

Protecting the Integrity of Internet Routing:

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Route Origin Validation

Volume A:
Executive Summary

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August 2018

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This publication is available free of charge from:
<https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/secure-inter-domain-routing>

1 Executive Summary

- 2 ▪ It is difficult to overstate the importance of the internet to modern business and to society in
3 general. The internet is essential to the exchange of all manner of information, including
4 transactional data, marketing and advertising information, remote access to services,
5 entertainment, and much more.
- 6 ▪ The internet is not a single network, but rather a complex grid of independent interconnected
7 networks. The design of the internet is based on a trust relationship between these
8 networks and relies on a protocol known as the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to route traffic
9 among the various networks worldwide. BGP is the protocol that internet service providers
10 (ISPs) and enterprises use to exchange route information between them.
- 11 ▪ Unfortunately, BGP was not designed with security in mind. Traffic typically traverses multiple
12 networks to get from its source to its destination. Networks implicitly trust the BGP information
13 that they receive from each other, making BGP vulnerable to route hijacks.
- 14 ▪ A route hijack attack can deny access to internet services, misdeliver traffic to malicious
15 endpoints, and cause routing instability. A technique known as BGP route origin validation (ROV)
16 is designed to protect against route hijacking.
- 17 ▪ The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) at the National Institute of Standards
18 and Technology (NIST) has developed proof-of-concept demonstrations of BGP ROV
19 implementation designed to improve the security of the internet’s routing infrastructure.
- 20 ▪ This NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide demonstrates how networks can protect BGP routes
21 from vulnerability to route hijacks by using available security protocols, products, and tools to
22 perform BGP ROV to reduce route hijacking threats. The example implementation described in
23 this guide aims to protect the integrity and improve the resiliency of internet traffic exchange by
24 verifying the source of the route.

25 CHALLENGE

26 Most of the routing infrastructure underpinning the internet currently lacks basic security services. In
27 most cases, internet traffic must transit multiple networks before reaching its destination. Each network
28 implicitly trusts other networks to provide (via BGP) the accurate information necessary to correctly
29 route traffic across the internet. When that information is inaccurate, traffic will take inefficient paths
30 through the internet, arrive at malicious sites that masquerade as legitimate destinations, or never
31 arrive at its intended destination. These impacts can be mitigated through a widespread adoption
32 of BGP ROV.

33 To date, ISPs and enterprises have been slow to adopt BGP ROV for reasons that include an
34 unavailability of detailed BGP ROV deployment, operation, and management guidelines, as well as
35 lingering concerns and questions about functionality, performance, availability, scalability, and policy
36 implications. These concerns need to be addressed so that potential users of BGP ROV can appreciate
37 the feasibility of using BGP ROV and the increased security that it can provide.

38 SOLUTION

39 The NCCoE Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) Project is improving internet security by demonstrating
40 how to use ROV to protect against route hijacks. The SIDR Project has produced a proof-of-concept
41 example that demonstrates the use of BGP ROV in realistic deployment scenarios, has developed
42 detailed deployment guidance, has addressed implementation and use issues, and has generated best
43 practices and lessons learned. Project results are presented in this publicly available NIST Cybersecurity
44 Practice Guide. This guide describes the following concepts:

- 45 ▪ security objectives that are supported by implementing BGP ROV that uses Resource Public Key
46 Infrastructure (RPKI) mechanisms
- 47 ▪ an example solution of methods and tools that demonstrate and enable a practical
48 implementation of BGP ROV
- 49 ▪ how to protect your own internet addresses from route hijacking by registering them with
50 trusted sources, thereby gaining assurance that traffic intended for your organization will not be
51 hijacked when it is forwarded by entities that perform BGP ROV
- 52 ▪ how to perform BGP ROV on received BGP route updates to validate, if possible, whether the
53 entity that originated the route is in fact authorized to do so
- 54 ▪ how to more precisely express your routing security requirements and/or service offerings

55 While the NCCoE used a suite of available products to address this challenge, this guide does not
56 endorse these particular products, nor does it guarantee compliance with any regulatory initiatives. Your
57 organization's information security experts should identify the products that will best integrate with
58 your existing tools and information technology (IT) system infrastructure. Your organization can adopt
59 this solution or one that adheres to these guidelines in whole, or you can use this guide as a starting
60 point for tailoring and implementing parts of a solution.

61 BENEFITS

62 The NCCoE's practice guide is intended to improve the security and stability of the global internet by
63 allowing networks to verify the validity of BGP routing information and strengthen the security and
64 stability of traffic flowing across the global internet—benefitting all organizations and individuals that
65 use and rely on it. This practice guide can help your organization:

- 66 ▪ reduce the number of internet outages due to BGP route hijacks
- 67 ▪ ensure that internet traffic reaches its destination
- 68 ▪ make informed decisions regarding routes and what actions to take in cases when BGP ROV
69 implementation has not been performed or has indicated that an advertised route is invalid

70 SHARE YOUR FEEDBACK

71 You can view or download the guide at [https://nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/secure-inter-](https://nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/secure-inter-domain-routing)
72 [domain-routing](https://nccoe.nist.gov/projects/building-blocks/secure-inter-domain-routing). Help the NCCoE make this guide better by sharing your thoughts with us as you read
73 the guide. If you adopt this solution for your own organization, please share your experience and advice
74 with us. We recognize that technical solutions alone will not fully enable the benefits of our solution, so

75 we encourage organizations to share lessons learned and best practices for transforming the
76 processes associated with implementing this guide.

77 To provide comments or to learn more by arranging a demonstration of this example
78 implementation, contact the NCCoE at sidr-nccoe@nist.gov.

79

80 TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS/COLLABORATORS

81 Organizations participating in this project submitted their capabilities in response to an open call in the
82 Federal Register for all sources of relevant security capabilities from academia and industry (vendors
83 and integrators). The following respondents with relevant capabilities or product components (identified
84 as “Technology Partners/Collaborators” herein) signed a Cooperative Research and Development
85 Agreement (CRADA) to collaborate with NIST in a consortium to build this example solution.



87 Certain commercial entities, equipment, products, or materials may be identified by name or company
88 logo or other insignia in order to acknowledge their participation in this collaboration or to describe an
89 experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply special
90 status or relationship with NIST or recommendation or endorsement by NIST or NCCoE; neither is it
91 intended to imply that the entities, equipment, products, or materials are necessarily the best available
92 for the purpose.

The National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE), a part of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is a collaborative hub where industry organizations, government agencies, and academic institutions work together to address businesses’ most pressing cybersecurity challenges. Through this collaboration, the NCCoE develops modular, easily adaptable example cybersecurity solutions demonstrating how to apply standards and best practices using commercially available technology.

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