Published: June 21, 2013
Author(s)
Ray Perlner, Daniel Smith
Conference
Name: Fifth International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto 2013)
Dates: June 4-7, 2013
Location: Limoges, France
Citation: Post-Quantum Cryptography, Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol. 7932, pp. 165-173
Announcement
Multivariate Public Key Cryptography(MPKC) has become one of a few options for security in the quantum model of computing. Though a few multivariate systems have resisted years of effort from the cryptanalytic community, many such systems have fallen to a surprisingly small pool of techniques. There have been several recent attempts at formalizing more robust security arguments in this venue with varying degrees of applicability. We present an extension of one such recent measure of security against a differential adversary which has the benefit of being immediately applicable in a general setting on unmodified multivariate schemes.
Multivariate Public Key Cryptography(MPKC) has become one of a few options for security in the quantum model of computing. Though a few multivariate systems have resisted years of effort from the cryptanalytic community, many such systems have fallen to a surprisingly small pool of techniques. There...
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Multivariate Public Key Cryptography(MPKC) has become one of a few options for security in the quantum model of computing. Though a few multivariate systems have resisted years of effort from the cryptanalytic community, many such systems have fallen to a surprisingly small pool of techniques. There have been several recent attempts at formalizing more robust security arguments in this venue with varying degrees of applicability. We present an extension of one such recent measure of security against a differential adversary which has the benefit of being immediately applicable in a general setting on unmodified multivariate schemes.
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Keywords
differential; Matsumoto-Imai; multivariate public key cryptography; symmetry
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