Published: October 01, 2014
Author(s)
Taylor Daniels (University of Louisville), Daniel Smith-Tone (NIST)
Conference
Name: 6th International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto 2014)
Dates: October 1-3, 2014
Location: Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
Citation: Post-Quantum Cryptography, Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol. 8772, pp. 59-75
Announcement
Multivariate Public Key Cryptography (MPKC) has been put forth as a possible post-quantum family of cryptographic schemes. These schemes lack provable security in the reduction theoretic sense, and so their security against yet undiscovered attacks remains uncertain. The effectiveness of differential attacks on various field-based systems has prompted the investigation of differential properties of multivariate schemes to determine the extent to which they are secure from differential adversaries. Due to its role as a basis for both encryption and signature schemes we contribute to this investigation focusing on the HFE cryptosystem. We derive the differential symmetric and invariant structure of the HFE central map and that of HFE − and provide a collection of parameter sets which make these HFE systems provably secure against a differential symmetric or differential invariant attack.
Multivariate Public Key Cryptography (MPKC) has been put forth as a possible post-quantum family of cryptographic schemes. These schemes lack provable security in the reduction theoretic sense, and so their security against yet undiscovered attacks remains uncertain. The effectiveness of...
See full abstract
Multivariate Public Key Cryptography (MPKC) has been put forth as a possible post-quantum family of cryptographic schemes. These schemes lack provable security in the reduction theoretic sense, and so their security against yet undiscovered attacks remains uncertain. The effectiveness of differential attacks on various field-based systems has prompted the investigation of differential properties of multivariate schemes to determine the extent to which they are secure from differential adversaries. Due to its role as a basis for both encryption and signature schemes we contribute to this investigation focusing on the
HFE cryptosystem. We derive the differential symmetric and invariant structure of the
HFE central map and that of
HFE − and provide a collection of parameter sets which make these
HFE systems provably secure against a differential symmetric or differential invariant attack.
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Keywords
MPKC; cryptostystem; HFE-; systems; differential properties
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