Published: November 29, 2011
Author(s)
Daniel Smith-Tone (NIST)
Conference
Name: 4th International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto 2011)
Dates: 11/29/2011 - 12/02/2011
Location: Taipei, Taiwan
Citation: Post-Quantum Cryptography, vol. 7071, pp. 130-142
Since the discovery of an algorithm for factoring and computing discrete logarithms in polynomial time on a quantum computer, the cryptographic community has been searching for an alternative for security in the approaching post-quantum world. One excellent candidate is multivariate public key cryptography. Though the speed and parameterizable nature of such schemes is desirable, a standard metric for determining the security of a multivariate cryptosystem has been lacking. We present a reasonable measure for security against the common differential attacks and derive this measurement for several modern multivariate public key cryptosystems.
Since the discovery of an algorithm for factoring and computing discrete logarithms in polynomial time on a quantum computer, the cryptographic community has been searching for an alternative for security in the approaching post-quantum world. One excellent candidate is multivariate public key...
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Since the discovery of an algorithm for factoring and computing discrete logarithms in polynomial time on a quantum computer, the cryptographic community has been searching for an alternative for security in the approaching post-quantum world. One excellent candidate is multivariate public key cryptography. Though the speed and parameterizable nature of such schemes is desirable, a standard metric for determining the security of a multivariate cryptosystem has been lacking. We present a reasonable measure for security against the common differential attacks and derive this measurement for several modern multivariate public key cryptosystems.
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Keywords
Matsumoto-Imai; multivariate public key cryptography; differential; symmetry
Control Families
None selected
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