#### NIST Cryptographic Standards Program

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## NIST Cryptographic Standards

 First Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) in Cryptography in 1977

- FIPS 46, The Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- Mandatory for Federal use of cryptography to protect unclassified, sensitive data
  - FIPS 140-2
- Standardize a set of strong cryptographic tools
  - Can't test and approve every good algorithm/method
    - Too expensive to study each one
  - Too many would confound interoperability

# Crypto Standards Toolkit

- Standardized, best of breed solutions for
  - Encryption
    - algorithms
    - modes
  - Message authentication
  - Digital signature
  - Hashing
  - Key generation
    - deterministic (pseudorandom) generators
    - nondeterministic (hardware) generators
    - key derivation
  - Key management
    - wrapping
    - agreement



### Toolkit Advantages

#### • FIPS 140-2 product testing

- CMVP Laboratory validation testing
- Known answer testing for many of the tools
- Confidence in the security of the tools
  - Carefully evaluated and monitored
- Interoperability and acceptance
  - Tools very widely implemented and used
  - Seen as the safe choice
- Use by Federal agencies often required

#### Sources of Standards & Recommendations

- Public submissions with NIST selection
   DES, AES, new crypto modes
- Standards Bodies
  - ANSI-X9
    - TDES, Diffie-Hellman, ECDSA and ECDH, DSA (sorta), RSA variants
  - IETF
    - HMAC
    - perhaps eventually PKIX, TLS, S/MIME, IKE....
- NSA
  - DSA, SHAxxx, proposed AES Key Wrap

## Cryptographic Standards



### **Comparable Strengths**

Size in bits

Sym. Key	56	80	112	128	192	256
Hash	10	50	24	56	384	512
MAC	64	160	24	56	384	512
RSA/DSA	512	1k	2k	3k	7.5k	15k
EC	160		224	256	384	512

Sym. Key: Symmetric key encryption algorithms MAC: Message Authentication code Pub. Key: Factoring or discrete log based public key algorithms EC: Elliptic Curve based public key algorithms White background: currently approved FIPS Yellow background: under development Black background: not secure now

## NIST Crypto Standards Status

	56	80	112	128	192	256		
Sym. Key	46-3	185	46-3	FIPS 197 (AES)				
Modes		81		SP 800-38-A				
Hash	18	0-1	180-2					
MAC	FIPS 198 (HMAC)							
RSA, DSA,	186-2		186-3					
EC-DSA								
DH/RSA	Key Management FIPS:							
EC-DH	Scheme and Guidance							
White: FIPS approvedYellow: draft in progressRed: working draft phasegray: initial recommendation published, more toBlack: no longer secureFinitial recommendation published, more to								

## Modes of Operation Recommendation

- SP 800-38A 2001 ED, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, 2001
  - update of FIPS 81
  - 5 modes
    - ECB
    - CBC
    - CFB
    - OFB
    - Counter
- Generalized for any block cipher

#### Submitted Modes

- Total of 17 Modes submitted
- Message authentication seemed most urgent
  - Problems with CBC MAC
    - Extension and collision attacks
  - Originally proposed to limit CBC MAC to fixed size or known size messages
    - Didn't make anybody happy



## RMAC

- Proposed NIST Special Publication 800-38B, The RMAC Authentication Mode
  - submitted by E. Jaulmes, A. Joux, & F. Valette
    - DCSSI Crypto Lab
  - comments to EncryptionModes@nist.gov by 12/02/02
  - resists "general forgery" & "extension forgery" attacks
  - parameters:
    - *k*, the keysize of the encryption algorithm
    - *b*, the blocksize of the encryption algorithm
    - *m*, the length of the MAC
    - r, the size of R, a per message random salt
  - define five parameter sets for b=128 and 2 for b=64
    - Most are roughly "balanced" wrt "general forgery" and "extension forgery" attacks

#### Next Modes?

- Counter with CBC-MAC mode
  - appears destined to be mandatory to implement in 802.11
- AES Key Wrap
  - encryption mode or or key management scheme?



## Key Management

- Key Management
  - Workshop in November 2001
  - Schemes document
    - missing part is RSA
      - Bert Kaliski & Russ Housley
        - » Proof of security of TLS with RSA
        - » Simple RSA per per Shoup for endgame
  - Guidance document: hard to scope, many issues
  - Proposed 80-bit crypto end of use date: 2015
  - http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/tkkeymgmt.html

#### e-Authentication

- 24 Projects
  - President's Management Agenda
  - E-Sign and Paperwork Elimination acts
  - Intense OMB interest
  - Concept of authentication gateway
    - Password authentication
- NIST doing technical guidance on e-Authentication
  - Success of 802.11 complicates this
    - Access point authentication
      - Man-in-the-middle used to be harder
    - Eavesdropping is more probable

### 802.11 Issues

- Authentication
  - Theft of service
  - Active attacks inside Government LANs
  - Broader implications for business and citizen e-Authentication
    - more passwords through tunnels
      - rogue APs
      - man-in-the middle
- Confidentiality
  - Need "FIPS quality" encryption

#### Questions





## Crypto FIPS

- FIPS 46-3, Data Encryption Standard -1999
  - refers to ANSI X9.52-1998 for triple DES
  - expect to kill 56-bit DES with 46-4 due in 94
    - http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/TDESGuidance.pdf
- FIPS 81, DES Modes of Operation 1980
- FIPS 113, Computer Data Authentication 1985
   DES MAC for financial apps.
- FIPS 117, Key Management using ANSI X9.17
   being withdrawn
- FIPS 180-2, Secure Hash Standard 2002

– SHA1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512

## Crypto FIPS

- FIPS 185, Escrowed Encryption Alg. 1994
   Skipjack
- FIPS 186-2, Digital Signature Standard
  DSS, RSA: X9.31 & PKCS#1, ECDSA: X9.62
- FIPS 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 2001
- FIPS 198, HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code, 2002

## Links

- NIST Cryptographic Toolkit – http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/
- AES
  - http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/
- Modes of Operation
  - http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/modes/
- Key Management
  - http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/tkkeymgmt.html
- Cryptographic Module Validation
  - http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/