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Security in a Computational Grid Environment

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Introduction

- The GRID Environment
 - Security issues for the GRID Environment
 - Its more than Client - Server!
 - Globus GSI
 - GSSAPI
 - Delegation - Proxy Certificates
 - Interfacing to local site security
 - GSI vs. Kerberos
 - Conclusions
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


The GRID Environment

- Multiple supercomputers
 - ◆ Each may have own job scheduler
 - Multiple organizations
 - ◆ DOE, DoD, NASA, NSF, Universities
 - User has accounts on each
 - ◆ Local control of resources
 - User runs a job across the GRID creating a virtual supercomputer
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A GRID Virtual Supercomputer





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Security Issues for GRID Environment

- Multiple Organizations
 - ◆ May not have MOUs, but user has accounts
 - Process to process communication
 - ◆ User's processes act as servers to other processes
 - ◆ Need authentication at least
 - ◆ Firewall issues
 - May need credentials for local resources such as DFS or AFS
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Its More than Client - Server!

- Processes start other processes
 - Processes act as servers
 - Process to process authentication, integrity, encryption
 - Local control of resources
 - Local security infrastructures
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Globus

- Enables the construction of networked virtual supercomputers
 - ◆ <http://www.globus.org>
 - Multiple Components - A toolkit
 - ◆ Scheduling, I/O, Naming Services ...
 - Security Component - GSI
 - ◆ Globus/Grid Security Infrastructure
 - ◆ Single sign-on
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Globus/Grid Security Infrastructure

- Globus Security adopted by Grid Forum and renamed to Grid Security Infrastructure
 - ◆ Widely adapted: DOE, DoD, NCSA, NPACI, NASA, among others
 - ◆ Installations on five continents
 - ◆ Globus CA in operation since 1998
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GSI Features

- Public key certificates X.509 (standard)
 - Multiple CAs
 - Commercial CAs
 - SSLv3 protocol (standard)
 - SSLeay or OpenSSL
 - Delegation
 - "Proxy" certificates - short term
 - U. S. export exemption
 - We also have encryption if you need it
 - GSSAPI implementation (standard)
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GSI Applications

- Globus
 - SSH mods for GSSAPI authentication
 - ◆ ssh-1.2.27
 - ◆ SecureCRT
 - Commercial SSH for Windows
 - FTP/FTPD - MIT gssftp, ncftp, wu-ftpd ...
 - Any other GSSAPI aware application
 - CORBA, SASL?
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


Delegation using Proxy Certificates



- Server creates key pair and certificate request, client signs request, returns certificate to server
 - Subject name + CommonName "proxy"
 - Passed by SSL in certificate chains
 - GSI will accept a proxy as the user
 - ◆ Verifies the certificate chain
 - Usable for process to process authentication
 - Limited delegation - continuing research
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Keys and Certificates



Key



Certificates



Proxy Files




U'' - /C=US/O=Globus/.../CN=Doug/CN=proxy/CN=proxy

U' - /C=US/O=Globus/.../CN=Doug/CN=proxy


U - /C=US/O=Globus/.../CN=Doug

CA - /C=US/O=Globus/.../CN=Certificate Authority


GSSAPI_SSLEAY - Proxy



GSSAPI_SSLEAY- Proxy



Local Site Authentication





Local Site Authorization

- Local accounts/username
 - ◆ Users arrange for this on their own
 - Control access by local site
 - ◆ Gatekeeper/SSHD/FTPD/Server uses grid-map file to map certificate subject name to local userid
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Interfacing to local site security infrastructures


- Kerberos, DCE and AFS
 - sslk5 - Use GSI certificates to get Kerberos ticket at local site Equivalent to PKINIT
 - K5cert uses Kerberos ticket to get short term certificate
 - Entrust
 - Generate "Proxy" certificate (NASA - proof of concept)
 - Secure-ID
 - SecureID gets Kerberos ticket
 - K5cert uses Kerberos ticket to get short term certificate
 - Smart cards
 - PKCS#11 (Demonstrated at SC98) Uses same DLL as Netscape on Win32
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K5cert to get a certificate

- K5cert authenticates to k5certd
 - ◆ User has Kerberos TGT:
 - ◆ b17783@dce.anl.gov
 - K5certd acts as a CA
 - ◆ /C=US/O=Argonne National Laboratory/OU=Kerberos Realm
dce.anl.gov/CN=Certificate Authority
 - Issues certificate:
 - ◆ /C=US/O=Argonne National Laboratory/OU=Kerberos Realm
dce.anl.gov/CN=b17783@dce.anl.gov
 - Certificate lifetime = ticket lifetime
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Local Site Authentication and user to user





GSI vs. Kerberos GSSAPI

- Certificate subject name
 - /O=Grid/O=Globus/CN=Doug Engert
 - /O=.../CN=host/cpu.anl.gov
 - Grid-proxy-init
 - Key and Certificate
 - Delegation
 - Proxy (key and certificate)
 - CA (offline)
 - Process-to-process - YES
 - CRL
 - Principal name
 - b17783@dce.anl.gov
 - host/cpu.anl.gov@dce.anl.gov
 - kinit
 - password or v5srvtab
 - Forwarding
 - Forwarded tickets
 - KDC - online
 - User-to-user - Almost
 - Online KDC
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Conclusions

- GSI is becoming widely accepted
 - GSI uses well established security protocol
 - GSI uses standard GSSAPI
 - GSI can interface to current site security
 - Delegation, across Kerberos and GSI
 - Process -to-process authentication
 - Local authorization and accounting
 - Single sign-on
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The End