELs) to the controller. When applied properly, the TELs allow the Crypto Officer to detect the opening of the chassis cover, the removal or replacement of modules or cover plates, or physical access to restricted ports. Vendor provides **FIPS 140** designated TELs which have met the physical security testing requirements for tamper evident labels under the FIPS 140-2 Standard. TELs are not endorsed by the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP).



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The tamper-evident labels shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation.

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Aruba Provides double the required amount of TELs. If a customer requires replacement TELs, please call customer support and Aruba will provide the TELs (Part # 4011570-01).

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
The Crypto officer shall be responsible for keeping the extra TELs at a safe location and managing the use of the TELs.

---

### Reading TELs

Once applied, the TELs included with the controller cannot be surreptitiously broken, removed, or reapplied without an obvious change in appearance:

**Figure 3 - Tamper-Evident Labels**




Each TEL also has a unique serial number to prevent replacement with similar labels.

## Required TEL Locations

The Aruba 6000-400 controller chassis requires a minimum of 11 TELs to be applied as follows:

**Figure 4 - Required TELs for the Aruba 6000 Controller Chassis**



### *To Detect Opening the Chassis Cover*

1. Spanning the left side and rear of the chassis
2. Spanning the right side and rear of the chassis

### *To Detect the Removal of Any Module or Cover Plate*


3. Spanning the Slot 2 faceplate or blank and the top of the chassis
4. Spanning the Slot 3 faceplate or blank and the top of the chassis
5. Spanning the Slot 0 faceplate or blank and the Slot 2 faceplate or blank
6. Spanning the Slot 1 faceplate or blank and the Slot 3 faceplate or blank
7. Spanning the fan tray faceplate and the bottom of the chassis
8. Spanning the PS1 handle (or blank faceplate) and the bottom of the chassis
9. Spanning the PS2 handle (or blank faceplate) and the bottom of the chassis
10. Spanning the PS3 handle (or blank faceplate) and the bottom of the chassis

### *To Detect Access to Restricted Ports*

11. Spanning the Serial port on the M3

The Aruba 3000 series Controller require a minimum of 3 TELs to be applied as follows:

**Figure 5 - Required TELs for the Aruba 3000-series Controller**



### *To Detect Access to Restricted Port*

1. Spanning the Serial port

## To Detect Opening the Chassis Cover

2. Spanning the top of the faceplate and top of the chassis
3. Spanning the back and top of the chassis

## Applying TELs

The Crypto Officer should employ TELs as follows:

- Before applying a TEL, make sure the target surfaces are clean and dry.
- Do not cut, trim, punch, or otherwise alter the TEL.
- Apply the wholly intact TEL firmly and completely to the target surfaces.
- Press down firmly across the entire label surface, making several back-and-forth passes to ensure that the label securely adheres to the chassis.
- Ensure that TEL placement is not defeated by simultaneous removal of multiple modules.
- Allow 24 hours for the TEL adhesive seal to completely cure.
- Record the position and serial number of each applied TEL in a security log.

Once the TELs are applied, the Crypto Officer (CO) should perform initial setup and configuration as described in the next chapter.

## Ongoing Management

The Aruba 3000 and 6000/M3 Controllers meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements. The information below describes how to keep the controller in FIPS-approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer must ensure that the controller is kept in a FIPS-approved mode of operation.

## Crypto Officer Management

The Crypto Officer must ensure that the controller is always operating in a FIPS-approved mode of operation. This can be achieved by ensuring the following:

- FIPS mode must be enabled on the controller before Users are permitted to use the controller (see [“Enabling FIPS Mode” on page 37](#))
- The admin role must be root.
- Passwords must be at least eight characters long.
- VPN services can only be provided by IPsec or L2TP over IPsec.
- Access to the controller Web Interface is permitted only using HTTPS over a TLS tunnel. Basic HTTP and HTTPS over SSL are not permitted.
- Only SNMP read-only may be enabled.
- Only FIPS-approved algorithms can be used for cryptographic services (such as HTTPS, L2, AES-CBC, SSH, and IKEv1/IKEv2-IPSec), which include AES, Triple-DES bits (3 key Triple-DES only), SHA-1, HMAC SHA-1, and RSA signature and verification.
- TFTP can only be used to load backup and restore files. These files are: Configuration files (system setup configuration), the WMS database (radio network configuration), and log files. (FTP and TFTP over IPsec can be used to transfer configuration files.)
- The controller logs must be monitored. If a strange activity is found, the Crypto Officer should take the controller off line and investigate.
- The Tamper-Evident Labels (TELs) must be regularly examined for signs of tampering. The Crypto Officer shall be responsible for developing an inspection schedule in compliance with agency-specific policies.



- When installing expansion modules for the Aruba 6000, use only FIPS-approved modules, replace TELs affected by the change, and record the reason for the change, along with the new TEL locations and serial numbers, in the security log.
- The Crypto Officer shall not configure the Diffie-Hellman algorithm with 768-bits (Group 1) or 1024-bits (Group 2) in FIPS mode for IKEv1/IKEv2-IPSec and SSHv2.

## User Guidance

The User accesses the controller VPN functionality as an IPsec client. The user can also access the controller 802.11i functionality as an 802.11 client. Although outside the boundary of the controller, the User should be directed to be careful not to provide authentication information and session keys to others parties.

## Setup and Configuration

The Aruba 3000 and 6000/M3 Controllers meet FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements. The sections below describe how to place and keep the controller in FIPS-approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer (CO) must ensure that the controller is kept in a FIPS-approved mode of operation.

The controller can operate in two modes: the FIPS-approved mode, and the standard non-FIPS mode. By default, the controller operates in non-FIPS mode.

## Setting Up Your Controller

To set up your controller:

1. Make sure that the controller is not connected to any device on your network.
2. Boot up the controller.
3. Connect your PC or workstation to a line port on the controller.

For further details, see the ArubaOS 6.4 Quick Start Guide.

## Enabling FIPS Mode

For FIPS compliance, users cannot be allowed to access the controller until the CO changes the mode of operation to FIPS mode. There are two ways to enable FIPS mode:

- Use the WebUI
- Use the CLI

### Enabling FIPS Mode with the WebUI

The IP address of the controller will be set during initial setup of the controller, as described in the *ArubaOS 6.4 Quick Start Guide*. When you connect a PC or workstation to a line port on the controller, you can connect to this IP address through a Web browser.

To log in with the WebUI:

1. Open a Web browser and connect to `https://ip_address`.
2. Log in using the username/password set during the initial setup procedure.
3. Go to the **Configuration > Network > Controller > System Settings** page (the default page when you click the **Configuration** tab).
4. Click the **FIPS Mode for Controller Enable** checkbox.

### Enabling FIPS Mode with the CLI

Login to the controller using an SSHv2 client. After entering the “enable” command and supplying the enable secret (established during the initial setup procedure), enable FIPS mode using the following commands:

```
#configure terminal
Enter Configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z
(config) #fips enable
(config) #exit
#write memory
Saving Configuration...

Configuration Saved.
```

To verify that FIPS mode has been enabled, issue the command `show fips`.

## Disallowed FIPS Mode Configurations

When you enable FIPS mode, the following configuration options are disallowed:

- All WEP features
- WPA
- TKIP mixed mode
- Any combination of DES, MD5, and PPTP