Published: October 14, 2009
Author(s)
Karen Scarfone, Peter Mell
Conference
Name: 5th International Workshop on Security Measurements and Metrics, 2009 (MetriSec 2009)
Dates: October 14, 2009
Location: Lake Buena Vista, Florida, United States
Citation: 2009 3rd International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement, ESEM (ESEM 2009), pp. 516-525
Announcement
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a specification for measuring the relative severity of software vulnerabilities. Finalized in 2007, CVSS version 2 was designed to address deficiencies found during analysis and use of the original CVSS version. This paper analyzes how effectively CVSS version 2 addresses these deficiencies and what new deficiencies it may have. This analysis is based primarily on an experiment that applied both version 1 and version 2 scoring to a large set of recent vulnerabilities. Theoretical characteristics of version 1 and version 2 scores were also examined. The results show that the goals for the changes were met, but that some changes had a negligible effect on scoring while complicating the scoring process. The changes also had unintended effects on organizations that prioritize vulnerability remediation based primarily on CVSS scores.
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a specification for measuring the relative severity of software vulnerabilities. Finalized in 2007, CVSS version 2 was designed to address deficiencies found during analysis and use of the original CVSS version. This paper analyzes how effectively...
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The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a specification for measuring the relative severity of software vulnerabilities. Finalized in 2007, CVSS version 2 was designed to address deficiencies found during analysis and use of the original CVSS version. This paper analyzes how effectively CVSS version 2 addresses these deficiencies and what new deficiencies it may have. This analysis is based primarily on an experiment that applied both version 1 and version 2 scoring to a large set of recent vulnerabilities. Theoretical characteristics of version 1 and version 2 scores were also examined. The results show that the goals for the changes were met, but that some changes had a negligible effect on scoring while complicating the scoring process. The changes also had unintended effects on organizations that prioritize vulnerability remediation based primarily on CVSS scores.
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Keywords
vulnerabilities; vulnerability scoring
Control Families
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