Published: August 09, 2010
Author(s)
Stefan Popoveniuc, John Kelsey, Andrew Regenscheid, Poorvi Vora
Conference
Name: 2010 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/ Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE '10)
Dates: August 9-10, 2010
Location: Washington, DC, United States
Citation: Proceedings of the 2010 International Conference on Electronic Voting Technology/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE '10), pp. 1-16
Announcement
The term "end-to-end verifiability" has been used over the past several years to describe multiple voting system proposals. The term has, however, never been formally defined. As a result, its meaning tends to change from voting system to voting system. We propose a definition for end-to-end verifiability of public elections based on performance requirements, as opposed to design requirements. We suggest a set of properties that collectively define the term. The properties help detect some of the possible problems that may influence the integrity of the election outcome.
The term "end-to-end verifiability" has been used over the past several years to describe multiple voting system proposals. The term has, however, never been formally defined. As a result, its meaning tends to change from voting system to voting system. We propose a definition for end-to-end...
See full abstract
The term "end-to-end verifiability" has been used over the past several years to describe multiple voting system proposals. The term has, however, never been formally defined. As a result, its meaning tends to change from voting system to voting system. We propose a definition for end-to-end verifiability of public elections based on performance requirements, as opposed to design requirements. We suggest a set of properties that collectively define the term. The properties help detect some of the possible problems that may influence the integrity of the election outcome.
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Keywords
cryptography; end-to-end voting system; voting; voting system
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